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ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND LABOUR MIGRATION
IN CENTRAL MOZAMBIQUE, 1980-1995: A
CASE STUDY OF MANICA PROVINCE

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SOAS - UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

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**Economy, Society and Labour Migration in Central Mozambique, 1930- c.1965: A
case study of Manica province.**


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ABSTRACT

ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND LABOUR MIGRATION IN CENTRAL MOZAMBIQUE, 1930- c.1965: THE CASE STUDY OF MANICA PROVINCE.

My thesis deals with the social and economic history of central Mozambique, in particular Manica province. The main purpose of the study is to explain and analyse the causes and processes through which central Mozambique was gradually integrated into the regional economy and transformed into a labour reserve for Southern Rhodesia's mines and commercial farms. In particular, the thesis explores the socio-economic implications of labour migration for rural life in Manica and examines the different forms of collective organisation and political consciousness amongst Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia between 1930 and 1960s.

The thesis is structured into four sections. The introductory section provides the overview of the independent local kingdoms of Manica and Quiteve. The first part of the section examines the impact of mercantile capital before the nineteenth century and the influence of the Gaza-Nguni between 1830s and 1890s. The second part, analyses colonial conquest and the political economy of the Mozambique Company and labour migration before the 1930s.

The second section, concentrates on the colonial years of 1930 and 1965, and discusses the unsuccessful attempts of the undercapitalised Portuguese economy to attract and stabilise local African labour. African households responded to the market economy through producing maize, wheat and cotton cash crops.

The third section investigates the different ways youth and adult males incorporated migrancy into rural society in Manica district, particularly its role in the process of the emergence and consolidation of African peasantry, as well as the improvement of their standard of living and the education of their children. The last section analyses the process through which Mozambican migrants established proto-nationalist organisations and developed various forms of political consciousness in Southern Rhodesia.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Manuela, my son Dércio and my daughter Vânia who patiently bore the pain of my absence during the period of my study.

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I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to the Eduardo Mondlane University for granting me permission to have this rare opportunity to pursue my studies at SOAS. I am particularly indebted to the following:

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Last but not least, I am grateful to my friends particularly those I met while conducting my studies for providing an enabling environment without which my student life would not have been easy. The list is long but without prejudice, I would like to recognise the following: Professor Richard Rathbone, Professor Jeanne Penvenne, Professor Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, Professor Gerhard Liesegang, Dr. Jocelyn Alexander, Dr. Maria Inês Nogueira da Costa, Dr. Teresa Cruz-Silva, Dr. António Sopa, Dr. Luís Covane, Dr. Arlindo Chilundo, Dr. Martinho Dgedge, Alexandre Mate, Rafael Sitei, Augusto Nascimento, Pedro Machado, Sandra Ferreira and Darlene Mutalemwa.

ABBREVIATIONS

- AHM: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique – Mozambique National Archives
- BO: Boletim Oficial – Official Bulletin
- BSAC: British South Africa Company
- BSEM: Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique – Mozambique Studies Association
- BSGL: Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa – Lisbon Geography Association Bulletin
- CEA: Centro de Estudos Africanos – Centre of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University (Maputo)
- CEM-AM: Conselho Executivo de Manica (Arquivo Morto) – Manica Administrative Council Collection
- CX: Caixa - Box containing archival documents
- CYL: Rhodesian City Youth League
- FACC: Fundo da Administração do Conselho de Manica – Manica District Collection
- FCM: Fundo da Companhia de Moçambique – The Mozambique Company Collection
- FDSNI: Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços dos Negócios Indígenas – Native Affairs Department Collection
- FDSAC: Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços da Administração Civil - Administrative Services Collection
- FGDB: Fundo do Governo do Distrito da Beira – Beira District Collection
- FGG: Fundo do Governo Geral – Governor-General Collection
- FNI: Fundo dos Negócios Indígenas – Native Affairs Department Collection
- FRELIMO: Frente de Libertação de Moçambique - Mozambique Liberation Front (Mozambique's Ruling Party)
- ICS: Institute of Commonwealth Studies

ISANI: Inspeção dos Serviços Administrativos e Negócios Indígenas – Administrative Services and Native Affairs Inspection

ITPAS: Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social – Institute of Labour and Social Welfare

JEAC: Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial – Colonial Cotton Export Board

M.A.: Master of Arts

MANC: Mozambique African National Congress

MANU: Mozambique-Makonde National Union

NDP: National Democratic Union (Rhodesia)

PAFMECA: Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa

Ph. D.: Doctor of Philosophy

PIDE: Polícia Internacional da Defesa do Estado – Portuguese Intelligence/ Secret Police

RNLB: Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau

RNLSC: Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission

RTI: Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indígenas – Native Labour Regulations

SE: Secção Especial - Special Section of the Mózambique National Archives

SHER: Sociedade Hidro-eléctrica do Revue – Revue Hydroelectric Company (Manica)

SRANC: Southern Rhodesia African National Congress

SOALPO: Sociedade Algodoeira de Portugal – The Portuguese Cotton Company

SOAS: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

UEM: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane – Eduardo Mondlane University

UNAMI: National African Union of Independent Mozambique

WNLA: The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association



GLOSSARY

Assimilados: Africans or mixed-people who enjoyed Portuguese citizenship and the so-called civilised people.

Agricultor: African progressive farmer.

Banjas: Gathering meetings.

Caderneta Indígena: Pass Book.

Cantineiro: Shopkeeper; and cantina means shop.

Capatazes: Administrative overseers especially in cotton growing areas.

Capulana: Pieces of clothes.

Chibalo : Forced labour

Circumscrição: Territorial administrative division for the native and the so-called non-civilised people.

Colonato: State sponsored settlement scheme.

Colono: Colonist or Portuguese settler

Concelho: Territorial administrative division for the European and the so-called civilised people.

Concentrações algodoeiras: Cotton cluster system.

Contribuição braçal: Additional native tax equivalent to five days work per year.

Djangano: Intra-homestead co-operation (work parties).

Escudo: Monetary unit in Portugal and in Mozambique until 1980.

Gore re ndongue: Severe famine caused by locust in chi-Manica.

Iche: Local designation of village's chief.

Machambeiro: farmer.

Mambo: Local designation of village's Chief; also called regulos in colonial administration.

Mhuri: Homestead in chi-Manica.

Mukhuro or Sekhuru: Head of homestead in chi-Manica.

Mutwirika: Granaries for maize storage.

Ndongue: Locust in chi-Manica.

Ruralato: African community complexes, especially in cotton growing areas.

Sabhuku: Local designation of headmen.

Shângua: Drought in chi-Manica.

Shitikinane: Juvenil certificate in colonial Zimbabwe.


Shuma: bridewealth in chi-Manica.

Sipaio: African police.

Situpa: Native identification card in Colonial Zimbabwe.


Thangata: Local designation of forced labour in Manica.

MOZAMBIQUE




Map 1: Mozambique


MANICA PROVINCE




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Map 2: Manica Province




Map 3: Manica Province Landscap




Map 4: Manica District in 1890

MANICA AND "REGULADOS"




Map 5: Manica District and *Regulados*

AFRICAN RESERVES IN MANICA DISTRICT




Map 6: African Reserves in Manica District

CROP CULTIVATION AREAS



Map 7: Manica District: Crop cultivation areas, 1940-1960s



Map 8: White farms in northern Chimoio District, 1950-1960s



Map 9: White farms in southern Chimoio District, 1950-1960s

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

My thesis deals with the social and economic history of central Mozambique, in particular Manica province. The main purpose of the study is to explain and analyse the causes and processes through which central Mozambique was gradually integrated into the regional economy and transformed into a labour reserve for Southern Rhodesia's mines and commercial farms. In particular, the thesis explores the socio-economic implications of labour migration for rural life in Manica and examines the different forms of collective organisation and political consciousness amongst Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia between 1930 and the 1960s. The period selected for this study is demarcated by the framework of Portuguese colonial economic policy.

Even now, labour migration from central Mozambique plays a vital role for both commercial farms in Zimbabwe and rural life in the bordering areas of Manica province. Migrant labour to Southern Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe) was one of the main characteristics of Mozambique's colonial economic history and it reflected several endogenous social, political, economic and ecological factors. The conflict over the labour resources in southern Africa increased Rhodesia dependency, especially that of its commercial farms, on the labour of Mozambican men, women, children and youth throughout the period 1930-1965.

The border character of Manica province and its feeble economic development, the absence of attractive cash-earning alternatives, as well as forced contract labour with low wages and the deferred pay system, taxation and the fragile commercial network in its rural villages, all played an important role in stimulating out-migration. No less important were drought, plagues, locusts and termites which all contributed at times to increasing migration. Poverty and the lack of schools in rural Manica also prompted children and juveniles to migrate to Southern Rhodesia. However, migration did not necessarily mean resistance to adverse circumstances in Manica, there were always adults and juveniles who deliberately chose employment in the more attractive labour market in Southern Rhodesia in order to earn money for bridewealth and to buy agricultural implements and other commodities. Juveniles and children also migrated in

search of wage employment and education facilities, whether in farm schools or mission stations.

In general my analysis of the social and economic impact of migrant labour on the African economy concentrates on Manica district within Manica province. I have selected this district because it was intensively involved with labour migration and developed strong economic ties with Southern Rhodesia from the last decades of nineteenth century. By choosing Manica province I hope to be able to compare Manica, Chimoio and Mossurize districts so as to understand the economic dynamic and role of Manica district within the province. The choice of Manica is also due to its relatively vigorous colonial economy and the proximity of Beira city, with its relatively large white population, and its potential market for Manica crops. Moreover, Manica is crossed by the 'Beira corridor', a system of railway lines, roads and pipelines, which gave Southern Rhodesia access to Beira's harbour within a distance of about 170 miles.

My interest in this study was initially motivated by my own experience as a teacher at pre-university night school and later on at Eduardo Mondlane University and other local colleges in Maputo, where I taught the history of Mozambique and southern Africa. Given the concentration of historical research on southern Mozambique and a handful of works on the foreign companies in central Mozambique, trying to teach a balanced history of Mozambique was always a great challenge. In fact, the modern colonial history of central and northern Mozambique still lags behind its southern counterpart. In response, I started developing research on Tete and Manica provinces. My background in southern African history more generally also stimulated insights into the economic connections between central Mozambique and Zimbabwe, at time when historical knowledge about those connections was deduced from the more general history of Zimbabwe and Monomotapa, and the history of rebellion and primary resistance to colonial conquest.

Many of my essays as an undergraduate student at Eduardo Mondlane University in the early 1980s, were on the economic and political connections between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. I was also very much influenced by the political atmosphere of that period as Mozambique engaged with Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. During my studies for the Master's degree in Maputo, I increasingly concentrated on the social and economic

history of central Mozambique. After I completed my MA dissertation on Tete labour migration to Southern Rhodesia in 1990, I decided to look more closely at the social and economic impact of migration on the African communities. However, at that time the civil war prevented me from doing oral interviews in the area. With the cease-fire and peace agreement between the Mozambican government and RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance Movement) in Rome October 4, 1992, I was encouraged to travel to Tete and Manica for exploratory research.

In 1993 and 1994, I made two visits of about twenty days each to Tete and Manica provinces and managed to conduct a few interviews with peasants, former teachers, civil servants and local chiefs. This was also the first time I came into physical contact with those provinces, whose local vernacular I did not understand. I had to rely heavily on my assistants who, in most cases, were members of the FRELIMO's *Grupo Dinamizador*, or local teachers. However, oral testimonies and some archival sources from the Mozambique National Archives, enabled me to design a research proposal for my Ph.D. programme at SOAS. The academic environment which I enjoyed at SOAS in 1994/95 provided me with useful methodological tools to reassess my archival sources and the oral interviews which I had conducted in 1996 largely in Manica province and to lesser extent in Zimbabwe. After this field-research I decided to concentrate more on Manica rather than Tete province. Unlike Manica, Tete province, in particular its southwestern border area (Zumbo, Magoé, Chicoa and Changara) has lagged behind in its market centres, and has consequently stagnated economically. Furthermore, the province lacked communications and transport, and white settlement was practically non-existent.

Manica province is located in the centre-west of Mozambique, and borders Zimbabwe in the west, Tete district in the north, Sofala district in the east and Inhambane district in the south. [MAP] Ethnically, the region is inhabited by Shona-speaking peoples, generally subdivided into the Ndau in the south, the Mateve in the centre and the Manyika in the western region and across the border, while the northern section is settled by the Barue. All groups have a patrilineal kinship system. In colonial times, Manica province comprised three main districts (*circumscrições*): Chimoio (including Mandigos then Vila Pery, Gondola, Zembe and Bandula) with a land area of about

8000km²; Manica (including Macequece, Moribane then Mavita, Rotanda, Dombe, and Mavonde) with about 10,000km²; Mossurize (including Espungabera, Machaze and Gogoi) with about 17,000km². This study does not include the Bárue district, which was variably integrated into either the Manica or Tete provinces. In this study I will variably use Manica as a name of a district (*ex-circumscrição* or *concelho*) or when referring to the province of Manica which includes Chimoio and Mossurize districts. When in June 1891 the international western boundary between Mozambique and Zimbabwe was established, Manica was already one of Mozambique's ten districts, as Paiva de Andrada pointed out in 1891:

At the present day the name of Manica is not only applied to the ancient kingdom of that name, of which Mutasa is king, but also to an extensive territory which, by a decree published in 1884, was constituted one of the ten districts of the province of Mozambique, and which includes this kingdom, as also the region to the northward as far as the Zambeze.¹

The international boundary between Mozambique and Zimbabwe follows a range of mountains of Manica highlands, through Penhalonga in the north, and Vumba and Chimanimani in the centre and south respectively. Lying on the Rhodesian plateau, Manica is enclosed by the Pungué river in the north and the Save river in south. Two other main rivers, the Revuè and the Buzi, and various streams (especially the Zambuzi, Munene, Chimeze, Inhamucarara, Messica, Messambuzi, Mavuzi, Honde, Zonué, Vanduzi, Lucite and Mussapa) also traverse it. The main rivers descend from the escarpment of the Rhodesian plateau and cross the territory to the Indian Ocean. In their journey to the sea, particularly when the rains cause floods, the rivers silt up its valleys. The valleys of the Revuè and Chimeze rivers contained plenty of alluvial gold, and the South African Gold Dredging Company also used the Chimeze River to generate hydroelectric power in the early twentieth century.² In the early 1950s the Revue River was very important for irrigation and for generating electrical power.

The plateau's altitude varies from about 1500-3000m in the areas bordering of Mossurize (Espungabera - Chimanimani) and Manica (Penhalonga and Vumba) to 200/500-1000m in the central and eastern areas, particularly Chimoio. Climatic

¹J.Paiva de Andrada, Manica Being a Report Addressed to the Minister of the Marine and the Colonies of Portugal, (London, Philip, 1891), 21-22.

²See M.M. Cairnacross, "A região de Manica", Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de

conditions are in general good, with two distinct seasons: dry and cold from May to September (tropical winter); and hot, humid and rainy from October/November to March/April. The annual rainfall average varies between 700-800mm. However, in a very good season (sometimes with storms and floods) the annual precipitation reaches more than 1500mm. The annual average temperature is 20°C-22°C, with the minimum temperature in winter around 7°C-13°C, and the maximum in summer between 25°C-30°C.³ Due to its climatic irregularity, as is common in tropical Africa, Manica province sometimes experiences severe droughts, particularly in the flat midlands where the streams dry up completely. The climate on the highlands is cooler and the rainfall higher and more reliable than in the valley.

Although there are regional variations, its soils and environmental conditions are favourable for agriculture, hunting, forestry and mining. The upland area in the extreme west and the river valleys which drain the area are highly fertile and capable of supporting a large population. The physical characteristics of Macequece (the first headquarters of Manica district) was described by the British Geographical section of the Naval Intelligence as a territory of both physical interest and political importance. "This is a depression some 6-8 miles wide, lying between the two prominent summits of Vumba on the south and Venga on the north; the depression contains the head water of the Revue and its tributary the Munene".⁴ Moreover, Mossurize, whose ecological potential was fundamental for the settlement of the Gaza-Nguni homesteads, was described by St. Erskine in the nineteenth century as follows:

One thing that disagreeably impresses the traveler is the height and size of the grass growing on the slopes. So high, in fact is it, that no view can ever be obtained of the country, and it forms quite an arched way, under which you pass along, opening a path with your stick and hands; the grass seeds like javelins, descend in showers, and fill your clothes...In fact, a country more adapted to easy conquest by Europeans could scarcely be found; and when once on the plateau a climate superior to that of Europe prevails.⁵

Lisboa, 24, (1906), 23.

³See also José de Oliveira Boléo, *Geografia Física de Moçambique*, (Lisbon, 1950).

⁴See *A Manual of Portuguese East Africa*, I.D.1189, Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, (London, 1920), 43.

⁵See St. Vincent Erskine, "Journey to Umzila's South-East Africa, in 1871-1872", especially appendix A (Ancient travels) *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, vol.45, 1875, 98,104.

With the exception of the southern part of the territory (Mossurize) which was infested by tsetse fly, the ecological conditions in general were good for herding cattle and goats, although red locusts, rats, ants and other insects very often imposed agricultural constraints amongst local people throughout the territory. The destructive effects of ants has also been described by the British Geographical section of the Naval Intelligence as follows:

Ants are numerous and destructive; the so-called 'warrior' ant marches in serried ranks, ten or twelve abreast and often thirty or forty yards or more in length, covering everything that is on its line of march and eating and biting as it goes. The white ant or termite builds anthills up to 15 ft. high, and is especially destructive of the timbers of houses.⁶

During my field-research in Manica I had the opportunity to witness the devastating effects of locusts on food crops. In 1993, Manica and Sofala provinces were severely affected by green locusts which people also used for food. Further, in 1996 I again witnessed the invasion of the most feared red locust plague. In addition, my first visit to those areas coincided with a period of severe drought in southern Africa, and saw how people struggled to survive the harsh effects of civil war and natural calamities. This important experience provided me with the background to reassess their past colonial history. Years of severe drought, locusts and famine are well registered in oral tradition and have their specific designations.

From 1913 onwards Mozambique and Zimbabwe established labour agreements in order to supply Mozambican labour for mines and farms through the Rhodesian labour agencies, namely the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) and the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC). Under the 1913 agreement, Southern Rhodesian authorities could recruit a maximum of 15,000 labourers under one-year contracts lasting. Although, recruitment was not allowed in Manica by the Mozambique Company, a great number of illegal migrants (men, women and children) crossed the border from Manica to neighbouring Rhodesian plantations for permanent or seasonal work.

⁶ See A Manual of Portuguese East Africa, 85.

In addition, in the 1930s and 1940s, the Rhodesian authorities encouraged clandestine migration by establishing a Free Migrant Transport System (*Ulere*) and lorry stations along the border with Mozambique. Mission schools, health centres and stores along the border also attracted the Mozambican out-flow. This tendency persisted throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1950s the number of Mozambican workers in Southern Rhodesia were estimated at about 200,000. The flow of labour only began to diminish in the mid-1960s when Rhodesian industry ceased to contract foreign labour because a surplus of cheap internal labour was available for the first time. However, Mozambican labour remained important to the farming sector which was more dependent on that 'free flow' of cheaper labour, particularly from Manica.

With the independence of Mozambique in 25 June 1975, some migrants returned home while others remained divided between the two territories. In this group there were some pensioners and businessmen who had settled in Southern Rhodesia and acquired Rhodesian nationality. Others were began to transfer their businesses from Rhodesia to Mozambique and were exploring the possibilities of establishing business in their newly independent homeland. However, this dream which never came to fruition both because of the socialist ideology of the ruling party which inhibited private business and also because of the war which devastated the country for about sixteen years after independence.

In March 1976, Mozambican government joined the international economic sanctions against Rhodesia and closed its border posts and stopped railways connections between the two territories. As the 'Beira-Umtali corridor' (railways and road) crossed Manica province and played vital role in its economy, the international sanctions had prejudicial effects on Manica's economic and social life. The Rhodesian aggression further undermined the local economic situation as it destroyed the fragile existing infrastructure and villages. However, many young Mozambicans responded to the Rhodesian aggression by joining the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.

After the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the civil war (1976/80-1992) between the Mozambican government and the RENAMO intensified. Manica was one of the provinces most affected by the civil war. As a result, several thousands of peasants in Manica were transformed into refugees in Zimbabwe. During this period, Mozambican

refugees proved to be an important source of cheap labour for local commercial farms in Zimbabwe. With the peace agreement between the Mozambican government and RENAMO in 1992, many Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe sought to find their way back home. However, as the war had destroyed almost everything and former homes had reverted to bush, and because of the fear of land mines, some, if not many, adult men and young boys returned to Zimbabwe looking for relatively secure life and employment, especially on the commercial farms in the eastern-central districts.

Any understanding of the present socio-economic patterns in central Mozambique requires an analysis of the historical processes which created and integrated peasants in the regional capitalist economy and altered their relationship with the colonial state in the period from 1930 to the mid-1960s. The study of labour migration constitutes an important way of understanding these processes in Manica. An analysis of this subject which has not been studied in depth before, also contributes systematic information concerning social and economic evolution of Manica province, and to grappling with the great difficulties which still remain in the region as a result of scarcity of job opportunities, and its lack of infra-structure, rural poverty and continued informal migration to Zimbabwe. My thesis thus also looks at the social and economic implications of labour migration to Southern Rhodesia on rural life in Manica district, particularly African farming.

Although there are several studies of economic relations between Mozambique and South Africa, and particularly of labour migration in southern Africa, the study of economic relations between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), especially of labour migration, has been neglected by historians. In this section, I assessed the relevant secondary literature in an attempt to find appropriate theoretical and methodological approaches to the problem of migrancy and its impact on rural African economies in southern Africa. The literature produced during the colonial period, particularly by Portuguese institutions, as well as by scholars and administrative staff or amateurs, in the form of monographs and dissertations, are largely empiricist and were in various ways intended to justify the system of white settler rule. However, missionary writings provide

a more favourable view of the African society than that of the Portuguese officials although from a Christian humanist perspective.

With regard to more recent secondary literature on Portuguese colonial policy which deals directly with its impact on the rural economy of central Mozambique, there are a number of studies of specific areas of central Mozambique, namely the work of Vail and White (1980) and Judith Head (1980) for Zambezia and Sena; Borges Coelho (1993) for Tete; and Miguel da Cruz (1982) and Barry Neil-Tomlinson (1978,1990) for Manica; the later deal with central Mozambique in particular in the context of Mozambique Company administration. These studies have shown how the imposition of taxes, and contract and forced labour by the colonial state and companies in pursuit of their economic and financial goals, contributed to the disruption and impoverishment of the African household economy, and generated rural resistance in many parts of the region.

Other studies on Mozambique, which deal with the central region more generally, have been written by Newitt (1980,1995), Isaacman (1983), Munslow (1983) and Hedges et al. (1993). These studies demonstrate how demand from the Portuguese textile industry for a supply of raw cotton from the 1920s, in particular during the period of Salazar's 'New State', contributed to the intensification of conflicts amongst colonial authorities and peasants in rural areas and their consequent emigration to neighbouring countries. They also provide an explanation of the nature and implications of the labour legislation enacted by Portugal in the same period to ensure the colonial economic programme.

To a certain extent some of this work, in particular that carried out by the Department of History of Eduardo Mondlane University, does analyse the economic situation of Mozambique regionally, its concentration on the social and economic causes of migration, has meant that its analysis of the impact of the colonial economy on African households is often sketchy. Indeed, the problem is not given the significance it deserves. Another analytical weakness of these studies is concerned with their uncritical assertion of African agency, and their strong sympathy with the ideology of the ruling party, in the making of history.⁷ This is particularly evident in Isaacman (1983) and Munslow (1983). However,

⁷ For a more comprehensive review of this literature see J. Penvenne, "A luta continua! Recent literature on Mozambique", *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 18, 1 (1985), 109-138.

Isaacman's most recent book, *Cotton is the Mother of Poverty* (1996), provides a broader analysis of African communities.

Even those studies of specific areas in central Mozambique which are concerned with conflicts between the state, companies, farms and African peasants, have failed to analyse in depth the complexity of the relationships between peasant production and the colonial capitalist economy. Very often Mozambican peasants are pictured as victims of *chibalo* (the labour forced recruitment system) and taxation, and the variety and complexity of colonial production and their responses are not analysed adequately. Even Vail and White (1980), who provide by far the best research on the modern social and economic history of Central Mozambique, with particular reference to Quelimane District, analyse the dynamic of peasant production and its response to Company demands superficially. Despite these limitations, however their book provides a suggestive analysis of the social structure of the plantation and of the areas from which workers migrate. They deal particularly well with the following issues: the ethnic division of labour and its complex occupational hierarchy; the relationship between the pattern of labour mobilisation and the peasant production; and the role of women in the complex relationship between labour, cotton and rice production.

The weaknesses revealed in these studies means that to understand the effects of the colonial impact upon the family or household economy adequately it is important to explore the internal organization and dynamic of African communities, and their relationship with colonial capitalism.

Although there are a number of studies dealing with labour migration in Southern Rhodesia, in particular those by Scott (1954), Mitchell (1961), Warhurst (1970), van Onselen (1976), Makambe (1980), Boeder (1981), Hodder-Williams (1983), and David Johnson (1989), these only treat the problem of Mozambican labour migration tangentially and give more emphasis to migrancy from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Thus, they do not examine in depth the factors behind of the process of migrancy let alone the social and economic implications for the sender rural areas of central Mozambique. On the other hand, there is some research which focuses on Mozambique, carried out by Yussuf Adam et al. (1981), Rita-Ferreira (1985), Joel Neves (1990), and Newitt (1995). This provides a starting point for research on labour migration to Southern Rhodesia, even though it concentrates more on migration from Tete province and its legal aspects, namely, the

agreements signed between the Portuguese government and the Rhodesian administration from 1913.

There also a number of studies on other parts of Mozambique which have given me useful insights. The work carried out in southern Mozambique by Ruth First and her research team of African Studies Centre (*Centro de Estudos Africanos*) of Eduardo Mondlane University, is a valuable account of the impact of Mozambican migration to South Africa on rural economy. Using a Marxist structuralist approach, they produced the 'Mozambique Miner' as a research report in 1977, and, in 1983, published a more detailed study of the implications of labour migration in rural areas, especially on Inhambane province. Ruth First also published an analysis of the judicial aspect of the migrant labour agreements. Contrary to the formerly ahistorical ethnographic accounts presented by Rita-Ferreira (1961;1963), Ruth First shows how in Inhambane, for example, the system of labour migration strengthened the middle peasantry and its capacity to accumulate in order to satisfy *lobolo*, and its need for ox-drawn ploughs.⁸ In addition, studies carried out by Shirley Young's research (1977) on the Chopi people in southern Mozambique, shows the complexity of the relationship between African societies and labour migration to South African mines; she deals, particularly well with problems related to women's position in the migrant household.

Penvenne's doctoral thesis provides an important explanation as to why migration in southern Mozambique to South Africa continued until 1960s to be an important alternative for African cash-earning. Luis Covane's doctoral thesis provides an outstanding study of the impact of labour migration on the African peasantry focusing on the Gaza province. Apart from an extensive overview of the literature produced on the colonial economy, particularly that related to southern Mozambique, he also assesses the literature on labour migration to South Africa. On the basis of the Lisa Brock's doctoral thesis and the Patrick Harries' criticism of Katzenellenbogen work, Covane stresses the need for examination of effects of the social and economic linkages between Mozambique and South Africa on the rural areas of southern Mozambique.⁹ Indeed his thesis concentrates more on those

⁸Ruth First, *Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant*, (Sussex, 1983).

⁹See Patrick Harries, review of Simon E. Katzenellenbogen, *South Africa and southern Mozambique*, in *JSAS*, 11, 2 (1984): 171; Lisa Ann Brock, "From kingdom to colonial district: a political economy of social change in Gazaland, southern Mozambique, 1870-

migrants who decided to resettle in their home villages as farmers rather than those who became career migrant workers.

Given the paucity of literature on Mozambique, I have also looked at various studies carried out on the rural economy in southern Africa more generally. These provide important comparative insights, mainly on the problem of the peasantry, the social and economic dynamic of households, the role of chiefs, labour migration and the question of women and gender relations. In assessing this literature I have been more concerned with some theoretical issues and the historical background which enables one to understand the social and economic dynamic of the peasantry in the sender areas, particularly in Manica province. The articulation between migrancy, agriculture and trade is the main concern.

For several decades southern Africa has produced a wide range of studies of labour migration and the peasant economy. These studies have sharply different theoretical approaches; anthropological functionalism, economic dualism, structural and radical Marxism, among others. During the 1970s 'underdevelopment' theorists argued that colonial policies and white settler demands undermined African producers and impoverished them.¹⁰ Prior to this the literature was indeed static arguing that Africans were undeveloped or backward.

In the 1970s and 1980s, historians and sociologists devoted a great deal of attention to issues of economic development in colonial Africa, and in particular to the conflict between European settlers and African peasants. Studies in eastern, central and southern Africa have shown how European settlers, plantation-owners and African small-holders struggled over land distribution, labour and market conditions. African peasants were regarded by European settlers as a pool of labour for their economic enterprises, and legislation specifically enacted by the colonial regime ensured that they fulfilled this role.

1930", Ph. D. Northwestern, 1989; Luis A. Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture in southern Mozambique, 1920-1992", Ph.D. London, 1996, 45.

¹⁰See, G. Arrighi, "Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study in the proletarianization of an African peasantry in Rhodesia", *Journal of Development Studies*, 6 (1970), 179-234; H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power", *Economy and Society*, 1, 1972; Robin Palmer and Neil-Parsons (eds.), *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Los Angeles and London, 1977).

Since the landmark study by Colin Bundy in 1976, scholars of peasants in southern Africa have devoted a great deal of attention to African farming.¹¹ Bundy's definition of African peasantry recognises the social differentiation among its members. Indeed, in his attempt to establish the nature of that differentiation, he applied Galeski's analytical perspective. This sets up three categories of peasants:

- i) The poor or little peasant: he owns a dwarf farm and insufficient means of production to assume the family's subsistence; some members of the family have to dispose of labour power in return for wages;
- ii) The middle peasant: has a large enough farm or plot to assure family's maintenance, but not large enough to permit or require the employment of hired labour;
- iii) The large peasant: has a little more land, produces more surplus for sale and needs occasionally to hire outside labour.¹²

Bundy's contribution also includes his criticism of dualists who divided the economy into two sharply distinguished and independent sectors - the capitalist sector characterized by high productivity, market orientation, and receptivity to change, and the pre-capitalist sector - stagnant, displaying little market awareness, and the dominance of 'tradition' or 'custom' over rationality. Bundy argues that there was a substantially more positive and successful response by black agriculturists to market opportunities in South Africa than had usually been indicated, and that peasants met the new demands of the state and of white landowners by adapting their existing farming methods to the market economy.¹³

However, Bundy failed to identify the relations of production and internal dynamics of African communities adequately or to go beyond the fact of the positive response of African cultivators to colonial markets. In fact it is also very important to assess changing social relations within African homesteads in order to understand the impact of colonial capitalism and labour migration. An analysis of the role of women and children in household labour, especially those left behind by adult male migrants, is also very

¹¹See, C. Bundy, "African peasants and economic changes in South Africa, 1870-1913, with particular reference to the Cape", D.Phil. Oxford, 1976. However, Bundy was very much part of the underdevelopment school.

¹²Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, (London, 1979), 11. For further discussion see Henry Bernstein, "African peasantries: A theoretical framework", Journal of Peasant Studies [JPS], 6 4, (1974), 421-443: 431; Martin Klein (ed.), Peasants in Africa: historical and contemporary perspectives, (London, 1980), 9-44.

¹³Bundy, The rise and fall, 11; see also Tim Keegan, "The restructuring of agrarian class relations in a colonial economy: the Orange River Colony, 1902-1910", JSAS, 5, 2, (1979), 234-254.

important. Questions such as how peasant households were structured; how they reproduced their access to labour; and how they controlled and distributed their incomes are also very important for understanding the social and economic dynamic of homesteads or households.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Bundy's work laid the foundations for an analytical understanding of the growth of capitalism in South Africa and its regional implications.

Further studies of African peasants in southern Africa tackle those issues. They claim that although colonial policies worked to keep the African economy stagnant, some peasants were able to flourish at least temporarily with the stimulus provided by colonial markets, and through the investment of incomes gained from labour migration. The hallmark scholarship on the peasant political economy and labour migration in southern Africa has been provided by Colin Murray, William Beinart and Peter Delius.¹⁵

According to Beinart, for example, in Pondoland the migrant labour system was incorporated into the process of homestead reproduction. Workers not only migrated to get money for bridewealth and to establish their own homesteads, but also continued to work in order to purchase agricultural implements and accumulate other commodities.¹⁶ Moreover, studies in southern Africa have highlighted the continuity and diversity of agricultural production among African peasants despite the land and labour demands of white settlers and the constraints on their production imposed by colonial policies.¹⁷ Historians, anthropologists, economists and others have dealt well with such issues as

¹⁴ For a more comprehensive and critical review of the scholarship on peasants in southern Africa, see Terence Ranger, "Growing from the roots: reflections on peasant research in central and southern Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies, 5, (1978); 99-133.

¹⁵ Colin Murray, Families Divided, (Cambridge, 1981); William Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland, (Cambridge, 1983); Peter Delius, A Lion amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and resistance in the northern Transvaal, (Oxford, 1996).

¹⁶ Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland, 98. He also stresses that migrancy was not a consequence of a decline in agricultural output.

¹⁷ See among others, S.Marks and R.Rathbone (eds), Industrialization and social change in South Africa: African class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870-1930, (London, 1982); Beinart, The Political Economy of Pondoland; Peter Delius, The Land Belongs to Us (Johannesburg, 1983); John McCracken, "Planters, peasants and the colonial state: the impact of the Native Tobacco Board in the central province of Malawi", JSAS, 9 (1983), 172-92; Linda M. Heywood, "The growth and decline of African agriculture in Central Angola, 1890-1950", JSAS, 13, 3 (1987), 355-371.

land tenure, the environment, soil conservation and ecological changes as well as communication networks and market conditions.¹⁸

The literature on Zimbabwe and South Africa also stresses the role of the state in supporting the development of settler agriculture. In these territories the expropriation of fertile land has been the classic method by which household producers were turned into a wage-labour force. Thus, unfavourable land legislation, the institution of African reserves, the provision of credit facilities for white settlers but not Africans were among the measures imposed by colonial authorities to prevent competition between African peasants and settler agriculture. As a result the majority of peasants were driven into wage relations as migrants or labour tenants on white farms.¹⁹ However, we need to be cautious about the extent of land expropriation.

In the case of Malawi, Swaziland and Mozambique land expropriation was not totally responsible for the decline of African agriculture. In these territories the amount of land alienated was small in relation to the land available. As a result, the displaced population could find land elsewhere relatively easily. In fact, the lack of accessible markets, modern agricultural implements, and the effects of drought and pests seem to have worked against African agricultural self-sufficiency and accumulation.²⁰ However, after World War II, Southern Rhodesia fostered commercial agriculture amongst a small fringe of African farmers to supply the local market with foodstuffs, and the Land Apportionment Act of

¹⁸See among others, Henrietta L. Moore and Megan Vaughan, Cutting down trees: gender, nutrition, and agricultural change in the northern province of Zambia, 1890-1990, (London, 1994); Sara Berry, No condition is permanent: The social dynamics of agrarian change in sub-saharan Africa, (Wisconsin, 1993); William Beinart and Peter Delius (eds.), Putting a plough to the ground, (Johannesburg, 1986); Alan Low, Agricultural development in southern Africa: Farm-household economics and the food crisis, (London, 1986); William Beinart, "Soil erosion, conservationism and ideas about development: A southern African exploration, 1900-1960", *ISAS*, 11, 1 (1984), 52-83.

¹⁹See among others, Tim Keegan, "Debate: The origins of agrarian capitalism in South Africa: A reply", *ISAS*, 15, 4, (1989), 683-4; P. Mosley, The settler economies: Studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1900-1963, (Cambridge, 1983), chapter two; Robin Palmer, Land and racial domination in Rhodesia, (London, 1977); Ian Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe, 1890-1948: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle, (London, 1988).

²⁰See below chapter four; Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture", 56; Elias Mandala, Work and Control in a Peasant Economy, (Madison, 1990), 110.

1941 and the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 gave land rights to individuals instead of the former communal ownership with this objective in view.²¹

As far as the gender division of household labour is concerned, uncritical observers have described farming as a part-time activity for male members.²² More critical gender studies however emphasise the need to analyse the effects of male labour migration on the household division of labour. These studies stress the importance of the burdens on women left behind.²³ Studies of child and youth labour migration reinforce this perspective.²⁴ However, access to market facilities and the availability of modern agricultural instruments such as ploughs brought into household agriculture especially by migrants may have stimulated a new division of labour in which men took some responsibility for agriculture directed to the market.²⁵

Recent studies such as those carried out by Jeff Guy and Motlatsi Thabane, William Beinart, Peter Delius and Patrick Harries, have introduced further issues into the literature on migrant labour such as worker consciousness, ethnicity and cultural identity. These bring together urban and rural experience. Nevertheless, the first to integrate cultural issues with an historical analysis was Charles van Onselen in his book Chibaro.²⁶ Guy and

²¹See Jocelyn Alexander, "The state, agrarian policy and rural politics in Zimbabwe, 1940-1990", Ph.D., Oxford, 1993; I.Phimister, "Rethinking the reserves: Southern Rhodesia's Land Husbandry Act reviewed", JSAS, 14, 2 (1993), 225-239.

²²See for example Colin Murray, Families divided, 9. This was also characteristic of the discourse of the Portuguese colonial officials.

²³See for example Henrieta L. Moore & Megan Vaughan, Cutting Down Trees, (London, 1994), chapter six.

²⁴See William Beinart, "Transkenian migrant workers and youth labor on Natal Sugar Estates, 1918-1948", in Alan H. Jeeves and Jonathan Crush (eds.) White Farms Black Labor: the state and agrarian change in southern Africa, 1910-50, (Oxford, 1997), 147-171.

²⁵See below chapter four and five; Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture", chapter four and eight.

²⁶Beinart, "Worker consciousness, ethnic particularism and nationalism: The experiences of a South African migrant, 1930-1960", in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds) The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, (London, 1987), 286-309; Guy and Thabane, "Technology, ethnicity and ideology: Basutho miners and shaft-sinking on the South African gold mines", JSAS, 14, 2, (1988), 257-278; S. Marks and R. Rathbone, "Introduction", Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa 1870-1930, (London, 1982), 8; Harries, Work, Culture and Identity: migrant laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c.1860-1910, (London, 1994), Delius, A Lion Amongst the Cattle, chapters, one and two; Van Onselen, Chibaro, chapters six and seven.

Thabane show very clearly how the mine engineers manipulate ethnic identity but also how miners were able to use this for defensive purposes. Migrant workers were not passive victims of colonial capitalism. They joined varied forms of collective bargaining and organised themselves into welfare societies and labour associations, and developed forms of political consciousness. Hyslop and Raftopoulos for example, argue for the link between trade unionism and nationalism in Southern Rhodesia after World War II.²⁷ In addition Hyslop suggests that unionism was a major force in inhibiting the growth of ethnic divisions within the urban African community.²⁸

The literature on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia provides a useful theoretical framework and comparative evidence of the interdependence of migrancy and African agriculture. On the other hand, existing studies also stress the importance of state intervention for white settler agriculture. In central Mozambique attempts to support settler agriculture only began in the mid-1940s, and was only developed systematically in the late 1950s with the establishment of the state-sponsored settlement program in Manica. Nevertheless, the instability of the African labour supply meant that many white settlers, particularly the maize farmers, faced difficulties in developing agriculture in Manica. Unlike in southern Mozambique, in the 1950s, the Portuguese authorities attempted to enhance African agriculture in Manica in order to supply the local market with food. These conditions may have led migrants to invest their remittances in agriculture. Applying a social history and social anthropology perspective, my thesis explores these issues in chapters three to eight. In chapters nine and ten it examines the process through which Mozambican migrants developed different forms of collective consciousness and political ideas in Southern Rhodesia. The next section concentrates on the main questions analysed throughout the thesis.

²⁷Jonathan Hyslop, "Trade unionism in the rise of African nationalism: Bulawayo 1945-1963", *African Perspectives*, 1, 1-2, (1986), 34-67; Brian Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour in Salisbury, 1953-1965", *JSAS*, 21, 1 (1995), 79-93.

²⁸Hyslop, "Trade unionism", 35.

i) The first questions are about the influences of Portugal's "New State" policy on African integration into the colonial economic framework in central Mozambique and the extent to which it stimulated labour migration to Southern Rhodesia.

The ability of the state to extract labour and the impact of this extraction were determined in part by the nature of labour control and accumulation in the pre-capitalist economy. The policy of rural intervention embodied on 1928 Labour Code, and introduced in Mozambique through the Labour Regulations of 1930, apparently abolished forced labour, except for public work, and replaced it by compulsory crop-growing. This was largely engineered by the Native Affairs Department (*Repartição dos Negocios Indigenas*), which aimed to push the African economy into satisfying Portuguese needs for cash crops and supplying labour for European farmers. The Portuguese imposed forced contract labour (six months each year) and forced cotton-growing (which obliged each household to produce two hectares each season) to supply raw cotton to the Portuguese textile industry at very low cost. African rural areas were considered potential areas of cotton-growing for Portuguese industry, and not merely as traditional subsistence farming areas. To give effect to this measure, everywhere policemen and local chiefs were turned into the main body of state control at the rural level. The imposition of this pattern of economic organisation meant that the social and economic organisation of local communities was threatened by colonial capitalism. However, this pressure varied from one zone to another, as did the African response.

It is the aim of this study to understand how African peasants reacted as a whole to this process. It also aims at understanding how far the monetization of *lobolo* and the need to buy goods determined the establishment of a specific pattern of migration, and for the integration of the peasantry into a monetary economy influenced rural differentiation. Did peasants constitute an undifferentiated mass of rural producers? How far were they linked with the monetary economy? How far could peasants combine cotton cultivation with the production of food?

In chapters three to six I examine this process and suggest that Africans were reluctant to engage in wage labour, not only because of their relative economic self-sufficiency, but also because of their resistance to contract labour far from home, with a very low salary, the deferred pay system, and poor work conditions. On the other hand African resistance

led the Mozambique Company and the Portuguese authorities to reinforce their coercive measures. However, although taxation and compulsory labour were strengthened, it was not possible to secure enough labour supply for white enterprises. As I demonstrate in chapters seven and eight, usually people resisted recruitment through absconding and desertion to neighbouring countries where they expected to get better pay, could choose when and with whom to work, and could return home whenever they pleased. Moreover, the flow of African labour to Southern Rhodesia was stimulated by other social, economic and ecological factors, and eventually by pressures exerted by the Rhodesian recruiting agents across the border. The monetization of bridewealth, the need to buy manufactured products at relatively low prices, and the resistance of local chieftancies also may have contributed to the increasing number of migrants.

ii) The second series of questions asks about the impact of the Portuguese government's sponsorship of white settlement in the new economic context of the exploitation of the Mozambican rural economy in the late 1950s. The establishment from the late 1950s of a systematic, state-sponsored white settlement programme in the main fertile rural areas of Mozambique was related to the high level of poverty and discontent in Portugal. Although some settlers were mobilised locally, the majority arrived from Portugal were poor and unskilled. The decision to resettle them was taken more on political than on economic grounds. Agriculture was not mechanised, nor did the white settlers bring new agricultural skills and technical innovations. Under these conditions they were unable to pay competitive salaries and attract labour. This meant that state intervention was necessary for guaranteeing market, credit and land facilities on a discriminatory basis against African peasants. To understand this process in Manica we also need to know the extent to which the resettlement policy affected African peasants. Although the new settlement program may have undermined the expansion of African farming for the benefit of white settlers, reports from local administrators claimed that white farmers still faced difficulties in attracting local labour in free market conditions. Given the more attractive wage employment in Southern Rhodesia, many young adult men preferred to cross the border and earn twice or even three times more than they could in Manica. This issue is largely discussed in chapters five, seven and eight.

iii) Thirdly I ask how external factors influence different patterns of labour migration to Southern Rhodesia. Beyond these internal factors affecting migrant labour, we also need to

look at external elements, not only in the context of Southern Rhodesia, but also in terms of its regional context. The main questions to be answered are, among others: how did the pattern of economic relations in Southern Rhodesia produce a great shortage of internal labour supply? How did Southern Rhodesia solve the problem? In chapters seven and eight I suggest that Rhodesia's relatively developed capitalism did not face any competition over labour reserves from local enterprises in central Mozambique. Beyond legal migration from Tete, a great number of illegal migrants (men, women and children) crossed the border from Manica to the neighbouring Rhodesian plantations for permanent or seasonal work and to other employment in the mines, commerce, industry, transport, and domestic service. Further, Rhodesia encouraged this migration by establishing lorry stations along the border.

iv) Related to this are questions about the extent of Christian missionary activity influence on African social life and labour migration. As in many parts of Africa, so in central Mozambique education was a mission responsibility and was based on conservative western concepts of gender relations. Although there were some Protestant churches, their activity was often sabotaged and they were accused of spreading anti-Portuguese feelings amongst African population. The main role was played by Catholic missions which benefited from the support and protection of the Mozambique Company and the Portuguese government. In the three principal districts of Manica, Mossurize and Chimoio, rudimentary primary schools were established which taught up standard two or three. After these three years of primary education, African children were entitled to start at the third year elementary level of a mission or a public primary school in the main town. However, it was only in 1948 that the fourth level was introduced in these schools. From the 1930s the Catholic missions in Manica, Mossurize and Chimoio also provided training in such occupations as tailoring, carpentry and basic agricultural skills. However, because of the lack of money to pay school fees, their long distance from home and limited accommodation in missions, very few children could enter school. In general those who did so were the children of catechists, chiefs, teachers and migrants. Even those who attained schooling could rarely find jobs according to their skills and with adequate payment. This suggests that some may have migrate to Southern Rhodesia in search of suitable education and employment. I examine this aspect in chapter seven.

v) A further set of questions arises out of the implications of labour migration for African households on the one hand and for white farmers on the other. To what extent did the remittances of migrants influence the development of the rural economy and its social life? What were the implications of child migration to Southern Rhodesian plantations for local household economy, and to what extent did their absence affect the household division of labour?

With labour migration, the situation of white farmers in Manica, particularly from the 1940s, seems to have worsened because of the instability of their labour supply. The reinforcing of measures of compulsory contract labour functioned as both cause and consequence of clandestine migration. Further, the investment of migrant income within African households strengthened resistance to wage labour on white farms. At the same time, the purchase by migrants of agricultural implements (axes, ploughs, and ox-drawn carts) and instruments for carpentry, and the acquisition of donkeys, bicycles, knives, clothes, blankets, radio, and so on in Rhodesia, may have contributed to social differentiation at local level. In chapter six I suggest for example the importance of the introduction of donkeys from Rhodesia for African households. The use of donkeys for ploughing, transporting of crops to market and fetching water or firewood, seems to have considerably reduced these burdens on women. Another important contribution of migration seems to have been the way it stimulated the education of children either in Rhodesian mission schools or at local mission schools in Mozambique.

Moreover women, left behind by their husbands, now managed their economic and social subsistence. In this respect the communication networks established between migrants and their relatives in rural areas have to be examined. Although labour migration seems to have had a strong influence on the expansion of commercial network in rural areas, this was not evenly spread, because each region had specific conditions which encouraged or inhibited economic activity. This is particularly evident in remote areas where communications and transport were scarce or even non-existent. This thesis attempt to understand how this process happened in Manica.

vi) Finally the thesis explores the ways in which associations and political organisations in Southern Rhodesia influenced migrants in developing various forms of collective consciousness and political ideas. The sharing of daily experience on the mines and in

compound housing, and the burdens and exploitation which workers suffered on the mines, railways and manufacturing sector, seems to have provided Mozambican migrants with an experience of collective organisation and worker consciousness. The needs of self-help led migrants to organise themselves in societies on an ethnic basis, which may also have influenced the development of ethnic consciousness. In addition, they were exposed to a wave of syndicalist ideas and the independent church movement, and may have brought these influences home with them. In chapters nine and ten I examine this process and particularly the ways in which Mozambican migrants developed their political consciousness beyond ethnic boundaries.

For a full understanding of rural society in Manica I had, to some extent, to rely on oral testimonies. Personal memory is an indispensable source of evidence when investigating rural society, given the silence or bias of the written sources. However, I also used oral history as a supplementary resource. As Tim Keegan remind us,

oral testimony like other sources of evidence provides problems of verification. Human memory is given to error, misconception, elision, distortion, elaboration and downright fabrication. In this it suffers from the same problems as much that survives in the written form from the past.²⁹

In fact, oral evidence can be tested in a variety of ways against facts or information available from written sources such as newspapers and archival sources. Thus, "different sources of evidence, written or oral, reinforce one another, give each other meaning, and explain hidden significances in each other."³⁰ When in 1993 I first departed for Manica for my oral data collection I was aware of the importance of this dialectical interpretation.

I first arrived in Manica in April 1993 on the day when Italian troops were replacing the Zimbabwean military contingent from the 'Beira corridor' under the Rome Peace Accord between Mozambican government and RENAMO. My research was conducted at a time

²⁹Tim Keegan, Facing The Storm: portraits of black lives in rural South Africa, (Johannesburg, 1988), 162.

³⁰Ibid.

of peacekeeping and transition to multi-party elections. People still had fresh memories of civil war and had gone through the most stringent drought followed by famine. The war and famine affected people socially and psychologically. While they were cheering for peace they were also confused, and their memories were disturbed.

However, previously rich African farmers, members of the former local ruling lineage groups, teachers, were keen to record their past experiences which they regarded as better than any gains under independence. According to my informants independence did not match their social expectations. They hoped to substitute for white farmers and run their private businesses. On the contrary, socialist policy prevented them from fulfilling their dreams. Others even accused the *Grupo Dinamizadores* of undermining their power as in most cases the secretaries of the *Grupo Dinamizadores* were not local. In fact, this former elite was more open to talk about the past than were ordinary people who were more concerned with their economic and social insecurity. This tendency was also prevalent in 1994 when I returned for a second period of exploratory field research.

The fact that I came from southern Mozambique and did not speak the local language made my contact with ordinary peasants even more difficult without the co-operation of the local authorities. Nevertheless, my contact with the villages helped to develop my knowledge about the agricultural cycle, local habits and leisure-time activities. The background proved to be useful for planning my next field research.

My field research in 1996 was thus far more successful. In 1996, I spent about five months (June - October) in Manica province and was able to visit all districts except Mossurize which was affected by the Zimbabwean insurgent movement so-called *Chimuenjes*. I interviewed more than fifty people including men and women aged between 50 and 90 years. Their testimonies ranged from individual life stories to communal life experiences. Informants were peasants, ex-migrants, local Chiefs, ex-*sipaio* (African police), retired teachers and civil servants, former white farmers and businessmen, and missionaries. In this period I was able to work with the assistance of local school teachers and cultural activists with whom I spent much of time travelling throughout the villages. I first spent about three weeks helping the cultural activists collect and record popular songs for Mozambique Radio (*Radio Moçambique*). This activity combined with the pictures I used to take of local groups, helped me to build up

some credibility with the villagers. I also took the opportunity of improving my language skills in chi-Manyica.

In 1996, people were now more enthusiastic and fully engaged in their productive activities than they had been in 1993 and 1994. There had been rain over the last two years. Local chiefs believed their prayers (rain ceremonies) were answered by the ancestors who were also believed to be happy with the end of war between 'brothers'. Although chiefs were not re-integrated into the local administration (as in the colonial period), they felt powerful as they were openly allowed to fulfill their duties such as rain-making ceremonies. Farmers were now returning to their enterprises while other businessmen ran private transport services connecting Vila de Manica (district headquarters) to different rural villages.

Although many villages still lacked transport facilities because of the lack of roads, some had benefited with as much as twice the transport service available weekly, on specific days. I travelled with peasants (men, women, and children), packed in tracks and tractors, and carrying a varied assortment of goods (sacks of cement, iron sheets, firewood, sacks of maize and other commodities). Travelling by such transport was also a challenge as it often broke down or ran out of petrol halfway. I frequently experienced such situations and had to complete my journey on foot and uncertain of return as transport was only available once or twice a week. I also walked for long distances, climbing mountains in order to reach some dispersed villages and interview people at their homes. This was imperative if I wanted to meet elder people. Some interviews were even collected on the road on the way to the more remote villages by agreement with informants. Lack of personal transport and accommodation facilities undoubtedly influenced my access to ordinary people living in the remote villages.

However, the social understanding I developed with the villagers made them more interested in talking about their past experiences. Indeed local peasants and returned refugees were now eager to talk about their life stories. Despite this apparent understanding, however, it must be admitted that in some villages people still regarded me as representative of the ruling party or a member of the central government, and presented their local problems, such as the lack of roads, schools and marketing

facilities, and complained about the mal-functioning of the local administration. They therefore asked me to convey those problems to the central government.

Nevertheless, my assistants who were very familiar with the local social and political environment, were very helpful. They also became very interested in oral history, taking their own notes and suggesting additional older people for interview. Before starting an interview my assistants always introduced me to the informants and explained the general objective of my research and the nature of my questions. Depending of their preference, interviewees were addressed either in chi-Manyica, Portuguese or English. Many young and adult men in villages bordering to Zimbabwe are reasonably fluent in English.

The interviews were organised both individually and collectively, and I combined recording and note-taking. Although I preferred to conduct the interviews individually in order to ensure confidentiality, because of time factor I often conducted interviews collectively. However, individual interviews were more concerned with life stories and were followed by specific questions to explore general issues such as land tenure, commercialisation, contract labour, education and labour migration. In some cases informants also filled in a questionnaire. Individual interviews usually lasted three to four hours. I rarely managed to interview more than three people daily. Interviews conducted in Portuguese or English usually took less than three hours each.

Informants in the villages were selected according to their age, work experience in colonial Zimbabwe, or because they were progressive farmers. Teachers, ex-civil servants and local chiefs were also specifically selected for questions related to their experiences with the colonial past. Collective interviews helped me tackle general political, social and economic issues such as land tenure, access to water resources, trading and communication networks, forced crop cultivation, education and working conditions on white enterprises. Although women proved to be more informative about the details of social and economic events, interviews were in general dominated by men. Women were always busy with domestic affairs or absent in the field. Although informants with some literacy provided more systematic information about general trends, no-literate people were very knowledgeable about the specific details of rural life. Their life stories provided important information about child labour and its

influence on the household division of labour. Local stories were normally periodised with reference to great events such as the visit of central government officials, the construction of railways, roads, bridges, schools, churches or mission stations, as well as white settlement and wars.

From my interviews, there is a considerable evidence of how forced contract labour and low wages influenced labour migration to Southern Rhodesia. However, my informants also stressed that labour migration was not always a sign of resistance to poor conditions in Mozambique. They mentioned that they also migrated in search of better wages. In Manica men did not migrate because of lack of land. Although the limited commercial networks and roads to link villages to the market centres may have inhibited the development of African farming, my informants underlined the importance of purchasing agricultural implements and hybrid seeds to enhance their agricultural output. Although men in Manica were involved in agriculture especially for the market, none of my informants mentioned that he decided to work in Southern Rhodesia in order to buy agricultural implements. The first priority was to buy clothes and to bring back money to buy cattle and to pay *shuma* (bridewealth). There is also much evidence of the social importance of bridewealth and its influence on juvenile labour migration. When asked specifically about bridewealth, they emphasised its social value in regulating marriage transactions. I also questioned them about polygamy. They stressed its importance for social and biological reproduction as men wished to have as many children as possible to strengthen their homesteads. Children are portrayed as symbols of prestige and a guarantee of future labour. They also added that although the Catholic Church and the colonial administration were very opposed to polygamy, local men would marry in Church or register their marriage with the administration, but would still marry more wives following local custom.

Ex-migrants mentioned that with the expansion of the local market for food in the late 1940s and early 1950s, they became more concerned with agriculture and therefore would migrate with plans to purchase ploughs and donkeys, and invest their remittances in cattle in Manica. Apart from members of the local ruling class, progressive farmers were generally people who had worked in Southern Rhodesia, especially on the neighbouring farms and plantations in Manicaland and Mashonaland. My informants residing in villages along the border to Zimbabwe recall their childhood experiences as

migrant labourers on Rhodesian farms. Others mentioned the education facilities on Rhodesian farms as the motive for migration. They also stressed their experience on farms and mission schools in Southern Rhodesia as important for the agricultural techniques which they later applied at home. In general, my interviews with ex-migrants in Manica also confirm the importance of migrant remittances for the development of agriculture and investment in the education of their children. Interviews with Catholic missionaries confirmed these trends. Moreover, missionary testimonies stressed their concern over the 'dangerous effects' of migrancy, as they feared the influence of Protestant missions on what they saw as the 'denationalisation' syndrome.

In 1997 and 1998, I was able to travel to Zimbabwe to interview Mozambican ex-migrants who had been established there for many years. I conducted interviews in Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare cities. During my research in Zimbabwe, I was helped by the Association of Mozambican migrants, especially in Harare which was the headquarters. The Harare Chairman recommended me to other branches in Mutare and Bulawayo. In this period I combined my interviews with archival research at Zimbabwe National Archives. Apart from collecting life stories, I was particularly interested in tracing migrant's experiences of political organisation. I found their information about political organisations astonishing and it drove me into more research through the archives and newspapers, especially in Zimbabwe archives in order to understand the political conjuncture of the 1950s and early 1960s.

In general, the interviews were organised over the weekend in the home of the branch Chairmen of the Association. In Bulawayo, the interviews were arranged during two days, Saturday and Sunday in Mpopoma township and the occasion was transformed into a big party. People were very interested in talking about their life stories. However, because of the time factor, I had to start with collective interviews focusing on worker associations and political organisations amongst Mozambicans in Bulawayo. Then I selected people who had been directly involved in such activities, before asking elder people to talk about their life stories. I was escorted to visit some Mozambican households, and was shown the former Joshua Nkomo's residence in Mpopoma township. Despite the short time I could stay there the interviews were very

rewarding.³¹ After the session I was invited to return as they promised to take me to other places like Shabani, where there is a large community of Mozambicans. As usual, I was presented with many complaints and asked to convey their problems to the Mozambican High Commissioner in Harare.

Some interviews were conducted at the Mozambique High Commission in Harare on week days after working hours. I also had a one day session of interviews with former members of the Mozambique African National Congress (MANC) at Mbare township. Interviews were collected following the same strategy as in Bulawayo. Much remained to be said as I just whetted their interest in writing their own political experience.

In Mutare I did interviews in Sakubva township. In Sakubva I witnessed the appalling living conditions, which were in contrast to Mpopoma township in Bulawayo. In Sakubva, people lived in small crowded houses without proper sanitation.³² I was also shown the former residence of the RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama. People lamented their poor social conditions and were very homesick. They were also much pleased at my presence and eager to learn about recent political events in Mozambique and how they could return home and establish their own businesses. I was also told (and visited some) about the existence of very successful Mozambican businessmen in Zimbabwe. Some interviews were also collected amongst people gathered at a tailoring workshop belonging to a Mozambican from Sofala. This place proved to be very useful for making more contacts with Mozambicans as many countrymen used to meet there for beer. I contributed substantially to their partying. This helped to build my rapport with them. The major handicap again was time as many interviews had to be collected after they left work in the evening, and I had to take the train at 9.00 p.m. back to Harare and travel through the night in order to pursue my research in the archives the following morning. Their testimonies stress their fear to return home because of forced contract labour and unattractive wages. Many of them had married in Rhodesia while others had families in both territories. The majority of my informants were from Zambezia, Tete and Sofala provinces. They also did not have any desire to engage in

³¹I cannot forget how warmly they welcomed me, and especially the way they joyfully escorted me to the railway station. This was a rare experience in my life.

³²It is believed that the majority of dwellers in Sakubva township are from Mozambique or are the second generation of Mozambican migrants.

agricultural activity at home. They remembered that the only agricultural activity they were allowed to perform was that of forced cotton cultivation. However, they used to send money to help their parents at home until they married and gradually ceased supporting their Mozambican home because of their increasing household responsibilities in Zimbabwe. This was particularly the case with those with children.

I also made contact with people in the African Methodist Episcopal Church in order to understand the influence of that Church, especially its mission station in Mutare, on Mozambican children. In my visit to the AMEC's Africa University Dr. William Humbane, a Mozambican who was educated in that mission station before leaving for USA for further studies, was recommended to me. In 1997 I finally managed to see him and he provided me with important insights into the role of the Methodist Church and especially of its bishop, Ralph Dodge, in helping Mozambicans pursue further studies in Zimbabwe and in the USA. Humbane's life story exemplifies the many deprivations young Mozambicans faced in their attempt to pursue higher education. He emphasised the role of the Protestant Church in helping them to fulfill those goals outside Mozambique.

Some interviews about Mozambican political organisations in colonial Zimbabwe were collected in Maputo and Swaziland as my informants in those places were able to clarify many of the issues raised in previous interviews. Two of these informants were key members of UDENAMO, and were more educated than their colleagues. With all these interviews, I was able to draft my last chapters.³³

In the following section I discuss my archival sources. As mentioned above, oral testimony rarely stands by itself as a source of evidence on the past. It has to be combined with the formal written sources which provide the wider context of public events, of political decision-making, of economic developments and missionary activity in relation to which ordinary people lead their lives.³⁴

³³However, I was not able to record women's voices. I am aware my work is dominated by the men's perspective and I will need to trace female oral testimonies in pursuing further research.

³⁴See Tim Keegan, *Facing The Storm*, 161.



My most important research findings were drawn from the Mozambique National Archives (AHM) which are well organised and with which I was already very familiar. In addition, I had the opportunity of collecting data in the Zimbabwe National Archives (NAZ) and in Portugal, at the Torre do Tombo Archives. While doing research in Portugal I was also able to work in the Geographical Society Library and the Lisbon National Library where many colonial contemporary monographs on Mozambique are available. The Portuguese Overseas Archives (AHU) was less useful for the period of this study as many of the sources are still not yet inventoried and classified.

Generally, the Mozambique National Archives helped me a great deal in the collection of data. The main problem in examining the archival sources on Manica province is related to the current stage of their classification. In fact, my research was done in parallel with the classification and listing of new sources by the archival staff who responded most positively to my requests. As a result some of the sources related to Chimoio and Manica districts are still inaccessible. Nevertheless, a huge number of records were consulted through the *Fundo do Governo do Distrito da Beira* [FGDB] (Beira District collection), particularly on general economic trends and labour mobilisation in Manica and Sofala provinces. Administrative reports from this collection cover a wide range of issues, such as agriculture, labour recruitment, trading and includes maps surveys and statistical data on population and agriculture output. Many of the issues related to white settlement and African farming (especially of maize, wheat and oilseeds) in Manica district are recorded in the annual reports of the *Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais do Distrito da Beira* (Farmers Association of Beira District). Material on Manica district was complemented with sources I gathered through the local administrative collections [CEM-AM] (which were left unattended in piles in a old garage) at Vila de Manica.

The *Fundo do Governo Geral* [FGG] (Central government collection) included central government reports, and correspondence between the central government and the local administration and the Native Affairs Department. Administrative material from this collection provides insight into the decision-making especially on matters related to African policy, such as the control of mobility and education. The collection also contains missionary reports, in particular of the Diocese of Beira from 1941 to 1959.

These reports provided me with valuable information for understanding the role of Catholic mission schools and their conflicts with Protestant churches on the creation of new identities amongst Africans. Missionary sources were also complemented with collection available at Jécua Mission Station in Manica district. This collection provided me with a vivid account of social history in Manica, especially how the mission station influenced people's life in the surrounding villages. Although their portrayal of African agency does not differ much from the colonial administration, they were nevertheless imbued with Christian humanism, and bitterly criticised the colonial policy and social injustice.³⁵

The *Fundo dos Negócios Indígenas* [FNI] (Native Affairs Department) collection provided information for understanding the contradictions between the liberal legislation which Portugal was forced to implement in Mozambique under the pressure of international labour regulations and the white settler dependence on cheap forced contract labour. The nature of labour legislation and policy and complaints against clandestine labour migration in Manica, are well captured in this collection. The reports dealing with clandestine labour migration recognised the wage difference between settler agriculture in central Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia as the main factor for migration. Correspondence between the central labour bureau and the Portuguese Curator in Southern Rhodesia also provides detailed information about the position of Mozambican workers in the Rhodesian labour market and their involvement in labour struggles and Protestant churches.

The *Fundo da Inspeção dos Serviços Administrativos dos Negócios Indígenas* [ISANI] (Administrative Inspection collection) provides material for exploring the impact of the colonial policy in rural areas, particularly between the 1940s and the 1960s. Apart from providing the means for understanding the political and economic environment in which they were written, they are also of crucial importance in complementing the oral sources because they provide first-hand reports of meetings with local chiefs and people; they also present critical information about the functioning of the local administration. The administrative inspection collection also reveals the voice of the emergent liberal colonial officials who openly denounced the errors of the Portuguese Native Affairs

³⁵I use much of this material on my study of child labour in chapter seven.

Department and suggested pragmatic reforms. The social and economic reforms which followed in the mid-1950s were largely the result of those surveys.³⁶

With the exception of the administrative and health inspectors, who sporadically argued in favour of improving African social and economic conditions, in general administrative officials ignored African complaints. Some local administrators, particularly in remote villages such as Mossurize and Mavonde, paternalistically argued in favour of allowing Africans to migrate to Southern Rhodesia in search of better wages. However, they did so because of the inability of the local administration to stop clandestine migration.³⁷

Material collected in the Zimbabwe National Archives basically consisted of the published reports of the Chamber of Mines, census data, Legislative Assembly debates, and unpublished reports of the District Native Commissioners. The reports of the Eastern District Native Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia illuminates the economic dynamic of Manicaland and Mashonaland, and shows the importance of migrant labour to local farms and plantations. The importance of Manica district as a supplier of African labour, especially to Rhodesian mines and farms, is clearly reflected in these reports.

I also had an opportunity of looking at some of the material produced by the Portuguese intelligence (PIDE) on nationalist movements amongst Mozambicans in the neighbouring territories. I was particularly interested in tracing the role of the proto-nationalist organisations amongst Mozambican workers in Southern Rhodesia. However, much of the material available at the Torre do Tombo archives in Lisbon refers to political events after 1960. On the other hand, I did find useful material on Portuguese overseas policy, particularly the political debate towards social and economic reforms in the colonies in the mid-1950s.

Through newspapers published in Southern Rhodesia (Bulawayo and Salisbury) such as the *Bantu Mirror*, the *Rhodesia Herald* and the *African Daily News*, I was able to gain general picture of African labour struggles in southern Rhodesia and the sometimes

³⁶This is well illustrated in chapters five and six.

xenophobic attitudes of local trade unionists towards Mozambican migrant workers in the late 1950s. These newspapers, particularly the *African Daily News* provided me with useful references on discussions about Mozambican migrant workers amongst trade unionist leaders, including Mozambican representatives.

My understanding of the establishment of Mozambican proto-nationalist organisations would not have been possible without the collaboration of Mr. João de Deus who allowed me to consult the voluminous collection on this issue in his possession in Tete province.³⁸ This material was very important in stimulating my interest in this issue in my interviews with Mozambican migrants in Zimbabwe. In addition, Mr. Vilanculos, a former migrant labour worker in South Africa and a semi-retired civil servant at the Ministry of Labour in Maputo, provided me with some colonial documents which enhanced my understanding of the history of nationalism amongst Mozambican migrants.³⁹

To sum up, on the one hand, the combination of the material gathered from different collections in the AHM provided me with useful insights into the impact of colonial policy on African communities, on the other hand, the analysis of administrative sources in the Zimbabwe National Archives contributed greatly to my understanding of administrative and official thinking and decision-making, especially on African labour issues and agriculture in both territories under colonial domination. However, in these collections, African voices are silent. In this introduction, I have summarised the most important studies on the impact of migrant labour on the rural economies of southern Africa, in particular South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique itself. I have discussed the methodological issues involved in the process of my research, particularly the collection and analysis of the oral testimonies and archival sources. This

³⁷See more in chapters seven and eight.

³⁸Mr. João de Deus is a Director of Labour Department in Tete province. Some time in 1976 (?) the local government in Manica decided to eliminate all colonial documents. Surprised with this action and because he was eager to learn about labour management, de Deus thought that those documents (many of them brought from the Portuguese Curadoria in Rhodesia) would be very useful. This explains why he retained those documents in his possession. When I met him during my first trip for field work in Tete in 1993, and explained the objectives of my research he invited me to his place and showed me those documents.

³⁹Mr. Vilanculos is an enthusiastic amateur of Mozambique's history and has some

introduction has shown the importance of using oral and written sources dialectically for a full understanding of rural society in Manica province. The thesis that follows is based on this material and is divided into ten chapters. In the following chapter, I provide an overview of the political and economic situation of Manica province before 1930.

fascinating colonial documents in his possession which allowed me to consult.

CHAPTER 2:

AFRICAN SOCIETY, SETTLER FARMERS AND LABOUR MIGRATION BEFORE THE 1930s:

Introduction

In this chapter I attempt, on the one hand, to describe the pre-colonial society of the Shona-speaking peoples of Manica province, on the other hand, to analyse the colonial impact on African societies from the 1890s to the 1930s. This chapter is generally structured into three main sections namely: society before the Nguni arrival; society under Gaza-Nguni influence; and society under Portuguese colonial domination. In each of these periods, the socio-economic and political structures of the Manyika, Matchwe and Ndau of Manica province showed distinct features. In the first section I analyse the extent to which the Manica and Quiteve kingdoms were affected by merchant capital. In the second section, I examine the political and economic changes introduced by the Gaza-Nguni state. In the last section I discuss the process through which colonialism integrated local peasants into the market economy, either as local labourers or as farmers.

Owing to the sketchiness of contemporary studies, whether anthropological, archaeological or historical, of Shona peoples in Mozambique, the reconstruction of their pre-colonial history is a challenge. I have, therefore, had to rely largely on studies relating to Zimbabwe which deal in part with Mozambique.¹ The pre-colonial history of Manica province as written by contemporary Portuguese chroniclers and military officials, deals more with the ruling groups than with the ordinary people. The exception seems to be the work of the Dominican Father João dos Santos in the seventeenth century, who described the customs and socio-economic life of the people.²

¹Although Zimbabwean scholars recognise the existence of a considerable number of documents to reconstruct the history of the region as early as 1500, their reliability is still doubtful. For instance, David Beach claims that "the archaeology is far from complete and is sometimes ambiguous, the oral traditions are not nearly as useful as was once thought, and the documents were usually not written by first-hand observers." Beach, *The Shona and their neighbours*, (Oxford, 1994), 98.

²See João dos Santos, *Ethiopia orientalis*, (Évora, 1609). However, his narrative is more concerned with Quiteve and Sofala than Manica, and St. Vincent Erskine, the Natal official who travelled throughout the territory in the second half of the nineteenth

While historical evidence of the Manyika and the Matchwe goes back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the reconstruction of Ndau history relies almost entirely on evidence from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

1. The Shona speaking-peoples: society, economy and politics before the 19TH century.

Historically the indigenous inhabitants of Manica province have been Shona-speaking peoples and are generally subdivided into three main ethnic groups: the *Ndau* or *Vandau* composed of the *Vadanda* in the south and the *Matombojes* in the north of Mossurize and Dombe. These groups spoke *Chidanda* and *Chindau* respectively; the *Matchwe* or *Mateve* who spoke *Chiteuè* and inhabited the central region, especially Moribane, Gondola and Chimoio; and the *Manyika* in the old Mutassa kingdom and across the eastern Zimbabwe border. The *Manyika* people spoke *chi-Manica*.³

Just before the arrival of the Portuguese, at the end of the fifteenth century, there were several migrations particularly of the Karanga élites from the Mutapa or Mwenemutapa state. These élites are supposed to be the founders of the large states which constituted the present-day Manica district, namely the Teve (Quiteve), Danda (Sedanda), Manyika, and Bvumba (Vumba) kingdoms.⁴ By 1512 it seems that the Manyika (Manica)

century, found distortions in the dos Santos narrative. See St. Vincent Erskine, "Journey to Umzila's South-East Africa, in 1871-1872", especially appendix A (Ancient travels) in Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, vol.45, 1875. Manuel Barroso in Alcântara Guerreiro presented a very sketchy description of the Manica kingdom, "Inquérito em Moçambique no ano de 1573", Studia (Lisbon), 6, (1960), 7-18: 16-18.

³For more details see among others, J.K.Rennie, "Christianity, colonialism and the origins of nationalism amongst the Ndau", Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1973; M.da Cruz, "História da formação da classe trabalhadora em Manica e Sofala ao sul do Pungue, 1892-1926", (MA, Maputo, 1982); A.Rita-Ferreira, Povos de Moçambique, (Porto, Afrontamento, nd.), especially chapter four; Gustavo de Bivar Pinto Lopes, Respostas ao questionário etnográfico apresentado pela secretaria dos negócios indígenas referente ao território da Companhia de Moçambique, (Beira, 1928).

⁴The definition of the Shona state is a very complex issue. As far as I am concerned, I understand Shona states as political unity. These political units, however, varied greatly in size and power. A preliminary study on Bvumba has been pursued by J.H. Bannerman, in "Bvumba - Estado pre-colonial Shona em Manica, na fronteira entre Moçambique e o Zimbabwe", in Arquivo (Maputo), 13, (April 1993), 1-54.

kingdom had been established, while Teve was a local power before the 1560s.⁵

Much of the literature on the history of Great Zimbabwe and the Monomotapa produced by Portuguese scholars, who relied on military and explorers' accounts, suggests that these states formed part of the Monomotapa empire, and that they were vassals of its king. They reached this conclusion because of the similarities in language, custom and institutions of the different chieftaincies of the region between the Zambezi and Save rivers.⁶ However, contemporary historians do not believe in the existence of a large empire, arguing that although most of the Karanga chiefly dynasties derived from the same ruling clan, they were forced to move with their followers into new territory and to establish relatively small states.⁷

With the domination of the local Shona-speaking populations of the region, the Manica plateau saw the emergence of the ruling Tshikanga (Chikanga) lineage and its emergence into the kingdom of Manica, which, although volatile, survived until the nineteenth century. The Manica kingdom was subdivided into small units (*Fumos*) and homesteads ruled by the heads of lineages. The local chiefs and the headmen had important economic and social functions within their territories. In addition to these roles, local chiefs also performed spiritual ceremonies that helped to strengthen their political power. Their connection with spirit-mediums and rainmakers lent the chiefdoms a theocratic character and contributed towards their political stability. On the other hand, the kings of Manica and Quiteve controlled this power through annual firelighting rituals and their assistance at religious ceremonies to ensure rain and good harvests.⁸

Further, the kings exacted tribute, administered justice (especially in the case of local

⁵D.N.Beach, The Shona and their neighbours (Oxford, 1994), 110-111, 211, fn.9. However, as is also recognised by Beach, "it is difficult to decide just when the formation of states began in the region, because the archaeological evidence can only show when the process has already started."

⁶See Ministère de la Marine a des Colonies: Quelques notes sur l'etablissement et les travaux des Portugais au Monomotapa, (Lisbon, 1889), 15.

⁷D.N.Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850, (London, 1980), 62-3,80; M. Newitt, A History of Mozambique (London, 1995), 39.

⁸Departamento de História, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, História de Moçambique, vol.I, (Maputo,1981).

disputes and witchcraft), enforced customary rights over parts of hunted game (especially the big wild animals' skins and ivory)⁹, and formalised marriage transactions (*shuma*). According to João dos Santos, in these transactions "Women were given in exchange for cows, cloths (*panos*), beads (*contas*) or hoes, each according to his power and the value of the woman".¹⁰

Polygyny and *shuma* were important aspects of household organisation in Manica, as was the role of chiefs in the control of marriage ceremonies. Polygyny was linked to the relative power of senior males who controlled access to women who were and still are important for their reproductive as well as their productive power. In Manica the "cow of the mother" was supposed to be given by the groom's family to the bride's mother for the propitiation of her ancestors. If the beast were not paid, any trouble in the new family was likely to be interpreted as a demand for the cow by one of the mother's spirits. Thus the spirit of the mother's family served to protect and guard the well-being of the child.¹¹ The more wives a man had the better his chance to gain access to more land and to generate wealth.¹² Men also wished to have as many children as possible to reinforce the reproductive power of the lineage. Daughters were also very important because their marriage represented social security.

The Manyika, Ndau and Matchwe societies were and still are based on kinship in which inheritance, including family names, is transmitted from father to son. They were divided

⁹ Beach refers to this practice claiming that: "When elephants became valuable for their ivory as well as for their meat, this idea became applicable to the ivory, with the ruler obtaining the tusk nearest the ground when the elephant had finally fallen"; See, Beach, The Shona and their Neighbours, 104. During my interviews in Manica, people remembered these stories, especially that which influenced the Chirara conquest of the Nengomacha chieftaincy.

¹⁰ Quoted by Newitt, A History of Mozambique, 52. Although the author does not explain how women's value was defined, it seems, from my interviews, that their value was measured by age and virginity.

¹¹ For more details on the impact of colonial economy on *shuma* transactions in Manica district see, Gustavo de Bivar Pinto Lopes, Respostas ao questionário etnográfico, 67,96. For example in the 1920s, if the girl was virgin the groom had to pay £3 more or 25 hoes.

¹² Wives were also regarded as capital. See also Julião Quintinha, Manica e Sofala, (Lisbon, 1938), 16; and Brito Camacho, Moçambique: problemas Coloniais, (Lisbon, 1926), 235-236.

into patrilineal clans and sub-clans, each with its own name or totem (*ntupo or mutupo*).¹³ The residential group or homestead was also based upon patriliney and sons usually stay in their father's homesteads. The leadership of the group was inherited from brother to brother and eventually by the eldest son or nephew in the absence of an uncle. However, in the case of Chimoio inheritance was through the female line and some chieftaincies were ruled by women.¹⁴ The head of the group had economic and social responsibility for all members of his or her extended family, although the social burden of the group was shared between all members of the homestead. The houses were either built with wattle and mud or with red-brown mudbrick, and thatched with grass in a circular or rectangular design. The homesteads were generally concentrated in the main fertile areas although some scattered further away.

The peasant economy was based on agriculture (sorghum, maize, monkey nut, fine millet or *ruquesa*, yams or *madhumbe*) and livestock (cattle and goats), and was supplemented by hunting, fishing and mining according to local ecological and environmental conditions. In the sixteenth century, Barroso described the economic situation in Manica and Quiteve as follows:

the land of Manhica has little food that which does exist is not enough for many of the inhabitants of the land and most of the year they eat food which they go to find outside in the lands of Quiteve and Barue where there is a lot and which is not far away, and the inhabitants of Manhica are more given to trade than agricultural work.¹⁵

However, contemporary research by Mudengue suggests that in Manica mining "was usually a part time occupation for people whose principal livelihood was farming". He adds that mining "was a dry-season occupation since the miners had to wait for the river level to fall or the table to drop sufficiently for deeper level mining to become possible."¹⁶ According to Newitt, hunting was the work of men, agriculture, weaving and mining were women's work.¹⁷

¹³See, Rita-Ferreira *Povos de Moçambique*, chapter four.

¹⁴Pinto Lopes, *Respostas ao questionário*, 23; Brito Camacho, *Terra de Lendas*. (Lisbon, 1925).

¹⁵ Manuel Barroso, "Inquérito em Mocambique no ano 1573", in Alcântara Guerreiro, (ed.), *Studia*, 6, 7-19: 16-17.

¹⁶Mudenge, *A Political history*, 166-7, 178-88;

¹⁷Newitt, *Mozambique*, 51.

Given the environmental conditions the agricultural and hunting potential of the region could thus support a substantial number of households. Some peasants also produced domestic utensils and agricultural tools such as wooden mortars, iron hoes and gongs, pottery, mats, and copper rings, local cloths and beads. Although chiefs relied on cattle as a local source of wealth, gold-mining was no less important as a means of accumulating wealth for the king in Manica.¹⁸

The Teve (Quiteve) state had a long and conflictual relationship with the Portuguese, which culminated in the outbreak of civil wars in the eighteenth century. It is believed that many Teve dynasties had descended from the Rozwi. This suggests that the Rozwi may have gained control over many regional areas of the Teve during this period.¹⁹ In the eighteenth century the Rozwi established the Sanga kingdom that was based in the present day Mossurize, Chipinge and southern Chimanimani districts of Zimbabwe. With the death of the Teve king, Tica, his widows, the Queens Ngomani and Nemaunga, initially ruled the state. It was then split into several large chieftaincies, amongst them under chiefs Chibata in Bandula, Tica (successor) in Nhamatanda, Queen Ngomani in Gondola and chief Moribane (Murivane) and Mavita (now Sussundenga).²⁰ The influence of the Rozwi dynasty was also extended to Dombe, where chiefs such as Gudza, Sambanhe, Chibue, Muxamba, and Muoco, were all likely to recognise the Murivane chieftainship.²¹

Apart from controlling the gold trade, the king of Manica also levied taxes (*curva*) on foreigners who had established themselves in the kingdom, and set up fairs (*feiras*) for gold and other merchandise throughout the territory. In the sixteenth century the king of Quiteve levied a five per cent tax (equivalent to one cloth in twenty). Merchants whether Portuguese, Indians or Africans (*vashambadzi*), brought cloth and beads from

¹⁸ Pinto Lopes, *Respostas ao questionário*, 23.

¹⁹ Beach, *A Zimbabwean past*, (Gweru, 1994), chapter 6.

²⁰ See my interviews with Mr. Ernesto Changai (Zembe, 2 August 1996).

²¹ J.H. Bannerman, "Distrito de Sussundenga Área Administrativa de Dombe - Area Report", MARRP, (Chimoio, June 1996).

the coast onto the Manica highlands.²² Macequece and Bandire were the most important fairs of Manica and Quiteve respectively.²³ The control of trade routes and taxation were important in the reinforcing the king's power.

In the 1600s Portuguese influence was carried into the hinterland, especially across the Manica highlands.²⁴ Agreements signed (especially in 1608 and 1629) between Portugal and local chiefs of the Monomotapa dynasty ensured that the chiefs acknowledged themselves to be vassals of the king of Portugal, and agreed to the opening of their territory to commerce, the expulsion of Arabs, the provision of facilities for gold mining and the establishment of Catholic missions. Somewhat later, the chiefs themselves became christianized. However, these agreements brought about internal conflicts amongst the power élite in the Monomotapa dynasty.

In the 1690s, the Manica and Quiteve kingdoms were severely affected by the Changamire wars. With the outbreak of these civil conflicts, trade at the Macequece fair was nearly paralysed. In 1719 the fair at Macequece was re-established and lasted until 1795 when the Manica Kingdom again became politically unstable. During the eighteenth century Manica chiefs still exerted political control over the goldfields. The Portuguese, who eventually established their officials (*capitão-mor*) and a garrison at Macequece, were not allowed to place gold-mines under their own control.²⁵ The captains paid tribute to the Chikangas, and through them to the Changamiras. The role of Macequece was more than a simple centre for trading gold. Indeed Macequece had

²²See Newitt, Mozambique, 50, 194, 198. The most important merchandise was Indian cloth, Venezian beads, Dutch gin and Chinese porcelain. Beach, The Shona and their neighbours, 104, comments that "on formal occasions, the fine locally made cloth was preferred, and also used as wall hangings, but the market for imported cloth was immense...the weavers of the drought-prone lower Zambezi worked hard to compete with the importers of Indian cloth in the inland market of the Mutapa state."

²³Macequece (Masekese or Massikessi) was formerly known as Chipangura. In the 1630s it had a large Portuguese and Christian community numbering twenty five heads of households. The nearest fair frequented by the Portuguese was at Vumba. Bandire fair only gained its importance in the seventeenth century. See Newitt, Mozambique, 195-96; Carlos da Silva Azeredo, "Missão de Nossa Senhora do Rosario" (mimeo), 1940.

²⁴A detailed account about the Portuguese presence in Manica has been presented in Newitt, Mozambique, particularly chapter four.

²⁵H.H.Bhila, Trade and Politics in a Shona Kingdom, the Manyika and their Portuguese and African Neighbours 1575-1902, (Harlow, 1982), 123.

been transformed into a centre for regional commerce in a variety of products such as iron hoes, cattle, copper, rubber, and ivory.²⁶

From the material briefly outlined in this section, it is clear that the Shona-speaking peoples of Manica and Teve had for many centuries been involved in market-orientated production through Sofala or Sena. Although gold was the main product of this trade, cloth and beads were most important to the Manica. Trade seems to have encouraged local peasants to produce surplus food for sale, especially on the trade routes and goldfields. The fairs of Manica were always subordinated to local chiefly control and contributed to the strengthening of chiefly power. Although the Portuguese appointed officials to reside at the fairs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they had no power over the local people. The Manica and Quiteve kingdoms were only overturned by the Nguni kings between 1830-1836.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Chikanga chiefs in the Manica kingdom adopted the new dynastic title of Mutasa (Umtasa).²⁷ Between 1830 and 1836 the Manica and Quiteve kingdoms were attacked by warbands under Nxaba's leadership and then by Gaza-Nguni warriors. Drought and Nguni invasions in Manica highlands may have affected the economic life, particularly trading in the region.²⁸ However, despite Nguni attacks the gold (washing) trade never dwindled away entirely and was still evident in the 1850s.²⁹ The following section analyses the impact of the Nguni presence on the Manica, Quiteve, Sedanda and Sanga (Quissanga) kingdoms.

2. Manica under Gaza-Nguni influence.

The presence of Nguni people in central Mozambique was a result of the movement of people from Zululand during the "Mfecane". This diaspora has been linked to political and economic disputes, as well as ecological disasters which caused famine in the region.³⁰ The northwards movement of the Nguni was led by Nxaba and Ngwana

²⁶Newitt, *Mozambique*, 214.

²⁷Bhila, *Trade*, 157.

²⁸Beach, *The Shona and Zimbabwe*, 178.

²⁹*Ibid*, 113.

³⁰A major conference on "The 'Mfecane' aftermath, towards a new paradigm": colloquium at the University of the Witwatersrand, 6-9 September 1991, reassessed this

Maseko in 1821, through the northern Transvaal and onto the Zimbabwe plateau. Nxaba's northwards movement was strengthened by regiments composed of Tsonga (or so-called Thonga) people. These war-bands attacked Inhambane in 1824, before conquering the ancient chieftaincies north of the Save river in 1827.³¹ The first Nguni to settle in central Mozambique were, therefore, the Nguni of Nxaba (Muava). According to Swynnerton

Uncaba [Nxaba] became unpopular here, one of the principal grievances being that he would not allow members of his crack regiment, the Amakanda, to marry until their heads were grey. Representations were made to Manikusa and he was induced to come up here. Fighting occurred and Uncaba, forsaken by his best fighting regiment (the Amakanda), retired with a following up the Sabi valley, and subsequently in a north-westerly direction.³²

Subsequently, Nxaba conquered Madanda (Sedanda) in 1827 and established a short-lived Nguni state in the Sanga or Quissanga kingdom which was responsible for raids into Manica and Teve state by 1830. In his expansion to east-central Manica and Sofala, Nxaba also raided the Portuguese at Sofala in 1836/1837.³³ In Sanga, he rounded up the cattle of the conquered people and seized young men and girls to strengthen his regiments.³⁴

Although he was responsible for disrupting the local social fabric, Nxaba brought all the region between Save and Zambezi rivers into a single tributary state under his central control. As Newitt stresses, "he began the process by which the fragmented lineage-based polities of lowland Mozambique were welded into a large, powerful and cohesive unit".³⁵ Nevertheless, Nxaba was threatened by the Gaza-Nguni chief Soshangane who expelled him from Sanga in 1840. After this, Nxaba fled west and northwards across the

now controversial matter. See Carolyn Hamilton (ed.) *Mfecane Aftermath* (Braamfontein, 1996). The 'Mfecane' reconsidered", *Journal of African History* (JAH), 33 (1992), 1-36.

³¹See, G. Liesegang, "Nguni migrations between Delagoa Bay and the Zambesi, 1821-1839", *African Historical Studies*, 3 (1970), 317-37.

³²C.F.M. Swynnerton, "An examination of the tsetse fly problem in north Mossurise, Portuguese East Africa", *Bulletin of Entomological Research*, XI, (1920-1921), 315-385:331.

³³See Liesegang, "Nguni Migrations", 325.

³⁴Liesegang, "Nguni migrations, 325.

³⁵Newitt, *Mozambique*, 260.

Zambezi river.³⁶

Shortly after the conquest of central Mozambique, Soshangane moved his headquarters (chief homestead) to southern Mozambique, leaving his son Mzila to bring the area under tribute. After Soshangane's death Mzila again moved the capital to north of the Save and established the centre of the Gaza state (Mandlakazi) in the Chipinge and Mossurize districts. Under King Mzila (1861-1884) and his son Gungunhana or Ngungunyane (1884-1895), the tributary areas under the Gaza state extended much further into the territories south of the Zambezi river.³⁷ During the period of their rule the Gaza kings forced many local people into their armies and took many of the women as wives. The Nguni influence was not only at a political or economical level; it also had a cultural impact. As a result, the Shona, especially in southern Manica (Dombe) and Mossurize, became partly acculturated. People in these areas spoke an Nguni language and adopted some Nguni customs.³⁸

While the northern chieftainships, particularly those clustered in the Manyika state or the contemporary Mutasa kingdom, resisted Gaza raids and survived as effective states, Murivane, the most powerful king in the south-central region of Manica province (Gondola, Mavita, Rotanda, Dombe), came to terms with the Gaza invasion and acted as a subordinate chief. Thus, the Gaza state exercised its power in the region (generally known as Mussapa) through Murivane.³⁹ Local "*mambos*" who were under Murivane received instructions from the Gaza kings through him, especially for tax collection, the recruitment of local men into Nguni armies and other duties. This strategy allowed pre-existing lineage groups and minor chieftaincies to survive, since they recognized Gaza overlordship and provided tribute.⁴⁰

³⁶Liesegang, "Nguni migrations, 328.

³⁷For more details on the impact of Mzila's Gaza-Nguni state in Manica, see António Maria Cardoso, "Expedição às terras do Muzila, 1882", Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, (BSGL) 1887, 184-6.

³⁸For more details on the process of acculturation among Ndaue people, see Rennie, "Christianity, colonialism and the origins of nationalism", chapter three.

³⁹According to Liesegang, when Nxaba invaded Quiteve in 1830 "the Portuguese suspected that the invaders were taking part in local politics supporting Murivane, one of the chiefs of Quiteve, against rival relatives who also wanted to become king of Quiteve. See Liesegang, "Nguni migrations", 325.

⁴⁰Newitt, Mozambique, 287; see also Liesegang, "Notes on the internal structures of the Gaza kingdom of Southern Mozambique, 1840-1895", in J.B. Peires (ed.), Before and

In general, the Gaza political elite had in cattle their principal means of accumulating wealth.⁴¹ In his journey to Mzila's territory, St. Vincent Erskine witnessed the importance of cattle as source of wealth in the Gaza-Nguni state. Referring to the existence of royal kraals scattered throughout the territory he stated that: "Umzila has about a thousand of cattle at his kraal, which have been, for the most part, plundered from the *Amadumas*".⁴² Bhila has found that in the 1840s and 1850s the Manica kingdom paid one hundred head of cattle as its acknowledgement of Gaza overlordship. He points out that in that short period the Nguni invaders also married Manyika women who were kidnapped from their homesteads as slaves.⁴³

Cattle was not the only way of paying tribute, but also replaced hoes and cloths as the main currency in marriage transactions. To fulfill his political and economic goals Mzila centered his strategy on the control of local people and labour supply.⁴⁴ In fact, at the highest point of the Gaza domination in the second half of the nineteenth century, Mzila and later his successor Gungunhana strengthened Gaza state power over the local people through their control of three important resources: the management of large cattle herds, the labour of conquered men, including slavery, and external trade. In his study of slavery in the Gaza-Nguni state Patrick Harries claims that slave labour was most important for domestic production and worked as servants, in agriculture, herding and as porters. He suggests that slaves "were concentrated in the hands of Nguni notables and commonly assisted, or took the place of, Nguni women in the fields".⁴⁵ The Gaza state also disrupted the old Portuguese trade-routes between the coast and the

after Shaka, 178-209:193.

⁴¹See explorers' accounts from the 1870s and 1880s by Cardoso, "Expedição às terras do Muzila, 1882", 172-73.

⁴²St. Vincent Erskine's, "Third and Fourth Journey in Gaza, or Southern Mozambique, 1873 to 1874, and 1874 to 1875", in *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, vol.48, (1878), 33.

⁴³Bhila, *Trade and politics*, 185.

⁴⁴Oral testimonies collected by Wilson Mhlanga in Chipinge provides an interesting description of Mzila methods of people's conscription into slavery; see W.Mhlanga, "(1) The story of Ngwaqazi (2) The History of the Amatshangana", *NADA* 25, (1948), 70-73.

⁴⁵Harries, "Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni: Its changing shape and functions and its relationship to other forms of exploitation", in Peires, *Before and after Shaka*, 210-223:218; Idem, "Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extraction: the nature of free and unfree labour in South-East Africa", *JAH*, 22 (1981), 309-330.

hinterland, and established its own control, especially over the ivory, hides and rubber trade.⁴⁶

However, at the time of the Nguni conquest, Mossurize was infested with tsetse fly (*glossina morsitans*). This disease vector carries trypanosomiasis from wildlife to cattle, by transmitting a fatal trypanosome. Although in the nineteenth century many African polities developed a way of reducing tsetse fly by dispersing wildlife,⁴⁷ Nguni strategy in Mossurize seems to have centered on the control of human settlement and labour. According to David Hughes, citing Swynnerton's collection of oral history, Mzila's strategy consisted of imposing the compulsory movement of the population.⁴⁸ Swynnerton illustrates this strategy in Mossurize and Chimanimani:

The Zulus [i.e. the Ngoni], knew the fly well, and the disease caused by it, and they regarded the proximity of game as dangerous for cattle...They said, 'this whole country is full of it - where shall we put our cattle?'... Later he said 'I cannot live away from my cattle'...Thereupon an immense compulsory movement of the population took place. The country to the east of the Sitatonga Hills, particularly in and south of Gunye's, was at that time more fully populated than that to their west, but almost the whole of this population was deported, territorial chieftains and all, to the lower parts of the tract between the Sitatongas and the present British border, to Spungabera and Gwenzi's country, and to the Umswirizwi (Mossurize) valley to Zinyumbo's Hills and Chimbiya's... The chief Gunye told me that he himself was compelled to settle at Chimbiya's.⁴⁹

Hughes also points out that Mzila and later Gungunhana ordered local residents to burn the bush annually late in the dry season. Drives with nets were then organised across the entire country to eradicate game, a measure that also may have produced ivory for sale by the king.⁵⁰

⁴⁶According to Swynnerton, "An examination", 333, rubber was "a valuable asset to the Zulus who traded the rubber for cloth on the coast, and used the latter in turn in the barter of cattle". The importance to Mzila of control over trade routes was recognised by St. Vincent Erskine in his "Third and fourth journeys in Gaza, or southern Mozambique, 1873 to 1874, and 1874 to 1875", 25.

⁴⁷See, H.Kjekshurs, Ecology control and economic development: the case of Tanganyika, 1850-1950 (Berkeley, 1977), 71-79.

⁴⁸David Hughes, "Disputed territory and dependent people: Rethinking land tenure on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border", Seminar paper presented to the International Association for the Study of Common Property meetings, 5-8 June 1996, Berkeley, California, USA.

⁴⁹Swynnerton, "An examination", 332.

⁵⁰Hughes, "Disputed territory and dependent people", 11; see also Swynnerton, "An

With the development of mining in Kimberley and the Transvaal in the 1870s and 1880s, men from villages in central Mozambique, particularly Mossurize and neighbouring areas, traveled to these new economic centres in search of wage employment. With the increasing influx of sterling brought home by migrant labourers, Gaza-Nguni chiefs demanded that tribute be paid in pounds. Although cattle did not lose its economic and social value, pounds became the principal currency in commercial and marriage transactions.⁵¹ This change might have influenced the increasing number of young and adult men migrating to the Transvaal.

In 1889, King Gungunhana left Sanga (Mossurize) and Mussapa, and transferred the capital of the Gaza state to Bilene (present Gaza province) in southern Mozambique. By this time, the Portuguese had already moved into Teve state, and subordinated the local "mambos". The fact that Portugal had signed treaties with Gungunhana in 1885⁵² and with the Manica chiefs in 1886, may confirm the partial autonomy the chiefs of the Manica kingdom enjoyed under the Gaza Nguni state.⁵³ However, in 1889, Portuguese officials recognised that Teve and other Shona "mambos" of Mussapa region were still obedient to the Gaza state. Moreover, shortly after they seized the territory, in 1893 the Mozambique Company established agreement or an *Modus-Vivendi* with Gungunhana.⁵⁴ This *Modus-Vivendi* aimed to formalise the Gaza-Nguni's vassal status in relation to the Portuguese government and to facilitate tax collection and labour recruitment by the Mozambique Company. The Portuguese only ended Gaza-Nguni

examination", 332-333. On the importance of ivory trade see, Rennie, "Christianity, colonialism and the origins of nationalism", 137.

⁵¹See Cruz, "A história da formação da classe trabalhadora", 84-93; "Kinship, ideology, and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration", in S.Marks and R.Rathbone (eds), Industrialisation and rural change in South Africa, (London, 1980), 142-166

⁵²José Casaleiro, a Portuguese official, persuaded the king of Gaza, Gungunhana, to become a Portuguese vassal through an agreement signed on 12 October 1885. See Liesegang, "Vassalagem ou Tratado de Amizade? Histórico do Acto de Vassalagem de Ngungunyane nas Relações Externas de Gaza", Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique. Estudos, II, 1986, 7-36.

⁵³M. Gouveia, Moçambique: O passado e o presente 1890-1974, (Lourenço Marques, 1974/5?), 127-133.

⁵⁴For more details see, Cruz, "História da formação da classe trabalhadora", 99-103; Trindade Coelho, Dezoito anos em Africa (Lisbon, 1898); In the 1890s Gungunhana was involved in very intensive diplomatic contacts with concession hunters, American missionaries, Portuguese political emissaries and the British South Africa Company.

power with the defeat of Gungunhana in 1895, however.

In this section the main concern has been to explain the economic, political and cultural influence of Gaza-Nguni in the Manyika, Teve and Ndaue milieu. From the literature it is clear that the Gaza economy was orientated more to cattle-herding than to agriculture. The impact of Gaza-Nguni over local chieftaincies varied according to their proximity to the chief's homesteads. Although herds of cattle need far more land than agriculture, in the Manica and Teve kingdoms the Gaza-Nguni state seems to have been relatively less concerned with land than with the need to control people's mobility and labour for herding cattle and hunting.⁵⁵ However, the conscription of men and women into slavery probably disrupted their traditional economy. Although the Nguni impact varied from one region to another, they were strong enough to exact tribute on the subsistence economy, crafts and trade, throughout the region between the Save and Zambezi rivers.⁵⁶

Moreover, although territorial control remained under local chieftaincies, the political centralization of the Gaza-Nguni state meant that it had control over people. The predatory Gaza-Nguni state may also have influenced the increasing migration of young and adult men to Transvaal and Rhodesia. Although there may have been other reasons, the need to pay tribute in sterling at least partly explains the migration.

Given four centuries of contact with the outside world, African societies in Manica could hardly have preserved their culture untouched. This process of acculturation influenced language, food, clothes, education and religion. Unlike the case in southern Mozambique (especially Gaza and Maputo), African languages, in particular Chi-manyika, incorporated more Portuguese vocabulary than English.⁵⁷ The early presence of Christian missionaries as early as sixteenth century may also have influenced local religious belief. However,

⁵⁵ However, it is true that agriculture is far more labour intensive than herding or hunting. In relation to Mossurize, J.Rennie, "Christianity, colonialism and the origins of nationalism", 137, quoting G.Wilder, observed that people were just the dogs of the King; "they must work hunting the Buffalo, the Hippopotamus and the Elephant." In addition he states that hunters were also fined for the unauthorized possession of ivory.

⁵⁶ For example Ngungunhana was not worried about gold-mining in Manica. Instead he preferred to control the ivory and rubber trade in the south-western region. See St. Vincent Erskine, "Third and fourth journeys to Mzila", 32.

⁵⁷ Robert H.Baker, "Portuguese words in chimanyika", *NADA*, No.24, 1947, 62-65.

these influences depended on how far the Europeans penetrated into the Manica hinterland. In fact, places like Mossurize, which to some extent remained untouched, kept their language and customs relatively uninfluenced by Europeans. However, the impact of Nguni culture was more remarkable here than in Manica or Chimoio. Manica cosmology certainly reveals traces of foreign culture, and this suggests that African society in Manica was not static but has been in a continuous process of social transformation.

With the arrival of foreign settlers, particularly in Manica/Macequece, homesteads were forced to move away to the mountains or into areas of low fertility, far from the main streams, and communication networks. Those who wished to remain in their original homes had to become labour tenants. The new economic patterns and ecological conditions both contributed to the variation in the size of the cluster of homesteads. The increasing influence of the Catholic and Protestant missions may have also contributed to the disruption of traditional patterns of social organisation. In fact, one of the most important conflicts in the twentieth century was related to the missionaries' attempt to abolish *shuma*' (bridewealth) and polygyny amongst local people.

3. The state, the Mozambique Company, settler farmers and African labour, 1890-1930.

Although the Portuguese presence in central Mozambique goes back to the fifteenth century their colonisation of Manica territory was not effective until the defeat of the Gaza empire and the establishment of colonial boundaries in the early 1890s. The European scramble for Africa constituted a severe challenge for Portuguese imperial power in central Mozambique in the 1890s. The combination of forces in the region was not favourable to the Portuguese monarch. With the Portuguese state caught in financial crisis, its extremely corrupt officials could not hold their own in the face of the powerful British interests in the region. At this time, the Portuguese lost much of what is now Manicaland in Zimbabwe.⁵⁸ Fertile areas such as the Lucite, Buzi and Revue valleys were constantly threatened by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which had

⁵⁸See Beach, "As origens de Moçambique e Zimbabwe: Paiva de Andrada, a Companhia de Moçambique e a diplomacia africana 1881-1891", *Arquivo* (Maputo), 13, (April, 1993), 5-80.

already established encampments at Murivane and Maforga villages, as well as on the lower Revue and in the gold mining areas of Penhalonga in the Mutasa kingdom.⁵⁹

According to Bannerman, Afrikaner farmers who had trekked north of Chipinge and Chimanimani districts of Zimbabwe occupied much of the most productive land on the Mossurize and Chipinge plateau in the 1890s.⁶⁰ It was only the perseverance, patriotism and ambition of Paiva de Andrada that enabled Portugal to come to terms with the British through diplomatic efforts and to establish the borders of its colony in Mozambique in June 1891.⁶¹ The immediate consequence of this demarcation was that the old Shona kingdom of Mutasa, Sanga and the old Gaza state core area were divided between Portugal and Britain, and are today part of Mozambique and Zimbabwe respectively. [MAP]

Under colonial domination, Manica district comprised three main economic regions. Crops were planted in accord with the quality of soils, and environmental, ecological and climatic conditions, as well as with the agricultural tradition in the region. While in Chimoio district non-Portuguese settlers who held large-scale farms dominated white settlement, in Manica there were basically medium and small-scale Portuguese farmers. In Chimoio the main crops were maize, tobacco, sisal, peanuts, sesame, sunflower, banana, citrus and natural forestry and timber (especially hardwood) in Gondola and Bandula.

Portuguese farmers in Manica held their farms either individually or in associations. Settlers in Manica produced maize, wheat, potato, beans, cotton (especially in Dombe), fruit and vegetables (including cabbages, garlic and ginger). There were also some agri-

⁵⁹ For more details see, J.Paiva de Andrada, Manica being a Report addressed to the Minister of the Marine and the Colonies of Portugal, (London, Philip, 1891).

⁶⁰ Bannerman, "Distrito de Sussundenga Área Administrativa de Dombe" (Research Report), MARRP, Chimoio, June 1996.

⁶¹ See among others, E.Axelson, Portugal and the scramble for Africa, (Witwatersrand University, Joahannesburg, 1967); P.R.Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese relations in South Central Africa 1890-1900, (Longman, London, 1962), 1-82 and Beach, "As origens de Moçambique", 5-80; Julião Quintinha, Manica and Sofala (Lisbon, Cosmos, 1938), chapter four.

forestry plantations, especially along the border in Penhalonga and Rotanda. Manica was also the main area of African maize, wheat and cotton farming for the market. Gold, copper, asbestos and other minerals, were generally exploited by non-Portuguese entrepreneurs.

Mossurize district was located on the south-western border of Zimbabwe. The region, especially the highlands (the highest point in Mozambique) along the border, had plenty of rivers and streams, with rich vegetation, forests, and varied wild life. However, it was heavily infested with tsetse fly. Mossurize was expected to be a labour reserve for Chimoio and Manica enterprises. In Mossurize people gathered bees-wax, collected wild rubber and produced maize. They were also forced to cultivate cotton by the Mozambique Company. Nevertheless, Mossurize lacked the commercial networks and the transport system of the Beira corridor which crossed Chimoio and Manica. As a result it only communicated with the rest of the province via Rhodesian roads through Umtali (Mutare) and Manica/Macequece. Given these conditions, Mossurize was less attractive to white settlers.

Because of their environment and their communication networks, from the beginning of the colonial settlement, Chimoio and Manica districts were occupied by foreign settlers from almost everywhere in the world, including Greece, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany, Britain, South Africa, India, and even China. However, the process of colonization was controlled by the Mozambique Chartered Company which received the right to administer Manica and Sofala territories from the colonial Portuguese government in 1891/2. The original Mozambique Company was formed in 1888 to take up mining concessions given to Paiva de Andrada.

In 1892 the new Mozambique Company received administrative rights over the territories of Manica and Sofala, and in 1897 the Portuguese government granted the Company a new charter extending its life from thirty to fifty years, i.e. until 1942.⁶² Shares in the Company were held by British, French, South African and Portuguese

⁶²Studies on the Mozambique Company have been pursued by M.I.Nogueira da Costa, "Inventário do Fundo: Companhia de Mocambique, 1892-1942", (Tese de doutoramento) Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 1993; Barry Neil-Tomlinson, "The Mozambique Chartered Company, 1892-1910", Ph.D., London, 1990; Cruz,

capitalists. The Company was responsible for establishing the infra-structure in its territory, especially roads through the "Beira Corridor", Beira harbour and the Beira-Umtali railway line, and for providing facilities for the settlement of Portuguese colonists. However, owing to the huge cost of building any infra-structure, the Mozambique Chartered Company relied on two sub-concessionaires related to the British South African Company, namely the Beira Railway and the Beira Junction Railway Company, to do so.

Initially, to achieve its economic goal, the Mozambique Chartered Company concentrated on the exploitation of railway services and mineral extraction, especially of gold and copper.⁶³ In addition it relied on taxation and trade in African produce, especially rubber, cotton and then maize, as the main source of accumulation. To fulfill their obligation of providing settlement facilities for Portuguese colonists, the Mozambique Company and the Portuguese administration planned to launch a Portuguese settlement scheme in Manica in 1897, after establishing two experimental settlements (*colónias agrícola-militares*) in Manica and Mossurize a year earlier.

Thus, after receiving its Royal Charter from the Portuguese authorities in 1891, the Mozambique Chartered Company was expected to help establish a nucleus of Portuguese colonists in Manica district within five years. Under the Decree of 11 February 1891, the Mozambique Company was responsible for providing newcomers with facilities which included shelter, land, agricultural implements, and financial subsidy. The colonists were expected to refund their loans but the term was not specified. The Portuguese colonial government had selected one thousand Portuguese family farmers to be sent by boat from Portugal to Manica and Sofala in order to establish a nucleus of European farmers to work side by side with the Mozambique Company.⁶⁴

"História da formação da classe trabalhadora", 1982;

⁶³However the Mozambique Company itself did little more than hand out sub-concessions to other mining companies. See Relatório e Contas da Companhia de Moçambique, 1889 and 1890.

⁶⁴Camilo Silveira da Costa, A fixação do militar desmobilizado como factor de valorização do povoamento agrário na provincia de Moçambique, (Lisbon, 1967), 14.

Although the Company had offered the facilities it was responsible for, and advertised the territory in Portugal and throughout Europe, the Portuguese response was very limited. Instead, it was British colonists who benefited from the regional and European advantages and who joined the venture. Given its promising economy with gold mining, railway services and fertile land for agriculture all available, other nationalities, especially Greeks and Afrikaners, enlarged the influx of non-Portuguese settlers in Manica. In contrast to the Portuguese unwillingness to emigrate to Africa, Britons and other foreigners quickly submitted applications for agriculture and grazing land, as well as for mines claims and the provision of railway services. The few Portuguese who emigrated to Africa, were more interested in job opportunities than business.

Given the slow pace of Portuguese immigration into Manica, the Portuguese government decided to amend the Mozambique Company's Charter in 1897. From this time the Company experimented with a new economic program, in particular promoting European settlement in the hope of developing commercial farming. The first step in bringing this project to fruition was through the establishment of a Portuguese settlement scheme in Inhamussanga, the so-called "*Colónia Meireles*", 10km away from Macequece village. In 1898 the Mozambique Company also established an experimental farm (*granja agrícola*) for maize, wheat, oats, barley, banana and pineapples.

The Portuguese settlement project was launched for ten years, and was planned to involve about one thousand Portuguese families.⁶⁵ Although the Mozambique Company was ready to establish Portuguese colonists in "*Colónia Meireles*", the Portuguese government was unable to fulfill its undertaking to transport the colonists from Portugal to Manica. Nevertheless, the Mozambique Company disbursed £45,000 sterling pounds a year on the settlement project.⁶⁶ As a result only some fifteen Portuguese families joined the scheme in its first three years.⁶⁷ According to da Cunha, most of the

⁶⁵In 1899 the Mozambique Company had already brought out 1400 colonists who were employed in public works at Beira harbour and railways. See Herculano Nunes, "Território de Manica e Sofala", Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, No.50, V, (1929), 218.

⁶⁶Ibid, 218.

⁶⁷P. José da Cunha, "A Companhia de Moçambique e a sua obra", Boletim Geral das

Portuguese immigrants who claimed to be farmers had not previously practised this occupation. The High Commissioner for Mozambique, Brito Camacho, confirmed this, claiming that the Portuguese farmers, especially those brought from Alentejo and Viseu villages, were illiterate and lacked agricultural skills. Some were either former soldiers or policemen, and were learning farming from local African peasants.⁶⁸ My informants in Manica remember how very poor António Tavares (who became a rich farmer in the 1940s-50s) and his family were when they arrived in Manica. According to them, Tavares and his wife began farming in the 1920s, cultivating their fields with hands and hoes.⁶⁹

On their arrival, some of Portuguese immigrants refused to travel to Manica and found employment elsewhere in Mozambique. Those who reached Manica joined the other immigrants as shoemakers or brickmakers, while some of those who were interested in settling in Macequece were unable to cope with the tropical conditions. The women and children in particular had health problems, and some even died. Others just returned to Portugal, but much poorer than when they had left. Very few, mostly unmarried men, continued farming.

In the following years, the majority of newcomers preferred to work in other more remunerative activities. Even those who engaged in industrial work, were unable to compete successfully with the Greeks, Italians and Asians (Chinese and Banyan), who were more skillful, so that the Mozambique Company had to return them to Portugal.⁷⁰ Thus, during the first ten years, the Portuguese settlement scheme failed to succeed.⁷¹ Despite this failure the Mozambique Company continued mobilizing its employees to invest their savings in Manica and provided them with land and technical assistance. As

Colónias, 1 (5), 1925, 31-67:38; Azeredo, "Missão de Nossa Senhora do Rosario", 5.

⁶⁸ Brito Camacho, Mozambique: Problemas Coloniais, (Lisbon, Guimarães & Company, 1926), 47.

⁶⁹ See collective interview in Jecua village, 12 July 1996.

⁷⁰ See Nunes, "Território de Manica e Sofala", 218; Barreto Miranda, Manica -Sofala Guide to the Mozambique Company's Territory (London, William Clowe and Sons, 1902), 102.

⁷¹ In 1907 the Governor-General of Mozambique, A. Freire D'Andrade, recognised the financial difficulties of the Portuguese government mobilising Portuguese farmers and subsidising entrepreneurial investment in the colony. The majority instead embraced this venture in Brazil. See A. Freire D'Andrade, Relatórios sobre Mocambique, vol. III (Lourenço Marques, 1907), 4 -5.

a result it was at last able to establish a few Portuguese farmers.

From 1910 onwards the foundations of the colonial economy were established in Manica province. In fact the Mozambique Company played a key role in the development of European agrarian capitalism here. As a result, Chimoio and Manica/Macequece became the main centre of European settlement in central Mozambique. The growing number of settler farmers concentrated along the railway line and in the valleys of the Punguè and Revuè rivers and their tributaries.⁷² With the increasing number of farmers cultivating maize, the demand for African labour also increased.

To boost commercial farming in Manica district the Mozambique Company reinforced its financial and technical support to the colonists, particularly through distributing free seed, especially maize, and providing credit facilities and agricultural machinery for land clearance and harvesting maize. The Company also set up Agricultural and Veterinary Departments in order to provide farmers with technical assistance.⁷³ In addition an agricultural magazine (*Jornal Agrícola*) was published to provide farmers with guidance and up-to-date information about agricultural techniques and pesticides. Parallel with farming, gold and copper mining was also developed in Manica/Macequece. In 1910, mining production was valued at about 473,842 thousand Portuguese Reis.

In 1910 under Pery de Lind's administration, the Mozambique Company reinforced the administration's measures in order to satisfy white needs, particularly in terms of capital, market opportunities and labour. Employers were also provided with loans to cover their workers' wages. In this context, between 1917 and 1919, the National Bank of South Africa provided funds for white settlers in Manica and Chimoio. From 1919 to 1932 credit for agriculture and mining was provided by the Bank of Beira, a

⁷² Relatório e Contas da Companhia de Moçambique referente a 1910, (Lisbon, 1911), 24.

⁷³ In 1911 for example, the Company brought some bulls and selected cows from Madagascar. See Relatório e Contas da Companhia de Moçambique, 1911, 30

shareholder in both the Banco Nacional Ultramarino of Portugal and the Mozambique Company.⁷⁴

As time went on new land claims were made, especially for maize cultivation which soon became the most important and profitable crop. In 1916 maize exported to Southern Rhodesia amounted to about 720,643kg, while 8,544,187kg were exported to Portugal. In 1917 about 4,326,060kg of maize and flour were again exported to Portugal. In this period, profits derived from maize exports seem to rival or even surpass gold and other minerals.⁷⁵ During World War I agricultural activity experienced a boom, especially maize.⁷⁶ (see appendix 1) With these market opportunities many colonists made considerable profits and they even changed their life style, building beautiful houses and buying cars and luxury furniture.⁷⁷

In 1920 64, 288ha of land were available for rent along the railway line in Manica and Chimoio, of which about 34,760ha were already set aside for settlers.⁷⁸ The total maize production was estimated at 46,542,690kg against 1,030,572kg of cotton and 970 ton of sisal in the 1920.⁷⁹ This new stage of agricultural development in Manica district demanded a new level of economic organization, and a Commission for Agricultural Development (*Comissão de Fomento Agrícola*) was set up by the Mozambique Chartered Company. It consisted of the Governor of the territory, the Financial Inspector, the Director of the Department of Agriculture and his deputy, the Director of the Veterinary Department, the Director of the Native Labour Bureau, the Manager Director of the Bank of Beira, and four colonial farmer's representatives. The Commission had meetings once a month.

⁷⁴ Beira News - A Companhia de Moçambique em 50 anos de actividade, 1892-1942, Beira, 1942, 11-12. The Bank of Beira was established on a nationalist basis and hoped to provide Portuguese farmers with more credit facilities than the South African Bank. See Nunes, "Território de Manica e Sofala", 220.

⁷⁵ See Relatório e Contas da Companhia de Moçambique, 1917, 26-28; G. Liesegang, "A First Look at the Import and Export Trade of Mozambique, 1800-1914", in G. Liesegang, H. Pasch, A. Jones (eds) Figuring African Trade, (Berlin, 1983), 451-523:477.

⁷⁶ However, cattle farming suffered a drastic reduction due to the disturbances caused by the resistance of Bárue chiefdom, floods, influenza and famine. See Relatório e Contas da Companhia de Moçambique, 1920, 27.

⁷⁷ Cunha, "A Companhia de Moçambique", 52.

⁷⁸ Relatório e Contas da Companhia de Moçambique, 1920.

In the mid-1920s Chimoio had become the main farming area of the region while Manica/Macequece had substantially developed gold, silver and copper mining.⁸⁰ Of the total of 64,361ha of arable land in Manica province, 25,992ha (about 144 farms) was in Chimoio. However, owing to the irregular climatic conditions, the maize output varied considerably. The same reasons and soil erosion may also have influenced the low harvest output in 1924 and 1925.⁸¹ For example, while in 1921 maize production in Manica and Chimoio amounted to 44,480 tons, in 1922 it had dropped to about 25,433 tons.⁸²

During the 1920s and 1930s, the number of white settlers involved in agricultural activities continued to increase, particularly in Chimoio and Manica. However, settler farming remained dominated by Afrikaners, Britons, Greeks and Chinese nationals rather than the Portuguese. Although the Portuguese government was very keen to settle more Portuguese subjects in the region, the lack of financial and technical assistance did not help it in mobilising Portuguese settlement. This was especially the case during the depression, when the government refused to support risky ventures which they thought might lead to an expensive subsidy, especially as African peasants were able to produce quantities of exportable goods without any government support. Under such circumstances only very few settlers were successful farmers. Those who failed in agriculture had to turn to marketing African maize in exchange for imported goods, such as wine, cloth, soap, and blankets. A small number engaged in lorry-driving, carrying migrant labourers from Tete to Southern Rhodesia, Manica and Sofala districts.

Head, Cruz and Neil-Tomlinson have all studied African labour mobilisation in central Mozambique before the 1930s.⁸³ From the early days of colonisation, labour

⁷⁹Cunha, "A Companhia de Moçambique", 52.

⁸⁰Relatório e Contas da Companhia de Moçambique, 1921. The responsibility for the mineral survey had been entrusted to the Imperial Institute of London a decade before.

⁸¹For more illustration of these fluctuations in Manica and Sofala (see appendix 1).

⁸²The low maize output in 1928-9 seems to have been affected by unfavourable market prices. Nunes, "Território de Manica e Sofala", 222.

⁸³Judith F. Head, "State, capital and migrant labour in Zambézia: A study of the labour

mobilisation was the main concern of the colonial administration in Manica. The legal foundations for the conscription of African labour in Mozambique were established by António Enes, through legislation passed in 1899.⁸⁴ Although this legislation was liberal, entrepreneurs, administrators and the Mozambique Company found its application unrealistic. So they published circulars and passed regulations which allowed them to coerce African men into wage employment. In 1900 the Mozambique Company issued labour regulations imposing on Africans the "moral obligation to work", either as wage employees or as farmers producing one hectare of subsistence food and an additional half hectare of commercial crops (rubber, groundnuts and sesame). The increasing labour demand, especially from the mining sector, brought about the need for an institution capable of guaranteeing a regular African labour supply in Manica. The publication of the *Regulamento dos Serviços Indígenas* in Manica in 1901, laid the foundations for the establishment of a Native Labour Service (*Delegação dos Serviços dos Negócios Indígenas*) at Macequece in 1902.⁸⁵

The development of the sugar industry in Buzi, Marrromeu and Sena, not only increased the competition over labour but also boosted African maize production for the market. This situation raised more complaints amongst white settler farmers in Chimoio and Manica. To overcome it the Mozambique Company administration imposed hut and poll taxes on African peasants. These compulsory contributions were complemented by labour regulations imposing wage labour on Africans.⁸⁶ Labour regulations passed in 1907 provided that 'natives' who did not cultivate their own farms properly, or did not voluntarily offer for work, would be conscripted into contract labour with the company or individual entrepreneurs for fixed wages and for a period of not less than three months.⁸⁷ Men who failed to comply with these regulations were sentenced to

force of Sena Sugar Estates", Ph.D., Durham, 1980; Studies on Manica and Sofala are particularly developed by Neil-Tomlinson and Cruz up to 1910 and 1920s respectively: Cruz, "História da formação da classe trabalhadora", 1982; Neil-Tomlinson, "The Mozambique Chartered Company, 1892 to 1910" Ph.D., London, 1990.

⁸⁴Decree of 9 November 1899.

⁸⁵M. Costa, *Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22o: Monografia do Território de Manica e Sofala sob a administração da Companhia de Moçambique*, (Beira, 1940), 397.

⁸⁶This strategy was not different from that applied in the neighbouring territories, particularly S. Rhodesia, as described by Charles Van Onselen in his *Chibaro: African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933.*, (London, 1976).

⁸⁷The new labour regulations (*Regulamento geral do Trabalho dos Indígenas no território da Companhia de Moçambique*) enacted in 1907, exempted women, children

correctional work at one third of the ordinary wage, to be paid in kind. If men absconded or deserted, their wives, sons or daughters were seized until they presented themselves. To fulfill these measures, the Mozambique Company used *sipaio* and chiefs to round up villages.⁸⁸ As a result, peasants saw tribute or taxes and labour conscription as coercion and not moral duty.

As in other parts of southern Africa, the Mozambique Company tried to combine African production and temporary wage employment (semi-proletarianization) so that it could keep salaries as low as possible.⁸⁹ The Mozambique Company adopted low salaries to attract more investment to Manica and Sofala districts. Neil-Tomlinson argues for example that the Company used the low level of wages, as part of its attempt to attract colonists and eagerly advertised that African wages in Manica and Sofala were 30 per cent lower than in Rhodesia and 50 per cent lower than in the Transvaal.⁹⁰

Employers also saved money by providing their workers with poor rations, rudimentary accommodation and unsatisfactory work conditions. African workers were also subjected to beatings and all kind of mistreatment. My informants in Manica remember that around the 1930s, on the farms and in the mines, African labourers worked from dawn to sunset.⁹¹ Sometimes, especially on farms, they also worked on moonlight nights. The result of such procedures was that voluntary labour became scarce, and peasants gradually took advantage of the availability of the market for rubber and food crops which gave them better remuneration than local wage labour. Men also engaged as voluntary labourers when they feared forced recruitment, in the hope of finding a better job and employers who would provide them with good conditions and reasonable salaries.⁹² Thus many Manican men preferred to engage in mining or to migrate to

under fourteen years and elders (more than 60 years old), chiefs and *sipaio* from labour conscription.

⁸⁸As mentioned by Neil-Tomlinson, "The Mozambique Chartered Company", 264: "as late as 1907 the standard routine was simply that of cypais being sent out armed with rifles, revolvers and even hippo whips and rounding up labourers at gun point".

⁸⁹For more discussion on this perspective, see G. Arrighi, "Labour supplies in historical perspective: A study in the proletarianization of an African peasantry in Rhodesia", *Journal of Development Studies*, 6 (1970), 179-234.

⁹⁰Neil-Tomlinson, "The Mozambique Chartered Company", 279.

⁹¹See collective interview in Jecua village-Manica, 12 July 1996.

⁹²See J. de Sousa e Vasconcelos, "A mão d' obra no território da Companhia de Moçambique", *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*, No. 33, 1915, pp. 81-87;

Southern Rhodesia or the Transvaal rather than accepting employment on local settler farms.

Although economic enterprises were growing, particularly from the 1910s, labour shortage still constituted their main hindrance. Given the African reluctance to engage in wage employment, white settlers regarded the Mozambique Company as their labour agency. However, the Company did not easily perform this role. After many conflicts between the Company and the settlers, the appointment of João Pery de Lind as governor in 1910 seems to have brought some hope that the labour problem would be solved. In fact, Pery de Lind took over the administration of the Manica and Sofala after the former governor Pinto Bastos resigned and left the territory fearing for his life because of his irreconcilable confrontation with the white farmers, miners, and traders who had gathered in Beira to protest against the constant desertion of their labourers.

The strong complaints about labour shortages by white farmers led Pery de Lind to set up a Native Labour Department (*Repartição do Trabalho Indígena*) in 1912. This Department was responsible for controlling and centralising the labour supply for entrepreneurs according to their needs and economic importance. The Department also established fixed salaries in order to avoid competition amongst employers. Further, its duty included the organisation of labour statistics and the payment of the African labourers. As a result the labour supply apparently stabilised. With the crisis in the rubber market, Mossurize and Moribane, its former suppliers, were transformed into labour reserves for Manica, Chimoio and Buzi. However, the increasing demand for labour was not accompanied by any improvement on work conditions, treatment or wages. This made recruitment in Manica district difficult because Africans could easily defy the Mozambique Company and its private labour agents.

These circumstances led the Mozambique Company to turn to external recruitment, especially in Mozambique district, Tete and Zambézia, and it conferred this role on a private labour agency.⁹³ However, the recruits still deserted in large numbers as soon as

José Capela, *O Imposto de Palhota e a Introdução do Modo de Produção Capitalista nas Colónias*, (Porto, 1977), 127.

⁹³The Mozambique Company established labour agreements with the Tete administration in 1914 and with the Zambezia Company in 1915. The main private

they joined their employers. Low salaries and bad work conditions contributed to increasing labour desertion. Entrepreneurs soon recognised that the Labour Agency was ineffective and urged its replacement once again by the Mozambique Company. To overcome these labour deficits and to minimize costs, the Mozambique Company now issued Circular No.10/618/1915 which imposed child labour, especially for boys from the age of twelve.⁹⁴ In the following decade the situation did not change at all. Instead it worsened because of World War I, the influenza epidemic and African resistance.⁹⁵ This was followed in the 1920s, by drought and famine which hit the original sources of labour recruitment and nearly paralysed the economy in Manica district.

The development of the market economy in central Mozambique coincided with the increasing demand for African labour from the mines and farms in the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia. The discoveries of diamonds and gold in the last third of nineteenth century in Kimberley and Witwatersrand had a great impact on African societies throughout southern Africa. In this period, central Mozambique also became an important route for long-distance African migrants from northern Mozambique and Nyasaland towards the Transvaal. Manica province and particularly the borders of northern Transvaal, Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique were the main gateways.

Both Rhodesia and the Transvaal exerted great pressure on African labour in the territory of the Mozambique Company and urged its administration to allow them recruit labour within its boundaries. While in southern Manica (Moribane, Dombe and Mossurize) labour migration was more directed to the Transvaal and to a less extent to the Melsetter and Victoria districts in Rhodesia, men from central and northern Manica,

labour agents were the Sociedade de Recrutamento Indígena and the Breyner & Wirth Co. However individual recruiters also played their role in Tete and Mozambique district, namely Gil Machado e Maia; Jorge Moctezma and Manuel Saldanha. See also Cruz, "A história da formação da classe trabalhadora", 228-29.

⁹⁴ For further details on child labour see chapter seven.

⁹⁵ This resistance started in Barue chiefdom and then spread throughout the Manica district and crippled the colonial economy in Macequece and Chimoio between 1917-1920. For more details see, T.O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa", *St Antony's Papers*, 15 (1963), 54-80; A.Isaacman and B.Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, (London, 1976).

especially at Macequece fled to Umtali, Penhalonga and Salisbury. Macequece had also become a route for migrants coming from Barue, Sena and Zambezia.

Although the region was included in the "*Modus-Vivendi*" between South Africa and Portugal in 1901, the Mozambique Company opposed recruitment in Manica and Sofala districts by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) and the Southern Rhodesia Labour Board.⁹⁶ Despite the Portuguese administration, the Niassa Company and to some extent the Zambezia Company had found recruiting for the Transvaal an important financial source, the Mozambique Company was strongly against the recruitment system. However, its resistance could not prevent clandestine migration either for Transvaal or for Southern Rhodesia.⁹⁷ Under such circumstances, Manica province became a zone of regional African labour disputes.

Given that situation, mining companies operating in Macequece complained about the diversion of their workers by Rhodesian recruiters and urged the Mozambique Company administration to protect them from foreign competition. For example, in 1901 the Mozambique Macequece Mining Company referred to about 75 mine 'boys' being taken by Rhodesian recruiters from the Guy Fawkes and Chimeze mines causing their stoppage.⁹⁸ However, the more aggressive south african labour agency, WNLA, went on pressurising the Mozambique Company to allow it to recruit labour in its territory.⁹⁹ For instance, in 1902 the Chamber of Mines proposed an agreement which would allow WNLA to act as the main recruitment agency in the region with responsibility for distributing labour to the Transvaal, Rhodesia and the Mozambique Company.¹⁰⁰

In 1903, after the South African War, there was an increasing demand for migrant

⁹⁶ See below chapter eight.

⁹⁷ However, people caught crossing the border without any permission were punishable by a maximum fine of twenty months' forced labour.

⁹⁸ AHM-FCM, SG, Processo 104: Nota queixosa da Mozambique Macequece Limited, para a administração do Território de Manica e Sofala, Macequece, 1 August 1901.

⁹⁹ The Chamber of Mines created the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) in 1900 in order to coordinate labour recruitment for Transvaal.

¹⁰⁰ AHM-FCM, SG, Processo 51: Nota No. A-682 da Secretaria Geral do governo do Território de Manica e Sofala para o Administrador delegado em Lisboa, Beira 24 November 1902. See also the enclosed draft of proposed Agreement between the

labour from the recovering mining industry. Increasing competition for labour in the region, especially between the Transvaal, Mozambique, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia marked the first decade of twentieth century. Central Mozambique, in particular Manica province, soon became a centrifugal zone of that competition, with local African men migrating clandestinely either to the Transvaal or for the mines and farms in Manicaland and Mashonaland provinces in Southern Rhodesia. To aggravate the situation, WNLA agents had established themselves along Manica's border and were sending African runners into the territory to recruit migrant labourers for the Rand. Although the Mozambique Company was diplomatically successful in excluding Manica from any of the migrant labour arrangements between the Portuguese government and South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, clandestine recruiters continued enticing African, especially from Manica and Mossurize, to employment in the Transvaal or Southern Rhodesia.

Clandestine migration was also encouraged by European recruiters with touts and African runners who increasingly joined the new lucrative business of human trafficking. In 1906, three recruiters, Devere in Macequece, Lambert from Cabo and Don Alberto di Artois were recruiting for Rhodesia in collaboration of local chiefs. Compensation paid to local chiefs for each labourer supplied reach as much as one pound. With such a profitable bonus, local aristocracies could hardly resist the business opportunity of labour recruiting for outside the territory. This was practised in defiance of the Portuguese administration.

Legislation passed in 1907 and 1909 formally prohibited the recruiting of migrant labour and imposed heavy fines for recruiters involved in smuggling labourers to Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia. The 1907 labour regulations prescribed punishment of about twenty months unpaid forced labour to any clandestine migrant. Illegal recruiters and runners were threatened with double of that penalty. Under the regulations of 1909, the Mozambique Company reinforced penalties by imposing twenty months unpaid forced labour for Africans attempting to leave the territory.¹⁰¹

Mozambique Company and the WNLA.

¹⁰¹Ordem No. 2870, Providências contra a emigração clandestina, Boletim da Companhia de Moçambique, No.23, 2 December 1907; Ordem No. 2966, in Boletim Oficial de Moçambique, 14 January 1909.

However, given the extent of the border, the local administration was powerless to physically prevent migration. Thus, these regulations were no more than palliative measures. Instead, some officials of the Company paternalistically supported African migration on the ground that the level of wages paid in the territory was too low and could not provide them with enough cash to fulfil their social needs and pay poll and hut taxes. Indeed, officials of the Mozambique Company were happy that migrants not only paid their taxes but also provided the Company with foreign exchange.¹⁰² The attitude of these officials can be understood because taxes were the main source of revenue for the Mozambique Company. In fact they feared that attempts to restrict it would only lead to the permanent loss of taxpayers.

Around 1910 the number of Manican migrants employed in Umtali (Southern Rhodesia) was estimated at about 3,500.¹⁰³ Forced labour, beatings by employers, low wages, the deferred pay system and poor rations and work conditions, all still contributed to high rates of labour desertion from Manica to neighbouring territories.¹⁰⁴ For example, the annual report of Mossurize district of 1913 reported that in 1912 about 490 households had emigrated to Melsetter (Rhodesia).¹⁰⁵ Despite the economic slump, in 1921 there were about 5,000 Mozambican migrant workers in the eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia.¹⁰⁶

Clandestine recruitment and African migration to neighbouring territories caused great concern to local employers in Manica province. In 1926 the Mozambique Company set up its own Department of Native Affairs (*Direcção dos Negócios Indígenas*) in an attempt to deal with labour recruitment. Nevertheless, the labour shortage continued to cripple settler farmers whose economic situation became worse due to the world market crisis in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In response, extra-economic measures were taken in order to undermine African farming and push Africans into the labour market.

¹⁰²AHM-FCM, SG, Processo 51: Emigração indígena, 1912.

¹⁰³See Cruz, "A história da formação da classe trabalhadora", 227.

¹⁰⁴For more details on the factors behind labour migration in this period, see Cruz, "História da formação da classe trabalhadora", chapter three.

¹⁰⁵Neil-Tomlinson, "The Mozambique Chartered Company", 290.

¹⁰⁶AHM-FNI, Cx 22: Correspondência da Curadoria dos Indígenas Portugueses na Rodésia, 20 April 1921.

In the following chapter I analyse the effect of these measures on the African economy and the extent to which they contributed to the development of agrarian capitalism in Manica province between 1930 and 1950.

CHAPTER 3:

WHITE SETTLER FARMERS AND AFRICAN LABOUR IN MANICA, 1930-1950.

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the nature and process of white settlement and its impact on African communities, particularly the establishment of the agrarian capitalism in Manica province between 1930-50. It is divided into three main sections. Firstly, it provides a political overview of the development of the colonial economy in Mozambique and shows how it was related to Manica. The second and third sections describe and analyse the political and economic dynamic which underpinned the new agrarian capitalist economy in Manica province, and how it integrated the African peasantry into the market economy, either as wage labourers or as cash-crop producers.

Given the relatively few highly influential companies and concessionaires on the one hand, and the preponderance of small-scale white settlement on the other, we need to know how far rural communities were transformed socially and economically in central Mozambique. A study of central Mozambique, particularly Manica district, may illuminate these issues.

1. The colonial legacy and the economic structure in Manica.

From the middle of 1928, when Salazar took over the Portuguese government new trends were established in Portuguese colonial policy. Prominent among them was the demand that the colonies, particularly Mozambique, be developed as a source of wealth for Portugal. The immigration of Portuguese nationals was considered a key to the success of the development of the colonies. However, despite excellent advertising and propaganda that Mozambique was a rich and salubrious country, few Portuguese could be induced to emigrate there. This lack of interest in the colonies was also shared by Portuguese

capitalists.¹ Their refusal to become involved in the colonial possessions resulted in the abandonment of the field to the British and South African interests which dominated the Mozambique Company in Manica and Sofala. Thus, in the 1930s, Portugal had to establish a system which fought to limit or contain the aggression of foreign capital.

From the 1930s the Portuguese "New State" government introduced colonial legislation in order to pursue the objectives of its new "Nationalist Economic Policy" in Portugal. This new legislation, summarized in the Colonial Act of 1930, was issued in opposition to the high level of foreign capitalist interference in the economy of the colony and aimed to impose a uniform administration controlled centrally from Lisbon.² Further, the colonial administration itself was strengthened and reformed, with the establishment of government inspectors who regularly visited local areas and occasionally attended *banjas*.³ Administrators also attended those meetings when they needed to deal with very sensitive issues such as labour supply, population census, taxes and forced crop cultivation. Meetings directed by Inspectors were surprisingly more open, allowing people and local chiefs to raise their complaints against mal-administration and even to protest against forced crop cultivation.

As the "New State" had no intention of industrialising the colonies the structure of their economy remained dominated by the agricultural activity of private companies, medium and small-scale white farmers and African peasants.⁴ Although the Mozambique Company's Charter came to an end in 1942, its economic influence over Manica and Sofala continued through capital investment in agriculture, mining and commerce.

¹See M. Newitt, Portugal in Africa: the last hundred years, (London, Hurst & Company, 1981), passim.

²For more details on this aspect see among others, Alan K. Smith, "António Salazar and the reversal of Portuguese colonial policy", Journal of African History (JAH), XV, 4, (1974), 656-666.

³"Banjas" were public meetings especially held by the Administrative Inspectors and sometimes by local administrators with local communities, represented by their chiefs and headmen.

⁴The Portuguese government enacted the Dec- Law No. 19,354 of 3 January 1931, which established the regime of "Condicionamento Industrial" as the main instrument of State control.

Plantations and small-scale farms had many different characteristics, depending on their capital assets, the extent of state protection, and, most importantly, their geographical location and environmental conditions. Large-scale farmers generally had vast acreages, employed considerable local or recruited wage labour, and produced single crops for the market. European small-scale farmers were mostly poor peasants mobilised from the Portugal hinterland and adjacent Atlantic islands; they were few in number and lacked finance and technical expertise.

As elsewhere in southern Africa White settlement reflected colonial economic and political goals. The establishment of white settlers frequently resulted in violent clashes with peasants, and the expropriation of their lands led them into compulsory labour tenancy.⁵ Thus, the expropriation of land together with taxation were the major means of creating a wage labour force. However, as peasants were integrated into the market economy, taxes became a less effective way of forcing out wage labour. As a result, the Portuguese administration resorted to the most stringent forms of rural exploitation. Through the labour regulations of 1930, peasants were conscripted into wage labour by a system of forced contract labour, which made Africans work for Portuguese enterprises for at least six months each year and also grow cotton and other crops.⁶ This was largely engineered by the Native Affairs Department (*Repartição dos Negócios Indígenas*), which aimed to push Africans into satisfying Portuguese needs and supplying labour for European farmers.

However, given relatively viable peasant production, this legislation was not enough to guarantee a labour supply to white farms. Moreover, the colonial administration and local entrepreneurs faced huge problems in mobilising labour against the competition from

⁵See for example studies on Zimbabwe by Palmer, Land and racial domination in Rhodesia, passim; and Phimister, An economic and social history of Zimbabwe, passim; for Malawi, Mandala, Work and control in a peasant economy, passim. See also my literature review in chapter one.

⁶The general picture on this issue is provided by Vail and White, Capitalism and colonialism in Mozambique, especially chapters six and seven; A. Isaacman, Cotton is the mother of poverty: Peasants, work, and rural struggle in Mozambique, (Oxford, James Currey, 1995).

South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi).⁷ To push African peasants into work, white settlers and the state restricted them from marketing facilities and sources of credit, so making them increasingly dependent on wages to purchase manufactured goods and to satisfy other social requisites.⁸

Manica province, with its adequate annual rainfall, rich and fertile soils, long growing season, and high productivity, was extraordinarily attractive for cash-cropping given the availability of transport. Because of these ecological characteristics the region was commonly recognised as the 'bread-basket' for all central Mozambique. These environmental conditions enabled white settlers, Portuguese, Greek, Britons, French, Italian, and Afrikaners, as well as Chinese citizens and others, to produce a variety of cash crops. These came to include maize, wheat, potatoes, oilseeds, tobacco, sisal and citrus, although wheat, tobacco, sisal and citrus were only encouraged in the late 1940s, because of intense soil erosion and the need to rotate the maize crop. Settler farmers also raised some livestock, especially cattle, in Chimoio and Manica.

Chimoio was the most important area of white farming, with Vila Pery as its headquarters. In the 1930s white settlers in Chimoio were estimated at about 506, and the land available for agriculture was about 156,475 hectares.⁹ Manica, the second area of white settlement, was more concerned with mining, particularly gold, copper and asbestos, although a small number of white settlers also engaged in small-scale agriculture, especially at Macequece,

⁷For more details on this aspect see below and chapter seven and eight.

⁸For further discussion, see Arrighi, "Labour supplies in historical perspective", 179-234; C.F. Keyter, "Maize control in Southern Rhodesia, 1931-1941: The African contribution to white survival", African Historical Association, Salisbury, 1978; B.J. Berman, "The concept of "articulation" and the political economy of colonialism", Canadian Journal of African Studies, 18,2, (1984), 407-415; For more critical discussion on this issue in South Africa, see among others, Murray, "The origins of agrarian capitalism in South Africa: A critique of the 'social history' perspective", 645-665; Tim Keegan, "The origins of agrarian capitalism in South Africa: A reply", JSAS, 15,4, (October, 1989), 666-684.

⁹Mário A. Costa, Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22º: Monografia do Território de Manica e Sofala sob a administração da Companhia de Moçambique, Beira, 1940, 126, 131.

the headquarters of the Manica district.¹⁰ In addition to engaging in agricultural and livestock production, some entrepreneurs exploited forests and timber in Manica.

Apart from the African subsistence cultivators there were three principal categories of settlers involved in the process of agrarian transformation in Manica and Chimoió: large-scale producers, medium and small-scale farmers. The large-scale producers were generally non-Portuguese land-owners and the Mozambique Company. Medium and small-scale farms were in general owned by Portuguese nationals. Usually these settlers lacked not only capital but also agricultural skills.

Because of their financial and economic weakness, medium and small-scale white farmers lacked modern machinery and techniques. The majority of Portuguese settlers were civil servants, former soldiers, administrative staff, and traders, and had no agricultural skills. In some ways they were probably worse off than the African peasants because of their lack of farming experience in general and knowledge of African conditions in particular. Very often they were in an economically desperate situation and were unable to meet their labour needs. They had, for instance, to appeal to the administration for assistance in recruiting labour from the neighbouring areas, particularly Mossurize and Tete district.

The proximity of the region to Beira (the second most important city after Lourenço Marques), however, and the availability of a very good road and railway system, the 'Beira Corridor', which crossed the territory for about 170 miles, and connected the sea port of Beira to Southern Rhodesia, proved an important asset for the white farmers, and made possible the export of some products to Rhodesia. Thus, the establishment of the Beira-Umtali railway line, which was primarily designed as an outlet for Rhodesia and other countries of the hinterland, gave an impetus to white settlement.¹¹

¹⁰See, AHM-Fundo da Companhia de Moçambique (FCM), Processos 18: Nota No. 16/552, Informação sobre a mensagem entregue ao encarregado do governo do território da Companhia de Moçambique em nome dos mineiros de Manica, 23 April 1939.

¹¹For the 1940s, see AHM-FGG, N°381: Relatório da Comissão de Agricultura e Terras, 1952; for the 1960s see, AHM-FGDB, Cx 754: Nota N° 115/D/9 da Administração de Manica para o Chefe da Administração Civil do Distrito de Manica e Sofala, by António Pedro Gomes de Amaral, 1965.

A substantial number of concessions to white settlers for maize cropping was made along the railway line as it moved across the fertile plateau-lands of Manica and Chimoio. These areas were restricted to white settlement and the Mozambique Company (Chimonica). This meant that African peasants formerly inhabiting the region were dispossessed. They had two options: to remain as labour tenants for European farmers; or to move far away and settle on the mountains. With the increase in the number of white farmers, the demands for land in the fertile areas also increased. Nevertheless, at least until the 1940s, Africans could find just enough land elsewhere to continue to produce maize in competition with European settlers, in spite of the segregationist measures, and the latter's advantages in transport facilities.¹²

Before World War II, maize produced in Manica and Chimoio was also exported to Portugal. Because of the competitive maize market, Manica and Chimoio were transformed into an intensive maize-growing area. However the intervention of the state through encouraging financial institutions in order to provide credit and loans, and for the centralisation and co-ordination of the maize market was also very important.

Unlike the small-scale farmers, plantation owners and large-scale farmers in Manica and Chimoio, did not suffer from a chronic labour shortage at all because, despite the constant desertion of local men to Southern Rhodesia, they were able to recruit workers through private agents from other places, such as Tete, Inhambane, and Mozambique (Nampula) districts. The recruited labourers were housed in barracks, supervised and guarded by African "boss-boys". Because they could provide relatively good pay, food, and reasonable accommodation for workers, the large-scale farmers were able to secure labour throughout the agrarian season. They also benefited from labour-tenant households.¹³

¹²For more details on African peasants see below (chapter five).

¹³See, AHM-FGG, N° 226:Relatório dos administradores da província de Manica e Sofala, 1947; see also Portaria N° 3.796 of 23 August 1939, which established the legal mechanisms of land tenancy by Africans within settler farms or in the concessionaires areas. For more details see below (chapters four).

2. White settlement and commercial farming in Manica and Chimoio, 1930- 1950.

This section attempts to analyse the development of settler farming and its impact on African communities in Manica province, especially from the 1930s to 1950s. The period witnessed the establishment of the first European settlement scheme in the hinterland of Mozambique. Thus, Manica province with its settler nucleus in Manica and Chimoio districts experienced a slight move towards an agrarian capitalist economy. While in the period up to 1941 this process was overseen by the Mozambique Company, from the 1940s it became part of a more general 'Salazar nationalist economic policy'. In fact, in the 1940s the state adopted a firm policy of promoting Portuguese settlement, applying further protective measures against African competition.

Following the enunciation of Portuguese colonial policy embodied in the Colonial Act of 1930, Portuguese corporate principles were also applied to its colonies and were defined by the 1937 Decree No. 27, 552.¹⁴ White settlers in Manica were encouraged to organise themselves into associations such as *Grémios* (employers' guilds) and *Juntas* (marketing boards) to deal with financial, technical, transport, labour and marketing concerns. The creation of those associations came to be vital in protecting white farmers against economic depression and African competition.¹⁵

During the world agricultural depression of 1930-1933, many farmers were financially ruined and forced off the land. Access to credit was very important and in certain measure the determining factor in overcoming the crisis. Indeed, only prosperous farmers who possessed capital, were able to acquire and maintain large farms. Consequently, they were able to use their properties as collateral to secure credit. The fluctuation of world market prices also contributed to the reduction of the number of settler farmers in the

¹⁴Boletim Oficial de Moçambique (BO), No. 14, 10 April 1937. See also M. Cahen, "Corporatisme et colonialisme: approche du cas Mozambicain, 1933-1979", *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, (Paris), No. 92, 1983, 383-417 and No. 93, 5-24.

¹⁵For comparative purposes, especially on Southern Rhodesia, see Palmer, *Land and racial domination*, 145-213.

early 1930s. The figures shown in the table below illustrate the impact of the depression in Manica and Sofala province:

SETTLER FARM PRODUCTION IN THE DEPRESSION, 1930-33¹⁶

Year (kg)	Farmers	Farms	Maize (bags 90kg)	Tobacco
1929/30	223	269	228,649	12,040
1930/31	258	236	188,977	3,490
1931/32	222	238	199,073	710
1932/33	209	239	146,510	200
1933/34	200	n.a.	179,865	300

It is interesting that between 1929/30 and 1930/31 the number of farmers went up, although the number of farms went down, as did output. This suggests that farmers' relatives, in particular the railway and Beira port workers, were perhaps returning to the land because of the rise of unemployment caused by the recession. Secondly, the table shows how much greater the decline in tobacco is than the decline in maize. This may have happened because tobacco is a cash crop dependent on the external market and maize is consumed locally.

From 1932 to 1939 credit for agriculture was provided by the *Junta de Crédito Agrícola*; thereafter it was provided by the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola* under the Mozambique Company's supervision. The *Junta de Crédito Agrícola* was established by Decree No 17,0581 of 29 July 1929, and had its headquarters in Chimoio, under the management of the Administrator of Chimoio district, Captain César Maria de Serpa Rosa.¹⁷ During this period it provided £54,614.00 for white farmers.¹⁸ However, from 1929/30 to 1940/41 the loans provided to settler farmers in Manica and Sofala territory amounted to about

¹⁶See J. C. Roque, "Algumas considerações sobre a agricultura do distrito de Manica e Sofala", in *Revista do Gabinete de Estudos Ultramarinos*, No. 13, (Lisbon, 1956), 46-61, anexo, mapa 1; Anuário Estatístico do Território da Companhia de Moçambique (1929 - 1933); Anuário Estatístico de Moçambique (1934-1941).

¹⁷ See *Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique: Relatório de Gerência da Caixa de Crédito Agrícola, 1940-1941*, (Beira, Imprensa da Cia de Moçambique), 4.

¹⁸ Mário A. Costa, *Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22º: Monografia do Território de Manica e Sofala sob a administração da Companhia de Moçambique*, Beira, 1940, 128.

£80,873-18-06.¹⁹ The settlers who benefited from agricultural credit were supposed to refund it within four to six years. White farmers paid their debts to the *Caixa de Crédito agrícola* every year through a deduction of 5 per cent on their sales or 'warrants'.²⁰ Apart from in the first year (1929/30) of the introduction of the credit system, when nine of the total eighteen settlers who had benefited from loans estimated at 28.552\$50 esc. (£6.345-00) failed to repay their debts, in the following years repayment seems to have been relatively stable.²¹ Thus, between 1930 and 1940 the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola* earned about 27.435\$75 esc. (£6,096-16-08) from the interest discounted on farmers' warrants.²² In 1933-34 the Mozambique Company provided settler farmers with a credit of 1.500.000\$00 esc. to help them combat an invasion of locusts.²³ The following table show the loans provided to settler farmers in Manica and Chimoio by the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola* between 1930 and 1940. In fact only a proportion of what was requested was loaned.

Loans provided to settler farmers in Chimoio and Manica in 1930-1940²⁴

Village	applications	requested	received
Vila Pery	373	533.305\$94	296.533\$66 (£65,896-16-04)
Macequece	13	48.163\$50	6.678\$00 (£1,484-00)

While in 1937/38 the amount loaned for seed, fertilizer, salaries and fuel was four times more than that for equipment, machines, warehouses, cow-sheds and other infra-structure, in the following year the budget was almost the same for both. However, in 1939/40 credit provided for investment in equipment and infra-structure was ten times more than it had been two years earlier, and twice as large as that supplied for the farmers' immediate needs. The next year showed an equilibrium between the two sides.²⁵ The investment pattern pursued by the Mozambique Company from 1938/39 reveals a new trend towards

¹⁹See Relatório de Gerência da Caixa de Crédito Agrícola, 1940-1941, (Beira, Imprensa da Cia de Moçambique), 12.

²⁰Ibid., 8.

²¹Ibid., 9,12.

²²Ibid., 23.

²³See Costa, Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22°, 124.

²⁴See Relatório de Gerência da Caixa de Crédito Agrícola, 1940-1941, 8,20.

²⁵Ibid., 21.

the modernisation of agricultural techniques in order to enable settler farmers to cope with the demands of the metropolitan and world market in foodstuffs.

Under Ordinance N° 7.122 of 1936 the Mozambique Company established the "Maize Marketing Board" (*Junta do Comércio do Milho e sua Farinha*), thereafter (*Comissão Directora do Milho*). This Board aimed to co-ordinate maize marketing, and sought to eliminate competition amongst white farmers and purchasers of African crops. In fact, all farmers were supposed to declare their maize stocks to the Maize Board annually. Those who failed to do so were fined 90\$00 for their first offence, and settler farmers who were found selling maize elsewhere instead of delivering their crops to the Maize Board were also likely to be fined.²⁶

The Maize Board and the *Caixa de crédito agrícola* worked side by side to ensure the success of settler farming, especially those who benefited from credit.²⁷ In the same year, in response to the slump in the price of maize in the international market, the "Maize Marketing Board" took its first action, buying all maize supplied by settler farmers for a price of not less than 55\$00 per bag of 92 kg.²⁸ The Board was regarded as exclusively for white settlers, and did not cater for African independent farmers.²⁹

The Mozambique Company also provided tractors and trucks for sale or rent at very low cost. This, too, was not available for Africans. Nevertheless, there were about 200 Africans who were considered 'farmers' and who in the 1930s produced about 6,000 sacks (92 kg each sack) of maize annually.³⁰ The following table shows the tractors bought and distributed among white settler on a loan basis between 1930-1940.

²⁶See Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique. Regulamento para o Comércio do Milho e sua Farinha no Território de Manica e Sofala, (Beira, Imprensa da Companhia de Moçambique, 1936), 10.

²⁷See articles 8 and 30, §2, of the regulations of the Maize Marketing Board; Portaria No. 6.656, 9 Novembro 1946.

²⁸Costa, Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22°, 132.

²⁹However African maize was commercialised through local administrative authorities in connection with African chiefs and storekeepers (*cantineiros*), who were mostly Indians.

³⁰See next chapter.

Tractors distributed by the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola* (1930-1940)²¹

Type of tractor	Number	Total cost
"Massey Harris"	24	41,570\$00
"John Deer"	10	15,862\$50
"Fordson"	03	1,962\$00
"Caterpillar"	02	4,086\$00
"Wallis"	01	2,025\$00
"Lanzi"	01	450\$00
Total	41	65,955\$66 (£14,656-16-03)

The introduction of tractors seems to have modernised agricultural technology and allowed white farmers to cultivate large areas in a short time. Although on the one hand farmers used tractors to replace African labour in ploughing, on the other hand its utilisation seems to have increased labour needs given the extension of the farms under cultivation. However, the majority of small and medium-scale white farmers still relied on ploughs or even hoes. Others combined hired tractors with ox-drawn ploughs to cultivate their land. The use of tractors not only helped increase the land under cultivation but also tended to put more pressure on peasant access to land.

With the establishment of associations, which provided farmers with some assistance, the number of white farms showed a very slight increase in the second half of the 1930s. In fact, with the availability of credit facilities between 1933/34 and 1939/40, white farmers in Manica and Chimoio districts showed signs of economic recovery from the great depression of 1929-33. The numbers increased slightly from 180 farmers and 208 farms in 1934/35 to about 234 farmers and 267 farm concessions in 1939/40. Their output also increased from 173,413 bags of maize and 1,661 kg of tobacco in 1934/35 to about 202,989 bags of maize and 13,000kg of tobacco in 1939/40.²² This boom in tobacco output shows how white settlers shifted from one crop to another according to market incentives.

²¹See Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique: Relatório de Gerência da Caixa de Crédito Agrícola, 1940-1941, 20.

²²See, J.C. Roque, "Algumas considerações sobre a agricultura do distrito de Manica e Sofala", in Revista do Gabinete de Estudos Ultramarinos, No.13, (Lisbon, 1956), 46-61, anexo, mapa 1.

However, during this period the production of maize was not regular. For example, after the increasing maize output of 28,050 tons in 1935 to 33,584 in 1936, it dropped to about 22,802 and 25,176 tons in 1937 and 1938 respectively.³³ This slump may have been caused by the drought and locusts which affected the Manica and Sofala provinces in 1937/38.³⁴ In terms of settler land assets, the Portuguese owned most, followed by British, Greek, German and Italian colonists. The following years showed a slight increase in agriculture output although far below the production reached in the 1920s.³⁵ As shown in the tables below, with their relative stabilisation, white settlers in Manica and Sofala provinces managed to repay their debts to the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola*.

Land concessions in 1938 and 1939 in Manica and Sofala territory³⁶

Year	1938		1939	
	Concessions No.	hectares	No.	hectares
Portuguese	598	469,370	603	470,368
Britons	249	294,307	243	292,274
Greeks	50	26,933	49	23,533
Italians	19	4,005	19	4,006
Others	65	36,136	66	40,571
Total	981	830,753	980	830,754

Farmer's Warrants discounted by the *Caixa de Crédito Agrícola*³⁷

Year	Amount	
1937/38	22.274\$00	(£4,949-17-10)
1938/39	44.508\$44	(£9,890-15-04)
1939/40	71.019\$10	(£15,782-20-05)
1940/41	86.426\$78	(£19,205-10-00)

Although the land distributed for white settler agriculture in Chimoio was estimated at about 156,475 hectares, only about 14,000 hectares were under maize cultivation in 1938. Also, in Manica the amount of land actually cultivated was still very small (680

³³ Costa, *Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22°*, 124-125.

³⁴ AHM-Companhia de Moçambique, RGM-M-80: Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique, direcção dos Negócios Indígenas, Nota-Circular No.2, Beira, 12 October 1938.

³⁵ See appendix one.

³⁶ *Companhia de Moçambique: Exposição aos senhores accionistas sobre os resultados económicos e administrativos da Gerência de 1939*, (Lisbon, 1940), 13.

hectares).³⁸ In general maize was produced by Portuguese settlers who were small or medium-scale farmers and who often failed to attract labour. However, apart from maize, white settler farmers also produced beans and groundnuts, sisal (especially the Zembe Sisal Plantation Ltd), tobacco, rubber, cotton and citrus, bred poultry and livestock, exploited timber, especially hardwood, extracted minerals (especially gold, copper and asbestos), and developed quarries.³⁹

According to E.Ribeiro, tobacco was encouraged as an alternative crop to maize, and was grown in association with maize and cotton.⁴⁰ Although Africans, especially in Mossurize, also planted tobacco, their production was largely for domestic consumption, given its poor quality. The state paid more attention to white production, providing technical support and markets.⁴¹

The principal markets for settler produce were Beira, Southern Rhodesia, (mainly Umtali), and Portugal. Tobacco and maize were exported to Portugal. Maize was exported through the *Grémio do Milho Colonial Português* in co-ordination with the Mozambique Company headquarters in Portugal.⁴² Citrus was exported to various European countries including England. In 1939 for example about 20,230 boxes of citrus were exported to England, Portugal, France, Ireland, Sweden, Germany, etc.

Cotton was exported exclusively to Portugal under Decree No.21,226, of 22 April 1932. Thus, Portugal hoped that raw-cotton from its colonies would help it maintain its increasingly difficult balance of payments. In that year, white farmers in Chimoio and Manica exported 93,950kg and 8,500kg cotton respectively to Portugal. The average amount of cotton produced by Africans in Manica and Sofala in the same year was

³⁷Relatório de Gerência da Caixa de Crédito Agrícola, 1940-1941, 21.

³⁸ See Costa, *Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22°*, 133-146.

³⁹ See Costa, *Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22°*, 126, 133 and 146. At least in Manica/Macequece it was reported that in 1938 a farmer had bred 2,000 chickens; In the same year about 26,545 boxes of citrus were exported from Chimoio.

⁴⁰ See E. de Queirós Ribeiro, "A Cultura de tabaco", *Boletim do Departamento de Agricultura do Território da Companhia de Moçambique*, No.4, (1940), 6.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See *Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique: Lista de Exportadores do Território, 1936-37.*

about 1,796,530kg. This huge difference confirms the Portuguese colonial tendency of lowering its cotton costs by relying on African production.⁴³ Indeed, the local cotton company (*Companhia Nacional Algodoeira*) in collaboration with the Cotton Board (*Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial*) relied on African cotton production to supply Portuguese industries with raw cotton.⁴⁴

In 1937, in order to co-ordinate the labour supply for white enterprise, the "Farmers Association of Manica and Sofala" (*Grémio da Lavoura do Planalto de Manica e Sofala*) was established. The creation of this association and the enactment of legislation undermining African peasants laid the foundations upon European commercial farming and the agrarian capitalist economy was consolidated in Manica district. Nevertheless, despite these basic inputs, the lack of infra-structure, especially roads and bridges, constituted a major hindrance for the development of commercial farms in the region. As a result, many land claims were established in the areas served by the "Beira corridor" (mainly in Manica district), while much fertile land located in areas far from the roads and railway (especially in Mossurize, Dombe, Mavita, Rotanda and Mavonde) remained almost undisputed.

In the 1940s, Manica and Chimoio partially regained their importance as the 'bread-basket' of the central region of Mozambique.⁴⁵ 1940 was a promising year with the maize and tobacco output reaching levels close to those of the 1920s. Thus, maize output was estimated at 252,378 bags of 90kg while tobacco accounted for a reasonable amount of 15,050 kg.⁴⁶ The revitalization of Manica and Chimoio agriculture was accompanied by an influx of financial and technical inputs to enhance commercial farming, especially maize. The period also witnessed the establishment of experimental agricultural stations at Chimoio and Manica.

⁴³For more details on African cotton production in Manica see below (chapter six).

⁴⁴See Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique: Lista de Exportadores do Território, 1936-37.

⁴⁵In the 1920s Manica and Chimoio were already regarded as the 'granary' of the region. See chapter two.



During this period the settler economy became more diversified with the extensive planting of tobacco and sisal, and the cultivation of potato and oilseeds such as sesame, soya and sunflower.⁴⁷ Tobacco and sisal were stimulated by world market demand, particularly during World War II.⁴⁸ In 1942, when the Portuguese government took over the administration of Manica and Sofala district from the Mozambique Company, it encouraged the establishment of new organisations in order to foster white agriculture. Thus, "The Association for Economic Activities of Vila Pery" (*Associação das Actividades Económicas de Vila Pery*); "The Cooperative for Livestock of the Chimoio plateau" (*Cooperativa dos Criadores de Gado do Planalto de Chimoio*), and "The Association of Cereal Producers of Beira district" (*Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais do Distrito da Beira*), were all set up in 1942/43.⁴⁹

The Grémio was responsible for the co-ordination of agricultural activities in both districts of Manica and Sofala, and functioned as a marketing board, especially of maize and wheat, and as a labour agency for local farmers. The Grémio was also responsible for providing settler farmers with land, credit facilities, seeds, sacks and agricultural assistance. To complement these arrangements, the state abolished land tax in areas occupied by rivers, infra-structure, houses and barracks.⁵⁰

In general, these associations not only constituted the way through which white entrepreneurs negotiated their projects or forwarded their complaints to the State, but also functioned as instruments to undermine the African household economy, mainly through segregationist maize marketing policies, the distribution of land far from the main communication networks and credit restrictions. Indeed, with such restrictions and with the imposition of cotton-growing on African households, white settlers could finally compete with the more skilful African farmers. Nevertheless, despite all these inputs, local

⁴⁶Roque, "Algumas considerações sobre", map 1; see also appendix one.

⁴⁷Luis A. de Magalhães Correa, As possibilidades económicas do território de Manica e Sofala, (Lisbon, 1945), 39.

⁴⁸Roque, "Algumas considerações sobre a agricultura", 49.

⁴⁹For more discussion, see M. Cahen, "Corporatisme et colonialisme 1979", Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, Paris, No. 92, 1983, 383-417 et No. 93, 5-24.

⁵⁰See Diploma Legislativo, 14.8.1943, art. 4, § 4.

white farmers still complained about the labour shortage. To cope with the problem they turned to Inhambane, Tete, Niassa, and Moçambique districts to find labour.⁵¹

Although there were more Portuguese settlers than any other group, and despite their ownership of more land, in terms of output, agriculture in Manica province was still dominated by non-Portuguese settlers. By 1943/44, for example, in Manica/Macequece the most important farmers were still non-Portuguese, such as Costa Aptosos (Greek, since 1929), George Gerasopulos (Greek, since 1919), S.Papadakis (Greek), W.Dyjas (Greek), Jimmy Page (British), Robert Garvin (British) and many others.⁵² Garvin, who had been established in the region since 1910, was the most successful farmer in Macequece with about 2,000 hectares of land; he cultivated potatoes and fruit. However, Portuguese nationals were now taking up farming activity more seriously than ever.⁵³ This happened because the Portuguese authorities provided them with more protection as they were keen to foster the "Portuguesification" of the territory and to maintain the supply of foodstuffs to the growing local market.⁵⁴

Macequece, Chimeze, Revuè, Munene and Vumba were the most important settler villages in Manica district. The total European population in Manica district was estimated at about 376, including 293 Portuguese and 83 non-Portuguese colonists. The latter included 66 Indians and 17 Chinese nationals. In 1943/44 only 24 Manican farmers were registered in the *Grémio*.⁵⁵ Among them, the most important Portuguese farmers were António Tavares, Hugo Nogueira, Correia do Vale, António Pereira Vilar, Francisco

⁵¹ For more details on farm labour see next section.

⁵² See AHM- ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da inspecção ordinária ao concelho de Manica, 1962. See also AHM-FGDB, Cx 727: Requerimento de Costa Aptosos dirigido ao Governador Geral de Moçambique, 11 February 1944.

⁵³ The chief of the Department of Agriculture in Manica and Sofala province, E.de Queirós Ribeiro, was very keen to promote white settlement in Chimoio and Manica, as he considered this region as an "oasis" of settler farming in Mozambique. See Ribeiro, "Diversos Assuntos Agrícolas", Boletim da Direcção de Agricultura, (Agriculture Magazine) No. 5, Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique, (February 1940), 26.

⁵⁴ Roque, "Algumas considerações sobre a agricultura do distrito de Manica e Sofala", 46-61.

Franco, Manuel Gonçalves Coterino, José da Cruz, Artur Magno Pinheiro, Helena de Jesus, Maria Elizabeth Delport in Macequece, and Armindo Duarte in Mavonde village, and Joaquim M. Carvalho in Sierra Tsetsera (Mavita village). In addition, some associations of farmers held extensive hectares of land, such as the "Sociedade Agrícola de Mavita" (established in 1942, with 525ha); the "Agro-Pecuária de Muza" (established in 1943 with 3,400ha); and the Jécua Mission Station (established in 1942 with 1,407ha). Moreover, the Mozambique Company, then represented by the "Chimonica" holding, took over still more land after 1937, with concessions at Elvas village (1,015ha), at Revué area (2,430ha), and with the "Agro-Pecuária do Dororo" in Mavonde (established in 1920 with 1,900ha).⁵⁶

In the same period, the European population in Chimoio district consisted of 553 Portuguese and 414 non-Portuguese, including 90 Greeks, 75 Germans, 68 Britons and a handful of other European nationalities. There were also 22 Chinese colonists and 105 Indians (mostly in trade). About 170 farmers were registered as members of the Grémio.⁵⁷ Although there were many Portuguese settlers in Chimoio and they owned relatively large acreages, the key economic position was still held by non-Portuguese, particularly Greeks. This for example, was the case of some Greek families such as Babiolakis, Verghis, Cutchi, Kavalieratos, Damoulakis and others. The records of maize production in 1938, for example, demonstrated the position of Babiolakis who produced 14,950 sacks against 4,400 sacks by Fernandes & Irmãos Ltd, then the most successful Portuguese agriculture enterprise in Chimoio.⁵⁸ The majority of these non-Portuguese foreigners seem to have worked at least initially for the Mozambique Company, the Beira Port or the Beira-Rhodesia railways. Others came to Manica from Southern Rhodesia either as refugees during World Wars I and II, or looking just for land to cultivate.

⁵⁵See AHM-FGG, No. 177: Relatório da inspecção as circunscrições de Chimoio, Manica, Mossurize, Buzi, Chemba, Cheringoma, Gorongosa, Marromeu, Sena and Beira, 1943/44, by Abel de Sousa Moutinho.

⁵⁶AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da inspecção ordinaria ao concelho de Manica, 1962; Rodrigues Júnior, Actividades e problemas do Niassa e de Manica e Sofala (reportagens), (Lourenço Marques, 1944). See appendix two

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Relatório anual da Junta do comércio de milho e sua farinha, 1938, 20-23.

In fact, much Portuguese-owned land remained undercultivated mainly because of their relatively weak financial position and thus their inability to attract African labour or invest in modern agricultural technology.⁵⁹ They often held this land in the hope that it would rise in value. Very often too they rented it out to African peasants or just allowed them to settle there as labour tenants. African peasants living under such conditions were allowed to rent a small plot of land if they agreed to work as labourers on the farms. Although white settlers may have benefited from the re-organisation of the agriculture by the state, the irregular climate quite apart from the labour shortage seems to have contributed to the fluctuation in the production output during World War II as shown in the tables below:

Maize harvested by white settlers in Manica and Sofala, 1941/42-1945/46⁶⁰

Year	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45	1945/46
Land (ha)	14,700	18,081	17,505	18,368	15,989
Harvest (bag90kg)	223,187	229,849	192,461	250,675	193,478
Productivity (bag/ha)	14,4	12,7	10,9	13,6	12,1

Settler Farm production in Manica and Sofala, 1941/42-1945/46⁶¹

Years	Farmers	Farms (ha)	Maize (90kg)	Tobacco (kg)
1941/42	233	270	223,187	15,000
1942/43	226	258	229,849	22,980
1943/44	212	236	192,461	25,000
1944/45	220	240	250,675	17,000
1945/46	210	235	193,478	22,747

⁵⁹See, Rodrigues Júnior, Actividades e problemas do Niassa e de Manica e Sofala (reportagens), (Lourenço Marques, 1944), 137-143.

⁶⁰Roque, "Algumas considerações sobre a agricultura"; AHM-FGG, No.304: Relatório anual do Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais do Distrito da Beira, 1952, Lourenço Marques, 1953. See appendix one.

⁶¹Ibidem.

After the war, most Portuguese settlers benefited from the boom in foodstuffs and the more stringent Portuguese administrative policy towards African labour, despite remarkable social differences between them.⁶² In this period settlers boosted their farming activities and paved the way towards a capitalist agrarian economy in Manica province.⁶³ However, the gap between poor and wealthy Portuguese farmers was vast, and individual land ownership varied from 4 hectares to more than 5,000 hectares. António Tavares, who held 1,200 hectares of land in 1942 was the most important Portuguese farmer in Macequece, while Joaquim Carvalho, who held 5,000 hectares in Sierra Tsetsera in 1949, was considered the most successful Portuguese farmer in Manica province.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, as in the past, underdeveloped agricultural techniques, low salaries, ecological disasters, irregular climatic conditions and labour shortages, still hampered the actual development of agriculture during the decade of 1940 to 1950, despite the Grémio subsidy to settlers. This pattern is illustrated by the figures in the tables below:

Credits received by settler farmers, (1945/46-1950/1)⁶⁵

Year	Amount (Portuguese escudo)
1945/46	1,372,475\$00
1946/47	969,000\$00
1947/48	1,156,000\$00
1948/49	2,667,000\$00
1949/50	2,724,000\$00
1950/51	5,892,500\$00

⁶²For more details on the impact of labour legislation in the 1940s, see the following section.

⁶³In the mid-1940s the report of the Department of Agriculture had already considered Manica province, especially Chimoio district, as the most important maize farming region in Mozambique. The land under cultivation (in hectares) was represented as follows: Chimoio, 15,342; Manhiça, 3,033; Massingire, 2,524; Buzi, 1,854; Marracuene, 1,529; Maputo, 1,316 and Sabié, 1,291. See, *Relatório do Chefe dos Serviços de Agricultura II, 1940-1944*, Lourenço Marques, 1946.

⁶⁴AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: *Relatório da inspecção ordinária ao concelho de Manica*, 1962.

⁶⁵AHM-FGG, No. 368: *Relatório anual do Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais*, 1951.

Settler Farmer production in Manica and Sofala, 1946/47-1949/50⁶⁶

Year	Farmers	Farms(ha)	Maize(90kg)	Tobacco(Kg)
1946/47	205	226	161,985	38,500
1947/48	200	222	186,841	32,000
1948/49	192	218	162,136	40,000
1949/50	206	229	254,570	80,000

Maize harvested by white settlers in Manica and Sofala, 1946/47-1949/50⁶⁷

Year	1946/47	1947/48	1948/49	1949/50
Land (ha)	17,020	17,748	18,869	20,972
Harvest (bag 90kg)	161,185	186,841	162,136	254,570
Productivity(bag/ha)	9,5	10,5	8,5	12,1

The figures in these tables show an irregular harvest although the land under cultivation had increased. Indeed, contrary to the period of 1941/42-1945/46, when average maize production per hectare was 12,4 bags, the following years were characterised by bad harvests due to dry seasons and labour. The administrative authorities also believed that soil erosion was one of the most important factors in the decreasing maize output. A new soil conservation policy was imposed and a Fund for Soil Conservation was set up in 1947.⁶⁸ The exception to the run of poor harvests was 1949/50, which was considered a good year, not only because of good rainfall but also because of the availability of labour.⁶⁹ The table below illustrates the annual rainfall in Chimoio between 1947-48 and 1951-52.

⁶⁶Roque, "Algumas considerações sobre a agricultura do distrito de Manica e Sofala", Anexos, map 1; AHM-FGG, No.304: Relatório anual do Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais, 1953.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸AHM-FGDB, Cx 728: Despacho do Governo Geral de 27.5.1947; AHM-FGG, No. 304: Relatório das actividades dos serviços técnicos durante o quadriénio de 1945-49: Junta de Exportação dos Cereais da Colónia, Vila Pery, 1950, 147/48, 191/96.

⁶⁹AHM-FGG, No.304: Annual Report of the Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais, 1953, 5-7.

Rain registered at Vila Pery (annual average in mm)⁷⁰

Year	1947/48	1948/49	1949/50	1950/51	1951/52
Total	715	794	773	762	1594

3. White farms and African labour supply in Manica and Chimoió.

In 1928, following criticism at the League of Nations against forced labour in the Portuguese colonies, the Portuguese authorities introduced some reforms and liberalized their labour legislation.⁷¹ The new labour legislation (*Código do Trabalho Indígena*) replaced the "legal obligation" of Africans to work, enjoined by the 1899 Labour Code, by a "moral obligation" to work, and by a system of "voluntary" tax-mobilised labour.⁷² This legislation came into effect in Mozambique through labour regulations (*Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indígenas*) in 1930 which defined in detail the obligations of the colonial officials and employers in dealing with African labour issues such as recruitment systems, accommodation, timetables, wages and health care.⁷³

Under the new labour regulations Africans legally had a free choice of employers, and could either sell their labour power as "volunteers" or as "contracted" labourers. They could also choose not to contract their labour if they could obtain their tax by other means. Article 271 clearly stipulated that obligatory labour for private individuals was absolutely

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹For further explanation of the international political environment which preceded the enactment of the labour code of 1928, see among others: Edward A. Ross, Report on Employment of Native Labor in Portuguese Africa (New York, 1925); Marvin Harris, Portugal African "Wards", American Committee on Africa, 1958, 19-21.

⁷²For more discussion on general aspects of labour legislation under the Salazar's New State regime see: Vail and White, 1980, Capitalism and colonialism in Mozambique, chapter seven; Hedges (ed.), História de Moçambique, vol. 3, chapter two; Jeanne M. Penvenne, "A history of African labor in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, 1877 to 1950", chapter nine. For more details on the legal aspects of labour policy in the Portuguese colonies see, J.M.da Silva Cunha, O Trabalho Indígena: Estudo de Direito Colonial, (Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1949); J.M. da Silva Cunha, O Sistema Português de Política Indígena: Subsídios para o seu estudo, (Coimbra Editora, 1953).

⁷³See República Portuguesa, Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indígenas na colónia de Moçambique, (Lourenço Marques, Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, 1947).

forbidden, and employers who imposed it would be punished. However, as Judith Head has observed, the prohibition on recruiting forced labour for private employers was not a prohibition on the use of forced labour given the nature of the Mozambique economy.⁷⁴ Moreover, African peasants were still exceptionally liable to be conscripted for public works, and the administration had the right to recruit forced labour for public services, such as the construction of roads, bridges, and public housing without pay. It also had the right to impose correctional forced labour on criminals, vagrants and tax defaulters. Furthermore, a new Identification Card or Pass Book (*Caderneta Indígena*) was imposed on Africans as a mean of controlling their mobility.⁷⁵ Although articles 272 and 273 of the labour regulations prescribed free food and tools, my testimonies suggest that in Manica very often peasants had to bring their own tools and provisions to sustain themselves for weeks in public services.

Under the Labour Code, forced labour seemed to have been abolished and labour recruitment liberalised. In fact, the liberalisation of labour recruitment brought about competition, with a bias against small white farmers who were unable to compete against the companies and large plantations in providing reasonable wages and decent work conditions as prescribed in the Code. In Manica province, the situation of settler farmers did not improve at all. White settlers were in a very poor position to cope with open labour recruitment. Those who could afford to hire private recruiters or to resume recruitment campaigns themselves were the better-off farmers, particularly the non-Portuguese. The majority of white farmers still relied on the local administration to help meet their labour needs. This situation may have led to nepotism and bribe-taking by administrators because in Manica some of the farmers were former civil servants or officials, and some were working for those in charge of the administration.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Judith Frances Head, "State, capital and migrant labour in Zambezia, Mozambique: A study of the labour force of the Sena Sugar Estates Limited", Ph.D. Durham, 1980, 72-76.

⁷⁵See Portaria No. 4950, 19.12.1942, art.9: "Regulamento de Identificação Indígena". This legislation prescribed that African natives were only free to move around their residential circumscription or administrative district.

⁷⁶For a similar picture in Zambezia see, Vail and White, *Capitalism and colonialism*, 293, 296.

In 1938 the Department of Native Affairs of the Mozambique Company Territory issued a Circular instructing all administrative authorities in Manica district to apply the new Labour Code rigorously.⁷⁷ Administrators were not allowed to take active part in the recruiting or even to provide recruiters with the assistance of *sipaio* (African police) or to induce local chiefs to help recruiters to go round their villages. As a result, arrangements for recruiting voluntary labour were made through the Delegate (*Curador*) of Native Affairs or his local representatives, namely the *Intendente* of Native Affairs or Administrators of Councils or *Circumscriptions* and *Chefes de Posto*, at a very local level. For instance, recruiters had to be licensed annually by the *Curador Geral* or District governors, and could only operate in areas for which they had been licensed and for specified companies or employers. They were forbidden to use force to conscript labour or even to employ *sipaios* to raid local villages.

The new Labour Code further reduced the direct administrative intervention in recruiting by allowing local administrators and *Chefes de Posto* (Chief of administrative Post) to "assist" recruiters only by informing them where there were local concentrations of population. The authorities were also responsible for overseeing contracts between the employers and employees. These imposed a series of obligations on employers. It was the duty of the local Administrator to supervise the period of the contracts (no more than six months) and to deduct the respective poll tax. Employers had to provide their employees with a salary (not below the minimum wage regulated by the state), decent accommodation, food (according to rations defined by the state), and clothing. The clothing was to be a shirt, a pair of shorts and a blanket. The food had to be varied, including maize (or maize flour), sorghum, beans, oil, meat and fish. Meals were to be served three times a day, including tea with sugar in the morning. However, workers could choose, between taking cooked food or foodstuffs to cook themselves. Other facilities included the provision of medical services, social welfare and compensation in the case of accidents or death at work. However, only very few employers managed to apply these

⁷⁷ AHM-FCM, RGP - M-80: Nota Circular No.2 da Direcção dos Negócios Indígenas do Governo do Território da Companhia de Moçambique, 12 October 1938.

regulations entirely. Even large companies such as the Buzi sugar plantation failed to provide cloth to their employees.⁷⁸

Although labour recruitment became an open field for entrepreneurs, the fact that the local administration had to pay for itself, mainly through tax collection, led to much violence, and may have resulted in the desertion of men from local homesteads. On the other hand, the salaries provided for farm labour remained very low. While the scarcity of labour for settler farms reinforced the role of private recruiters - who were mainly former administrators or military officials - it made the administrators vulnerable to blandishments of recruiters. The liberal labour regulations of 1930 were inadequate for the needs of nascent agrarian capitalism in central Mozambique. Settler farms in central Mozambique required state protection and, to some extent, forced labour to lower their costs of production and to achieve their primitive accumulation.⁷⁹

In the 1930s, the labour situation in Manica province failed to stabilize. African men remained reluctant to work on settler farms and time and again they reinforced the wave of emigration to neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the development of industries (cement, sugar, timber) and the improvement of the Beira harbour and railway services contributed not only to stiffer competition over labour but may also have strengthened African peasants, who could sell their maize on the new market and avoid farm labour. Given this picture, the labour situation was described by the local Portuguese authorities in the early 1940s as very bad and worrying, especially for small and medium-scale farmers.⁸⁰ Despite this outcry, however, a number of large-scale farmers as well as the Mozambique Company were still able to hire private recruiters or to recruit labour themselves because they could provide competitive wages.

⁷⁸ See my interview with Ernesto Changai, Zembe 2 August 1996.

⁷⁹ A similar picture in Zambézia is described by Head, "State, capital and migrant labour in Zambézia, Mozambique", 72-76.

⁸⁰ AHM- FACC, Cx 243: Circular No.3936/B/9, 2 Outubro 1943, da Direcção Provincial da Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala ao senhor Administrador da Circunscricção de Chimoio.

This situation soon led the Portuguese authorities to recognize the need to re-impose forced labour as the only way to boost settler farming. Indeed, as African labour supply was increasingly scarce and the protests of European settlers intensified, the newly appointed Governor-General of Mozambique, José Tristão de Bettencourt, issued a circular No.818/D-7, redefining the obligations of Africans to work.⁸¹

The enactment of Circular 818/D-7 in October 1942 coincided with the end of the Mozambique Chartered Company in Manica and Sofala territory, with the consequent re-integration of the region into a single Portuguese colonial administration. Henceforth the colonial administration was to be involved in developing the colony's economy rather than simply in preserving Portuguese sovereignty. However, as already mentioned elsewhere, the Mozambique Company continued as the most powerful economic entrepreneur in the region.

The circular prescribed that all able-bodied African men between the ages of 18 and 55 had to prove that they lived on the proceeds of their labour, and that they had worked at least six months of each year as employees for the state, private individuals or companies. However, some exceptions were made for those who had worked in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia under official agreements and for peasants who owned a few head of cattle or cultivated cash-crops according to a minimum size defined by the local administrative authorities. The exemption also included *assimilados*, *sipaio*, local chiefs and those who had recently served in the army.

Moreover the circular reinforced the mechanisms of control over labour mobility through a new "Passbook" (*caderneta indígena*), and native tax (*imposto indígena*), and imposed an additional tax (*contribuição braçal*) equivalent to five days work per year for the

⁸¹For more details see, J.T. de Bettencourt, Relatório do Governador-Geral de Moçambique, 1940-1942, 2 vols, (Lisbon, 1945),II, 78-9.

public.⁸² Single and divorced women, widows, and the second and additional wives of a polygamous man, were also supposed to pay half the poll-tax (*imposto indígena reduzido*).⁸³ The enactment of the circular of October 1942, superseded the more liberal labour regulations of 1930; although these were not abolished, they gave way to the official re-imposition of forced labour in Mozambique.

Following Circular 818/D-7, the Provincial Governor of Manica and Sofala, Pinto Fonseca, forwarded Circular No.3936/B/9 to the Administration of the Chimoio district on 2 October 1943 calling on local authorities to help settler farmers in meeting their African labour needs.⁸⁴ The local authorities in Chimoio and Manica were asked to play a key role to overcome the problem of labour shortage within a month. The governor also instructed local administrators that until, the end of December of 1943, the labour issue should take priority over their duties, with the exception of justice or other matters to be indicated. According to the governor, if these measures were not implemented, the agrarian season would deteriorate further with serious economic damage in the province.⁸⁵

In terms of Circular No. 3936/B/9, the administrators had to conscript all able-bodied men who did not engage in wage labour in 1942/43 to farm wage employment and public works. Those who resisted or absconded were to be considered vagrants, and were threatened with six-months labour (*thangata*). Sometimes, women and children were forced to replace their absconded or deserted husbands or fathers on the white farms. The local administrators were also expected to submit written reports on labour recruitment to the governor every week. The lists of recruited men had to record the name of the employer and the number of recruited labourers. On 21 October 1943, the administrator of Chimoio submitted the records of African labour as shown in the table below:

⁸²See Portaria No. 4.963 of 26.12.1942.

⁸³The exemption of married woman from poll tax was provided in order to force African men into monogamous marriage and to official registration. See J.T. de Bettencourt, *Quatro anos e meio no Governo de Moçambique*, (Lourenço Marques, 1944), 12/13.

⁸⁴AHM- FACC, Cx 243: Circular No.3936/B/9, 2 Outubro 1943, da Direcção Provincial da Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala ao senhor Administrador da Circunscrição de Chimoio.

⁸⁵Ibid; AHM- FGDB, Cx 658: Nota No. 2651/B/9, Maio 1944 da Direcção Provincial da Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala para todas as autoridades administrativas da Província.

African labour employed in Chimoio in 1943⁸⁶

	January-March	April-June	July-September
Sisal	306	453	236
Tobacco	56	30	49
Cotton	354	316	201
Maize and others	3398	4060	1849
Various services*	853	816	1246
Railways	623	411	395
Services	587	604	614
Public Work	68	68	140
Firewood cutting	167	104	108
Quarrying	218	73	87

*These services included carpentry, building, tailoring, etc.

Although the reasons for the reduced number of employees in July-September are not explicitly mentioned in the report, the fact that the period coincided with winter and harvesting seasons, may explain the unwillingness of local Africans to engage wage labour instead of dealing with their own crops. By contrast in industry where work was less rigorous, the labour supply was relatively regular throughout the year. The shortage of workers in quarrying seems to have been a result of unfavourable weather conditions.

In the same year, the Association of Labour Recruitment (*Sociedade de Recrutamento de mão-de-obra*) also submitted its records of labour recruited in the region to the governor of Manica and Sofala province as follows:

Labour recruited by the Association of Labour Recruitment⁸⁷

Circumscription	1942	1943
Dombe and Mavita	469	187
Mossurize	489	355
Bárue	90	1193
Chemba/Maríngue	639	217
Gorongozza	110	28
Sena	406	130
Buzi	397	-
Govuro	192	65
Total	2792	2175

⁸⁶AHM-FACC, Cx 243: Nota No.1614/B/9 of 21 October 1943.

⁸⁷AHM-FACC, Cx 243: Nota No. 1614/B/9, 21 October 1943.

The difference in labour supply between 1942 and 1943 suggests the increasing involvement of African peasants in cash-crop production of wheat (especially in Mavita) and cotton in other circumscriptions, namely Chemba, Gorongosa, Sena, Dombe and Mossurize, apart from the direct intervention of the local administration in recruiting labour in Mossurize. By 1943, Buzi had restricted labour recruitment for outside the circumscription (district) because of the increasing demand for labour by the Buzi Sugar Company.

In 1943/44, a report by the Inspector Abel Sousa Moutinho for the districts of Manica and Sofala province registered 224 recruited labourers without state intervention, against the 2,203 men recruited in Mossurize, Manica and Bárue with the intervention of the local administrators. Those workers were supplied to settler farmers in Vila Pery, Vanduzi, Zembe and Zinai villages.⁸⁸ In Manica district 730 Africans were recruited a six-months' contract on a monthly salary of 66\$00 (Portuguese escudo).⁸⁹ They were distributed among 24 local farmers. In addition, about 366 more labourers were recruited outside the district by the Mozambique Company. Of that number, 264 were recruited in Mossurize, 102 in Mutarara (Tete) and 60 in Sena. In general nearly one thousand African men were recruited from Mossurize between April and December of 1943.⁹⁰ These figures illustrate the key position played by Mossurize as the main labour reserve for settler farmers in Manica and Chimoio. However, time and time again Mossurize showed an increasing absence of men in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. This situation again caused concern to Portuguese administrators.

Despite the legislation forcing Africans to engage wage labour, many entrepreneurs, especially settler farmers in Chimoio and Manica, still complained about a labour shortage. In fact, in the mid-1940s the labour supply was still inefficient and settler farmers faced a high rate of desertion, and the region as a whole experienced an annual

⁸⁸See AHM-FGG, No. 177: Relatório da Inspeção às circunscrições de Buzi, Chemba, Cheringoma, Chimoio, Gorongosa, Manica, Marromeu, Mossurize, Sena and Sofala, 1943-1944, by Inspector Abel Sousa Moutinho.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Ibid.

labour deficit estimated at about 47,305 workers.⁹¹ According to the Governor of Manica and Sofala this was due to the ill-treatment of workers and their clandestine migration to neighbouring countries rather than demography.⁹²

Very often employers found themselves desperately submitting petitions to the local administration or even to the governor-general and the Department of Agriculture in Lourenço Marques, complaining about the high rate of labour desertion. This was, for example, the case of Adelino Loureiro, a maize farmer in Chimoio, and Heinrich Bargholz of Bandula.⁹³ However, the principal reasons of desertion were among others, low wages, ill-treatment and the poor working conditions offered to workers.⁹⁴ Indeed, the administrative authorities and Inspectors felt that the large potential labour supply within Manica district could be mobilised if adequate wages were provided by settler farmers.⁹⁵

Recognising that state intervention merely led to increasing labour migration, the authorities criticized the employers who regarded the local administration as their labour recruitment agency. To emphasize this point, the administration directed them to organise themselves in order to deal with recruitment directly.⁹⁶

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²AHM-FGDB, Cx 658: Nota No.2651/B/9 de Maio de 1944 de Direcção Provincial da Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala para todas autoridades administrativas da Província.

⁹³AHM-FGDB, Cx 639: Nota da Direcção Provincial de Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala, para o Administrador da circunscrição de Chimoio, Vila Pery, 9 January 1945; AHM-FGDB, Cx 622: Processo No.804/B/9, 15 March 1946, Direcção da administração civil de Manica e Sofala: Requerimento do agricultor alemão Henrich Bargholz proprietário em Garuzo ao Director de Agricultura de Lourenço Marques. In April 1946, 43 farmers members of the "Grémio" submitted a petition to the President of the Grémio complaining about labour shortage.

⁹⁴For example a committee of enquiry sent to Henrich Bargholz farmer, found that although workers earned 125\$00 monthly they oftenly deserted because of ill-treatment and long labour journey (11 hours per day). See, AHM-FGDB, Cx 622: Nota No.1274/B/9 of 15 March 1946.

⁹⁵See Arquivo da Torre do Tombo (Lisbon), AOS/COL/UL-62: Correspondência sobre mão-de-obra - Carlos Henriques Jones da Silveira, encarregado de Serviços da Inspeção dos Negócios Indígenas ao Ministro das Colónias, 1949.

As time went by, the labour crisis deeply affected almost all settler farmers in Chimoio and Manica. To overcome this, the Grémio, with the collaboration of the administrative authorities tried many strategies, including the establishment of a labour recruitment agency in 1946 designed exclusively to serve its members.⁹⁷ In the same year, the governor of Manica and Sofala reinforced the state protection of settler farmers through circular No. 5958/3/14/3 of 13 November 1946, which instructed all local administrations to help the Grémio in recruiting labour, given the increasing difficulties in enticing African men to join farm labour.⁹⁸ In addition, the Grémio proposed the establishment of "emergency brigades" in order to supply labour to settler farmers during the peak seasons, especially for weeding and harvesting.⁹⁹

As the labour demand intensified, however, the Grémio's labour agency seemed too weak to provide all its members with enough labour.¹⁰⁰ It was financially weak and had to compete with private recruiters for local industry or forestry, the Rhodesian runners who very often enticed labour from Manica and Tete districts. Southern Rhodesia's dramatic economic development during World War II also contributed to clandestine migration, especially from Manica and Mossurize districts. In 1947 the number of emigrants to Southern Rhodesia was estimated at about 7,000 from Mossurize, 2,700 from Manica and 1,000 from Chimoio.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶AHM-FGDB, Cx 658: Nota No. 265/B/9 Maio 1944, Direcção Provincial de Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala para todas as autoridades administrativas da Província.

⁹⁷See Portaria No.6656, 9.11.1946, Boletim Oficial de Mozambique (B.O.), I Serie, No.45, 9.11.1946.

⁹⁸AHM-FGDB, Cx 639: Circular No.5958/B/14/3 of 13. 11. 1946, of the governor of Manica and Sofala province.

⁹⁹AHM-FGG, No. 368, Annual Report of the Grémio, 1947.

¹⁰⁰However, apart from being restricted to hire labour from private recruiters, members of the Grémio's labour agency had to submit their requests with 60 days of antecedence. This system might have contributed for their vulnerability. See art.13, 14 of the Regulations of the Labour Agency; Regulamento da Agência de Recrutamento de mão-de-obra indígena do Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais do distrito da Beira, (Lourenço Marques, 1946).

The local government response to this competition was through the establishment of new minimum wage rates in Manica and Sofala province. Thus, in Manica the monthly wage for farm labour was 72\$00 compared to 100\$00 for industrial workers. However, labourers contracted from outside Manica and Sofala only earned 66\$00 per month in agricultural work and 90\$00 in industrial employment. In Tete district, farm workers were paid 40\$00 per month while in industry they received 60\$00.¹⁰² Although Mozambican salaries were slightly increased, African earning power remained relatively weak compared with provided in Southern Rhodesia, while work conditions, for example, rations and clothes provided to contracted workers were also worse. In 1947, the annual report of the administration of Bárue denounced the poor quality of blankets imported from Portugal specifically designed for supplying contracted labour (*mantas para recrutamento*), and the administrator of Bárue suggested that the importation of such blankets, which he classified as "rags" (*trapos*), be suspended.¹⁰³

African unwillingness to engage in contract farm labour, far from home, was also prompted by the system of deferred payment. Under this, workers received 20 per cent of their wage at work and the remaining 80 per cent was paid to the administration of their district of provenance after the deduction of the poll-tax. Apart from deferred payment, employers sometimes paid their workers in produce instead of cash. This may also have contributed to the common dislike of farm employment.

Given their weak capital base and the persistent use of less-developed technology in agriculture, white settlers, especially small and medium-scale farmers, were still dependent on the use of extensive African labour at as cheap a cost as possible.¹⁰⁴ Under these circumstances, state protection remained very important. For example, in order to

¹⁰¹AHM-FGG, No. 226: Relatório dos Administradores da província de Manica e Sofala, 1947.

¹⁰²AHM-FGDB, Cx 658: Nota No. 1284/B/15, Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas, L.Marques, 25 February 1947.

¹⁰³AHM-FNI, Cx 128: Nota da Direcção Provincial da Administração Civil da Beira ao chefe da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas: Cópia do Relatório da Circunscrição do Bárue, referente a 1945 e 1946, 3 April 1947.

¹⁰⁴Roque, "algumas considerações sobre a agricultura", 50.

protect small-scale farmers from the competition offered by the industrial sector and large-scale farms, the administrative authorities of Manica and Sofala province established a system of "closed labour reserves" (*sistema de zonas de recrutamento*) in 1947.¹⁰⁵ Under this system, the districts of Mossurize, Bárue and Gorongosa were exclusively reserved for the recruitment of labour for settler farmers, while in Chimoio, Manica and Buzi, recruitment for employment outside these villages was strictly forbidden.

The new steps towards settler protection were underpinned by Circular 566/D-7 of 15 May 1947, which imposed the obligation on all able-bodied African men to work at least six months in each year unless they were registered as progressive farmers (*agricultor*) in terms of the African Farmer's Statute of 1944 (*Estatuto do Agricultor Africano*). To fulfill this obligation, the administrators and the local chiefs and *sipaio* were susceptible to bribery to provide labour to local entrepreneurs, especially settler farmers.¹⁰⁶ Although, there was discussion between the Governor-General and the governor of Manica and Sofala provinces over the legal aspects of such procedures, the local authorities battled to protect local farmers as far as possible.¹⁰⁷

With living costs increasing at about 20 per cent per annum in 1949, the administrative authorities established new monthly wage rates of 125\$00 for agriculture and 150\$00 for industry in Manica and Sofala provinces.¹⁰⁸ Although the administrative authorities enforced legal mechanisms to help the Grémio recruit labour for settler farmers and increased wages, Africans remained reluctant to engage in farm labour. On the contrary, African peasants found their own agricultural activity was enhanced by the market facilities now available either in Manica district or in the vicinity Southern Rhodesia.

¹⁰⁵See AHM-FGDB, Cx 639: Circular N° 7876/B14/ of 11 December 1947, of the Administrative government of Manica and Sofala Province.

¹⁰⁶See, for example, the situation described by the chief of the Administrative Post of Dombe in Manica circumscription in: CEM-AM: Secção A, Processo 42, 1946: Reports and Official diaries: Official Diary of the Chief of Administrative Post of Dombe, 1-7 November, 1946, by Artur José de Andrade Leitão.

¹⁰⁷See Circular N° 6,436/B/14, 12 December 1947; Circular N° 7876/B/14, 11 December 1947 in AHM-FGDB, Cx 639; Circular N° 6.908/D/14 of 21 September 1950 in AHM-FACC, Cx 376: AHM-FGG, N° 368, Relatório anual do Grémio, 1950.

¹⁰⁸See A.H.M.-FNI, Cx 128: Relatório Trimestral -4o. Trimestre - Nota do Concelho de Manica ao chefe da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas, 22 February 1949.

Labour migration to Southern Rhodesia also still played an important role in diverting young boys and adult men from local wage employment. As the local administrative authorities in Manica commented:

Local employers are [still] facing labour problems because the natives of Manica, apart from being used to work in Southern Rhodesia, also do not engage in economic enterprises. [In addition] they have many ways of getting money by selling fruit, especially strawberries, and vegetables, etc. [In general] the local natives have got money.¹⁰⁹

From data shown below, labour recruited from Manica province seems to fluctuate a great deal over the period between 1947 and 1952. The bulk of labour distributed amongst settler farmers during the period under discussion seems to have been recruited from outside Chimoio and Manica.

Labour supplied by the Grémio's recruitment agency¹¹⁰

	1947/48	1948/49	1949/50	1950/51	1951/52
1st October	1289	2040	2774	2344	1759
1st January	1401	2766	3338	2480	2003
1st April	1917	3492	3582	2397	1991
1st July	2006	3147	3594	2278	2176

In the early 1950s, discussions on labour strategies continued to be the main administrative agenda. Farm associations, local administrators, and the governor of Manica and Sofala province, were all very concerned about the labour supply for settler farmers. However, labour conditions, food and salaries, continued to be at a very low standard and many small and medium-scale farmers rarely conformed with the labour regulations. As a result workers very often complained about inefficiencies and ill-treatment, and deserted their employers. To aggravate the settlers' situation, the privileges

¹⁰⁹Ibid. My informants in Jécua village - Manica circumscription, reinforced that view when recalling their past experiences as farmers in the 1950s, as they used to sell strawberries in Mutare. According to them a basket of strawberries could be sold for 150\$00 (one sterling pound was 80\$00). Mr. Nengomacha, one of the most successful African peasants would sell twenty or thirty baskets per day in the harvesting season. See collective interview in Jécua Village - Manica, 12 July 1996.

¹¹⁰AHM-FGG, N° 304: Relatório anual do Grémio, 1953.

established in 1947, were now ended by Circular N° 6,436/B/14 of 12 September 1950, issued by the governor of Manica and Sofala province. In terms of this circular it was decided to abolish the "closed labour reserves" completely and to open the field for free recruitment. Although such a decision seems paradoxical, it must be understood in the context of the renewed international pressure against forced labour in Portuguese colonies now that war was over.¹¹¹ With the abolition of "closed labour reserves", local administrators and settler farmers felt desperate as the following statement illustrates:

It is true that labour is free, that recruiters have freedom to round up the administrative areas as they please...But, can we consciously stand and watch quietly, with crossed arms, the degeneration of white settlement...which has helped us to overcome the food crisis.¹¹²

It has been argued in this section that during the 1940s and 1950s labour shortage was the principal obstacle to the growth and development of European commercial farming in Manica and Chimoio. The increasing number of farmers and the expansion of cash-crop production generated a demand for labour that exceeded the capacity of the original labour reserves. This was quite apart from the inefficiency of the labour recruitment agency, which lacked the finance to subsidise recruitment campaigns and provide labour at sustainable cost. The development of industrial activities and forestry in the region aggravated the competition over labour, and the situation was worsened by the clandestine migration from Manica and Mossurize to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.¹¹³ Although in Manica the state did not allow official recruitment to neighbouring countries, clandestine migration was the constant major cause of concern among white farmers.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹See AHM-FACC, Cx 376: Nota N° 3167/B/14 de 8 de Outubro de 1951 da Administração civil de Manica e Sofala.

¹¹²See AHM-FACC, Cx 376: Circular Urgente N° 6,908/B/14 de 21 de Setembro de 1951 da Direcção da Administração Civil de Manica and Sofala ao Senhor Administrador da Circumscricção de Chimoio.

¹¹³However it would be misleading to assume that labour conditions in Southern Rhodesia were a paradise. See, David Johnson, "Settler farmers and coerced African labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1936-46", *Journal of African History (JAH)*, 33, (1992), 111-128; see also chapters seven and eight.

¹¹⁴For comparative purposes with southern Mozambique see, Covane, "Settler agriculture and migrant labour", chapter five.

Despite segregationist marketing conditions imposed on African peasants, the less capitalized Portuguese settlers had to fight in many ways to make their agriculture more profitable and to guarantee a regular labour supply. Small and medium-scale white farmers were unable to compete against African maize production. Moreover, due to the strong competition from other recruiting agents, they had to apply for exclusive labour reserves. The state intervened through many local administrative authorities and African chiefs, who were responsible for collecting and supplying contract labour to white settlers and public services.¹¹⁵ It was only in the late 1950s that this pattern showed some change. White agriculture was then diversified and new infra-structure (dams and hydroelectric systems) was developed.¹¹⁶ Sponsored settlement schemes and some processing industries (cotton spinning-mills; maize-mills), as well as the imposition of cotton-growing upon African households to supply the Portuguese textile industry with raw-cotton, all assisted white farming. However, despite these changes, white farmers and colonial authorities continued to worry about labour shortage as we will see in chapter five.

This chapter has shown that the development of settler farming in Manica province in the 1930s and 1950s was engineered by the Mozambique Company and the state, and was a result of the more general colonial settlement policy which aimed at setting colonies with white people, especially Portuguese colonists, in order to avoid their 'denationalization'. The state and the Mozambique Company not only created a political atmosphere favourable to the suppression of African communities, but also played a major role in providing labour, land and credit facilities on the basis of which settler farmers could gradually take control of farm production, particularly maize.

¹¹⁵AHM-FGDB Cx 639: Circular N° 5958/B/14/3 of 13 November 1946 and Circular N° 7876/B/14 of 11 December 1947 of the Civil Administration of Manica and Sofala Province. Nevertheless, conscript African labour could not be supplied in satisfactory quantity by simply relying on African chiefs and *sipaio*. As far as people were adverse to contract wage farm labour they sometimes hid in the bush or just fled to Southern Rhodesia when the recruiting campaigns were carried on. Some even could bribe local headmen to avoid contract.

¹¹⁶See AHM-FGG, N°587: Relatório e contas do Conselho de Administração e Finanças do Conselho Fiscal da Sociedade Hidro-Eléctrica do Revuê, SARL, 1956.

State protection has been common in southern Africa and in other parts of colonial Africa. This has been described by Keegan who stresses that agrarian capitalism in South Africa "was imposed from above in a process of struggle under the auspices of a strong state". He also claims that "the state not only played the crucial role in creating the conditions for the entrenchment of capitalist property relations, but also played a major role in supplying the money capital on the basis of which landholders could seize control of production and revolutionise productive processes."¹¹⁷

The incorporation of African labour into the new agrarian capitalist economy was one of the most daunting challenges that faced white settlers in Manica province. The small and medium-scale farmers in Manica were totally dependent on African labour at the cheapest cost possible to run their economic enterprise.¹¹⁸ The stiff competition over African labour offered by the neighbouring territories of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the need to supply Portugal with raw cotton, all played a key role in the imposition of coercive measures to secure African labour by the state. Thus, in Manica extra-economic forms of coercion and direct state intervention played an important role in securing a labour supply for settler farmers during the period under discussion.

Settler farmers relied on state protection and labour coercion, although, officials and administrative staff claimed that the labour shortage was 'artificial', and that the solution lay in improved wages and working conditions, including decent accommodation, clothing and good food. However the undercapitalised settler farmers did not or were not able to implement such measures. In fact, very often Portuguese administrative inspectors reported the failure of white settlers to fulfill their duties as prescribed in the labour regulations as the main cause of African labour desertion and

¹¹⁷ See, Tim Keegan, "Debate: The origins of agrarian capitalism in South Africa: A reply", *JSAS*, 15, 4, (1989), 683-4. For a more critical interpretation on state protection of white settlers, see P. Mosley, The settler economies: Studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1900-1963, (Cambridge, 1983), chapter two.

¹¹⁸ Martin Murray's paper, "'Slave driving' and 'the poor man's friend': Capitalist farming in the Bethel district, ca. 1910-1940", African Studies Seminar Paper, African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, (August 1993), provides a similar

migration to Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, the majority of settler farmers failed to modernise their agricultural techniques, and relied instead on a labour-intensive system of production. With the instability of the African labour supply many white settlers, particularly maize farmers, faced difficulties in developing their agriculture in Manica.

This study of Manica district has also shown, however, that although peasants were victims of coercion, some sections of African peasantry, if not the majority, remained autonomous and took advantage of the available market for the supply of foodstuffs supply and labour migration remittances. This is analysed in detail in the following chapter.

pattern of social differentiation within white settlers and how it influenced the development of Agrarian capitalism in Transvaal.

CHAPTER 4:

THE PEASANTRY AND THE RISE OF AFRICAN PROGRESSIVE FARMERS, 1930-1950s

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined the impact of African labour shortage on white settler agriculture in Chimoio and Manica districts. This chapter concentrates more on the African response to the market economy. I therefore, examine the way in which peasants in Manica adapted themselves to the transformations brought about by the colonial market economy. I also explore the significance of labour migration for the household economy, looking particularly at its effects on the household labour and agricultural inputs. Here, I will also look closely at the role of women and children in household labour, especially those left behind by their husbands and fathers.

My analysis of African peasantry in Manica, relies mainly on oral testimonies and local observation, which I combine with the available rather scarce, colonial sources.¹ In fact, there is very little evidence from official records, and the statistical data which exists is in general inaccurate. I have assumed that local observation of present-day African peasant farming can help to raise questions about the colonial period, whether labour systems and social institutions, gender, field techniques, crop storage, evolution of staple crops, plagues and pests, or the impact of the state policy.

Contrary to the functionalist analysis and dependentist theories of peasantry which characterised studies before the 1970s, however, scholars trained in other fields and historians have, in the last two decades or so, produced work which has led to a better understanding of African farming and its dynamism. To some extent, it has been the recent consensus that African peasant farmers responded and adapted well to the new conditions brought by the colonial economy and ecological changes.²

¹Oral interviews were carried out at Vila de Manica, Sussundenga, Rotanda, Mavita, Chimoio, Gondola and Rotanda districts. These interviews involved a range of people from common peasants, teachers and local chiefs. Interviews with chiefs Chirara, Chazuca, Kupenya, Maridza, Nhacuanicua and Nhandiro were particularly important for understanding their role in the colonial society. See chapter one.

² See my literature review in chapter one.

A wide range of studies by historians, anthropologists, economists and others, has covered issues such as land tenure, household labour, market conditions, gender, ecology and environment.³ Important discussions on soil conservation and ecological changes in southern Africa have been reviewed by William Beinart in particular.⁴ These studies have underlined the continuity and diversity among African agricultural producers. The expropriation of fertile land has been the classic method by which household producers were turned into a wage-labour force in southern Africa.

The case of Manica province sheds important light on many of the aspects discussed in these studies. Owing to the need for cheap labour for white economic enterprises, colonialism almost inhibited any possibility of accumulation for rural households. Compared to southern Mozambique, in Manica, peasants seem to have responded differently to the presence of whites. In Manica province, alienated land was small in relation to the total land surface, and occurred along the railway line. As a result, this was insufficient to provide free African labour. In fact, the displaced population could find reasonable land elsewhere relatively easily. Moreover given their proximity to Southern Rhodesia, Manica African peasants were also integrated into the Rhodesian colonial market, either as labourers or through selling their crops at very competitive prices. In the 1940s and 1950s, this economic relationship provided local peasants with an extra market in Southern Rhodesia which endures to this day.

In 1978 Barry Neil-Tomlinson argued that, contrary to the situation in other parts of Africa, in the Mozambique Chartered Company's territory of Manica and Sofala, the peasant economy was neither stimulated nor integrated into the market. Peasants in this area were regarded purely as a labour reserve:

³See among others, William Beinart and Peter Delius (eds.), Putting a plough to the ground, (Johannesburg, 1986); Sara Berry, No condition is permanent: The social dynamics of agrarian change in sub-saharan Africa, (Wisconsin, 1993); Henrietta L. Moore and Megan Vaughan, Cutting down trees: gender, nutrition, and agricultural change in the northern province of Zambia, 1890-1990, (London, 1994). Allan Low, Agricultural development in southern Africa: Farm-household economics and the food crisis, (London, 1986).

⁴ William Beinart, "Introduction: The politics of colonial conservation", *JSAS*, 15,2, (1989), 143-162; William Beinart, "Soil erosion, conservationism and ideas about development: a southern African exploration, 1900-1960", *JSAS*, 11, 1, (1984), 52-83.

It is important to emphasise that unlike other colonies in Africa there was no visible change in the African domestic agriculture or in the development of new economic needs to which this change in the nature of the response to labour can be attributed. Rather it was a direct consequence of the growth of labour. Once the impossibility of avoiding labour had been firmly established individuals began to seek out the best conditions within a colonial economy from which there was no escape.⁵

Nevertheless, Neil-Tomlinson argued paradoxically that, in 1936, when the Company failed to 'enforce' labour recruitment, it established a segregationist Marketing Maize Board (*Junta de Comércio do milho*) as protection against African peasants. "As an integral part of this policy, traders were prohibited from buying maize from Africans. The *Junta de Comércio do Milho* also did not buy maize from Africans, and almost overnight African market-orientated production of maize collapsed."⁶

Quite apart from this contradiction, Neil-Tomlinson's argument is generalised and not based on a specific case study. In his study, he tried to cover Manica and Sofala without considering the differences between regions, or the specificity of different zones. Nor did he explain why the Mozambique Company imposed segregationist measures, how African peasants responded, or how far they were integrated into wage labour. We need to know how African peasants reacted as a whole to the monetary economy, and what the articulation was between white settlers and the African peasantry. To understand the impact of the colonial capitalist agrarian transition in central Mozambique we need to look first at the specificity of each zone and how it was integrated in the political economy as a whole.

1. Household, land and labour access.

The structure of the African economy in Manica was basically constituted by homestead agricultural production mainly for subsistence, with sorghum, finger millet, beans, sweet potatoes, and yams as the staple food crops. Maize and a variety of imported cultigens, including fruits and vegetables, were generally produced for the European

⁵Barry Neil-Tomlinson, "The growth of a colonial economy and the development of African labour: Manica and Sofala and the Mozambique Chartered Company, 1892-1942", In: *Mozambique Seminar Proceedings*, African Centre Studies, (University of Edinburgh, 1978), 13.

market. In the remote villages of Dombe and Mossurize, peasants also collected beeswax and wild rubber for the market. Further, peasants produced tobacco or *bangue* (*cannabis sativa*) for home consumption.⁷ Apart from agriculture, men fished and mined alluvial gold and copper in the Revué river and in the main streams running across the villages. Also, homesteads or households, particularly in Manica and Chimoio, managed to graze a few cattle and goats.

In the African community, the homestead or *mhuri*, functioned not only as the basic unit of production but also as a social entity. The head of the homestead (*mukuro* or *sekuru*), usually the eldest male in a lineage, made the decisions. Land was distributed by the local chief (*mambo* or *iche*) through local headmen (*sabhuku*) to different homesteads or households. *Sabhuku* and homestead heads were responsible for contacting the *iche* and his council on the need to allocate land. Among other duties, it was the responsibility of a *sabhuku* to ensure that his people produced food for their own consumption and social security.

Access to land depended on community membership. On the other hand, an individual's moral behaviour was a very important precondition for the right to belong to a rural village and have access to land.⁸ The allocation of land depended on the size of the homestead or household and its capacity to produce and the number of wives may have stimulated the need for land. The more wives a man had the better his chance to gain access to more land and to generate wealth. Finally, the introduction of cash crops, especially maize, and the use of the ox-drawn ploughs led to expansion in the amount of land required by homesteads. Wives and children were very important sources of household labour. Chirara and Kupenya, who are local chiefs and farmers, stressed the importance of women and children for land acquisition and wealth accumulation.⁹ Chirara was married to two wives in the late 1920s and had 15 children, nine of them being boys, while Kupenya was married to three wives in the late 1930s. With the expansion of the colonial capitalist

⁶Ibidem, 15.

⁷However, the production of *bangue* had been officially prohibited through legislation enacted in 1914. See Portaria No. 2054 of 19 September 1914, in Boletim Oficial No. 39 of 26 September 1914.

⁸My interviewees noted that people convicted of witchcraft could be expelled from the village. The same applied to thieves.

economy and with the integration of local chiefs into the colonial administration, access to agricultural land ran through two channels: traditional authority with its form of patronage and the colonial administration. The two systems were both complementary and conflicting.¹⁰

Ownership in the homestead was common and followed its hierarchy. For instance, headmen had authority over homestead activities, including land, the means of production, goods, grain storage and livestock.. Succession was through the oldest male descendant. This meant that inheritance was through patrilineal succession. The headman was supposed to provide land for his wife or wives and for the wives of his sons and nephews so they could grow food. Tobias Chazuca, who remembers this 'tradition' in Chazuca village vividly, mentioned that his father Chapanduca Chazuca, then local Mambo in the early 1900, had five wives and provided them each with a single plot and hut.¹¹

Women exercised rights over land through marriage and had control over their own grain storage. However, women only inherited land from their lineage where they were supposed to be buried. It is also important to note that each wife had to provide meals for her husband (headman), who usually stayed at his 'first' wife's hut. The 'first' wife also had responsibility for control over all the daughters of the headman. Spiritual ceremonies were also performed at her place. She was responsible for brewing porridge beer ('seven days') with finger millet or *njera*. The headman (father or uncle) had responsibility for the payment of the bridewealth of his sons and for allocating land when the bride gave birth. However, the scarcity of land could lead to a fragmentation of the homestead through the migration of young married men in search of new land. It was also common after one or two years for the young couple to move away and establish their own household.¹²

Crops harvested in the homestead's fields were kept in granaries (*mutwirica* or *tsapi*) under the headman's control, and their management was shared between the headman and his 'first' wife. The produce of the homestead farm was not only to feed its members, but also

⁹See my interview with Benedito Chirara (Manica, 20 June 1994) and Kupenya (Sussundenga, 16 June 1994).

¹⁰For comparative purposes see the study carried out in Zambezia by José Negrão, "One hundred years of African rural family economy: The Zambezi delta in retrospective analysis", Ph.D. Thesis (University of Lund, Sweden), 1995.

¹¹Interview in Manica, Chazuca village, July 1996.

to meet other social needs, such as the education expenses of children, clothing, and tax payment, as well as for financing marriage and traditional ceremonies.

Although maize became an important food staple crop, it also constituted the main cash crop, together with fruit (bananas and strawberries), sugar cane, spring vegetables, sesame, barley and ginger. Livestock, mostly cattle and goats, were used for inter-homestead exchange or kept as security against bad harvests and for marriage transactions. Cattle were widely viewed as symbols of prestige. Although the basic structure and relations within the homestead were still headed by *sekuru*, with the increasing impact of the colonial economy, especially the increasing access to cash earnings, youthful members of the lineage sought relative independence to establish their own households.

In many homesteads cultivation was with hand and hoe and the technique was slash and burn. The ash of burnt branches was used to fertilise the soil for planting. Manure was rarely used amongst peasants in Manica. However, some homesteads managed to acquire ox-drawn ploughs. The use of ox-drawn ploughs depended not only on the access to ploughs but also on environmental and ecological conditions. For instance, in Mossurize, Dombe and to some extent in Mavita, people did not use ox-drawn ploughs much due to the prevalence of tsé-tsé fly and glossina. Although Chimoio offered good environmental conditions, peasants did not use ploughs. The reasons for the lack of improvement in the means of production in Chimoio are not clear.

Unlike in Mossurize and Chimoio, in Manica, some peasants especially in Macequece and Rotanda, did use ox-drawn ploughs.¹³ This was possible mostly because of their contacts with Southern Rhodesia, particularly the farming areas of eastern Manicaland which bordered on Manica. Generally, the system of agriculture involved both a form of land rotation and shifting cultivation. Land was used as long as it was fertile, usually up to three or four years. Seeds were selected from the crops harvested in the previous agricultural season and were preserved in pots or bottles mixed with ash. African agriculture was

¹²See interview with Pedro Baradzai, Manica city, 22 January 1998.

¹³Migrant labourers in Rhodesian farmers not only learnt new agricultural techniques, such as using ploughs, they could buy these instruments in local stores and bring with them to home. In some areas this included the 'import' of donkeys.

subject to all kinds of climatic and ecological uncertainties, such as in the amount and timing of rainfall, and attacks by insect and pests.

The structure of the homestead in many ways affected the potential access to labour from within and its capacity to respond to the growing market economy. Homesteads with large numbers of members tended to be relatively well off. The availability of labour within homestead provided more possibilities for headmen to diversify production and distribution of tasks amongst members, including children.¹⁴ However, labour shortage could be overcome through the investment in ploughs and cattle, especially oxen. The smaller and poorer homesteads were vulnerable to bad harvests caused by drought (*shângua*) and plagues. Among many other plagues in Manica province, red locust (*ndongue*) was the most horrifying and was followed by severe famine (*fome do gafanhoto* or *gore re ndongue*).¹⁵

The labour employed in homestead production was drawn from household members, i.e. the head's wives and children and brothers and their wives and children, daughters-in-law and grand-children. The marriage of its young members was also very important in increasing the homestead labour force. With marriage, sons brought daughters-in-law into the homestead's field labour force. The division of labour was based on sex and age. Although men and women could share agricultural work, mainly during ploughing and harvesting seasons, men usually cleared bush, kept cattle, hunted and fished, and built huts and granaries. Women were the back-bone of homestead production. They performed the actual work of agriculture such as hoeing, weeding, reaping and threshing, as well as a range of domestic tasks such as food preparation and brewing beer for mutual parties.

Children, either boys or girls, performed tasks with their fathers or mothers and helped in sowing, weeding and harvesting. Boys chased baboons and birds in the gardens to prevent them from destroying crops, and sometimes worked as cattle herders. Young boys also

¹⁴This analytical perspective is advanced in Henrietta L. Moore & Megan Vaughan, *Cutting down trees*, 1994, chapter eight. See also Sara Berry in her comparative study of west central and eastern African farmers; S. Berry, *No condition is permanent: The social dynamics of agrarian change in sub-Saharan Africa*, (Wisconsin, 1993), chapter five and six.

¹⁵The most severe hunger are remembered with specific designations, such as: 1920s (*Goto-koto*); 1930s (*Sikhisiranhe*); 1960s (*Gonda-mutonono*).

travelled to Manica and Umtali (in Zimbabwe) selling seasonal crops, fruit and vegetables. As I demonstrate in chapter seven, youth and even children frequently crossed the border to Umtali to sell strawberries, sugar cane and other crops. In many cases they used that money to enroll at mission schools in Manicaland. There were others who worked for local rich African farmers. As Macequece is about 14km from the border it could be reached in about three hours. People living at Chazuca chieftaincy were about an half hour's walking distance from the border.¹⁶ Girls also fetched water and collected firewood, as well as prepared food and looked after their young relatives.

Although there was intra-homestead co-operation (*djangano*) through exchanging labour or mutual help, this was only possible if the beneficiary homestead was prepared to give labour in return. However, although *djangano* or meeting did not involve any kind of payment, the beneficiary had to be able to prepare a certain amount of beer (*pombe* or *dôro*) for work-party. Usually poor families were unable to organise such work-parties, and therefore were not eligible for exchange labour. Adult men from more vulnerable households were recruited for at least six months' contract labour for white settlers very far from their village. Under such circumstances, a great amount of household labour fell on women who had to cope with not only food production but all domestic burden, including bearing and rearing children.

Men who absconded or ran away from their employers made their wives' or parents' life more difficult. Women, either wives or mothers, and young relatives could be recruited to replace their absconded kin. However men who migrated to neighbouring plantations and white farms in Southern Rhodesia, could invest their incomes in agriculture in order to change their economic status. Labour migration also involved peasants when their sector of the economy was in trouble.¹⁷

As elsewhere in colonial Africa, so under the Salazar 'New State', local chiefs (*régulos* or *regedores*) in Manica became part of the territorial colonial administration and had to fulfil

¹⁶ Silvestre Chabai born in 1925 in Nhacabau chieftaincy, emphasised on this aspect stating that he began to travel to Umtali in 1935. Everyday he carried baskets of tomato and strawberries from his parents' s gardens to sell in Umtali. See my interview in Manica, 19 April 1994.

its duties. Local chiefs functioned as the bottom rung of the ladder of the colonial administration, working under the supervision of the local administrator, the so-called Chief of Post (*Chefe de Posto Administrativo*), the lowest Portuguese administrative official at rural level. In fact, with the cessation of the Mozambique Chartered Company, the administration was centralised in government officers. The role of the local administrator included the enforcement of labour regulations and punishment of infractors, the collection of tax and census data, and the supervision of African agriculture.

With the expansion of the territorial administration, the boundaries of the chieftaincies, then *regedorias*, were surveyed and subjected to divisions into groups of villages (*grupo de povoação*) and villages (*povoação*). However, the designations of these institutions when extrapolated into the rural universe, differed from one region to another.¹⁸ In Manica, *régulos* were generally called *Mambo* and the heads of groups of villages were designated *Iche*, while the village chiefs were known as *Sabhuku*.¹⁹

Although the *régulo* was the traditional Mambo, entitled to rule in accordance with the customary law of succession, his functions were prescribed by formal law.²⁰ Thus, at local level, the *régulo* was a government officer, dealing in particular with the 'indígena' or 'native' population. The Portuguese administration divided African people into two groups. *Assimilados* were mixed and black people who renounced their traditional way of life and fulfilled the requisites to apply for full Portuguese citizenship. These could be progressive farmers and were sometimes local chiefs. But the basic condition was to attain the fourth level of primary school. The majority of peasants who failed these conditions were all considered *indígenas* or natives and were under customary law.

¹⁷ For further details see chapter eight.

¹⁸ For comparative purposes see, Jocelyn Alexander, "Land and political authority in post-war Mozambique: A view from Manica province", (unpublished research report), Oxford University, 1994.

¹⁹ See my interview with Chief Richon Chazuca (Manica, Chazuca village, 19 September 1996); Chief Benedito Bande Chirara (Manica, Chinhambudzi village, 20 June 1994); Chief Franela Andicene Nhandiro (Manica, Mavonde village, 18 September 1996) and Chief Murindi Paulo Kupenya (Manica, Sussundenga village, 16 June 1994).

²⁰ For more details on the more general colonial policy towards local chiefs in Mozambique, see, Negrão, "One hundred years of African rural economy", 162-171; Borges Coelho, "Protected villages and communal villages", chapter four.

In order to strengthen his prestige and influence over his community, the *régulo* was given a uniform. Further, *régulos* were offered material rewards, such as a percentage of the tax collected or of the labour recruited, and were exempted from contract labour and taxation. Occasionally brick houses were built for chiefs instead of their being paid in cash, or in compensation for being promoters of cotton cultivation.²¹ Moreover, some chiefs were granted with trips to Portugal. For example, Chief Chirara was granted with a trip to Portugal in 1952. After his return the local administrator of Manica district organised a big *banja* (meeting) with all chiefs of the district. At that meeting Chirara praised Portugal and called upon his fellows chiefs to mobilise their people to follow the example of the Portuguese peasants in engaging with agriculture.²² However, the administration could remove *régulos* who failed to accomplish their duties and replace them by new ones without following the customary law of succession. Administrative measures against chiefs could also be applied by contracting the extent of their chieftaincies or lowering their rank.

During the administration of the Mozambique Company, and especially with the intrusion of white settlers, local chiefs found their power reduced and limited to settler defined African areas. In fact, white settlers could choose land wherever they pleased without any negotiation with local African authorities. Peasants living in those areas could be expropriated and removed from their fields without any material compensation. This situation revealed the fragility of local power over land in the colonial context. Although some chiefs reacted against land expropriation, their voices were simply ignored by the colonial authorities. However, there were some, very few indeed, who used their spiritual power to protect their land.²³ This was particularly the case of chief Mahate in the south-western areas of Manica district (between Dombe, Mavita and Rotanda). Mahate controlled the powerful spirit in the region including parts of actual Zimbabwe. Even

²¹Although Manica-Macequece was not a cotton-growing zone, one of its most prestigious chiefs, Marufu Chazuca, became the first Mambo to receive a brick house from the colonial administration in Manica province in the early 1940s. Interview with Elias T. Chazuca, (Manica, Mudonguara village, 26 July 1996).

²²See, CEM-AM: Diário de serviço do administrador do Concelho de Manica, Afonso Calçada Bastos, 22 July 1953.

²³See interview with M.Nengomacha, Manica, Chitehwe village, 12 July 1996.

today access to Mahate territory is very difficult and is full of mystery. Others called on their spirits (*vadzimu*) to protect areas with rich minerals against white penetration.²⁴

In Manica, chiefs invoked cultural practices (propitiating ancestral spirits, recognizing sacred features of the landscape), and therefore enforced respect from people for the land which represented an inalienable birthright.²⁵ Nevertheless, in most cases, chiefs had no choice other than to accept colonial machinations. These manipulations were in general through the sponsorship of local ceremonies by local administrators or by white settlers themselves. The ambivalence of local chiefs can be understood as the result of their need to protect their power, instead of losing it to strangers. Indeed, because of the ties chiefs had with their communities they often retained their influence over them even simultaneously while they worked as agents of the colonial state.²⁶ Some chiefs like Chazuca even used African prophetic churches as an alternative form of political and cultural resistance.²⁷

Although in general local chiefs and the colonial administration co-existed in a fraught interdependence, their colonial interaction was frequently characterised by violence. Rather than being simply puppets of the colonial administration, because of this violence, some chiefs, particularly those who had some education, resisted their subordination through avoidance and fled to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. However, very often their positions were taken over by their next of kin. João de Deus remembers how, in the 1950s, his father, Nicolau João de Deus, resisted being appointed *regulo* in Mossurize by fleeing to Southern Rhodesia. In Rhodesia, apart from working as a migrant, he developed his carpentry skills and later established his own workshop in Mossurize.²⁸

²⁴See collective interview in Manica, Chitehwe village, 12 July 1996.

²⁵For comparative purposes, see an interesting study of eastern colonial Zimbabwe by Donald S. Moore, "Contesting terrain in Zimbabwe's Eastern Highlands: political ecology, ethnography, and peasant resource struggles", Seminar paper, Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, n/d. I am grateful to Dr. Ken Wilson for this reference.

²⁶In this analysis, I borrow Beinart's perspective that although chiefs have been used as instruments of control at local level by colonial government, they have also been seen by rural dwellers as an institution for the defence of their rights. W. Beinart, "Chieftaincy and the concept of articulation: South Africa ca 1900-1950", in *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 19, 1 (1985), 91-98: 96.

²⁷For more details on this aspect see below (chapter ten).

²⁸Nicolau de Deus was replaced by his young brother. See my interview with João de Deus, 13 April 1994. However it is important to underline that to assume that chiefs

In the 1940s, local chiefs virtually lost their power over land allocation due to the expansion of white settlement, particularly in Chimoio and Manica districts. Their power remained however, in performing ritual ceremonies and collaborating with the system as labour recruiters or by directing the *sipaio* and recruiters in their chieftaincies, and as poll tax collectors. With the increasing production of cash crops, especially maize, local chiefs also played an important role as intermediaries between local African farmers and traders or state institutions. They were also responsible for mobilising peasants to cultivate cotton. These tasks reinforced their position as collaborators with the colonial system. However chiefs were always under great pressure, and when they failed to provide labour, or taxes according to the number of population (able-bodied men), they were subjected to beatings with *palmatória*, or even dismissed or deported to S.Tomé Island.²⁹

2. The Mozambique Company and the rise of African farmers, 1930-1942/44.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the conflict between African and European settlers was minimal. However, as time went on, the colonists' demand for land and labour became more insistent, and they came to cultivate their fields more intensively, they started to clash with African peasants. This conflict was more pronounced in areas near railways, roads, mines and water resources. However, in Manica, Chimoio and Mossurize a certain sector of the African peasantry was stimulated by the need for foodstuffs for local enterprises at as low a cost as possible.

With the increasing number of enterprises in Manica and Sofala provinces more food was required to feed the labourers. As white settlers's agricultural production was frequently constrained by a shortage of labour, African households responded vigorously to the increased opportunities of the market, basically producing maize. This trend remained

who did not try to escape were content with their situation is misleading. Desertion was no easy course to follow.

²⁹During my interviews in Manica, almost all testimonies remembered episodes where chiefs were taken to the local administration for punishment. Chirara and Chazuca, the two most prestigious chiefs close to Macequece (the district administrative centre) did not escape such humiliation. *Sabuku* Chazuca was even deported to S.Tomé island in 1953.

almost unchanged until the early 1950s. In addition, local peasants took advantage of the availability of the colonial market in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia.

As I showed in the previous chapter, by the 1920s, with the presence of European settlers and the expansion of their maize production, the pressure on the best land, particularly along the railway line and the road connecting Beira to Southern Rhodesia, seems to have affected the local people who were forced either to move to the mountains or to remain on the original land as labour tenants. This mostly happened in Chimoio and Manica-Macequece. Chirara and Chazuca chieftaincies in Manica suffered most from land expropriation, and Mechisso, born in Chazuca chieftaincy about 1905, remembers how people were expelled from the fertile Messambuzi valley and forbidden to extract alluvial gold by the Mozambique Company and white settlers.³⁰

However, peasants living outside these areas and as far as Penhalonga, Rotanda, Dombe and Mavonde, could gain access more land and take advantage of the available foodstuff market, especially in the mines, by producing maize. In addition to the land kept in African hands, the Mozambique Company had reserved an extensive area for the 'indígena' about 20km along the border with Southern Rhodesia and from Manica southward to the Save river.³¹ [see Map] Although the region was very fertile, it lacked communications and was infested with tse-tse fly. Under such ecological conditions people could not keep livestock or use ox-drawn ploughs in agriculture or ox-carts for carrying crops to the market. Nevertheless, they could cope with these conditions so long as they retained reasonable control over their household labour, and did not become dependent on local wage labour.

Contrary to the situation in many territories of southern Africa, in Manica land shortage was not an important factor influencing peasant farming. Although the Mozambique Company had seized a large area of land and white settlers had alienated land along the so-called Beira 'corridor', only a small proportion of this land was in fact under cultivation. Lack of capital, technical assistance and labour prevented white settlers from utilising their land fully. Furthermore, both the Mozambique Company and the white settlers allowed

³⁰Interview with F.Mechisso, Manica, Chazuca village, 4 June 1997.

³¹AHM-FGG, No.177: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária à Circunscrição de Manica.

African peasants to remain on their land as labour tenants or as share-croppers growing market crops for sale to the company.

With the Great Depression of the 1930s, many white settlers abandoned agriculture and some even left the territory.³² One of the main reasons for the abandonment of agricultural enterprises was the low prices offered for maize. In fact these prices were unsatisfactory that they failed to pay their land mortgage.³³ Under such circumstances, the African peasantry, particularly in Manica district, began growing increasing amounts of maize at the expense of their older staple crops, sorghum and finger millet. The main areas of development of African farming for the market in Manica district were Mavita, Rotanda, Dombe, Penhalonga and Macequece villages.

Before the enactment of the 'African Farmer Statute' in 1944, the Mozambique Company exempted African farmers from forced contract labour if they produced about thirty sacks of maize for sale. By the late 1930s, opportunities for commercial agriculture had been seized by African households, especially in Manica and Chimoio. Despite the obstacles imposed on them, some peasants had achieved relative prosperity boosted by the European market, following the need for foodstuffs at the Beira harbour and on the railways, as well as by the Buzi company (*Companhia Colonial do Buzi*). In this period the number of African farmers was estimated at about 200 and they produced about 6,000 sacks of maize for market every year. However, due to the lack of transport many peasants just produced enough to pay their tax and avoid forced contract labour.

In fact, owing to their weak financial resources, neither the Portuguese administration nor the Mozambique Company invested in transport or roads outside the Beira 'corridor'. There were no trucks or cars at all. Until 1940, apart from the railway services connecting Beira harbour to Southern Rhodesia, the only transport facilities available in Manica were private ox-carts or carts pulled by buffalo or donkey-carts. This meant that only those who

³²See statistical data in chapter three and appendix one. Agostinho dos Muchangos, former school-teacher and interpreter in the Manica administration, remembers quite well how white settlers abandoned agriculture because the Bank of Beira could no longer finance them during the Depression. See interview in Manica, 10 April 1993.

³³Interview with Portuguese engineer, Manuel Magalhães (director of Textáfrica), Chimoio city, 26 January 1998.

had their own carts could carry their crops to the market on any scale. Transport difficulties therefore reinforced social differentiation.³⁴

The more wealthy farmers were, in general, members of dominant lineages or peasants with additional resources raised from labour migration to Southern Rhodesia. Members of the Chazuca and Nengomacha lineages were the richest farmers in Manica-Macequece during the period under consideration.³⁵ For example, Elias Chazuca, who benefited from the railway services (which passed across the chieftaincy), sold more than 100 sacks of maize to Chimoio using railway services. Muzuatine Nengomacha sold about 60 sacks and had several hundred of fruit trees, particularly strawberries which he sold in Umtali. In fact, apart from these individuals, both lineages had a wide range of sources of accumulation including labour migration remittances of their relatives in Southern Rhodesia.³⁶

The majority of peasants who lived far from market centres could only sell the few sacks they were able to carry on their shoulders over long distances by foot. These market places were generally organised by the end of each harvesting season, by either the Mozambique Company or the local administration and the Maize Marketing Board. However, the Maize Marketing Board established in 1936 was regarded as exclusively for white settlers, and did not include African farmers.³⁷ Indeed, the Marketing Board sought to eliminate competition between the white farmers and the purchasers of African crops.

Although Indians storekeepers (*cantineiros*) provided alternative market facilities in some places, when the harvest was abundant, Africans had marketing difficulties, and their maize lay in heaps on the ground at every trading place. Very often peasants, unable to sell their surplus, had to destroy their maize in order to start the new agricultural cycle. However, in remote areas and across the border, in regions which were eventually

³⁴For comparative purposes on African production and transportation networks, see the work conducted in northern Mozambique by Arlindo Chilundo, "The role of transportation in cotton producing areas of northern Mozambique, 1930-1960", mimeo, (Maputo, UEM, 1993).

³⁵ However in the following decades and to date they still continued preponderant homesteads in Manica district.

³⁶ See my interview with M.Nengomacha (Manica 12 July 1996) and Elias Tobias Chazuca (Manica, 27 July 1996).

³⁷See Neil-Tomlinson, "The growth of a colonial economy", 13-15.

regarded as 'labour reserves' such as Mossurize, Moribane and Dombe, African peasants directed their agricultural production to the Southern Rhodesia market and became involved in migrant labour either to Southern Rhodesia or to South Africa's mines and plantations.

Although in the 1940s white settlement was encouraged once more and the demand for African labour increased, the administrative authorities found it difficult to impose wage employment on local peasants. Although most African peasants could not accumulate at the same level as white settlers, they gradually became independent of local wages and were able to raise sufficient cash to satisfy their social needs. In so far as peasants engaged in maize production and successfully resisted forced contract labour, they were capable of generating sufficient food for themselves and for the market.

3. The "African Farmer Statute" of 1944 and the African progressive farmers: Maize & Wheat cash-cropping.

In the mid-1940s Manica had become the 'breadbasket' of central Mozambique, and provided a ready market for foodstuffs to Africans. Africans listed as progressive farmers were exempted from contract labour. As a result, apart from the stringent labour legislation imposed in 1942 and 1947, the Portuguese colonial regime also tried to foster African agriculture through new legislation enacted in 1944, such as the 'African Farmer Statute' (*Estatuto do Agricultor Africano*).³⁸

My analysis of the development of African progressive farms in this period will concentrate on Manica district. References to Chimoio and Mossurize will be made for comparative purposes. In fact, Manica-Macequece, Dombe and Mavita were the most significant districts for the development of maize, wheat and cotton cultivation. In the 1940s the total African population in Manica district was estimated at about 35,000 and was distributed as follows: 13,545 in Dombe; 12,627 in Manica-Macequece; and 8,780 in Mavita-Rotanda.³⁹ In the mid-1940s about one thousand peasants were registered as progressive farmers in Manica district, particularly in Mavita and Macequece. Mavita and

³⁸See, Diploma Legislativo N°918, 5 August 1944. For more details on its implementation see, AHM-FGG N° 366: Relatório do Departamento dos Negócios Indígenas, 1940-1950.

³⁹See AHM-FGG N°177: Relatório da Inspeção às Circunscrições de Búzi, Chemba, Cheringoma, Chimoio, Gorongosa, Manica, Mossurize, Sena e Sofala, 1943-1944, por Abel de Sousa Moutinho.

Rotanda were about 100km from Manica-centre, while Dombe was about 200 km away. These long distances without good roads and bridges made commercial contact very difficult.

Peasants who produced at least 25 sacks of maize for market, or cultivated 1 hectare of cotton and another of subsistence crops, could be qualified as *agricultores*. In general, Africans who were *sipaio*, teachers, nurses, interpreters, and some migrant labourers to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had the resources from their alternative occupations to become 'progressive' farmers. They were therefore able to buy ploughs and carts and hire labour. However, the Portuguese did not allow Africans to farm near the roads and railways network where they would compete with white settlers. Consequently most peasants were pushed out of the area of lands designated for white settlement.[see Map]

Whenever and wherever new settlers arrived and applied for new claims, African households were moved out. Furthermore, Africans could not receive legal title to land. Although Portuguese policy led to the undermining of the prosperity of African households, tying them to metropolitan economic interests through cotton-growing, African maize production for the market never disappeared. In other ways, it was in the interest of the Portuguese administration to keep African as producers and as consumers of imported goods from Portugal. Although the number of stores was very small and they were sparsely distributed over the province, the central administrative authorities urged local administrators to stimulate trade in wine, dried cod fish and clothes to Africans as a way of improving their living standards and 'civilisation'.⁴⁰

The Portuguese settlement policy was designed to prevent African migration to neighbouring countries rather than to enhance the emergence of richer peasants. However, in the second half of the 1940s agriculture in Manica was rapidly becoming a means of obtaining wealth and changing social status among Africans. Maize, wheat and cotton were the most important crops that the Portuguese administration tried to foster among African farmers. Maize represented the basis of the economy of African households, and a guarantee of economic survival for white settlers in Manica.⁴¹ It was also the product

⁴⁰See, AHM-FGDB, Cx 754: Circular confidencial N°2143/D/13 da Direcção provincial de administração civil da Beira as circunscrições e concelhos da província, 1 June 1945.

⁴¹For more details on white farmers see chapter three.

which dominated all other goods, and fed the commercial life of the region. For example, African maize sales in 1944 and 1945 was estimated at about 700,000kg and 850,000kg respectively.⁴²

Other cash-crops included beans, peanuts, sesame, sunflower, barley, and rubber. Sorghum was still the main staple food crop, particularly in southern areas of Manica district and Mossurize. In addition, there were many peasants who had large gardens and produced strawberries for sale to a factory established in Umtali (Zimbabwe).⁴³ Although the state had established reserves for Africans in southern Manica and along the border with Southern Rhodesia, due to the prevalence of tse-tse fly and its long distance from the market centres, peasants were scattered and occupied fertile land elsewhere.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, by 1944 and 1945, peasants scattered in these areas produced the following crops:⁴⁵

Crops (kg)	1944	1945
Sorghum	1,300,000	1,500,000
Beans	120,000	140,000
Peanuts	67,000	70,000
Rubber	14,625	7,926

Cotton was imposed on peasants in Mavita or in Dombe. However, peasants in Rotanda-Mavita often resisted cotton-growing successfully and shifted to wheat cultivation. Inappropriate land and long distances from the cotton markets seem to have contributed to African unwillingness in cotton production.⁴⁶ Wheat production suited the soil better and its agricultural cycle could be combined with food crop production. Indeed, in the 1940s and 1950s, Rotanda became the main area for wheat production. In addition, Africans had an incentive to produce wheat because of the availability of an alternative market in the neighbouring city of Cashel in Mutambara (Zimbabwe).⁴⁷ In fact, long before the establishment of the agricultural experimental station in Rotanda in 1943 by Portuguese

⁴²AHM-FGG N° 219, Relatório da Inspeção à Circunscrição de Manica, 1946.

⁴³On the importance of strawberries for African accumulation, see A.H.M. - FNI Cx 128: Nota do Concelho de Manica ao chefe da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas, 22 February 1949.

⁴⁴For more details on the establishment of land reserves see, Ordem N° 5024 of 20 April 1926, *Boletim da Companhia de Moçambique* N°9, 1 May 1926.

⁴⁵See, AHM-FGG N°219, Relatório da Inspeção à Circunscrição de Manica: Actas da audiência com os chefes gentílicos de Manica, 1946.

⁴⁶For more details on cotton production see chapter six.

authorities, peasants were cultivating wheat in Rotanda.⁴⁸ They introduced this crop from Southern Rhodesia.

However, from the mid-1940s, Portuguese authorities mobilised African farmers in Manica district to produce more wheat in order to supply Beira city and local bakeries in Chimoio. Apart from technical assistance, Portuguese authorities purchased the African wheat crop for 2\$00/kg.⁴⁹ This price and the increasing demand for wheat in the local market, especially in Beira city, may explain the increasing involvement of African peasants in wheat cultivation as shown in the table below.⁵⁰

African Wheat Production in Rotanda

Year	African farmers	Harvests (kg)	Value (esc.)
1942	235	27,713	30,761\$00
1943	264	74,933	42,686\$00
1944	250	121,355	112,639\$00
1945	271	182,360	182,443\$00

The total amount of wheat produced in the Manica district amounted at 143,000kg in 1944 and 195,000kg in 1945.⁵¹ Apart from Dombe, the majority of peasants in Manica and Mavita used ox-drawn ploughs. About 250 maize farmers in Manica were using ploughs. Some of them managed to sell 150 sacks of maize to the Grémio. In that year in Manica district there were about 7,806 cattle, of which 5,229 belonged to Africans. In contrast, African farmers in Chimoio only possessed 282 cattle of a total of 12,620.⁵²

Owing to marketing problems, in October 1944, a commission of African farmers submitted a petition to the Grémio Board complaining about the disparity in the price of maize between white farmers and African producers. The price offered to white settlers

⁴⁷See my interview with Rojas Manuel Corneta, Mavita, 12 August 1996.

⁴⁸For more discussion on wheat production in Mozambique and its development in Manica, see Manuel Dias da Silva, "Alguns aspectos do panorama económico-social da cultura de trigo em Moçambique", In Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, XXXI, (April-June, 1962), 41-46.

⁴⁹See AHM-FGG, N°304: Relatório das actividades dos serviços técnicos da Junta de exportação dos cereais da colónia durante o quadriénio de 1945-49, Vila Pery 3 June 1950.

⁵⁰In average each farmer accumulated about 600 escudos. AHM-FGG N°219, Relatório da Inspeção à Circunscrição de Manica, 1946.

⁵¹See, CEM-AM: Diário de serviço da administração da circunscrição de Manica, 19 February 1946 by administrator Filipe Luís Janes.

for 92 kg a bag of maize in 1943 was about 82\$00 against 32\$00 for Africans. This price was increased to 97\$00 for white farmers in August 1944, while African maize remained at the same price of 32\$00 per bag. Even after this petition the price of African maize was only increased to 40\$00.⁵³

In 1944, the trading network was constituted by 24 stores in Manica centre, five in Dombe and only one in Mavita/Rotanda. The majority of these stores belonged to either Indian or Chinese. From the total of thirty stores only five belonged to Portuguese nationals. Storekeepers in Dombe and Mavita were all Indian-owned.⁵⁴ In 1946 about 1,192 African peasants were registered as *agricultores* in Manica district.⁵⁵

As African production became concentrated on maize, the surplus grew to such amount that neither the traders nor the Grémio were able to buy it. In 1946, the Grémio Board sent a note to the governor of Manica and Sofala, complaining about the lack of transport and storage facilities which they said were their major handicaps to the development of maize farming in Manica.⁵⁶ In fact, the lack of transport, sacks, warehouses and storage facilities seem to have undermined the expansion of African maize farming.

In 1947/48, there were about 242 African maize producers registered in Manica-Macequece. Despite bad weather conditions, especially drought, they managed to sell about 7,823 sacks of maize to the Grémio. The individual contribution varied from 30 to 300 sacks. About 143 farmers sold between thirty and forty sacks. On the other hand, African farmers in Rotanda and Manica sold a total of 123 sacks of wheat.⁵⁷ As a result, of the increasing contribution of African farmers to wheat and maize cash cropping, the administration of Manica district suggested the award of prizes to African farmers in order

⁵²See AHM-FGG N° 219: Relatório da Inspeção à Manica, 1946.

⁵³See AHM-FGDB Cx 728: Parecer do Grémio dos produtores de cereais do distrito da Beira ao Director da Administração Civil da Beira, 20 October 1944.

⁵⁴AHM-FGG, No. 177: Relatório da inspeção às circunscrições de Búzi, Chimoio, Manica, Mossurize, 1943-1944, by Abel de Sousa Moutinho.

⁵⁵See, AHM-FGG No.219: Relatório da Inspeção à Circunscrição de Manica, 1946.

⁵⁶See AHM-FGDB Cx 639: Nota do Grémio dos produtores de cereais do distrito da Beira para o governador da provincia de Manica e Sofala, 9 May 1946.

to stimulate them to produce more. Ploughs, grades, hoes and other agricultural instruments, as well as cattle, were given as prizes. However, ploughs were only provided to farmers who managed to sell more than 200 sacks of maize.⁵⁸

By this time, some African farmers had managed to accumulate a degree of wealth. For example Mateus Mazia, a farmer in Rotanda applied to local customs authorities for exemption as he had bought a mechanical grinding-mill for about £180-00 in Cashel city at Mutambara (Zimbabwe). He held about 55 cattle, two ploughs, and produced 24 sacks of wheat and 49 sacks of maize for sale annually and his son was working as an assistant mechanic in a workshop in Mutambara.⁵⁹

In the second half of the 1940s the colonial government shifted its attention from white settlers to promote African maize production. White farming was becoming less productive and the costs of production were not compensated for by the profits derived from their sales. Soil erosion, and labour costs both contributed to weaken white maize production. The costs of investment in African farms was minor. In fact, Africans bore the costs of labour and transport, apart from the risks resulting from poor harvests caused by pests or adverse weather conditions.⁶⁰

As a result of this move towards the enhancement of African agriculture, the colonial officials became more concerned with the African access to land.⁶¹ On the ground of the

⁵⁷See, AHM-FGDB, Cx 727: Nota No. 213/D/49 da Junta de Exportação dos Cereais das Colónias - delegação de Vila Pery, ao Director provincial de administração civil dea provincia de manica e Sofala, 30 July 1949.

⁵⁸See, AHM-FGDB Cx 728: Nota do Grémio dos produtores de cereais do distrito da Beira ao governador geral da colónia de Moçambique, 11 April 1949, by Carlos da França Nóbrega (president of the Grémio).

⁵⁹ The administrator of Manica district was astonished at the economic success of this farmer and thereafter used him as an example of the Portuguese settlement policy in Rotanda valley. See, AHM-FGDB Cx 728: Nota da Administração do Concelho de Manica ao director provincial de Administração Civil da Beira, 8 July 1948, by José de Brito Rebelo.

⁶⁰See, AHM-FNI, Cx 153: Conselho de governadores da colónia de Moçambique: actas das sessões, 1948.

⁶¹See, Aurélio Quintanilha e outros, "Contribuição para o estudo da planificação do desenvolvimento económico da colónia de Moçambique", 1o. Congresso da Sociedade de Estudos da Colónia de Moçambique, Boletim da Sociedade de estudos da Colónia de Moçambique, I-II, (1947), 1-45.

land legislation of 1938,⁶² as Negrão has noted, the central government had to enforce the principle of rights of land access by the Africans living on land concessions in 1946 it urged the local administrators to protect them from any type of aggression against their rights. Moreover, in 1948, the governor-general of Mozambique concluded that the 'native reserves' were inadequate and urged his assistants to provide freehold land for the Africans. In general, these plots had to be small free-holds starting at 2ha and rising to a maximum of 20ha.⁶³

In 1947, local administrators in Manica recognised this situation and urged central government that it was necessary to reinforce land legislation passed in 1939 which allowed peasants to remain on their land after its purchase by white settlers.⁶⁴ These initiatives were bitterly opposed by white settlers who even tried to seize the land concessions in the 'native reserve areas'. Nevertheless, in 1948 the administration of Manica district proposed the establishment of three new African reserve areas in Macequece, Mavonde and Dombe.⁶⁵ [MAP] Furthermore, owing to ecological problems especially glossina and the lack of accessible roads, areas located to the south and north of the 'Beira corridor' were still unattractive for white settlement, although some forestry concessions were acquired. As a result, Rotanda, Dombe, Penhalonga and Mavonde still boasted a large number of African farmers.

Given the success of African farming, the Portuguese authorities introduced new institutional measures to foster it. As a result, the African Agricultural Fund (*Fundo de Auxílio à Agricultura Indígena*) was re-structured in order to provide more inputs for African farmers instead of just investing in the Grémio for marketing purposes. Thus, in April 1949, a dispatch from the general governor imposed new criteria for the administration of the African Agricultural Fund as follows: distribution of ploughs, cattle and other agricultural implements to distinguished African farmers; the establishment of

⁶²See Portaria N° 3, 286, 19 January 1938 and Portaria No. 3, 796, 26 August 1939.

⁶³ Negrão, *One hundred years*, 114.

⁶⁴See AHM-FGG N° 226, Relatório dos Administradores de Manica, 1947.

⁶⁵See, CEM-AM: N° 604 do chefe da repartição provincial dos serviços físicos e cadastrais da Beira ao administrador do concelho de Manica, 17 October 1947; CEM-AM: Nota N° 2.189/D/27 da administração do concelho de Manica ao chefe da repartição provincial de agrimensura da Beira, 31 October 1947.

full-time African agricultural auxiliaries and of agricultural demonstrations amongst African farmers; and free seed distribution to African farmers.⁶⁶

Investments in the African farming in 1948, amounted to about 103,679\$00esc. from which 40,937\$00 were spent on seeds and 36,312\$00 on ploughs and hoes. About 52,382\$00 was invested in warehouse for maize storage. In 1949 the average amount invested in promoting African agriculture was about 236,913\$00, of which 188,389\$00 was invested in ploughs, hoes and tractors, while 37,640\$00 was spent in seeds.⁶⁷ African farmers responded to these inputs with increasing maize and wheat production. Thus, in 1950, African farmers in Manica district sold about 155 sacks of wheat and 15,494 sacks of maize. Successful farmers invested their income in building brick houses, purchasing bicycles, grind-mills and cattle, and in the education of their children.

4. African progressive farms in the 1950s.

In 1950, the African population was estimated at about 40,500 in Manica, 52,842 in Chimoio and 47,600 in Mossurize districts.⁶⁸ In the early 1950s, liberal administrators, technicians, intellectuals and clergymen continued arguing for political reform and for the enhancement of African agriculture through the development of infra-structure and the abolition of compulsory labour legislation. They demanded more land security, technical assistance, credit facilities and an accessible market for African homestead agriculture. Thus, they advocated a new approach to integrate the peasantry into the modern economy.⁶⁹ Some of these measures were already being implemented in Mavita and Rotanda valley in order to reverse the depopulation resulting from African labour

⁶⁶See, AHM-FGG N°312: Relatório sobre a 1a. Conferência de Intendentes e administradores da província de Manica e Sofala, September 1950. The African Agricultural Fund was originally established in 1943 (Portaria No.5,147, 29 May 1943). However there was no investment in roads, leaving remote areas outside the existing market centres.

⁶⁷See, AHM-FGDB Cx 728: Grémio dos produtores de cereais do distrito da Beira - Fundo de auxílio à agricultura indígena, 1949.

⁶⁸See, AHM-FGG, No. 318: Relatório do inspector superior de saúde referente a inspecção na província de Manica e Sofala, 1950.

⁶⁹AHM-FNI, Cx 52, "Conferência inter-africana do bem estar rural", Lourenço Marques, 1953; AHM-SE aII P.9 N° 90: "Economia indígena de Moçambique e planificação económica", Lisboa, Curso de Estudos Ultramarinos, 1959.

migration to Southern Rhodesia.⁷⁰ As mentioned above, with the establishment of the African Agricultural Fund (*Fundo de Auxílio à Agricultura Indígena*), the administrative authorities in Manica showed great interest in boosting African agriculture to supply foodstuffs in the region.

Parallel to the organisation of settlement schemes in Rotanda, African commercial agriculture was also encouraged in Manica and Dombe and to lesser extent in Chimoio. However, Chimoio was a well-established white farming area and did not provide much room for Africans, particularly in the main river valleys and along the road and railway line. In Manica and Mavita/Rotanda, Africans were encouraged to cultivate maize and wheat, while Dombe and Mossurize remained a cotton area, though some peasants cultivated maize, peanuts and sesame for market. Peasants registered as maize farmers were supposed to cultivate 2ha of maize crops plus a half hectare of peanuts. However, farmers using oxen-drawn ploughs were expected to cultivate 5ha of maize and one hectare of peanuts. In both cases, maize had to be cultivated in association with beans.⁷¹ As maize, peanuts and beans constituted the main staple foods in the region, they had a ready market. Indeed, there was a great demand for food to feed to workers in Manica and Sofala provinces in white economic enterprises and plantations.

Parallel to these market incentives the department of agriculture also gave African farmers incentives to use ox-drawn ploughs. As Manica district was also a cattle-farming area, the agricultural department distributed ploughs among farmers on a loan basis. However, the agricultural department soon realised that in Manica district almost all African farmers were already using ox-drawn ploughs in their agricultural activities.⁷² To enhance African farming, in 1952 the department of agriculture established agricultural extension services in Manica-town. Those services were constituted by one agricultural expert and three African assistants.⁷³ Under such

⁷⁰Conselho Executivo de Manica - Arquivo morto: Nota No. 75/B/3 do Posto administrativo de Mavita ao Administrador do Concelho de Manica - Relatório sobre o despovoamento da area da sede do posto de Mavita e medidas a tomar para o seu repovoamento, 14 April 1950

⁷¹AHM-FGDB, 728: Nota da Repartição de agricultura ao governador da província de Manica e Sofala, 12 July 1950.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³AHM-FGDB, Cx 724: Nota confidencial da administração do concelho de Manica ao director de administração civil de Manica e Sofala, 18 November 1952.

conditions the number of African maize farmers in Manica district rose from about 242 in 1948 to around 600 in 1952. Their maize output also experienced a massive boom from 7,823 sacks to about 45,700 sacks which sold to the Grémio in the same period. The production of wheat increased slightly from 123 in 1948 to 184 sacks in 1952.⁷⁴

Although maize production increased, the lack of transport, good roads and bridges to link farming areas and market centres threatened to discourage African farmers. To aggravate this situation, the Grémio was too weak financially to meet its responsibility of trading African crops, especially maize. In fact, very often it failed to distribute empty sacks in time. In 1950, administrative reports indicated that out of the 10,000 sacks required for maize trading, the Grémio only managed to distribute 1,500. In most cases, even the sacks that were distributed were overused and therefore of poor quality. In general, the Grémio depended on the international market, especially India, for its sacks. International price fluctuations, and transport and financial problems all contributed to halting Grémio trading activity. In 1955, the administrative authorities in Manica district feared a possible drop of 40 per cent in the purchase of African maize due to the lack of sacks and cash as well as the transport problems faced by the Grémio.⁷⁵ Once again this situation probably affected many African farmers, particularly in Mavita, Mavonde and Dombe due to their long distances from the main market centres of Manica and Chimoio cities.

During the 1950s, African farmers included people with varied social status and differentiation. Sources for investment in agricultural implements were variably derived from agricultural incomes, migrant remittances, and savings from public work. Local chiefs and *sipaio* also took advantage of public facilities provided by the administration or through their political or administrative position in the community. Although teachers, nurses and civil servants enjoyed freedom from forced contract labour and some degree of social prestige given their status of *assimilados*, their economic condition was very weak. To bridge the gap they had to invest their salaries in livestock and agriculture, buying cattle, and ploughs, and hiring labour to cultivate their plots.

⁷⁴AHM-FGDB, Cx 473: Relatório de contas da gerencia do gremio dos produtores de cereais do distrito da Beira, 1952.

⁷⁵AHM-FGDB, Cx 726: Nota da administração do concelho de Manica ao secretário da administração civil de Manica e Sofala, 18 November 1955.

António Mogne, for example, who was born in Caia, Sofala, was employed by the Grémio as an agricultural assistant (*monitor agrícola*) from 1947 to 1960 when he was transferred to the *Brigada de Fomento do Revue*. While working for the Gremio in Manica district in the 1950s, he acquired 12ha of land to cultivate maize as staple crop. Although he was not a full time farmer, he combined his employment with the farming activity. The farm was run by his wife and he had hired two men to help cultivate the field-crops.⁷⁶

Agostinho dos Muchangos was educated in the Catholic mission school and trained as a teacher at Boroma mission station in Tete. From 1933 to 1943 he worked as a teacher in Manica district. Because of his low salary, in 1943 he abandoned teaching and joined the local administration in Macequece as an interpreter. He got married in 1941 and paid about 3,500 esc. for *shuma*. To complement his salary, Muchangos acquired some land and started cultivating maize and planting bananas. With cattle left by his father who had passed away in 1930s, he used ox-drawn ploughs on his farm. Muchangos stressed the importance of combining wage employment and investment in agriculture:

When I arrived here this place was bush. At that time it was difficult to sustain my family and educate my children with my salary. Then I decided to clear a very large area full of snakes and monkeys. People use to call me a mad man! I opened a canal to bring water from Munene River to my plot. I did this work with my family. With revenues derived from maize trading I managed to educate my children and build a brick house. No one could survive just with wages.⁷⁷

The teaching profession was never financially rewarding. Although teachers were greatly respected by the community, their social prestige was counterbalanced by their economic situation. To overcome this they either abandoned the profession or invested their poor salary in agriculture. The testimony of Silvestre Chabai is illustrative:

A teacher was the poorest person in the community. I was never poor. I became poor because of the war [FRELIMO liberation struggle]. Now I do not have anything. I was important. I had cattle, I had everything [sic]. I was born in Machipanda village in 1925. My father is from Chazuca and my mother from

⁷⁶Interview with António Mogne, Sussundenga, 5 August 1996.

⁷⁷Interview with Agostinho dos Muchangos, Manica city 10 April 1993.

Zimbabwe. In 1949, I completed seven years primary school in Jécua. Then I went to Boroma mission station where I took the teacher training course in 1953. In 1955, I started teaching in Manica and earned 175 esc. monthly. In 1957, when I got married, my salary was increased to 500 esc. In 1963, I was getting about 700 esc. monthly. The salary was very low. Many colleagues abandoned teaching for other professional occupations. Very often my wife and I did not buy any clothes. I had to pay 500 esc. for my two children to study at Jécua mission station. After paying their school fees, I had only 200esc. left in my pocket. How could I survive? Only with agriculture. I acquired a big plot, with cattle and ploughs. I inherited cattle from my late father. As I did not have much time to cultivate my field. I sometimes prepared *pombe* and invited neighbours to help us resuming cultivation or harvesting maize. With income from maize which was far higher than my salary as a teacher, I managed to buy more cattle, goats and a sewing machine. In the early 1970s, I bought a mechanical grinding-mill.⁷⁸

Alongside *assimilados* or *não-indígena*, a new class of rich farmers was emerging in Manica, Mavita, Mavonde and Dombe. Those farmers were generally among ex-migrants and members of the main chieftaincies and distinguished themselves from the ordinary people. In fact, during the decades 1950 and 1960 some of these rich African farmers competed economically with white settlers in Manica district.⁷⁹ Among them, chief Chazuca, chief Nhandiro, Muzuatinhe Nengomacha, Mateus Mazia, Lázaro Mucudo, Johane Marota, Enoque Marota, Herbert Marota, Godfrey Dirway and William Dirway were the most outstanding. The areas African progressive farmers were most concentrated in the Revue valley, Jécua, Chazuca, Penhalonga, Chirara and Chua villages.⁸⁰

Given the increasing number of African farmers seeking land, the local administrative authorities proposed the establishment of new African reserves. These were located in areas where white farms had been abandoned for more than ten years.⁸¹ Besides the integration of a small number of African farmers in *colonatos*, following the 1961 reforms, the colonial state established the *Fundo de Terras* (Land Fund) to be distributed amongst peasants not classified as *assimilados* or progressive farmers. Land

⁷⁸Interview with Silvestre Chabai, Manica city, 19 April 1993.

⁷⁹See, AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da inspecção ordinária ao concelho de Manica, António Christova de Sousa Franklin, 1962.

⁸⁰See interview with Agostinho dos Muchangos, Manica city, 23 January 1998.

⁸¹See, AHM-FGG, No.312: Relatório sobre a 1a. conferência de intendentes e administradores da província de Manica e Sofala, September 1950; AHM-FGDB, Cx

allocated under these conditions was inalienable, and therefore could not be used for credit or mortgage. The first and third class were respectively the land owned by the state and urban centres, and plots allocated to the commercial farms. Land classified as second class or *Fundo de Terras* was regarded as in communal ownership and reserved for local peasants.⁸²

As Portuguese administrative authorities failed to conscript men into wage labour for white settler agriculture in Manica province, particularly due to the increasing wave of labour migration to Southern Rhodesia and Transvaal, they applied new strategies, such as promoting African cash-cropping. Although this policy was implemented throughout the province, the colonial administration was more concerned about the bordering areas of Manica and Mossurize districts. In fact, in the 1940s and 1950 Rotanda, Mavita, Dombe and the Mossurize highlands were regarded as the main target for the establishment of government-directed African settlement projects. The colonial administration provided African farmers with more technical support, especially through the *Junta de Exportação de Cereais* which set up an agricultural experimental station in Rotanda in 1943. These changes were complemented by the establishment in 1949 of an agricultural fund (*Fundo de Auxílio à Agricultura Indígena*) to support African farming.

Overall, the economic changes which occurred in the 1940s and early 1950 in central Mozambique seem to have contributed both to the reinforcement of household or community subsistence agriculture and to the emergence of African progressive farmers. However, African response to these transformations was uneven and depended mostly on their control over household labour. Labour resources were mainly mobilised for food production. The adoption of new crops and farming systems in response to the market implied the mobilisation of surplus labour and or investment in oxen and ploughs. Ecological factors also contributed to rural and social differentiation amongst households in Manica. Indeed, people living in tsetse fly areas were inhibited from breeding livestock, especially cattle. Sometimes, peasants also faced seasonal hardship as a result of drought and plagues, particularly locusts, and this increased the vulnerability of small households. In the next chapter I will analyse the transformations occurred during the late 1950s and

727: Nota da circunscrição de Chimoio ao director da administração civil da Beira, 6 October 1950.

⁸²See Negrão, "One hundred years", 1996, 117.

mid-1960s, in particular the impact of the state-sponsored settlement scheme (*colonatos*) on African communities.

CHAPTER 5:

COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE, 'COLONATOS' AND AFRICAN LABOUR, 1950-1965

Introduction

In the last two chapters, I have concentrated on analysing the transition to agrarian capitalism and its impact on African peasants until the early 1950s. In the ten years after the end of the Mozambique Company, the Portuguese administration tried to implement its nationalist ideology of bringing the colonies under metropolitan control and to give incentives to white settlement in central Mozambique in general, and in Manica province in particular. Although World War II had provided Portugal with some economic prospects in its colonies, its policy of forced labour and forced cotton-growing faced strong resistance from local peasants. White settler agriculture was jeopardized by the irregular African labour supply due mainly to the prompt response of Africans to the market economy and labour migration to Southern Rhodesia and Transvaal. White dependence on African cheap labour was a result of the lack of capital to invest in the modernization of agricultural techniques and to provide reasonable payment.

This chapter looks at the impact of economic reforms pursued by Portuguese administration in the 1950s and 1960s on settler agriculture. In particular it analyses the rise of African progressive farmers and how this conflicted with the white settler economy. While the 1950s confirmed the failure of white settlers to conscript local African labour into their economic enterprises, in the 1960s the colonial authorities tried to bring Africans and Portuguese colonists into a multi-racial economic program, the so-called *colonatos*.

1. Political economy, settler agriculture and African labour.

Although in the late 1940s suggestions for the social and economic organisation of the 'native' population and the establishment of 'native villagisation' were proposed, into

practice nothing happened came until the late 1950s.¹ Over the decade, administrative officers discussed the 'native villagisation' strategy, analysing the 'pros' and 'cons' of their coexistence with European settlers.² While at the political level Portugal introduced administrative reforms, converting the colonies into overseas provinces in 1951, the lack of capital hampered change in the economic sphere. In general, in the 1950s Manica still lacked roads, trade networks and a more consistent rural development strategy.

The state encouraged wheat cultivation in order to supply the growing European community in Beira and Chimoio cities. Maize was still the main staple food in the region. As a result, Manica province was regarded as the 'breadbasket' of central Mozambique.

In 1953, the administration launched the first Five Year National Development Plan (*Plano de Fomento*) (1953-58) in the colonies. Manica province benefited the most from this plan which started local development projects. It prioritized the development of infra-structure such as roads, bridges, dams, barrages, hydroelectric power and irrigation scheme, and in the mid-1950s, the administration established the first hydroelectric power (Chicamba Real Dam) in Mozambique in Manica. The dam was the property of the *Sociedade Hidroeléctrica de Revue (SHER)*, and was built on the Revue River in Manica district.³ According to Henricksen, to implement these projects the colonial government relied on the National Treasury to provide long-term loans. In addition, sources of capital included Marshall Aid from the USA which was used to modernize communication networks. To boost local investment in agriculture and

¹See, J.P.Borges Coelho, "Protected villages and communal villages in the Mozambican province of Tete, 1968-1982", Ph.D., Bradford, 1993, 120.

²See Aurélio Quintanilha e outros, "Contribuição para o estudo da planificação do desenvolvimento económico da colónia de Moçambique", 1º Congresso da Sociedade de Estudos da Colónia de Moçambique, *Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos da Colónia de Moçambique*, I-II, 1947, 1-45; AHM-FNI, Cx 52: "Conferência inter-Africana do bem estar rural", Lourenço Marques, 1953.

³See, AHM-FGG, N° 587: Relatório e contas do conselho da administração da Sociedade Hidro-Eléctrica do Revue, SARL, 1956.

industry, the Portuguese administration established the National Development Bank in 1959.⁴

The Development Plan was also designed to develop projects in order to strengthen the integration of the colonies and the metropole, as well as to stimulate the production of commodities for local markets. As a result, Manica was chosen as the place for the first textile factory in Mozambique.⁵ Moreover, with the building of infra-structure, Portugal also accelerated its settlement programmes, for the encouragement for the settlement of Portuguese colonists in Manica province.

As a result of internal and external pressure, new more liberal officials of the Salazar executive, particularly Marcelo Caetano and Adriano Moreira, secured Portugal's signature on both the International Labour Code of 1955 and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 1957. These changes paved the way for Portugal's admission to the United Nations in 1955.⁶ With this achievement, Portugal sought to integrate Africans into the moral, social and economic setting of the Portuguese nation in order to divert international public opinion from further criticism. In general, these proposed reforms aimed to bring Africans to coexist with European institutions and to live under Catholic principles.

In addition, the immigration of Portuguese settlers to the colonies, particularly Mozambique and Angola, was expected to solve rural unemployment in Portugal, and to contribute both racially and culturally to an integrated society.⁷ As we have seen, at the same time, in the mid-1950s the colonial state shifted from a policy based on coercion to one based on incentives for African cotton cultivation.⁸

⁴T. Henricksen, *Mozambique: A History*, (Cape Town, 1978), 136.

⁵See, *Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial, S.A.R.L., 1944-1969: 25 anos em Moçambique*, (Vila Pery, 1970).

⁶Henricksen, *Mozambique*, 1978, chapter seven.

⁷BO N°36, 1, 14 September, 1961, 1127-1128; J.P.Borges Coelho, "Protected villages", 1993, 149-151. However, 'colonatos' were initially established in Angola through Legislative Diploma N° 2266 of 5 July 1950.

⁸This aspect is discussed in the following chapter.

In his study of the Limpopo valley, Luis Covane stresses that, for the most part, the settlers mobilised to join the settlement scheme or 'colonato', were the poorest elements of their communities in Portugal. Ordinary Portuguese citizens, he adds, regarded migration to Africa as socially undesirable.⁹ Yet, civil servants were somehow obliged to carry out their duties in the colonies, then called overseas provinces. Contrary to the more common practice followed in Limpopo valley, which aimed to promote the settlement of poor whites from Portugal, in Manica province the government mobilised farmers who were already in the region or civil servants who wished to develop agriculture.¹⁰ This gave Manica a specific, rather different, pattern of white settlement in the 1950s and 1960s.

The spread of nationalism in Africa in general, and the local uprisings in Mozambique and Angola in 1960 and 1961 in particular, influenced Portugal to introduce further changes in its colonial policy.¹¹ Thus, in 1961, the Overseas Minister, Adriano Moreira, introduced legislative reforms and published a series of decrees dealing with such matters as African labour; the re-organisation of local chieftaincies, land concessions, and the creation of settlement boards and other institutions.¹²

⁹Luis Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture in southern Mozambique", 273-279.

¹⁰For more details on Limpopo valley white settlement, see among others, Kenneth Hermele, Land struggles and social differentiation in southern Mozambique: A case study of Chokwe, Limpopo, 1950-1987, (Upsala, 1988); Merle Bower, "Peasant agriculture in Mozambique: The case of Chokwe Gaza province", Canadian Journal of African Studies [CJAS], 23 (1989), 355-79.

¹¹Jeanne M. Penvenne, "Mozambique: a tapestry of conflict", in David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin (eds.) History of Central Africa: The contemporary years, (London, 1998), 231-266:237.

¹²The legislation enacted in September 1961, included among others, the following decrees: Decree N° 43, 894, approving the regulation on occupation and concession of lands in the overseas provinces; Decree N° 43, 895, enacting rural settlement boards (Juntas Provinciais de Povoamento) in the overseas provinces and creating the Provincial Rural Settlement Boards of Angola and Mozambique; and the Decree N° 43, 896, establishing legal provisions which aimed at re-organising local chieftaincies (regedorias) in the overseas provinces.

In 1950, there were about 1,156 European settlers in Manica province. They were unevenly distributed throughout the region. About 807 were in Chimoio, 330 in Manica and only 19 in Mossurize.¹³ Of this number, about 178 were affiliated to the *Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais* as farmers in Chimoio district.¹⁴ The establishment of the *Sociedade Algodoeira de Portugal (SOALPO)* in 1944, called the *Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial* in 1950, and then the *Textáfria de Chimoio* and the *Sociedade Hidro-Eléctrica de Revue* all seem to have contributed to enhance white settlement in Manica province.¹⁵ During this decade white commercial farmers were spread along the railway line in Bandula, Vanduzi, Messica, Zónue, Macequece and Machipanda. However, the majority were still concentrated in Chimoio.

In the mid-1950s, agricultural and settlement schemes were initiated in Manica, particularly in the Zonue and Rotanda valleys (MAP). The *Brigada de Fomento e Estudos Hidráulicos de Revue* (henceforth *Brigada*) was responsible for the land survey, clearance, construction of roads, bridges and dams, and the establishment of other agricultural infra-structure.¹⁶ The *Brigada* was also responsible for preparing the *colonatos*, especially the Sussundenga *colonato*. In addition, the *Brigada* carried out other tasks such as drainage and irrigation works, as well as agricultural demonstration. In 1956, it had surveyed about 10,000ha between Bandula and Mavita, including the Zonue and Sussundenga blocks between Munhinga and Revue rivers.¹⁷

The Zonue valley was mostly designated for tobacco production, while in the Rotanda valley colonists were supposed to grow wheat and potatoes (particularly in Tsetsera upland). A wide range of vegetables was also tried. White settlers in Chimoio still

¹³There were also Chinese (51 in Chimoio and 25 in Manica) and Indian (136 in Chimoio, 48 in Manica and 13 in Mossurize) citizens.

¹⁴See AHM-FGG N° 318: Relatório do Inspector de saúde referente à inspecção na província de Manica e Sofala, 1950.

¹⁵See, *Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial. SARL, 1944-1969: 25 anos em Moçambique*, (Vila Pery, 1970).

¹⁶The *Brigada de Fomento e Estudos Hidráulicos de Revue* was a big enterprise under the supervision of the *Missão do Fomento do vale do Zambeze*. It employed about 800 African workers with contracts lasting one year. Skilled staff was from Portugal. See interview with Mr. Pina, former employee of the *Brigada*, Chimoio, 17 October, 1996.

¹⁷See AHM-FGG, N° 593: Relatório da Brigada de estudos hidráulicos do Revue, 1957.

concentrated on maize production and orchards. Meanwhile, livestock and poultry were growing rapidly. In parallel with a land survey for white settlement, the Portuguese authorities also planted large areas with forests in Messica, Rotanda, Mavita and Penhalonga these together with the expansion of settler agriculture resulted in the dispossession of African peasants, particularly in those areas chosen for the establishment of *colonatos*.

As in previous years, the *Grémio dos Produtores de Cereais* still functioned as the backbone of white settler agriculture. In the 1950s, it established a Fund for soil conservation and provided settlers with technical advice against soil erosion and urged them to introduce the rotation system. Other facilities included the distribution of selected seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and credit facilities. Transport and storage facilities were also guaranteed by the Grémio.

In this period, there were some large farmers, namely, Babiolakakis (Chimoio-Gondola), Joaquim Lemos dos Santos (Bandula), António Nerantzoulis (Revue), Costa Aptosos (Messica), António Grego, Agostinho Simões e Manuel Rosa (all in Machipanda), António Tavares (Macequece), Garvin (Chimeze), Manuel Campos (Jécua), António Fernandes de Aguiar (Chirara-Macequece), Bernardino José Carvalho (Águas Frescas-Chazuca), and Joaquim de Carvalho (Tsetsera). Although the majority acquired their land for the first time in this period, some farmers just added to their existing land-holdings.¹⁸

While in Chimoio-Gondola many farms were still controlled by the Babiolakakis family and the Mozambique Company, in the western areas up to Manica district there were many white farmers with more than 400 ha of land. Joaquim de Carvalho and António Tavares were the main Portuguese landlords. They held large hectares of land throughout the Manica district. Carvalho who mainly cultivated potatoes had about 8,000ha, while Tavares who controlled many maize farms and much livestock (500

¹⁸For comparison with previous period, see chapter three.

heads of cattle) had about 7,000ha. In addition, in the 1950s, in Manica district about twenty farmers were allocated new land-holdings of over 200ha each.¹⁹

However, the shortage of African labour continued to constitute the main handicap for the development of white commercial agriculture. To remedy this situation, the labour recruitment agency (related to the Grémio) turned its attention to Tete, Nampula and Sul do Save, particularly Inhambane province, for the recruitment of African labour. Although this may have relieved the situation for richer settlers, however, poor and small farmers could not afford to pay the costs, and therefore failed to gain access to labour.²⁰ To alleviate their situation, local administrators in Chimoio and Manica now proposed a return to the old system of 1946 'labour reserve areas' which reserved Chimoio, Búzi, Marromeu, Cheringoma and Manica for recruitment only for local enterprises.²¹

The system of 'labour reserve areas' had been withdrawn in 1950, when the governor of Manica and Sofala provinces decided to open these areas for free recruitment. The consequences of that decision were extremely prejudicial for small and medium-size settler farmers who could not compete with industrial enterprises and large commercial farms.²² In fact, even the Grémio labour agency was unable to compete with enterprises such as the Sena Sugar Estates, the Companhia Colonial do Buzi or the private recruiter, Ivo da Silva, who recruited labour for Rhodesia. Data on labour recruitment in Manica and Sofala provinces in 1952 for those enterprises indicates that about 4,000 workers from Niassa were employed by the Buzi Company (3,000) and the Beira Railways

¹⁹See, AHM-ISANI Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Concelho de Manica, 1962.

²⁰For more details on white poor farmers see, AHM-FACC Cx 244: Nota No. 2932/D/1 da Administração de Chimoio ao Director de Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala, by administrator Júlio dos Santos Peixe, 5 November 1953.

²¹AHM-FACC Cx 376: Circular No. 6, 908/B/14 urgente da Direcção da Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala ao Administrador da circunscrição de Chimoio, 21 September 1951.

²²See AHM-FACC Cx 376: Nota da Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala, 8 October 1951. According to this note, local farmers lost about 50 per cent of their potential labour supply.

(1,000). About 6,000 workers were recruited in Zambézia by the Sena Sugar Estates.²³ In 1953, the Grémio labour agency managed to recruit only 730 workers in Nampula province.²⁴ Although it offered 100\$00esc. to each labourer who accepted an eight-month contract in Mutarara (Tete), due to financial problems this strategy did not last long.²⁵

A cheap African labour supply continued to be the key issue for settler agriculture in the region and constituted the main administrative concern. Indeed, local authorities believed that Manica and Sofala provinces were the most dynamic agricultural and industrial regions and therefore deserved more protection for their labour needs. Thus, the governor of Manica and Sofala provinces issued a circular re-imposing the 'labour reserve areas' for local economic enterprises.²⁶

Unlike the many smaller white settler farmers, large-scale farmers and industrial enterprises were able to recruit labour themselves or to hire private recruiters. For example, in 1950, about ten sawmills employed an average sum of 2,000 workers. Of these, John Souglides, Carlos Baunstein, Serração Portuguesa do Revue in Chimoio, and Serração de Moribane each dealing with forestry and sawmill activities in Manica district, were the major employers, with about 300 workers each.²⁷ In 1954, 'Zembe Plantations Limited', the major cultivator of sisal and fibre industry in Manica province, employed about 898 workers. They were recruited respectively from Mutarara (476), Barue (177), Gorongosa (172) Angónia (55), and Móssurize (18).²⁸ The *SOALPO*

²³AHM-FACC Cx 268: Circular No. 2 856/B/14 da Direcção da administração Civil de Manica e Sofala, 1952.

²⁴AHM-FACC Cx 261: Contratos de diversas circunscrições da agência de recrutamento da mão-de-obra indígena do Grémio dos produtores de cereais do distrito da Beira, 1953.

²⁵AHM-FACC Cx 243: Grémio dos produtores de cereais da Beira - Comissão administrativa da agência de recrutamento de mão-de-obra, actas N.º. 62,63,64, 7 November 1952.

²⁶See, AHM-FACC Cx 268: Circular No. 2,856/B/14 da Direcção da Administração Civil de Manica e Sofala ao Administrador da circunscrição de Chimoio, 10 April 1952.

²⁷Ibidem; AHM-FGG N.º318: Relatório do inspector da saúde, referente à inspecção em Manica e Sofala, por Dr. Augusto Pereira Brandão.

²⁸These figures show how Mossurize had failed to become labour reserve for Manica and Chimoio as initially planned by the administration. See AHM - FACC Cx 264:

recruited about 78 workers from Gorongosa, Barue and Nampula, while the *Brigada* employed an average of 800 workers, generally recruited from Inhambane province (Mambone, Massinga and Vilanculos) each year.

Despite labour difficulties, some small farmers managed to expand their agriculture, particularly by cultivating new crops, such as a variety of vegetables as well as oilseeds, citrus and tobacco. Those who continued cultivating maize, however, had to compete with African farmers. In fact, as we have seen in 1950 the state had reached the conclusion that it would be worth concentrating its attention on fostering African maize cropping instead of the declining white sector.²⁹ Thus, African progressive farmers, particularly in Manica and Chimoio district, benefited from this shift to foster their maize production. In the early 1950s white settlers were encouraged to produce tobacco and citrus and other green vegetables instead of maize. Market garden produce for city consumption was usually quite profitable.

In 1955 there were fifteen tobacco farmers with about 157 workers. They benefitted from guidance provided by the tobacco experimental station established in Zonue block and in 1962 they were already producing about 1000 kg in each hectare. In this year, the production of potatoes, particularly in Mavita and Mavonde, was estimated at about 1,200 tons. Of this, Joaquim de Carvalho claimed 1,000 tons came from his own farms. He was still by far the most successful farmer in mechanised agriculture in Tsetsera upland. His output was exported to Rhodesia and supplied Beira and Lourenço Marques as well. Citrus were generally produced in Chimoio-Gondola, and its annual production was estimated at about 4,000 boxes.³⁰ In the early 1960s, about 150 white farmers

Proc. B/14/3, da Curadoria dos Negócios Indígenas sobre o recrutamento de trabalhadores indígenas para serviço próprio, 1954.

²⁹See, AHM-FGG N° 312: Relatório sobre a 1a. Conferência de Intendentes e administradores da província de Manica e Sofala, by the administrative inspector, Álvaro de G. e Melo, September, 1950,

³⁰AHM-ISANI, Cx 52, Relatório da inspeção ordinária ao concelho de Manica, by António George Christova de Sousa Franklin, 1962; Manuel de Magalhães, "Problemas de Chimoio na Imprensa Moçambicana". In *Exposição-feira de Chimoio*, (Vila Pery, 1966); Rodrigues Júnior, *Moçambique*, 123-125.

employed 6,000 African workers in Chimoio, while in Manica fifty white settlers employed about 1500 Africans.³¹

In the early 1960, with the increasing number of white settlers, estimated at about 5,000 in Chimoio and 900 in Manica, and their concentration in urban areas of Chimoio, Gondola and Macequece, some farmers concentrated on producing vegetables such as tomatoes, onions, garlic and green leaves, as well as on breeding poultry and livestock in order to supply the local market with fresh foodstuffs. Others acquired forestry concessions and established sawmills to supply the local construction industry and furniture workshops with timber and hard wood. As discussed below, this shift into new economic activities may have accelerated conflicts between white settlers and African farmers over land occupation, especially as the abolition of forced labour in 1961 and the outbreak of the liberation struggle in northern Mozambique in the mid-1960s gave Africans more courage to defy white settlers.

2. White settlement and the Sussundenga *colonato*.

In 1959-1964, the Portuguese authorities implemented the Second National Development Plan.³² This plan was envisaged for both white and black state-sponsored settlement programmes and paralleled the political reforms being implemented at the time. These settlement programmes were largely initiated in an effort to establish the so-called multi-racially integrated society propagated by Portuguese spokesmen who defended the Salazar colonial fascist system against its critics. Thus, both political reforms and development plans were largely a response to nationalist unrest in the Portuguese colonies, including Mozambique. In the early 1960s, the colonial administration established the Settlement Board (*Junta Provincial de Povoamento da*

³¹See AHM-FGDB, Cx 793: Nota da Administração do concelho de Chimoio ao secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 12 February 1960.

³²See, Mário J.S. de Sousa C. Pignatelli, "II Plano de Fomento Português (Moçambique)", *BSEM*, XXXI, 130 (1962), 35-53.

Provincia de Moçambique) to encourage Portuguese settlement.³³ Studies on land survey, ecology, African society, and urbanization were subsequently undertaken to assure the safety of the Portuguese settlement in the colonies.³⁴

Investments in the land survey and white settlement in Revue valley were estimated at about 58,000,000 *esc.* and 160,000,000 *esc.* respectively, while studies on irrigation absorbed about 130,000,000 *esc.*³⁵ According to David Hedges, these plans to install white settlers amounted to about 75 per cent of state investment.³⁶ Under this program it was planned to settle about 200 to 300 Portuguese families in Manica between 1959 and 1964. To implement this, in 1951 technical staff of the *Brigada Tecnica de Fomento e Povoamento do Revue* were sent to Angola (*Cela colonato*) and Israel for observation and training.³⁷

Although the settlement program was eventually implemented in Manica province, fertile land was still distributed only among Portuguese settlers, while Africans were allocated the peripheral dry lands without access to irrigation. The establishment of the *colonato* in Sussundenga valley in this period was in response to a five-year plan. Small European villages were then established in the same fashion as the Trás-os-Montes or Alentejo rural villages of Portugal. Sussundenga village centre was renamed Vila Nova de Vidigueira.³⁸

³³See Regulamento das Juntas Provinciais do Povoamento de Angola e Moçambique, Decree N° 43 895, 6 September 1961.

³⁴See for example, the study conducted by the Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Promoção Social em Moçambique, N° 71, Centro de Estudos de Serviço Social e de Desenvolvimento Comunitário, (Lisbon, 1964); Mário de Oliveira, Os Novos Povoamentos nas Províncias Ultramarinas, Agência Geral do Ultramar, (Lisbon, 1965).

³⁵Mário Pignatelli, "II Plano de Fomento Português (Moçambique)", 44.

³⁶David Hedges and Aurelio Rocha, "Moçambique durante o apogeu do colonialismo português, 1945-1961: a economia e a estrutura social", in Hedges (ed.), História de Moçambique, Vol. III, (Maputo, 1993), 129-196.

³⁷Júnior, Moçambique, 126. See also interview with Mr. Pina (Chimoio, 17 August 1996).

³⁸Vila Nova de Vidigueira was about 40 km from Vila Pery (Chimoio city centre). See "Sussundenga jovem núcleo agrícola, fruto de uma ocupação planificada", in X Exposição feira de Chimoio, (Vila Pery, 1969).

As mentioned above, in Manica white settlers were not only drawn from amongst poor peasants in Portugal's villages. Apart from former soldiers who joined the 'colonato' in the late 1960s, the majority were former civil servants in Manica and Sofala provinces or former employees of the Mozambique Company. Others were mobilised through family networks in Portugal or were hired as employees of the more successful Portuguese farmers in Manica. For example, Joaquim de Carvalho, the most successful farmer in the Tsetsera upland, brought employees from Portugal in the early 1950s, who found their way to the Sussundenga 'colonato' in the 1960s. According to my informants, officials and other civil servants were not allowed to join these programmes. Nevertheless, some civil servants used their relatives to hold land titles on their behalf.³⁹ As in the Limpopo valley, however, most settlers had no experience of large-scale agriculture.

To ensure white settlement and its agricultural profitability, the colonial government provided each farmer with a large, furnished house with running water, as well as basic domestic utensils and a small warehouse. In addition, they received a plot of 10ha with irrigation facilities and a cattle-yard. Technical assistance was assured to all settlers and transport facilities were also provided. Agricultural assistance included selected and hybrid seeds, pesticides and fertilizers, demonstrations, tractors with wagon, ploughs, grades and seeders for rent or purchase at subsidized prices.⁴⁰ White settlers were provided with loans in cash (about 3,500 *esc* per month) for labour recruitment and other expenses. However, to cope with their daily expenses they had to engage in small business by selling poultry and spring vegetables. They were expected to pay back their debts after five years.⁴¹ From then, a small percentage was deducted every season to ensure a certain margin of accumulation.

³⁹ For example, a well known senior lawyer of Manica and Sofala provincial Court, Dr. Palhinha, held nine farms under such conditions in Cafumbe, Gondola, Bengo and Vista Alegre. See, interview with António Mogne, Sussundenga, 5 August 1996.

⁴⁰ Tractors (Massey Ferguson) were distributed by Auto-Industrial A. Teixeira Company and the Entrepósito Comercial based in Vila Pery and Beira cities.

⁴¹ According to Mr. Pina, white farmers could pay their debts after five or ten years and were deducted every year from their marketed crops. See interview in Chimoio, 17 October 1996. For comparative purposes, see Jocelyn Alexander, "Terra e autoridade política no pós-guerra em Moçambique: O caso da província de Manica", Arquivo, 16 (Maputo, 1994), 5-94.

The Grémio worked closely with the white settlers to provide them with any assistance required and to guarantee a market for their agricultural output. In 1960, there were ten white farmers in Sussundenga village. Mr. Pina remembers that the first three colonists to settle in Sussundenga (Chitarinana - Sussundenga experimental station) in 1960 were Álvaro Ribeiro, João Mira and José Mendes. In the mid-1960s there were about 45 white families there, of whom Augusto Nobre became the most dynamic farmer.⁴² There was a distinction between medium and small-scale farmers. Medium-scale farms varied between 80 to 100ha of arable land and concentrated their production in three crops namely, tobacco (Barley), *Kenaf* (for sack industry) and maize. Small-scale farms were as large as 10ha and they basically produced maize and a variety of other green vegetables.

In Zonue block, medium-scale farmers also produced tobacco (Virginia) and maize, and bred livestock.. Tobacco was sold to Lourenço Marques (Fábrica Velosa) while *kenaf* was processed by the Textil Pungue factory in Sofala.⁴³ In 1965, there were about fifty medium-scale farmers and 91 small-scale farmers.⁴⁴ This figure was far below the original plan to settle 200 or 300 white families. Among other problems, financial constraints seem to have been the major reason for this relative failure.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the Sussundenga *colonato* was still viewed as an important political achievement, as the President of Portugal, Sarmiento Rodrigues made clear in his visit to Vila Nova de

⁴² See, "Sussundenga jovem núcleo agrícola, fruto de uma ocupação planificada", in X Exposição feira de Chimoio, (Vila Pery, 1969). Augusto Nobre, who still control many economic enterprises in Chimoio, in the late 1960s became an important businessman in Vila Pery. He was mobilised from the army to join the colonato. See interview with Mr. Pina, Chimoio, 17 October 1996.

⁴³ See, AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Concelho de Manica, by António A.S. Borges, 1968; Rodrigues Júnior, Moçambique: Terra de Portugal, (Lisbon, 1965), 90-94.

⁴⁴ See, AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Concelho de Manica, by António A.S. Borges, 1968.

⁴⁵ See Manuel João Correia, "O povoamento de Moçambique depende do desenvolvimento económico do seu vasto território", in Notícias (Lourenço Marques, 2 March 1968).

Vidigueira in 1965.⁴⁶ In 1967, there were about 67 and 109 medium and small-scale farmers respectively registered in the *colonato*.⁴⁷

In the second half of the 1960s, the settlement scheme was extended from Munhinga River southwards and was comprised of individual white farms especially with orchards.⁴⁸ From Sussundenga to Rotanda and Messambuzi River (Tsetsera upland), there was a large forest of about seven million of cypress and cedar trees.⁴⁹ In the late 1960s, the settlement program concentrated on persuading soldiers to become residents of the colony after completing their military duty. In this context, the *Brigada de Fomento* was supposed to provide about 100 or 200 ha for the settlement of Portuguese soldiers in Sussundenga. To achieve this goal, the so-called 'sword and plough' (*espada e enxada*) policy, the colonial state urged joint action to be taken by the Settlement Board and the Mozambique Military Command.⁵⁰

3. African progressive farmers and the Sussundenga *colonato*, 1950s-1965.

In 1959/60, the number of the African population was estimated at about 66, 850 in Chimoio, 46,500 in Manica and 71,345 in Mossurize. Further, in Manica district there were about 1,750 African progressive farmers, of whom 600 were maize producers, 250 cultivated wheat and about 950 were registered as cotton-growers. In Chimoio, about 200 African farmers were planting bananas and citrus and were considered well off by the local administrative authorities.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Júnior, *Moçambique*, 126.

⁴⁷ AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Concelho de Manica, by António A.S. Borges, 1968.

⁴⁸For example, apart from his large garlic farm, Mr. Pina was a big plum grower in Rotanda. Interview in Chimoio 17 October 1996.

⁴⁹ AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Concelho de Manica, by António A.S. Borges, 1968.

⁵⁰See, Camilo Silveira da Costa, *A fixação do militar desmobilizado como factor de valorização do povoamento agrário na província de Moçambique*, (Lisbon, 1967), 54-56.

⁵¹See, AHM-FGDB, Cx 793: Nota da administração do concelho de Manica ao secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 18 September 1959; Nota da administração da circunscrição de Mossurize ao secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 24 October

With the relative increase in agricultural income and labour migration remittances, African farmers invested more in agricultural inputs, such as ploughs, axes, oxen, and donkeys. With these implements and animals combined with the assistance provided by the Department of Agriculture, local farmers sought more land to expand their production. The need for land and the increase in agricultural output brought about two problems. First, the Grémio could no longer manage to buy all African maize surplus in a normal season in order to allow peasants to empty their granaries and start with a new agricultural cycle. In fact, the Gremio was undercapitalised and lacked cash to purchase African maize. Second, the increasing number of the rural population, in particular farmers, put more pressure on the land. With the abolition of forced contract labour and the *estatuto indigena*, many Africans sought more land and hoped to expand their farming. However, this desire clashed with the interest of white farmers who imposed more restrictions on African access to their concessions. They increased taxes for those who wished to continue living on their land, unless they were prepared to remain on as labour tenants.

During the 1960s, there were widespread land conflicts throughout Manica district, particularly in Chazuca, Rotanda and Penhalonga villages. In 1961 for example, a white farmer in Manica-Macequece complained about the occupation and cultivation of 25ha of his concession by African farmers who refused to pay rent or to work for him.⁵² In 1962, peasants in Rotanda complained about the expropriation of land by the Brigada de Fomento do Revue which planted about seven million of eucalyptus and pine trees in African reserves and therefore prevented the expansion of their farms and pasture.⁵³ In 1962, there were many African farmers using ox-drawn ploughs, and they were producing a great surplus of maize for the market in that year, Africans traded an estimated 16,000 sacks. However, peasants gathered in *banjas* (communal meetings

1959; Nota da administração do concelho de Chimoio ao secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 12 February 1960.

⁵²See, AHM-FGDB, Cx 734: Cópia da nota confidencial da secretaria distrital de administração civil de Manica e Sofala, 6 January 1961.

⁵³AHM-FGDB, Cx 52: Relatório da inspecção ordinária ao concelho de Manica, António George Christova de Sousa Franklin, 1962 - Acta da banja realizada na regedoria Mucímua do posto de Mavita, 30 January 1962.

with administrative authorities) in Macequece and Mavita complained about the low prices of maize (1\$00/kg) and wheat (2\$20/kg).⁵⁴

With the outbreak of the liberation struggle in northern Mozambique, conflicts over land between white and African farmers in Manica seem to have been exacerbated.⁵⁵ In fact, some white farmers were already victims of African violence and had to hire bodyguards to avoid personal assault. Fearing the escalation of violence, the administrator of the Manica council urged the central administrative authorities in the province to take rapid measures in order to grant more land to Africans.⁵⁶ To alleviate the tension, he proposed that land classified as third class should be incorporated into the second class so that it could be distributed among peasants through local chiefs. Moreover, he tolerated the settlement and farming activity of Africans on under-cultivated white concessions. In 1965, it was estimated that only one-third of white concessions was being cultivated by their owners.⁵⁷

In 1965 and 1966, more complaints were raised by local peasants. For example, 30 Africans of Chazuca chieftaincy went to complain to the local administrator in Manica against the expansion of Penhalonga forestry onto the communal land they used for pasture and crop rotation. Thus, peasants took possession of undercultivated white farms regardless of their land rights. This practice increased conflicts and violence between white and African farmers and stimulated land reforms. In the meantime, at least local alternatives to deal with this matter were broached. However, in Sussundenga and Dombe African progressive farmers adopted a different strategy. Here, African peasants were either forced to grow cotton or were integrated in the *colonato* or *ruralato* systems.⁵⁸

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵However, in Mavonde, Mavita and Dombe African peasants had enough land to perform their agriculture.

⁵⁶AHM-FGDB, Cx 754: Nota da administração do concelho de Manica ao chefe dos serviços distritais de administração civil, 15 November 1965.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸For more details on *ruralato* system, see next chapter.

Although 'liberals' argued that access to irrigated land was the key factor in the success of cooperative production and the *colonato* system, this, in general, was not implemented before the 1960s, and was never centred on African communities. Instead, the idea of *colonato* was applied to Portuguese settlers to the disadvantage of African farmers. As Borges Coelho points out, "the new approach had to be considered as part of a wider strategy according to which a developmental dynamic had to be established in the colonies and it would be white settlement which would lead the process."⁵⁹

Although the majority of African peasants were moved away from the areas of white *colonatos* in Manica, it was in the interests of the Portuguese administration to keep a small number of progressive African farmers within, or side by side with, the Portuguese villages. The main purpose of this practice was for the Portuguese farmer to set an example to Africans of private land ownership and commercial agriculture. Yet, the state gave priority to white settlers and only very small plots were given to Africans. Moreover, the establishment of the *colonato* system seems to have weakened the power of local chiefs who did not have any say over the distribution of land.

The Sussundenga *colonato* was located at Moribane chieftaincy, and its village-centre was at Kupenya village (*povoação*). As far as land was concerned, chief Kupenya became powerless and unable to protect his people from expropriation. Although some peasants were paid compensation for their fruit trees, the majority just lost their property and were moved from their land. Those who agreed to become labour tenants remained on their original lands but dependent on white farmers. The following account by André Festa Bofo, who himself became one of seventeen selected African farmers to join the *colonato*, provides some insight into the way this process started in the early 1960s:

Initially access to land was through local chiefs. But in 1960, things started to change around here. The *Brigada* came with machines, cleared the land, opened a [dirt] road and afterwards called chief Kupenya for a meeting. They told Kupenya that they wanted people for agriculture. They talked to him about the plants [fruit trees] and asked him how much they could sell them for. For people, the pawpaw tree was more expensive because when the fruit falls it gets spoilt;

⁵⁹See, JPBorges Coelho, "Protected villages", 1993, 149.

the orange tree because it does not last long; the banana tree is more resistant. Then they asked about cereals. 'How much grain do you need to fill the granary?' Before they went to measure the fieldcrops they distributed money and sweets among children. They did not say anything about the fields. After that they again called chief Kupenya and headmen to inform them about the demarcation of the fields. Afterwards, they continued questioning: 'How much money do you need to walk around? How much money can you offer a friend? Would you like to live in a brick house? Would you like to live in the *colonato*? Kupenya answered these questions by saying that: 'We are not used to living in brick houses and we cannot afford to build them. We, Africans, cannot live in communal villages because we have many [ancestral] spirits'. Kupenya supported his people in refusing to join the *colonato*. As a result he was imprisoned for two months.⁶⁰

In fact, peasants supported by their chief Kupenya were reluctant to join the resettlement program. Tradition also made the integration of peasants in the settlement program almost impossible. Africans wished to preserve their local customs and lifestyle and feared their integration into new settlements would destroy their homesteads, housing system, land distribution and customs, including their cemeteries and sacred places.⁶¹

Nevertheless the *Brigada* returned to meet the people and persuaded them to join the settlement program. Faced with the local resistance, the *Brigada* threatened them with expulsion from the land and said they would bring people from other places to settle there if they persisted in refusing to join the *colonato*. By then Kupenya had been released, but he did not take part in the *colonato* scheme. Andre Bofo and another sixteen African farmers agreed to join the *colonato*.⁶² The *Brigada* provided them with a 10ha piece of cleared land; a furnished two-bedroomed brick house with a roof of asbestos tiles; a garage and a warehouse. The cost of these assets was about 200,000esc. African farmers were supposed to pay back their debt after four years through annual discounts from their sales. Initially they hired tractors and ploughs from the *Brigada* to cultivate their land.

⁶⁰Interview with André Festa Bofo, Sussundenga 5 August 1996.

⁶¹See interview with chief Paulo Kupenya, Sussundenga, 16 June 1994.

⁶²See interview with André Festa Bofo, Sussundenga, 5 August 1996.

Andre Bofó's experience exemplifies the way in which these African farmers established themselves in the Sussundenga *colonato*.⁶³ He was born in Sussundenga in 1920. He studied up to 2.a classe (grade II). Like many children in the region, he helped his parents in the maize and sorghum gardens, especially during the seeding, weeding and harvesting seasons. He also chased baboons from the gardens and sometimes went to fish in the Revue river. In 1942, he was forced into contract labour for a white farmer in Vanduzi (about 40km from Sussundenga) together with another fifteen workers in the cotton and maize fields. However, after ten days he ran away with three friends to South Africa where he worked in a big farm in Transvaal for about three years before moving into a pesticide factory. He stayed there until 1947 when he returned home. The main reason for his migration to Transvaal was the bad treatment and relatively low wage (about 50 esc. or less than one pound monthly) he received in Vanduzi.

In 1949, Bofó was forced into contract labour again. This time he went to work for Victor Carvalho in the Tsetsera uplands for six months as a house-boy. As we have seen, Carvalho had a large potato farm and exported his crop to Rhodesia after supplying the cities of Chimoio, Beira and Lourenço Marques. In 1950, Andre Bofó voluntarily joined Carvalho again and soon after became a tractor driver. As a tractor driver he earned about 450esc. (£5.00) monthly. This lasted for five years. There were about 100 other workers. The majority were from Dombe and Sussundenga and went there voluntarily. Much of the agricultural work was mechanized.

By the end of 1955, using his experience as farm labourer in Transvaal and on Carvalho's farm, he returned home and established himself as a maize farmer (*agricultor*) in Sussundenga. He used ox-drawn ploughs to cultivate his land and employed family labour. He hired two workers for 25esc monthly each. In the peak seasons he organised work-parties (*djangano*) for which purpose he prepared *pombe*. By this time he had married two wives for whom he had paid 2,500 esc. (about five cows) for each *shuma*, and with whom he had twelve children (seven boys and five girls). In the late 1950s he had built five huts. When the Brigada arrived in 1960, he was already

⁶³The following description is extracted from an interview with Andre Festa Bofó, Sussundenga, 5 August 1996.

farming about 10ha of land with maize, sesame, sunflower and sorghum as his main crops.

As soon as Andre Bofo joined the *colonato* in 1960, he received an additional 10ha of cleared land and some agricultural implements. The *Brigada* provided him and other farmers with a tractor and a plough with two discs to cultivate their fields. The tractors were the property of the *Brigada* and could be rented. Farmers had to pay their debts by deducting one sack in five of maize harvested in the field. However, this system of payment changed in 1965 when farmers had to hire tractor services and pay a daily rate of about 500 esc. for each 5ha cultivated.⁶⁴ In the mid-1960s Andre Bofo produced about 90 sacks of maize, 18 sacks of sorghum, 30 bundles of sunflower, and cultivated 1ha of tobacco, 1ha of sunflower, 1ha of sesame and forages. By 1970, he was a very well established farmer and managed to buy his own tractor (second hand) for 120,000 esc. He borrowed the money from the bank and repaid it within three years.⁶⁵

Andre Bofo's story can be applied to the other sixteen farmers integrated into the *colonato*. Although they may have experienced somewhat different processes, in general they shared similar facilities and had similar difficulties with the *Brigada*. The *Brigada* not only provided them with agricultural expertise through agricultural assistants but also provided transport facilities to ease their access to the market. Depending on the quality of the product, the price system was similar to that applied to white farmers.

Moving from subsistence to commercial agriculture and applying modern technology such as mechanized cultivation, rotation system, fertilizers and hybrid seeds those African progressive farmers changed their economic and social status.⁶⁶ To reinforce their position, they moved from huts to brick houses and had access to pumped water. Although their modest brick houses were far below the quality of those provided to

⁶⁴ See, interview with André Festa Bofo and António Mogne, Sussundenga, 5 August 1996.

⁶⁵ Interview with Andre F. Bofo, Sussundenga, 5 August 1996.

⁶⁶ Although they were located in areas with relatively adverse conditions if compared to white settlement, African farmers managed to accumulate some wealth which placed them in a privileged position, only jeopardized after the independence with the inefficient economic program of communal villages.

white farmers, they still shared social facilities with white settlers in Vila Nova de Vidigueira, including a Catholic church, a health centre and an official primary school which served all farmers, white or black. In addition, a social or recreational club, including a bar and dance hall, was also established. Further, the colonial administration intended to allow the children of these progressive farmers or *assimilados* to play together, or share some degree of intimacy, with white children.

Nevertheless, the degree of approximation achieved was not very high, given personal attitudes and cultural differences. Although it is not clear whether this was for economic or for cultural reasons, African farmers preferred to enroll their children at the 'rudimentary' primary school on the periphery of the settlement and not at the official one in the Sussundenga village-centre. According to my testimonies, the main reason was that they could not afford to dress their children and provide them with the shoes required for class attendance. Adults also found it difficult to share cultural interests with white settlers in the club. As they could not afford suits or shoes or were not used to wearing them, they found themselves socially marginalised and very often 'joined' the parties by staying outside the hall and receiving food and drink through the window.⁶⁷

However limited, this number of African progressive farmers enjoyed some degree of social relaxation and tasted a multi-racial community life. The majority of peasants however, still lived in a condition of 'semi-slavery' as labour tenants on small and medium-scale white farms. The abolition of forced labour in 1961 did not have any meaning for them. Parallel to the establishment of *colonatos*, the colonial administration fostered African farming through a new cluster system of so-called *ruralatos*. In Manica province, *ruralatos* were designed to enhance African cotton production, especially in Dombe and Mossurize. This is the subject of the next chapter.

⁶⁷See interview with André Festa Bofo and António Mogne, Sussundenga, 5 August 1996.

CHAPTER 6:

AFRICAN FARMERS, COTTON PRODUCTION AND THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN MANICA, 1930s-1965.

Introduction.

This chapter looks at the development of the cotton system and its implications for African social stratification, particularly in Dombe and Mossurize, and at how far the use of incentives in the cotton regime in the 1950s influenced the process of commodisation and social differentiation among African producers in Manica. It also analyses the process through which Chimoio became an important centre of the development of textile industry and how it affected the regional economy.

Cotton growing for the textile industry was the most remarkable aspect of the relationship between Portuguese industry and the colonies.¹ Contemporary studies by W.G.Clarence-Smith, Anne Pitcher and Carlos Fortuna provide an important overview of the relationship between the colonial regime, the Portuguese textile industry and the international market in this period.² Although these studies analyse the cotton regime in the broad perspective of the Portuguese empire, they also provide important insights into the role of Mozambique in cotton production. However, they do not analyse the causes and effects of the establishment of the textile industry in central Mozambique.

Nelson Saraiva Bravo and Allen Isaacman have concentrated their attention on the economic and social implications of cotton-growing on Mozambican peasants. Bravo stresses the functional role of the African production of raw cotton for Portuguese

¹For more details on the evaluation of these relations in 1952, see Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, AOS/CO/UL-61, Pasta 5: Relatório sobre os progressos da cultura do algodão em Angola e Moçambique, 11 December 1952.

²William Gervase Clarence-Smith, The third Portuguese empire 1825-1975: A study in economic imperialism, (Manchester, 1985); M. Anne Pitcher, Politics in the Portuguese empire: The state, industry, and cotton, 1926-1974, (Oxford, 1993); Carlos Fortuna, O fio da meada: O algodão de Moçambique, Portugal e a economia-mundo, 1860-1960, (Porto, 1993); Idem, "A construção histórica de uma periferia: Moçambique e a questão do algodão ao longo do século XX", in Moçambique: Navegações, comércio e técnicas (Actas do seminário), (Lisbon, 1998), 128-154.

industry, and its importance for the material and social improvement of rural communities.³ However, he does not analyse the harsh implications of cotton growing on the division of labour in African households, soil fertility, subsistence production and nutrition. This paternalist perspective is in great contrast to that of Allen Isaacman, who generally sees African cotton production as the 'mother of poverty'.⁴

Isaacman demonstrates in masterly fashion how the colonial policy of forced cotton placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of African peasants. He also analyses different forms of African resistance against forced cotton production. However, his analysis of regional differentiation and the social implications of cotton production on Africans in central Mozambique is very sketchy. In fact, his study, which barely goes beyond 1960, does not cover Manica at all.⁵ Moreover, although he provides some evidence of the emergence of social stratification among cotton producers in northern and southern Mozambique, his emphasis remains on the role of African chiefs and their privileges within the colonial system as the main stepping stone for their accumulation of wealth.⁶

Indeed, Isaacman argues that "no Africans profited more from the cotton regime than chiefs loyal to the colonial state." Although in the case of northern Mozambique this thesis might be correct, we need to be more cautious when applying it elsewhere.⁷ This statement may dilute his efforts to explain the emergence of *machambeiros* as an important section of rich cotton farmers, particularly in southern Mozambique. Luis Covane's recent study of southern Mozambique demonstrates how cotton helped many a family to enter the market economy. He also emphasises the role of the wives of

³ Nelson Saraiva Bravo, A cultura algodoeira na economia do norte de Moçambique, (Lisbon, 1963).

⁴ Allen Isaacman, et al. "'Cotton is the mother of poverty': Peasant resistance to forced cotton production in Mozambique, 1938-1961." International Journal of African Historical Studies 13 (1980), 581-615; Allen Isaacman, Cotton is the mother of poverty: Peasants, work, and rural struggle in colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961, (London, 1996).

⁵ Isaacman, Cotton is the mother of poverty, 1996. See in especial chapters seven, eight and nine.

⁶ Isaacman, Cotton is mother of poverty, 1996, 174. See also Allen Isaacman, "Chiefs, rural differentiation and peasant protest: The Mozambican forced cotton regime 1938-1961" African Economic History 14, (1985), 15-56.

⁷ See chapter eight of Cotton is the mother of poverty (1996).

migrants to South Africa who cultivated cotton in order to reduce their economic dependence on men's migrant income.⁸

The foundations of the a new cotton regime was laid after World War II. While the state relied mainly on forced labour to supply its metropolitan textile industry with raw cotton in the initial years of the cotton regime, after World War II, the colonial administration changed its policy in favour of material incentives in order to encourage African producers to increase their cotton output. According to Anne Pitcher

Criticism from the international community, responses by Africans, balance of payments fears, a commitment to modernisation, and especially, pressure from domestic textile industry all contributed to the government's shift from a policy based on coercion to one based on financial and status-based incentives.⁹

Distancing herself from an eurocentric perspective, Pitcher looks at the African peasantry as the centre or the main author of this change. Taking into consideration the impact of cotton policy on African producers, she argues that "coercion engendered new difficulties of its own, requiring adjustments in the system, and in turn, the adjustments elicited multiple responses on the part of Africans."¹⁰ Following this perspective, we need to understand how African peasants in Manica reacted to the cotton scheme reforms launched in 1950s by the colonial state.

1. African forced-cotton cultivation before the 1950s.

In the 1930s cotton production was imposed on Mozambican peasants throughout the country. In 1938 the government set up a Cotton Board known as the JEAC (*Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial*) to intervene directly in African communities.¹¹ Although the Mozambique Company had tried to foster cotton cultivation by Africans

⁸Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture in southern Mozambique", 221, 225-227.

⁹M. Anne Pitcher, "From coercion to incentives: The Portuguese colonial cotton regime in Angola and Mozambique, 1946-1974". In The social history of cotton in colonial Africa, ed. Allen Isaacman and Richard Roberts, (Portsmouth, 1994), 119-143:129.

¹⁰ Pitcher, "From coercion to incentives", 121,125.

¹¹A more comprehensive study on forced cotton cultivation and its impact in Mozambique is provided by Allen Isaacman, Cotton is the Mother of Poverty: Peasants, work, and rural struggles in colonial Mozambique, 1938-1961, (London, 1996).

before, in central Mozambique the imposition of this crop never took a firm hold until it was cultivated as an experimental crop in the late 1930s. In 1939, the amount of cotton produced by African peasants in Manica and Sofala provinces was estimated at about 1,796,530kg. However, Manica province was not the main target area for cotton cultivation because it was regarded as the granary of the region. In this region there was a need to reconcile maize production with other crops. Nevertheless, it could not wholly escape forced cotton production, and from the 1940s, African peasants in Mossurize, Dombe and Mavita villages were forced to produce cotton as an experimental crop.¹²

Although only a very small amount of cotton was gathered each season, the colonial authorities still induced people to grow cotton under what was termed the 'cluster' system (*concentração algodoeira*). For example, in 1943/44 the amount of raw-cotton gathered in Mavita and Dombe was 47 tons and 282 tons respectively.¹³ In the following two years, the amount of cotton produced in Manica district was astonishing. Thus, in 1944 they produced 347, 136 kg against 689,772 kg in 1945. In 1946, there were about 542 farmers registered as cotton-growers in Dombe and 176 in Mavita.¹⁴ The marketing of cotton was monitored through a private company, the *Companhia Nacional Algodoeira*, in collaboration with local chiefs. Despite all the efforts of the government, African peasants were not motivated to cultivate cotton, mainly because of the adverse terms of trade as a whole not simply the relatively low prices. Although imported goods were available in these market stations, due to their high prices and low quality compared to Southern Rhodesia, cotton peasants were usually unable to buy them in desired quantity, and found themselves exploited even after a year's hard work in cultivating the crop.

In the mid-1940s, the Portuguese administrative authorities recognised the disparities between prices offered in Southern Rhodesia and central Mozambique as the main reason why almost all peasants crossed the border to purchase manufactured goods in Rhodesian stores. In fact, in Rhodesia prices were almost half of those charged in

¹²See the interview between Rodrigues Júnior (a senior journalist) and Alfredo de Lemos Armando (director-manager of the *Companhia Nacional Algodoeira*). In : Rodrigues Júnior, *Actividades e problemas*, (Lourenço Marques, 1944), 98-102.

¹³See, A.H.M-FGG N° 177, Relatório da Inspeção a Manica, 1946.

¹⁴See, AHM-FGG, No. 219: Relatório da Inspeção à circunscrição de Manica, 1946.

Manica.¹⁵ Further, the Portuguese colonial authorities prohibited the establishment of stores within a distance of 40 km to the frontier with Rhodesia.

The *Companhia Nacional Algodoeira* only supported peasants involved in cotton growing by distributing cotton seeds, and sometimes providing old sacks for gathering. The distribution of seeds was not accompanied by the provision of ploughs and technical or agronomic training before the end of the 1950s. Nor were the soils selected according to their fertility and viability. Thus, African peasants had to bear costs and risks resulting from cotton production.

Beyond cotton growing, there was no other policy designed to enhance peasant production in Dombe and Mossurize.¹⁶ Moreover, in the late 1940s, colonial authorities precluded Mossurize and Dombe from the agricultural development plan designed to boost African farming in the province. These areas were considered unsuitable for agricultural development due mainly to the lack of roads and transport facilities.¹⁷ As a result, Dombe and Mossurize were regarded as labour reserves for white economic enterprises in Chimoio, Buzi and Manica. Indeed over the decade there was an increasing conscription of African peasants into compulsory labour contracts for the white settler economy.¹⁸ For instance, in 1947 the state enacted new labour legislation imposing on Africans six months of work for estates, white farms or public works. Although this legislation may have encouraged wage labour to some extent, due to the low wages and poor work conditions, many young men deserted the region in search of relatively better work and payment in neighbouring countries of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.¹⁹

¹⁵ See, AHM-FGG No. 219: Relatório da Inspeção a Manica, 1946. This tendency was also recognised by local administrator of Dombe in 1953. Administração do Concelho de Manica - Diário de serviço do chefe do posto administrativo de Dombe, Fernando Manuel Bastos, 3 August 1953.

¹⁶ See, Administração do Concelho Executivo de Manica, Pasta A/42 - Relatórios e diários de serviço: Diário de serviço do Administrador de Manica, Afonso Calçada Bastos, October, 1953.

¹⁷ See, AHM-FGG No. 312: Relatório sobre a 1a. Conferência de Intendentes e Administradores da província de Manica e Sofala, September 1950, by Administrative Inspector Álvaro de G.e Melo.

¹⁸ For more details on the role of Dombe and Mossurize as labour reserves see chapter three.

¹⁹ See chapters three, seven and eight.

To overcome African resistance, the official administration, with the collaboration of *sipaio* and local chiefs, forced people to plant cotton under threat of severe punishment. While in Manica, Rotanda and Mavita, peasants could resist cotton cultivation because of their profitable maize and wheat cash crops, in Dombe and Mossurize, due to the lack of transports, peasants had no alternative. They engaged in cotton cultivation just to avoid forced contract labour.²⁰ However, the majority of men still escaped to Southern Rhodesia and Transvaal, leaving the agricultural burden on the shoulders of their wives or mothers. Although the cotton scheme was basically designed for men, owing to their increasing exodus, much of its cultivation relied on women as did subsistence agriculture. Under such circumstances women were overburdened with work in cotton fields and food-crop production.

By late 1947 local women complained that their involvement in cotton growing resulted in a shortage in the production of subsistence crops,²¹ and peasants in Dombe refused to receive cotton seeds for the next agrarian cycle.²² In Dombe too, during a *banja* organised by the administrative inspector, Hortênsio de Sousa, local chiefs asked the administrative authorities to exempt women from cotton cultivation because of their diversion from food-crop cultivation.²³ The local administrator in Manica district opposed this idea adamantly claiming that if peasants did not cultivate cotton, which provided them with cash, they would have been worse off because of the poor agricultural season. Without cotton, he added, "they would not have food or cash";

²⁰See CEM/AM: Diário de serviço do chefe do posto administrativo de Dombe, Fernando Manuel Bastos, 3 August 1953.

²¹In a letter addressed to the Cotton Board in November 1947, the administrator of Manica district referred to peasants resistance against cotton cultivation in Dombe village.

²²See, AHM-FGDB Cx 727: Informação do Concelho de Manica à subdelegação da Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial, 21 November 1947, by Filipe Luiz Janes.

²³For comparative purposes with other regions of Mozambique, see Isaacman, "Chiefs, rural differentiation and peasant protest: The Mozambican forced cotton regime 1938-1961", *African Economic History* 14 (1985), 15-56; Ibid. "Coercion, paternalism and the labor process: The Mozambican cotton regime 1938-1961", *JSAS* 18, 3 (1992), 487-526. However, contrary to the permissive attitude of local chiefs described by Isaacman in northern Mozambique, in Manica my sources suggest that chiefs were not always puppets of the colonial regime.

"Fortunately this is not the case because a hundred thousand *escudos* are in the peasants' possession".²⁴ Clearly, the position of the administrator was in tune with the JEAC and the CNA.²⁵

Over the decade of the 1940s, peasants in Manica province bore all the damaging effects of the experimental cotton cultivation which in most cases was undertaken on unsuitable lands and without transport networks, quite apart from the unfavourable prices offered by the CNA and local administration.

African resistance to forced cotton cultivation meant that if the colonial cotton scheme was to succeed it had to be approached in a different way. In fact, a new strategy had to consider the development of infra-structure such as roads and bridges, linking rural areas and market centres. In addition, the JEAC and the CNA had to introduce market incentives instead of using violence.

2. African farmers, cotton cultivation and *ruralatos* in Dombe and Mossurize.

The first sign of reforms in the cotton scheme was established by the *Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial* in 1948.²⁶ As mentioned in an earlier chapter, meetings held in 1948 between governors of the colony concentrated a great deal of their attention on the need to allocate land to African peasants.²⁷ Under the *bases para a campanha algodeira*, the JEAC distinguished two types of African cotton growers. The first, located in the 'cluster' system was designated *agricultores* (progressive farmers), while the rest of the ordinary peasants scattered elsewhere were called *cultivadores* (cultivators). *Agricultores* would be men, from eighteen to fifty-five years of age, who

²⁴AHM-FGDB Cx 727: Informação do Concelho de Manica à subdelegação da Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial, 21 November 1947, by Filipe Luiz Janes.

²⁵The difficulties faced by the CNA in the 1940s in Manica may contrast with its relatively success recognised by the JEAC as quoted in Isaacman, *Cotton is the mother of poverty*, 1996, 129. In fact the CNA's achievement in Manica was only visible in the turn of the 1950s.

²⁶See, Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, AOS/CO/UL-10C, Pasta 4: Correspondência sobre o algodão colonial, 17 June 1949; Newitt, *Mozambique*, 454-456.

²⁷See AHM-FDSNI, Cx 153: Conselho dos governadores da colónia de Moçambique, 17 June 1948; Negrão, *One hundred years*, 112.

farmed one hectare of cotton plus one-half hectare of cotton for each wife. *Cultivadores* were single, widowed, or divorced women, or old men between fifty-six and sixty years of age, who farmed one-half hectare of cotton and an equal area of food crops.²⁸ Thus, although cotton producers were not exempted from taxes they could avoid forced contract labour by joining cotton scheme as *agricultores* or *cultivadores*. However, the degree of implementation of these reforms varied from one region to another.

Joint efforts by the *Companhia Nacional Algodoeira*, the JEAC and the local administrative authorities were reinforced in order to mobilize local peasants in Manica and Mossurize to join the new proposed cotton 'clusters' (*concentrações algodoeiras*). However, as in other parts of the country, this enterprise still faced strong local resistance because peasants preferred to grow food crops or other commodities such as maize and wheat instead of the less profitable cotton. Drought and locusts, which devastated Manica in 1947/48 and 1950/51, seem to have increased peasants' dismal performance.²⁹ That natural calamity accelerated African lack of interest in cotton cultivation although about 1,100 and 250 cotton-growers were still registered in Dombe and Mavita respectively.³⁰ Moreover, the prevalence of harsh treatment of peasants by *capatazes* (cotton overseers) increased peasants discontent. In January 1948, a group of 16 women gathered at Dombe administration again to complain against cotton cultivation and their physical abuse by *capatazes*.³¹ In response to African despondency, the state, the CNA and the JEAC designed new strategy to boost African interest on cotton production.

In the mid-1950s colonial authorities and the JEAC in Manica recognised the need to abandon cotton production on unsuitable land and to free peasants from its cultivation. Although forced cultivation still constituted the main characteristic of relations of production, colonial authorities envisaged some reform in order to attract more peasants.

²⁸See Bravo, *A cultura algodoeira*, 117, quoted in Pitcher, "From coercion to incentives", 130.

²⁹AHM-FGDB, Cx 729: Agricultura Indígena, 1950-1958.

³⁰AHM-FGDB, Cx 728: Nota da administração do Concelho de Manica ao director provincial de administração da Beira, 22 June 1950.

³¹AHM-FGDB, Cx 724: Nota do governador da província de Manica e Sofala ao governador geral de Moçambique, by José Diogo Ferreira Martins, 16 January 1948.

Those reforms implied the mechanization of the means of production, technical support, construction of roads and bridges, increasing prices as well as land selection and distribution of pesticides.

The question of cotton prices was extensively debated in Portugal as the low supply of raw-cotton affected the metropolitan textile industry.³² Thus, in 1951 the overseas minister Sarmiento Rodrigues, proposed an increase in the price of cotton. However, the new prices were still below the international market level. To fulfill the reforms the JEAC established the Cotton Fund (*Fundo de Fomento Algodoeiro/Fundo de Algodão*). The first half of the 1950s was characterised by land survey, the mobilisation of African peasants to join new *concentrações mecanizadas (ruralatos)*, and the development of infra-structure in Manica and Mossurize districts.³³

In August and September 1953, the administrator of Manica district, in his tour across the villages, organised *banjas* (gathering meetings), in order to persuade local chiefs and peasants to commit themselves to cotton cultivation which he regarded as an important way to improve peasants' economic and social status. However, it was not surprising that in Dombe the administrator was taunted with a storm of protests from peasants who asked him to let them abandon cotton in order to cultivate maize and sesame. Some peasants justified their requests on account of their advanced age or sickness. Further, peasants also threatened the administrator with the exodus of their entire villages to Southern Rhodesia.³⁴

³²See Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, AOS/CO/UL-61, Pasta 5: Relatório da Junta de Exportação do algodão sobre os progressos da cultura nos últimos dois anos, 5 December 1952.

³³ See AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Agricultura indígena, Junta de Exportação do Algodão e Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, 1954-1958.

³⁴See, CEM-AM, Pasta A/42: Relatórios e diários de serviço - diário de serviço do Administrador do concelho de Manica, Afonso Calçada Bastos, 3 August and 5 September, 1953.

On 7th September 1953, the administrator of Dombe launched the first resettlement programme of peasants in *concentrações mecanizadas* at Sambanhe chieftaincy. After the demarcation of plots, seven hectares for each farmer, it was realised that only twenty farmers could be accommodated in the scheme. However, the resettlement of cotton farmers implied the dispossession of local peasants as the local administrator recognised: "Because of this *concentração*, I have to dispossess many natives and disrupt many fruit trees. I hope to cope with this matter in a reasonable way in order to avoid African complaints."³⁵ Although peasants who did not join the new cotton scheme may have had some degree of freedom to cultivate food crops, they lost their best land. As a result, they had to move far away from the main roads and commercial networks. Under these conditions, ordinary peasants felt more vulnerable.

In order to motivate more peasants to join the new cotton scheme, the JEAC and local administrative authorities added an important social dimension to new *concentrações*. Thus, the *ruralato* scheme (community complexes) was conceived to be a model of rural development and social progress among African peasants. The *ruralatos* were established in parallel to *colonatos* and were designed to boost a new class of rich African progressive farmers in cotton areas. This scheme was supervised by the state, the JEAC and the CNA, in collaboration with local chiefs. The state had the overall administrative responsibility for supervision and this included financial and management assistance to the *ruralatos*. The JEAC provided *ruralatos* with general assistance, including agronomic and technical expertise. In coordination with the local administration, the CNA was responsible for supplying farmers with pesticides and agricultural implements, such as ploughs, tractors and the respective spares and fuel, as well as its maintenance. The CNA was also expected to provide training to farmers who wished to become tractor drivers. To monitor African agriculture performance the JEAC and the administration employed about 118 *capatazes*.³⁶

³⁵See, CEM-AM, Pasta A/42: Relatórios e diários de serviço - diário de serviço do Administrador do concelho de Manica, Afonso Calçada Bastos, 3 August and 5 September, 1953.

The *ruralatos* were primarily conceived to improve methods of cultivation, especially through mechanisation of agriculture by applying tractors and other machines. Each *ruralato* comprised twenty families who were legally registered at the local administration. However, the agricultural unit was individual, i.e. per family. This practice was to instill the notion of private property and individual responsibility. The state also encouraged food production in rotation with cotton. Thus, each family received two hectares for cotton plus one or one and a half hectare for food crops.³⁷ Although families would organise work parties during the harvesting season, however, for ploughing and weeding they were supposed to rely on their family labour resources.

Each *ruralato* purchased one tractor, a plough, a grade and a seeder on a loan basis. The debt was redistributed among its twenty family members and had to be discounted from their annual revenues during four years. This practice was also applied for other expenses resulted from agricultural assistance. In addition, each *ruralato* had to nominate one family to take responsibility for the machines with the assistance of some other members.³⁸ Those elements were generally chosen amongst the most prosperous farmers who were not necessarily chiefs or headmen.

By the end of 1954, four *ruralatos* were established in Dombe village (Sambanhe, Chironda, Varuca) and Macequece. [MAP] These *ruralatos* had received four tractors with ploughs with two discs, and grades of twenty discs, seeders, and other implements from the administrator of Manica district. The total value of these implements was estimated at about 325,320 *escudos* or 81,330 *escudos* for each *ruralato*. With the additional expenses of fuel consumption and maintenance the overall debt was calculated at about 353,258 *escudos*.³⁹ In the same year, cotton output was below the

³⁶AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Agricultura indígena, Junta de Exportação do Algodão e Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, 1954; Nota da direcção da administração do concelho de Manica ao director da Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, 17 November, 1954.

³⁷AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Agricultura indígena, 1954-1958.

³⁸AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Nota do Intendente do distrito da Beira ao administrador do concelho de Manica, 9 October 1954.

³⁹AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Relatório sobre as concentrações algodoeiras do posto do Dombe, campanha, 1954-55, 27 August 1955.

estimated harvests. According to local administrative authorities this failure was associated with the invasion of cotton fields by the *jacide* pest. The following tables illustrate cotton production in each *ruralato* and debt discount in their first year:⁴⁰

Cotton production by *ruralato* in Manica (1954)

	families	area (ha)	production (kg)	value (esc.)
Sambanhe	20	40	6,915	16,703.00
Chironda	20	25,2	17,897	43,682.30
Varuca	20	26	11,855	28,856.60
Macequece	23	27,5	16,195	39,626.30

Debt discount (esc.) by *ruralato* in Manica (1954)

	Total debt	discounted	balance
Sambanhe	87,668.70	4,872.00	82,196.70
Chironda	88,032.60	20,584.47	67,448.12
Varuca	88,062.90	10,778.80	77,248.10
Macequece	87,658.90	12,949.20	74,709.70

Despite the relatively low cotton output, the administrative authorities were happy with the African farmers' performance. It was believed that African farmers in the mechanised *ruralatos* in Dombe were well off. In fact, after debt repayment each family earned a minimum average income of about 590 *escudos*. In addition, the annual report of Dombe administrative post stressed that there was a great enthusiasm among peasants of the main chieftaincies of Dombe, Gohonda, Zomba and Chibué to join the *ruralato* scheme and cotton cultivation.⁴¹In 1955, the economic situation of African progressive cotton farmers was even better. Following a good season, all four *ruralatos* almost doubled their production, and the family income increased almost four times as shown in the tables below:⁴²

Cotton production by *ruralato* in Manica (1955/56)

	families	total prod.	prod.(per ha)	total value (esc.)
Sambanhe	20	34,433kg	861kg/ha	93,842.00
Chironda	20	31,172	779	83,856.20
Varuca	20	25,955	649	69,117.20
Macequece	23	43,149	1079	116,439.20

⁴⁰AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Agricultura indígena, 1954-1958.

⁴¹AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Relatório do Posto Administrativo de Dombe, 6 November 1954.

⁴²AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Agricultura indígena, 1954-1958.

Income (cash in esc.) in possession of cotton farmers

	per <i>ruralato</i>	family (net)
Sambanhe	44,892.02	2,244.60
Chironda	53,411.54	2,670.58
Varuca	35,142.93	1,557.15
Macequece	74,049.76	3,702.49

The agricultural success of 1955 seems to have persuaded local peasants to join *ruralatos*, and in 1956 three more *ruralatos* were established in Dombe, respectively, Gohonda, Paringue and Dinde chieftaincies. In Macequece *ruralato* the number of families increased to twenty four. Reforms introduced through Decree-law 40,405 of 1955 may also have contributed to the peasants enthusiasm to engage in cotton cultivation. Indeed, investment in the means of production and the introduction of more efficient process of production contributed for output increase. On the other hand, it is possible that price incentives had influenced this short-lived enthusiasm between 1955 and 1956/58.⁴³

However, despite being gathered into *ruralatos*, some farmers still found difficulty in reaching their quotas. In this situation, soil fertility, productivity and labour input constituted their main concerns. In fact, the way each farmer dealt with these aspects probably explains their socio-economic position and the consequent social differentiation. For example, in 1955 the successful farmers in Sambanhe and Macequece *ruralatos* repaid their debts in sums above the stipulated annual rate. On the other hand, in 1957 the most vulnerable farmers refused to pay their debts threatening to abandon the use of tractors or even to migrate to Rhodesia. Among other reasons, they complained about being discounted every year for the cost of seeding and weeding machines when they were not using them at all.⁴⁴

After about five years, the *ruralato* scheme faced soil erosion and land problems. The degradation of soils required the clearance of new land for rotation. In fact, the administrative authorities in Dombe admitted that cotton fields undermined African

⁴³For further discussion on price incentives see, A.Pitcher, "From coercion to incentives", 130-136;

subsistence yields.⁴⁵ As a result, the administration in coordination with the CNA decided to eliminate the newly established *ruralatos* of Dinde and Paringue, while the Chironda and Macequece *ruralatos* were moved elsewhere. The CNA was keen to maintain *ruralatos* in regions with enough land for rotation, at least 6,5 ha per family. Thus, the *Brigada de serviços técnicos e do fomento* was urged to proceed with a land survey and to establish new areas with enough arable land to set up new *ruralatos*.⁴⁶

Besides the mechanised *ruralatos*, in 1955/56, about 838 peasants were registered as *agricultores* and about 1,945 as *cultivadores* in Dombe. In 1955/56, they cultivated 942ha and 1,902ha of cotton respectively. In Mossurize, the number of *agricultores* and *cultivadores* was estimated at about 372 and 1,070 respectively. The former cultivated about 219ha and the later about 265ha of cotton.⁴⁷ *Cultivadores* were more vulnerable to cotton hardships. In general, they cultivated unsuitable lands, using rudimentary technology, and were very far from market centres. It was mainly men in this category of peasants that fled to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa to escape forced cotton production and contract labour. In 1956, for example, the percentage of able-bodied men migrated to neighbouring countries from Mossurize was estimated at 50 per cent.⁴⁸

Many areas of Mossurize, particularly its hinterland, lacked roads, bridges, health centres, schools and drinking water facilities. To have access to these basic social services people had to walk several miles and cross the border to Southern Rhodesia, especially to Chipinge and Mount Selinda. Migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia influenced their children or relatives to join them there. Children and juveniles, either boys or girls, also crossed the border to enroll at mission schools in Mount Silinda and

⁴⁴AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Parecer da JEAC sobre o plano de trabalho para a campanha de 1957/58. February 1957.

⁴⁵AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Relatório sobre as concentrações algodoceiras do posto administrativo do Dombe, 18 November 1958.

⁴⁶ AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Agricultura Indígena, 1957-1959.

⁴⁷AHM-FGDB, Cx 730: Agricultura indígena, 1954-1958.

⁴⁸AHM-FGDB, CX 729: Informação da administração da circunscrição do Mossurize sobre a produção indígena referente a 1956.

Melsetter. In general, boys joined tea estates as labourers and benefited from the education facilities that the companies provided for their juvenile labourers.⁴⁹ Although administrative authorities and the JEAC recognised the need for improvement of social infrastructure, nothing effective was done in the 1950s and 1960s.⁵⁰

It was only in 1962 that the CNA launched a programme of construction of wood bridges across main rivers, in particular the Revue, Lucite and Mussapa, in order to have access to more areas for cotton cultivation in Dombe and Mossurize.⁵¹ Much of the construction of bridges across numerous rivers and streams in Dombe was done by peasants at their own expense. Indeed, the construction of bridges, clearance of paths and tracks, and cotton cultivation resulted in great pressure on local peasants.⁵² With the abolition of the forced labour regime and the publication of Decree No. 43 639 in 1961, the colonial authorities could no longer use force or make local chiefs impose cotton cultivation on their subjects. Thus, in 1963, the colonial authorities reported the great unwillingness of peasants to continue producing cotton.⁵³ The socio-economic pattern remained almost unchanged until the defeat of the colonial regime in the early 1970s.

Because of male labour migration, cotton fields remained the responsibility of women who suffered most from the vicissitudes of cotton policy. In addition they also had to produce food for their households. This was recognised by the administrator of Mossurize, who in 1959 pointed out that there were very few men in his district working

⁴⁹For more details on child and juvenile labour migration see below (chapter seven).

⁵⁰See AHM-FGDB, Cx 729: Nota No 300 da administração de Mossurize à delegação da comissão administrativa do Fundo do Algodão de Manica e Sofala, 17 April 1958; AHM-FGDB, Cx 724: Nota No.888 da circunscrição de Mossurize ao Secretário distrital de Manica e Sofala, 6 August 1959; AHM-ISANI Cx 2150: Nota do governo do distrito de Manica e Sofala ao director dos serviços de centralização e coordenação de informações, 14 September 1967.

⁵¹AHM-FGDB, Cx 725: Nota No.1203 do concelho de Manica ao secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 21, May 1962.

⁵²See AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da inspecção ordinária ao concelho de Manica - Acta da banja realizada na regedoria Dombe por António George Christova de Sousa Franklin, 2 January 1962.

⁵³See AHM-FGDB, Cx 724: Informação confidencial da secretaria distrital da administração de Manica e Sofala, 15 November 1963.

in the field. "It is almost exclusively women who work in the cotton and food fields".⁵⁴ In fact, women not only found the combination of cotton with food production very hard, but they also had to walk long distances carrying cotton on their shoulders or heads to market stations. Apart from the low prices they derived from their low quality cotton, they were often beaten by *capatazes* in the trading centres. After seeing other women being beaten, they often abandoned their sacks of cotton at trading centres without receiving their money they were so frightened. João de Deus remembers some of the episodes which occurred in southern Mossurize in the 1950s:

I also witnessed cultivators being beaten because they did not select or pack their cotton properly. Because men migrated to South Africa or Rhodesia, their wives suffered a lot. Although innocent, they were the ones punished. Once a woman left ten sacks of cotton without receiving her money because she feared beatings. This happened just when she saw other women being tormented or beaten by *capatazes*.⁵⁵

In fact, cotton trading centres were viewed by peasants as hell on earth. They served as centres where local administrators demonstrated their power. The local administrator, the representative of the JEAC, the police, African *capatazes* and other administrative authorities, including local chiefs whose chieftaincies very often served as marketing places, gathered there. The administrative authorities had to make sure that all able-bodied men paid tax and bought manufactured goods (blankets, rags, exercise books and pencils for school-children, and other things) brought by the Institute of Cereals or by the JEAC for cotton exchange. As João de Deus recalls:

They brought blankets to convince people of the importance of cotton production for the textile industry. However, those blankets were very small and of poor quality. They could not cover many children [sic]. They were third class. But *magaiças* [returned migrants] could bring good blankets and big boxes full of clothes and beautiful *capulanas* [pieces of cloth] for their wives.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See, AHM-FGDB, Cx 724: Nota confidencial da administração de Mossurize ao secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 19 May 1959.

⁵⁵ Interview with João de Deus, Tete, 13 April 1994. He also mentions that although in his region many men were polygamus, household labour force was always short. "There was a lot of work to do. Women had to concentrate more on food production."

⁵⁶ Ibid. The term *Magaiça* generally referred to male migrants to South African mines.

With the establishment of the textile industry in Chimoio in the 1950s, the administrative authorities in Manica province intensified the pressure on peasants to grow more cotton.⁵⁷ The result was the increasing use of child and juvenile labour, not only in households but also for the CNA. The conscription of boys and girls into cotton cultivation led to complaints by the missionaries because children and teenagers were abandoning school.⁵⁸ Sometimes, the mission schools had to close their classes during the peak cotton seasons.⁵⁹ As a result of the conscription of boys into forced labour contract for the CNA and other white settler enterprises, many teenagers fled to Southern Rhodesia, following the example of their fathers and uncles.⁶⁰

Although João de Deus had witnessed peasant hardships, his father's situation was relatively different. First, his father was a son of the local chief; second, he had been to school up to grade three (the maximum available in Mossurize in the 1950s); and third, he had been a migrant labourer in Southern Rhodesia where he developed carpentry skills. While working in Southern Rhodesia he brought home some donkeys and a kit of carpentry tools. With these skills and inputs, his father enjoyed the status of *agricultor* and could combine carpentry with growing food, breeding livestock, goats and donkeys, and cotton cultivation.⁶¹ Deus also added:

My father had large farms and cultivated cotton using ploughs pulled by donkeys. Donkeys were also used for driving carts and pulling water barrels. We hired two men who worked along with us in the cotton fields. My father also rented out donkeys to other agricultors. After selling cotton, my father used the money to enroll us at a mission station and to buy clothes and other things.⁶²

As in other parts of the territory, in Manica province, particularly in Dombe and Mossurize, cotton cultivation resulted in the development of an African farming sector with noticeable social differentiation. While ordinary *cultivadores* suffered the disruptive effects of forced cotton growing, some *agricultores*, not only those from chief

⁵⁷See below.

⁵⁸AHM-FGG, No.405: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1951. For more details see chapter seven.

⁵⁹See interview with priest Fernando Chaves, Manica city, 30 July 1996.

⁶⁰See interview with João de Deus, Tete, 13 April 1994.

⁶¹Ibidem.

⁶²See my interview with João de Deus, Tete, 13 April 1994.

lineages, managed to accumulate some wealth and therefore strengthen or even change their social status. Unlike in northern Mozambique where, according to Isaacman, chiefs benefited most from the cotton regime, in Manica and Mossurize their power seems to have been weakened by it.⁶³ Labour recruitment and land distribution were key in strengthening chiefs' power elsewhere in Mozambique. However, in southern Manica and Mossurize this worked the other way round. In fact, *ruralatos* and labour migration weakened the role played by chiefs in allocating land and controlling people.⁶⁴ With the abolition of forced contract labour and forced cotton cultivation the position of local chiefs in the administrative structure became precarious.

3. *Textáfrica* and textile industry in Manica

The establishment of the textile industry in Manica was a local response to the New State's approach to economic development in Portugal and the colonies after the World War II. In fact, the responses to new world market challenges prompted Portugal to introduce reforms in its industrial policy in the colonies. In the mid-1940s, large firms in Portugal made significant moves towards industrialisation in Angola and Mozambique.⁶⁵ With the possibility of exporting ginned cotton or textile products from the colonies at competitive prices, investment in the colonies became very attractive. This move was underpinned by the enactment of the Decree No. 33, 924 of 5 September 1944, which revoked the Decree 26, 509 of 11 April 1936 of *regime de condicionamento industrial*, by allowing colonies to establish processing factories, particularly textile industry. Important industrial reforms continued during the 1950s in order to boost cotton industry in the colonies.⁶⁶

⁶³For comparison, see Isaacman, *Cotton is the mother of poverty*, 1996, chapter eight.

⁶⁴In an interesting study on land tenure in Mozambique-Zimbabwe border, David Hughes argues that outmigration during Portuguese rule weakened African chiefs' power. D.Hughes, "Disputed territory and dependent people: Rethinking land tenure on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border", Department of Anthropology, University of California, Paper presented to the International Association for the study of common property meetings, (Berkeley, 5-8 June, 1996).

⁶⁵See Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire, 1825-1975*, chapter six.

⁶⁶Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, AOS/CO/UL-33 Pasta 1: Industrialização e condicionamento industrial no ultramar- Nota do Gabinete do Ministro do Ultramar

Although there was a strong metropolitan objection to competition from the colonies, the colonial state allowed the *Companhia do Fomento Colonial*, later *Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial (SOALPO)* to set up one cotton textile mill in Angola and Mozambique respectively.⁶⁷ The state also supported industrial initiatives by providing energy and transport facilities. In the case of Mozambique, the programme of hydro-electric power was launched in Manica province soon after the war and was a joint-venture between the state and the *SOALPO*. The enterprise was under the *Sociedade Hidro-eléctrica do Revué (SHER)*.⁶⁸ With this policy, Portugal paved the way for industrial expansion in central Mozambique. In the following decade, the region saw the establishment of other industries, such as corn grinding, vegetable oil processing, *Kenaf* and jute spinning and weaving, alongside cotton textiles.⁶⁹

In 1946, two engineers, João Pais de Aguiar and João Ribeiro of *SOALPO* had been sent to Manica province in search of a suitable place to set up a hydro-electric power plant to supply electricity for the textile factory. With the location of Revue falls near Chimoio city (or Vila Pery), the *SOALPO* bought 2,000ha of land from two white farmers (Fernandes and Bimble) in Chimoio to build its industry complex and other

sobre industrialização de territórios e condicionamento industrial; Manuel Gonçalves Monteiro, "A industrialização nas províncias ultramarinas portuguesas de África", *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, Ano XXIX, No.340 (October, 1953), 21-54; Jens Erik Torp, "Industrial planning and development in Mozambique: Preliminary considerations and their theoretical implications", in *Mozambique seminar proceedings*, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1978, 122-41.

⁶⁷The *Companhia do Fomento Colonial* was initially established in Angola in 1944 and was ran by the Félix family and with the Banco Português do Atlântico as a major share holder. See Clarence-Smith, *The third Portuguese empire*, 169; The *Sociedade algodoeira de Portugal (SOALPO)* was created on 15 November 1944 with initial capital of 100 thousand *contos* (one conto is equivalent to 1000 *escudos*).

⁶⁸The *SHER* was created on 1st July 1946. According to Manuel Magalhães, Marcelo Caetano and Oliveira Salazar were keen to strengthen the position of *SOALPO* and *SHER* in the region as parte of portuguesification of the territory which was followed by the nationalization of Beira port and railways in 1949.

⁶⁹See Gonçalves, "A industrialização nas províncias ultramarinas Portuguesas", 25-46; Rodrigues Júnior, *Moçambique: Terra de Portugal*, (Lisbon, 1965), 90-94. *Kenaf* was an important fibre for production of sacks.

social infra-structure.⁷⁰ The place was considered excellent as it had a good climate, high agricultural potential, and white settlement; in addition, most importantly it was crossed by the railway line and the international tar road linking Beira port to Umtali city of Southern Rhodesia and its geographical position offered good prospects for exploiting the regional market.

Although the factory was expected to start its activity in 1950, due to drought, financial problems and delays in importing building materials, it only began its full operation in 1954.⁷¹ In the meantime, in 1950, the SOALPO and the *Companhia de Fomento Colonial* of Angola merged into a single company, the *Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial, SARL*, with assets estimated at about 200 thousand *contos*. The enterprise was responsible for supplying textile products to Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese African colonies, and used *Textáfria* as its trade mark.⁷² In 1951, experimental (*unidade piloto*) cotton spinning consumed about 300 tons of raw cotton and supplied some cotton products to the local market.⁷³ Initially, unskilled workers were generally recruited in Angónia, Zambézia and Nampula through the local on one-year contracts. Semi-skilled workers were recruited in Manica and Sofala or were brought from Portugal.⁷⁴ In 1954, *Textáfria* had already settled about sixty families from Portugal.

In the second half of the 1950s, *Textáfria* was functioning at 60 per cent of its capacity and was employing about 1,200 African workers and 130 Europeans, mainly from Portugal.⁷⁵ It was also the aim of *Textáfria* to settle about three hundred Portuguese families and encourage others to join the Zónue and Sussundenga colonato. Some senior

⁷⁰See interview with the director of *Textáfria*, Manuel Magalhães, Chimoio, 26 January, 1998; *Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial, SARL, 1944-1969: 25 anos em Moçambique*, (Vila Pery, 1970).

⁷¹Almost all building materials were imported from foreign countries. Cement was imported from Belgium, steel from England and fibreglass from South Africa. The factory was inaugurated in 1954.

⁷²See *Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial*, 1970.

⁷³*Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial: Relatório, balanço e contas do conselho de administração, ano de 1951*, (Porto, 1952), 6.

⁷⁴Interview with Mr. Brito, Chimoio, 16 October 1996.

⁷⁵Júnior, *Moçambique*, 138-39.

staff invested their money in farming and brought relatives from Portugal to run business on their behalf.⁷⁶In 1956, the factory manufactured about 920 tons of cotton and increased its production of fibre and clothes. As in many textile factories in the world, in 1957, Textafrika employed about 300 child labourers (between 10 and 14 years) in the textile industry.⁷⁷

With the introduction of new equipment in 1958, Textafrika began to produce blankets.⁷⁸ Parallel to the industrial expansion and variety of products, the factory also employed more workers. Thus, in the early 1960s, Textafrika and SHER had both employed about 1,500 African workers and 170 Europeans.⁷⁹Although SOALPO was not directly involved in cotton cultivation, with the demand for more raw cotton, it increased pressure on local cotton-growers in Manica and Sofala provinces. As we have seen above, Dombe and Mossurize were the areas most affected by cotton cultivation in Manica. Moreover, SOALPO applied a labour tenant system and had about 8,000 families settled on its 2,000 ha. Those peasants included unskilled workers living in the compound with their wives who were supposed to grow foodstuffs such as maize, peanuts, beans and other green leaves. There was also an experimental cotton-field and livestock farming.⁸⁰

The establishment of Textáfrica had three main implications in central Mozambique. First, with the demand for raw cotton it exerted more pressure on cotton cultivators in Mossurize, Dombe and elsewhere in Sofala and Zambezia provinces; second, as part of a more general policy of *portuguesification* in the overseas territories, it played a pivotal role in white settlement, industrialisation and the development of infra-structure in central Mozambique in general and in Manica province in particular. Although other

⁷⁶See interview with Mr. Brito, Chimoio, 16 October 1996.

⁷⁷See Centro de documentação do Ministério do Trabalho: Nota No.4139/B/8 do Governo de Manica e Sofala ao Chefe dos Serviços dos Negócios Indígenas, José Diogo Ferreira Martins, 14 June 1957.

⁷⁸Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial: Relatório, balanço e contas do conselho de administração, ano de 1958, (Porto, 1959).

⁷⁹AHM-FGDB, Cx 793: Nota da Administração do concelho de Chimoio ao Secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 12 Fevereiro 1960; Júnior, Mozambique, 138.

⁸⁰"Breve resenha historica da Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial", in X Exposição Feira de Chimoio, 1969, (Vila Pery, 1970).

industries made their appearance in this period, Textafrika, Textil de Pungue and Moçambique Industrial, were the most important and helped enhance farming enterprises in Manica and Sofala provinces.⁸¹

The establishment of hydro-electric power was a revolutionary factor in the development of plantations and industries along the Beira-Umtali corridor and in Beira town itself. The SHER also supplied energy to the neighbouring Rhodesian city of Umtali;⁸² Finally, it contributed to the development of an industrial working class and urbanisation in Chimoio or Vila Pery. Textáfrika established a large modernised residential area for its workers with a big shopping centre (the first one in Mozambique), recreational facilities (big hall, swimming pool, courts of tennis, football stadium, and other sport facilities), health centres, nurseries, schools and a chapel which served both Africans and white workers and the neighbouring communities.⁸³

While in Manica-Macequece, Mavonde, Rotanda and Mavita, African peasants were entitled to cultivate maize and wheat as the main cash-crop; in Dombe and Mossurize, peasants were forced into cotton-growing in order to supply raw cotton to the Portuguese and the local textile industry. As in other areas bordering Southern Rhodesia, in Dombe and Mossurize, the cotton scheme was also imposed to prevent men from migrating to neighbouring countries of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. However, due to the low prices provided and the absence of favourable market facilities, peasants were hostile to cotton cultivation.

⁸¹See Rodrigues Júnior, Moçambique, 90-98; Rui Martins dos Santos, Uma contribuição para a análise da economia de Moçambique, (Lourenço Marques, 1959).

⁸²Apart from supplying electricity to SOALPO, in 1956 and 1957, the SHER began to supply electric power to Beira and Umtali cities respectively. For more details see, AHM-FGG, No. 587: Relatório e contas do Conselho de Administração da Sociedade Hidro-Eléctrica do Revue, SARL, 1957.

⁸³See, "Breve resenha histórica da Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial", in X Exposição Feira de Chimoio, 1969, (Vila Pery, 1970).

To overcome this situation, in the early 1950s, the CNA and the colonial administrative authorities introduced some incentives, such as new prices and the semi-mechanisation of agricultural methods through the provision of ploughs and tractors as well as transport facilities. Further, they planned to establish some social infra-structure including boreholes, stores, health centres and schools.

However, most of these projects remained theoretical until the late 1950s when they finally came into being. These rural development programs were designed in form of *ruralato* scheme or communities complexes. Two types of *ruralato* can be distinguished: one which developed mechanised agriculture, and another where peasants depended on rudimentary technology. Nevertheless, financial problems seem to have hampered these projects, leaving great part of Dombe and Mossurize without any significative change until the outbreak of the liberation struggle in the region in 1972.

The integration of African farmers into cotton schemes accelerated African social differentiation. In general, land for cotton cultivation was distributed to men. The colonial administration regarded women as men's assistants on the cotton fields. The women's agricultural role was mainly supposed to be food-crop production. Although very few African farmers hired wage labour, access to labour was basically through household networks and the co-operation of neighbours. In general, African farmers relied on the labour of their wives and children to farm.

With mechanisation and price incentives, a few African farmers invested their income in cotton farming. However, the price incentives were not enough to stimulate peasant cotton growth. Land fertility, labour input and technology also played an important role in household decisions to produce cotton. Cotton cultivation had many risks and the income generated from its production could not guarantee the subsistence of household members, let alone the satisfaction of other social needs and accumulation. Indeed, many peasants resisted cotton cultivation in favour of food-cropping. Most men preferred to join the labour market in neighbouring countries because that way they could earn more money to fulfill their social needs. Although some migrant labourers

invested in agricultural implements, because of the lack of transport facilities to access the market and the irregular household labour due to the migration of teenagers, the majority of peasants were unlikely to become rich farmers.

The high prevalence of male migration not only jeopardized the normal functioning of their household agriculture, but also resulted in an increased workload on women. Women left behind played an important role in the household subsistence. Thus, dependent on the circumstances, women were found either in a vulnerable or in a powerful position in the African household. Migrant's wives with access to remittances or agricultural implements brought by their husbands were likely to hire labour or to organise work-party and obtain high levels of agricultural production.

With the establishment of the textile industry in Manica pressure on peasants to grow cotton and the employment of child and juvenile labour, increased. Either boys or girls were conscripted as juvenile labour into cotton cultivation in the household or for CAN, and this prejudiced their education. This situation resulted in their migration to Southern Rhodesia looking for education facilities or to relatively less deplorable wage labour conditions. Labour migration and its socio-economic implications is discussed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 7:

CHILD AND YOUTH LABOUR MIGRATION TO SOUTHERN RHODESIA.

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to discuss child and youth labour in central Mozambique and to analyse the factors behind their migration to colonial Zimbabwe as wage labourers in farms, plantations and mines. Although children were also employed in the household and on mission farms, this chapter deals particularly with the forced contract employment of children on settler farms, and how it influenced child migration to Rhodesia during the 1930s and 1960s. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first is concerned with the importance of child and youth labour in household economy. Secondly, it examines the incorporation of children into wage farm labour in colonial economy in Manica province. Thirdly, it explores missionary concerns about child labour and its influence on missionary education. Finally it considers the ways in which children and youths have resisted local forced labour and have migrated to Southern Rhodesia in search of education and work.

Recent research has stressed the need to understand child labour as an important source of cheap labour in the colonial economy and as a measure of social and economic changes in African communities.¹ Yet very few studies have addressed this issue in southern Africa as a whole, or in Mozambique in particular.² This chapter attempts to explain this process by looking at the colonial context in central Mozambique, especially in Manica and Mossurize districts. It also allows African

¹In this study I am also informed by works conducted in other regions such as: Nick Van Hear, "Child labour and the development of capitalist agriculture in Ghana", Development and Change, vol 13, 4 (1982), 499-513; Zahidé Machado Neto, "Children and adolescents in Brazil: Work, poverty, starvation", Development and Change, 13, 4 (1982), 527-36; Diane Elson, "The differentiation of children's labour in the capitalist labour market", Development and Change, 13, 4 (1982), 479-496.

²T.O. Ranger has pioneered the understanding of this issue in Zimbabwean social history. See, Ranger, "Literature and political economy: Arthur Shearly Cripps and the Makoni Labour Crisis of 1911", Journal of Southern African Studies [JSAS], 9,1, (1983), 33-53, and his book Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in

voices, particularly of those who were child workers in the 1940-1960s, to speak for themselves as they are silent in written records. The views of missionaries, school-teachers, Chiefs and settler farmers are also very important.

William Beinart has written an outstanding study of migrants and child labour in Natal, and has shown how it affected the social and economic dynamic of African household in Transkei.³ Malawian scholars have also recently been interested in child labour studies in particular on tobacco farms,⁴ while in Zimbabwe, recent works by Pamela Reynolds, Beverly Grier and Peter Mayavo have continued the research pioneered by Terence Ranger in 1983.⁵ However studies of child labour and its relationship to mission education are very sketchy. In addition, a new study by Peter Mayavo addresses issues related to the interaction between child farm labour and education in Zimbabwe.⁶

In 1985, David Hedges's pioneering research on Mozambique emphasized labour policy and analysed the impact of colonial education policy on African people and the role of missionary institutions, particularly the Catholic Church.⁷ Nevertheless, the relationship between missions, education, employment, child labour and

Zimbabwe, (London, James Currey, 1985), especially chapter two, are instructive for studies on the role played by children.

³William Beinart, "Transkeian migrant workers and youth labour on the Natal Sugar Estates 1918-1948", Journal of African History, 32 (1991), 41-63. See also Stefan Schirmer, "Migrations, land and labour tenants in Mpumalanga, 1940-1950", African Studies, 55, 1, (1996), 111-148.

⁴See C. Wiseman Chilwa, "Child and youth labour on the Nyasaland plantations, 1890-1953", JSAS, 19, 4 (1993), 662-680.

⁵Pamela Reynolds, Dance civet cat: Child labour in the Zambezi valley (London, Zed Books Ltd, 1991); Beverly Grier, "Invisible hands: The political economy of child labour in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1930", JSAS, 20,1, (1994), 27- 52; Peter Mayavo, "The 'Invisible' victims: Child labour on Gatooma's cotton plantations, 1890-1980", Unpublished MA dissertation, (University of Zimbabwe, 1996), 1-102.

⁶Ranger, "Literature and political economy", passim; Peter Mayavo, "The 'Invisible' victims", passim.

⁷D. Hedges, "Educação, Missões e a Ideologia Política de Assimilação, 1930-1961", Cadernos de História (Journal of the History Department), 1, (Maputo, UEM, 1985), 7-18.

migration remains largely unexplored.⁸ Thus far most of the literature has concentrated either on southern Mozambique or has remained very general. In the case of central Mozambique, even the study of church-state relations has been ignored.

An assessment of missionary sources is of great importance for understanding rural societies, particularly those surrounding mission stations. In a recent article, Justin Willis claims that in many areas missionary sources provide the earliest comprehensive written records, and this has led historians studying the interaction between missions and African societies to rely on them. Willis points out that the study of mission stations as institutions offers useful insights into the societies among which they were established, because missionary writings on the way in which people were taken into the mission institution provide, in passing, much evidence on the nature of social relations in local society.⁹

1. Household, economy and child labour in Manica.

By and large the importance of child and youth labour in the homestead or household economy has been stressed in previous chapters. As in other African societies, in Manica child labour was (and still is) of vital importance and played an important role in social relationships. Child labour was also regarded as an important '*rite de passage*' from childhood to adulthood life. Thus, child labour particularly in pre-capitalist society was viewed as a learning process and accumulation of practical knowledge of the conventions drawn upon in the

⁸Some very sketchy references on child and youth labour in southern and northern Mozambique are addressed respectively by Jeanne Penvenne, "A history of African Labor in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, 1877 to 1950", Ph.D., Boston, 1982, chapter nine; and A. Isaacman, *Cotton is the mother of poverty*, 1996, chapters seven and nine.

⁹J. Willis, "The Nature of a Mission Community: The Universities' Mission Central Africa in Bonde", *Past and Present*, 140, (August, 1993), 127-143: 127, 128.



production and reproduction of social interactions.¹⁰ According to Beinart, in Mpondo society

Herding for boys involved education about the natural world, about custom, and about fighting skills as well as the formation of friendship networks. The pace of work was also shaped by the social practices of the youth: there was time for enjoyment. Work was part of a domestic environment supervised by family members and not an 'impersonal' wage relationship.¹¹

This applies to Manica society too. In Manica boys and girls occupied an important position within the local division of labour and learned about real life by carrying out domestic or productive tasks side by side with their parents within the household or homestead. Indeed, peasant child labour in African society "was embedded in broader kin relationships and in an ethic which made it part of the socializing processes."¹²

The involvement of children and juveniles in peasant labour varied according to the degree of rural stratification. Children's work also varied with ecological conditions, with the season, with the child's sex and with the size and relative wealth of the homestead or household. With the expansion of the colonial market economy and the spread of missionary schools in rural areas the workload reserved for children seems to have undergone more variations. As Reynolds points out "the workload expected of any particular child varies across time (age, season, family's domestic cycle) and in relation to current social norms and economic realities."¹³

¹⁰This point is also explored in Pamela Reynolds, Dance civet cat: Child labour in the Zambezi valley (London, Zed Books Ltd, 1991), introduction, xxviii.

¹¹W.Beinart, "Transkeian migrant workers and youth labour on the Natal Sugar Estates, 1918-1948", in Alan H. Jeeves & Jonathan Crush (eds.), White farms, black labor: The state and agrarian change in Southern Africa, 1910-1950, (Portsmouth, 1997), 147-171:164.

¹²Ibid. However it is important to underline that the crucial difference between African (and developing countries in general) and European (or developed) countries is the degree of economic and technical development.

¹³Reynolds, Dance civet cat, Introduction, xxix.

However it is important to note that in African rural society, but not only, the concept of the child differs from the modern concept of childhood or youth.¹⁴ In those societies girls and boys of twelve or thirteen years of age assumed and performed tasks reserved for adults in a modern society. Even girls under thirteen could be married and assume reproductive functions.¹⁵ Boys could also get married at fourteen or sixteen depending on their physical development. In these circumstances teenagers entered adulthood life.

As described in previous chapters, agriculture, the keeping of livestock and the extraction of alluvial gold constituted the main economic activities of homesteads in Manica. Traditionally, children and young boys farmed and herded livestock for their parents from an early age. Boys and girls were also important supplements of peasant labour during peak seasons, especially for weeding and harvesting, in addition to doing the more common work of chasing baboons and birds from the fields. Boys fished and hunted and extracted alluvial gold in the Revue River.

Herding was a very tough activity and required some skills. Herdboys had to develop a knowledge of the local environment, and notions of time, space and distance. What was most difficult was preventing herds from entering fields and destroying crops. Herders who failed to do this would suffer severe punishment from the respective owners or their parents. Apart from the above tasks, boys also helped their fathers in building houses and granaries. Girls worked side by side with their mothers in farming and helped them in such domestic tasks as processing food, fetching water and collecting firewood as well as rearing young relatives. The role of children was so important that households without child labour were rarely economically viable.

With the establishment of the Mozambique Company in the last decade of the nineteenth century, African communities were gradually integrated into the colonial

¹⁴However it is worth recognise that even in capitalist societies the socio-economic role of children depends on many factors, particularly the family's socio-economic status.

capitalist economy either as wage labourers or as foodstuffs suppliers to white settler enterprises. The development of a market economy implied new patterns of social relations including the integration of child labour into the colonial economy. Subsistence production, the need for cash to pay taxes and the increasing labour demand from colonial economy generally resulted in great pressure on women and children as their husbands or fathers were forced into the labour market or deserted to neighbouring countries.

The emergence of African cash crop farming meant that additional labour had to be drawn from outside the household or homestead. Thus, children and youths were often hired to work for these farmers in gardens or as headcarriers of surplus crops to the market either in Manica or across the border in Southern Rhodesia. In fact, in addition to herding and chasing baboons and birds from the fields, boys carried crops for trading in Penhalonga and Umtali in Southern Rhodesia. Girls were not only important sources of accumulation through *shuma* transactions but also played important role in agriculture. Thus, the more children a household had the better as they constituted a guarantee of labour.¹⁶

The expansion of African commercial farming after the great depression of 1930s and during the 1940s in Manica district increased the integration of children into peasant labour. The following testimonies describe personal experience of ex-child labourers which may well have applied to very many children in Manica and elsewhere in central Mozambique:

In the 1930s I helped my parents in maize cropping in Machipanda. In 1935 when I was about ten years old I carried baskets of tomatoes and strawberries to Umtali for trading. I used to go there everyday during harvest seasons. There was no control in the border between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. Macequece was a small town with about fifteen white

¹⁵Very often parents received *shuma* for marriage transactions of their daughters of five or six years old.

¹⁶My interviews in Manica emphasised on the importance of having many children for producing much crops.

households, the administration, mines, hospital and military barracks. There were no trading facilities before 1948.¹⁷

My father Chipaumire was a chief [*iche*] in Rotanda. He was a good farmer and produced wheat, maize, sorghum, peanuts, hemp, cane and banana. He also had some head of cattle. In the 1940s, when I was younger I helped my parents in cultivating vegetables, especially *madumbe* [yam] and chasing birds from the wheat fields.¹⁸

I helped my father in the garden. I also did wage labour for a local African farmer, chasing birds from his wheat fields. I worked there for two years. We were three children and earned about 2.5 shillings monthly. Mr. Kuchinga Mulima was a very rich farmer and used ox-drawn ploughs in cultivating his farms. He also had some stores before the arrival of Portuguese [sic] in the 1940s [before the cessation of the Mozambique Company administration]. Mr. Mulima was the richest African farmer in Rotanda.¹⁹

In the 1950s other two children and I worked for Mr. Nengomacha as headcarriers. We carried full baskets of strawberries on our heads to Umtali city where we sold them to white houses. We worked for a week and made our journey to Umtali twice: on Tuesdays and Fridays. On each journey we spent a day walking up and down knocking every white's door until we sold everything. For each basket we got about two pounds. After the journey we were paid three shillings. Mr. Nengomacha was very rich. He could sell about twenty to thirty baskets of strawberries.²⁰

During the colonial period child labour became a common practice elsewhere in central Mozambique. Almost all my interviewees had for different reasons experienced child or youth wage labour. Others, like João de Deus or Agostinho dos Muchangos' s children, whose social conditions were relatively better, also helped their parents in the fields.²¹ Even the children of local chiefs, whether *mambo* or *iche* also worked side by side with their parents or in some cases for their neighbours. Chief Chirara remembers quite well his childhood in the 1920s and 1930s as a peasant labourer in his homestead and as wage labourer and pupil in Southern Rhodesia. He also recalls the daily life he shared with his age mates:

¹⁷Interview with Silvestre Chabai, Manica city, 19 April 1993.

¹⁸Interview with chief (*Iche*) Solomon Chipaumire, Rotanda, 10 September 1996.

¹⁹Interview with Muzuatine Nechire, Rotanda, 10 September 1996.

²⁰Interview with Sossai Pandai, Jecua village, 12 July 1996.

In general many children were involved in selling local crops and fruit in Zimbabwe. They carried full baskets of products on their shoulders or heads and walked across the border through Mavonde, Penhalonga and Machipanda. The main products were tomatoes, banana, strawberries, ginger, garlic and cabbages.²²

With the expansion of African peasant farming child labour took preference over school and large numbers of young boys and girls abandoned school from the first grade.²³ The employment of children increased absenteeism which was aggravated by migration and the attraction of foreign mission stations in Manicaland in Southern Rhodesia. In fact, although missionaries congratulated Portuguese authorities for fostering African commercial agriculture during the 1940s and 1950s, they feared low attendance at mission schools because parents would resist releasing their children from farm labour.²⁴

The question of education and child labour in Manica was very complex.²⁵ Although in the 1940s and 1950s some parents valued education and frequently encouraged their children to go to school, some 'traditionalists' were still concerned about the damaging effects that education would have on the homestead and social relations.²⁶ The former regarded education as an important asset that would provide their children with better job opportunities and relatively better life in the future.²⁷ The

²¹See chapters five and six.

²²Interview with Benedito Chirara, Manica, Chinhambudzi village, 3 August 1996.

²³See Carlos de Azeredo, "Missão de Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Macequece" (mimeo), 1940, 1-54:34. However causes for disinterest of some children to go to school beyond first grade seems to have been the result of the unattractive curricula designed for rural schools.

²⁴Missão de Jécua - Relatório anual da Missão de Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Macequece, by Superior priest Armando Vaz da Mota, 1952.

²⁵See my seminar paper, J.das Neves, "The state, missionary education, child labour and migration in Manica, 1930-1960", African History Seminar, SOAS, 19 February 1997, 1-17.

²⁶See my interview with former school teacher Silvestre Chabai, Manica city 19 April 1993.

²⁷ See below. On the role of protestant missions see also J.das Neves, "A American Board Mission e os desafios do protestantismo em Manica e Sofala (Moçambique), c.1900-1950", paper presented at Deuxièmes Journées D' Études de Lusotopie: Protestantismes en Lusophones, (Instituto Franco-Português) Lisbon, 12-14 December, 1997, 1-16.

latter, however, saw education as a threat not only to their sources of labour, but also to the rural way of life and customary values. For example, the present bishop of Beira Dom Jaime Gonçalves remembers that when he was younger, African families in his village Machanga and in Mossurize and Dombe were reluctant to send their daughters to school because women were regarded as guardians of culture and local tradition.²⁸

In fact, one of the conflicts between African headmen and Catholic missionaries was related to the practice of *lobolo* or *shuma* (bridewealth) and polygamy amongst African people. Polygamy and *shuma* were two important aspects of the socio-economic organisation of households in Manica, and gave chiefs control over marriage ceremonies.²⁹

Moreover, with the growing number of white settler farms conflicts over child labour were exacerbated. White farmers were less interested in African education because they wanted to draw cheap child and youth labour from local households. As the following sections show, in the 1940s and 1950s forced child labour on white farms became a cause of conflict between missionaries, white settlers and African households. Muchangos, a former tractor-driver and catechist at Jécua Mission Station, remembers the extent of these conflicts:

Many children particularly adolescents, left school before the end of the term. There were many factors behind this situation, namely wage employment, family farms and forced contract labour. Young boys were harassed on their way to school and conscripted to join the 'contract'. Farmers from this area [Manica district] did not respect the age limits as defined in the labour legislation. This situation worsened because of the connivance attitude of the administration. Because of constant raids by police [*sipaio*] many young boys ran away to Rhodesia.³⁰

²⁸See my interview with bishop Dom Jaime Gonçalves, Beira, 15 August 1996. Similar situations in Mavonde were reported by priest F. Chaves. See interview in Manica city, 30 July 1996.

²⁹ See Luis F. dos Santos, "O 'Lobolo' à face do Decreto No. 35.461", In Boletim Geral das Colónias, XXII, No. 254-255 (Lisbon, August, 1946), 45-49.

³⁰See my interview with A.Cufa dos Muchangos, Manica, Jécua village, 27 July 1996.

2. Colonial economy and child labour in Manica.

The analysis of forced child labour in central Mozambique has to be correlated with an understanding of labour policy and the dynamic of the colonial economy more generally. Although the Mozambique Company had exempted women and children under fourteen years from forced contract labour in 1907, the increasing labour demand from white settler farmers in the 1910s forced the administrative authorities to impose child labour, especially for boys from twelve years old in 1915.³¹ The imposition of child labour was in response to the increasing shortage of adult labour which was aggravated by the open competition between the farming sector and mining enterprises quite apart from the constant attraction by *runners* from neighbouring countries.³²

However, the labour regulation of 1915 was revoked in 1928 with the enactment of the new apparently more liberal labour code under the Salazar regime which was applied in Mozambique in 1930. Under this legislation it was forbidden to contract women, anyone over sixty and boys under eighteen years old.³³ Nevertheless, this provision was not uniformly and consistently imposed, given the administrative weakness or its leniency. Under these circumstances it seems that young boys and eventually girls were still employed by local white enterprises in Manica in direct conflict with local households.

Despite the labour legislation which was amended in 1942 and 1947 which maintained the prohibition of any recruitment of children and teenagers under eighteen years of age, very often settler farmers recruited them in order to meet their

³¹See Regulamento geral do trabalho indígena no território da Companhia de Moçambique enacted in 1907 and Circular No. 10/618/1915. See also above (chapter two).

³²For more details on labour disputes in the 1910s see, Cruz, "História da formação da classe trabalhadora", chapter three.

³³See art. 92 of *Regulamento do Trabalho Indígena* of 1930. For more details on the impact of the 1930's labour regulation see chapter three.

labour needs.³⁴ As discussed in chapters three and four, from 1944 some peasants registered as master farmers and the *assimilados* were exempted from forced contract labour. Given this picture white farmers especially in Manica, Chimoio, Rotanda and the Buzi sugar plantations, complained about a labour shortage. To overcome this situation, in addition to recruiting outside the region they relied on child labourers. Thus the continuous shortage of adult labourers who migrated to neighbouring British colonies from central Mozambique, was a major reason for the conscription of child and juvenile labour on settler farms during the period under discussion.³⁵

In 1946, a report of administrative inspection in Manica and Mossurize districts, revealed that about twenty children aged between thirteen and fifteen were employed as farm labour by the *Companhia de Moçambique-Herdade Zambuzi*. They worked in orchards and on maize farms as well as carrying baskets of fruits and fresh vegetables for sale in Umtali city. They earned about 30\$00 *esc.*, the half adult monthly wage.³⁶

Although some youths engaged in wage employment voluntarily in order to supplement their family income with cash-earnings, particularly during bad harvests (because of drought, locust and famine), in general children and juveniles were forced to engage in wage labour.³⁷ Cotton, wheat and maize were the principal crops in which child labour was employed in Manica. On these farms apart from hoeing

³⁴ For an overview on the impact of the amendment of labour regulations in the 1940s, particularly on the employment of children, youths and women, see Penvenne, "A history of African labour in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, 1877-1950", chapter nine.

³⁵ In 1948 the emigration of able bodied African male comprised 61 per cent of local labour sources in Mossurize, and 32 per cent in Manica district. See AHM - FNI Cx 153: Conselho de governadores da colónia de Moçambique - Actas das sessões, 1948.

³⁶ AHM-FGG, No. 219: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária às circunscrições de Manica, Mossurize, 1946.

³⁷ In general children were employed for three months, though juveniles could be engaged for six months like adults. Children or juveniles were sometimes forced into wage labour in replacement of their deserted fathers. See interview with Chief Kupenya, Sussundenga village, 16 June 1994.

children were particularly engaged in herding, watching birds and baboons, and carrying crops from the field to the granaries. Aniva Alferes, who had been a youth labourer in 1948, remembers that:

When I was sixteen years old I was forced into contract wage labour at white maize farm in Vanduzi. I went on contract twice before I began to pay tax [eighteen years]. After the contract we were forced to work a week for the administration before receiving our salaries [deferred pay].³⁸

As economic activity increased in central Mozambique in the 1950s many settler farmers experienced a serious labour shortage. As a result, children and juveniles were recruited intensively and were particularly vulnerable as they often had to replace their fathers or other relatives who had deserted contract labour. Children, especially boys from twelve years old or even less, were removed from their villages or taken from the mission schools to work on white farms or in the local administration. The following testimonies from former child-workers record such phenomena in the 1950s in Manica district:

Young boys were often caught on the roads or local paths by *sipaio* on their way to school. One day, on the way to Jecua Mission School, fifteen boys were caught by *sipaio*. Five of them, myself included, ran away. A big rope was tied around the waists of those who could not run. Then they were conducted to the local administration and road construction sites. The *sipaio* held a big whip and threatened anyone who tried to escape.³⁹

During the colonial period we did not have peace. We were always threatened by Portuguese authorities who forced us to work on white farms. Although we had our fathers we were frightened and always hiding in the bush. Because of this situation we preferred to go to Zimbabwe and to work there.⁴⁰

In 1951, when I was twelve, I and three friends went to Zimbabwe [Rhodesia] running away from forced contract labour on the white farms. If we joined farm labour [in Rotanda] we could not attend school. So we ran away to Rhodesia where, apart from working on farms with better wages, we could attend night school.⁴¹

³⁸Interview in Mutare, Sakubva township, 27 October 1996.

³⁹Interview with Simão Ruvai, Manica, Mundonguara village, 22 July 1996.

⁴⁰Interview with Muzuatine Nechire, Rotanda 10 September 1996.

⁴¹Interview with John Combone, Rotanda, 10 September 1996.

Although under the tenant system which was practiced in the main fertile areas child labour was relatively accessible for settlers, very often they had to turn to the local administration or mission stations to force school children to work for them, particularly during the weeding and harvest season. This situation was recognised by the priest, F.Chaves, who was the Superior of Dombe Mission Station in the 1950s:

In Dombe, children, boys and girls, were very often involved in cotton cultivation not only with their parents but also for the *Companhia Nacional Algodoeira*, particularly harvest and during the rainy season. Sometimes it was better to stop classes in that period.⁴²

The harsh effects of the conscripting of children and juveniles into cotton cultivation have also been revealed by Isaacman in his study on northern Mozambique:

Girls as young as fifteen are taken and some are made to submit sexually to those in charge. They work under a black foreman who uses a stick. They begin work at six, stop for an hour at noon and work until sunset. There are some miscarriages from the heavy work.⁴³

Mr. Lourenço, who was a school teacher in the 1950s in Penhalonga, Zónue, Jécua and Rotanda villages, remembers vividly the deplorable effects of forced child labour on mission school attendance:

The farmers combined with the administration to catch school boys from the mission schools. If necessary the administrator ordered the interruption of the class in order to supply farms with child labour. Expressions like this were frequent: 'now it is the time of birds, do not oblige children to go to school.'⁴⁴

As a result of this situation, many children did not go to school because they feared forced contract labour. In addition, as many rural households did not see any advantage in sending their children to the Catholic mission schools, they kept them

⁴²Interview in Manica city, 30 July 1996.

⁴³A. Isaacman, *Cotton is the mother of poverty*, 1996, 24.

at home to help with subsistence production.⁴⁵ In Manica, young boys who did not go to school were considered vagrants or lazy, and were forced by missionaries and administrative authorities to join either mission farms or contract labour on settlers farms, earning half of the adult wage. In defiance of the labour regulations, even the local administration tolerated the wage employment of adolescents (14-18 years). The annual report of Mavita administration recorded 305 such juvenile workers in 1952, while on 15 May, 1953 the Department of Native Affairs issued a circular which legalized child labour as apprenticeship in industry.⁴⁶

Moreover many children, particularly from Mossurize, were increasingly conscripted to work on farms, and public works for the Buzi Sugar Company. This practice was justified as necessary in order to prevent children from migrating to Southern Rhodesia. Special meetings were then organized by local administrator of Mossurize with the *Grémio*, the employers in Chimoio and Manica, and with local communities to persuade parents to allow their children to contract to local public works and settler farms in Manica, Vila Pery and Buzi Company instead of letting them migrate to Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁷ In his diary for September 1953, the administrator of Mossurize acknowledged that almost all local youths were working in the neighbouring tea plantations and farms at Chipinga and Melsetter in Rhodesia while the majority of adult men were migrating to the Tansvaal. He also added that those boys were looking for money to buy clothes as they were almost naked.⁴⁸

⁴⁴Interview in Manica, Jécua village, 8 August 1996.

⁴⁵William Beinart explores this kind of conflict between the household economy and education in his book, The Political Economy of Pondoland, 1890-1930 (Cambridge, CUP, 1982), especially chapter four. My informants also regarded mission schools as places where their daughters could become prostitutes. See collective interview in Jécua village, 12 July 1996.

⁴⁶See CEM-AM: Relatório anual do posto administrativo de Mavita, 1952, by Joaquim António Rebelo (Acting Secretary).

⁴⁷See AHM-FGDB, Cx 216: Processo A/42 - Relatórios e diários de serviço da administração de Mossurize, 1943-1959.

⁴⁸See AHM-FACC, Cx 244: Cópia da Nota No. 107/B/10 da administração da circunscrição de Mossurize ao director da administração civil de Manica e Sofala, 10 February 1954, by Renato da Silva Guerra; The local administrator also blamed their parents because they only took care of their daughters from who they expected to get £25 or £30 from *shuma* transactions. See AHM-FGDB, Cx 216: Processo

However the main cause of labour migration was the lack of economic local enterprises, or any infra-structure such as roads, bridges, schools and health networks. In fact, as in previous chapters, Mossurize lagged behind the regional economic dynamic and was regarded as a labour reserve.

Apparently some parents, particularly in Machaze village, agreed to persuade their children to contract for work in Buzi, Vila Pery or Vila de Manica. As a result, between September and October 1954, thirteen boys under thirteen years old were contracted by the Buzi Sugar Company.⁴⁹ Moreover, in March that year three timber companies, namely Luso-Industrial Comercial Agrícola, Carlos Braunstein and John Souglides from Chimoio, had already recruited thirty children between twelve and fifteen years and 55 juveniles between fourteen and eighteen years old.⁵⁰ In 1955, about two hundred children were conscripted to join public work in Mossurize.⁵¹ In the same year, the *Grémio* labour agency recruited about 154 teenagers for employment in white farms in Manica and Chimoio.⁵²

With the shortage of adult labour generally aggravated by migration to Southern Rhodesia and Transvaal, settler farms resorted to child and youth labour. Children particularly from Mossurize were contracted to work outside their district. In 1956 and 1957, about 300 children were recruited from Mossurize for work in Manica, Chimoio and Buzi sugar plantations.⁵³ Although children and youth were mainly employed as farm labour, there were some who took advantage of wage employment in textile industry in Chimoio. Thus, in 1957, about 300 children

A/42 - Relatórios e diários de serviço da administração de Mossurize, September 1953.

⁴⁹AHM-FGDB, Cx 216: Processo A/30 - Relatórios e diários de serviço da administração da circunscrição do Mossurize, 1954.

⁵⁰AHM-FACC, Cx 244: Nota No. 762/B/10 do Chefe da circunscrição de Mossurize para o director de administração civil de Manica e Sofala, 10 March 1954, by Júlio dos Santos Peixe.

⁵¹AHM-FGDB, Cx 216: Processo A/30 - Relatórios e diários de serviço da administração da circunscrição do Mossurize, 1954 and 1955.

⁵²AHM-FACC, Cx 243: Mapa do movimento de mão-de-obra de mês de Fevereiro de 1955 do Grémio dos produtores de cereais do distrito da Beira.

between 10 and 14 years from Gondola were reported being employed *Textáfrica* factory in Chimoio.⁵⁴

However, children working on the Buzi sugar plantations were exposed to many accidents. For example, on 30 November 1957 the administrator of Mossurize reported that many children were returning from the Buzi sugar plantations with sores and had to be transferred to Spungabera hospital for treatment.⁵⁵ Apart from those wounds, children and juveniles working either at Buzi or elsewhere for white farmers were exposed to hazardous conditions of work, such as long labour journeys, accidents, punishment and poor accommodation, as well as poor quality and quantity of food. Physical health hazards, whipping, malnutrition and insanitary living conditions may have contributed to their vulnerability to sickness and postural deformity.⁵⁶

Because of harsh work conditions and low wages in Mozambique many children and youths still preferred to cross the border to Rhodesia where according to Pfumai Chali they could get good food, including breakfast, bread and meat, and could buy decent clothes.⁵⁷ Further, children working in Rhodesia wished to combine their employment with education either on the tea estates or in night schools. This tendency resulted in low attendance in local mission schools in Manica and brought missionary complaints against the Portuguese administration. In fact, many children involved in forced wage labour in Manica hardly attended school. Those who did not migrate across the border were generally more deprived of education facilities than their age mates.

⁵³AHM-FGDB, Cx 216: Processo A/30 - Relatórios e diários de serviço da administração da circunscrição do Mossurize, 1956 and 1957.

⁵⁴Ministério do Trabalho - Centro de documentação e informação: Nota No. 4139/B/8 do governo de Manica e Sofala ao chefe dos Serviços dos Negócios Indígenas, 14 June 1957, by José Diogo Ferreira Martins.

⁵⁵AHM-FGDB, Cx 216: Processo A/30 - Relatórios e diários de serviço da administração da circunscrição do Mossurize, 1957.

⁵⁶Further research is required for understanding health implications on child labourers.

(Mossurize) and many converts throughout the Manica and Sofala territory.⁶¹ In the 1920s three other Protestant (Anglican and American) schools were set up in Mavita, Penhalonga and Machipanda.⁶² The strategy was to set up a mission station at Mossurize in 1939/40, and rural schools in the areas where the Rhodesian Protestant missions had great influence. In Manica, the Catholic mission originally established in Macequece was transferred to Jécua (about 8km from Mutare in Rhodesia). However the mission only started a boarding school in 1943. For the missionaries a boarding school was very important because people wanted education not only to learn to read and write, but also to acquire occupational skills and to achieve this they often migrated to Rhodesia and enrolled at Protestant mission schools. The boarding school was seen as essential in preventing children from migrating to Southern Rhodesia.⁶³

From the 1940s the Jécua Mission Station (Manica) became the central point of Catholic expansion against Protestant influence along the border. At the same time, Saint Leonardo Mission Station in Mossurize opened rural schools in the main chieftaincies. The Catholic missionaries and the state tried to commit local chiefs to the Catholic enterprise. They believed chiefs would be useful in attracting or compelling their people to adopt Catholicism, and would divert them from the influence of Protestant ideas. Although rural schools were opened and the mission station in Mossurize provided 'rudimentary' occupational training, it seems they were established more to oppose the branches of the Protestant American Board of Mount Selinda (Melsetter) than to improve the quality of African education. In fact, Franciscan missionaries functioned as a "fire brigade" against foreign missions throughout the territory.⁶⁴ My informants in Rotanda, Mavonde and Manica villages

⁶¹NAZ-UN3/20/1/12/6: First annual report of Gogoyo mission station.

⁶²See, José M. da Cruz (ed), "Para a história das Missões Franciscanas: Missão de Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Macequece" in *Missão Africana*, No. 418, IX, (Beira, 2 May 1940), 1-6; "Missões Franciscanas de Moçambique", in *Missões Franciscanas*, No.3, (Braga, August, 1938), 1.

⁶³See AHM, FGG, No.120: Relatório anual das actividades missionárias, Diocese da Beira, by Archbishop A. Teodósio, Lourenço Marques, 1941.

⁶⁴Ibid.

3. Mission stations, child labour and missionary concerns.

In Manica, the presence of Christians and their impact on African chieftaincies goes back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and began with the Portuguese priest Dom Gonçalo da Silveira. However, it was only in 1898 that the Catholic mission took firm root there with the establishment of the Franciscan Order. Missions in Manica were set up on the principle of self-support rather than state subsidy until the 1930s when the Mozambique Company realized the need to improve the quality of the African labour in particular in basic agricultural skills, carpentry, and metalworking. This need, and perhaps also because of fear of the increasing influence of the Protestant missions in nearby Rhodesia, the Company and the Catholic Mission Board in Beira signed an Agreement in September 1930.⁵⁸ Thus, the Mozambique Company tried to foster the establishment of professional schools in Chimoio, Manica and Mossurize. Although rural schools were expanded throughout the territory, lack of staff hindered the Franciscans in their task.

According to Lopes, in the early 1930s the Amatongas Mission Station (Chimoio) was considered very weak and unable to attract African people, especially children, to attend the rural schools of the Catholic Church.⁵⁹ Although he does not discuss the reasons for this situation, it seems that the poor standard of education provided in rural schools and the recruitment of child labour for settler farmers in Chimoio were the main reasons for their disinterest.⁶⁰

Because of the intense activity of Protestant missions in Manica and Mossurize, the Franciscan missionaries turned their attention to this region. In fact, from 1916 the American Board of Commission for Foreign Missions established a branch at Gogoi

⁵⁷See interview in Rotanda, 9 September 1996.

⁵⁸See F.Lopes, Missões Franciscanas em Moçambique, 1898-1970, Braga, 1972, 351; M.A.Costa, Do Zambeze ao paralelo 22°: Monografia do Território de Manica e Sofala sob a administração da Companhia de Moçambique, 1940, 162.

⁵⁹F.Lopes, Missões Franciscanas em Moçambique, 351, 359.

⁶⁰See Carlos de Azeredo, "Missão de Nossa Senhora do Rosário de Macequece" (mimeo), 1940, 1-54.

earned in other services with similar or even inferior qualifications. The Bishop of Beira, Soares de Resende raised the same problem in 1943:

I would like to see our budget increased to such an extent [he said] that it will allow us to solve the problem of native education, especially that of providing fair salaries for school-teachers...Otherwise the best teachers will leave the schools and join companies or civil work which provide better pay.⁶⁸

Quite apart from these financial problems, in Manica and Mossurize, the people also resisted conversion to Catholicism. In addition, the threat of compulsory recruitment for contract labour, and the need to supply household farms with child labour as well as child and juvenile migration may have aggravated the low attendance to Catholic schools. The employment of children by settler farmers and their consequent diversion from the schools, brought out the missionaries, particularly Sebastião de Resende, the Bishop of Beira Diocese, against the practice. The Bishop frequently criticised the government bitterly in letters, pastorals and reports submitted to the colonial administration. The Annual Report of the Diocese of Beira of 1948 recorded for example that:

With such a labour recruitment system which applies to children from fourteen years if not before, and to all able-bodied men, almost all the inhabitants of each 'circumscription' go abroad every year. This system is destroying the organisation of African families. Without the restriction of child labour to these over eighteen years, educational problems in many parts of the Diocese of Beira will not be solved.⁶⁹

The Bishop's pastorals were aimed at discouraging the migration of school boys and girls and their employment in forced cotton growing.⁷⁰ However he was not powerful enough to change the established economic order given the continuous

⁶⁸AHM-FGG, No. 156: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1943; To overcome this situation, in 1950 the bishop of Beira proposed the prohibition of employment of teachers by other public services before they completed 10 to 12 years teaching. See AHM-FGG, No 355: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1950.

⁶⁹See AHM-FGG, No.271: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1948; AHM-FGG, No. 309: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1949.

⁷⁰See AHM-FGG, No.405: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1951.

confirmed the low quality of education provided in Catholic mission schools, as can be illustrated in the following testimony:

In Manica there were no good teachers. In general they were catechists. The standard of education was very low. Children at school spent more time singing or working in the teachers' gardens. Very often teachers were absent for more than two weeks. There was no control on them. By the end of year the child was still not improving.⁶⁵

Although rural schools were set up almost all over the region in the 1940s and 1950s, mission stations still lacked financial support, missionary staff and teachers to run their schools. The need to improve the quality of teaching in mission schools led the Diocese of Beira to set up a teacher-training school for African teachers (*Escola de Habilitação de Mestres Indigenas*) at Boroma Mission in Tete in 1944. To qualify for entrance the candidates had to have completed grade four and were sometimes required to have trained as teachers at mission schools. The course was taught in Portuguese, and included arithmetic, geography, history, natural sciences, drawing, teaching methods and practical agriculture, manual work, singing and physical education as well as hygiene, nursing and the Catholic religion. The tuition period was for four years.⁶⁶

However, after the conclusion of the course some teachers abandoned teaching and became nurses, lorry drivers, or even civil servants, while others migrated to Rhodesia.⁶⁷ The shortage of African teachers and their desertion from mission schools was caused by their low rate of pay in comparison with what could be

⁶⁵Interview with Ana Paula Luis Chidza, Manica city, 14 September 1996. See also collective interview with members of Nhandiro chieftaincy, Mavonde, 18 September 1996.

⁶⁶See Portaria No.1688, 18 November 1946; AHM-FGG, No.184: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1945.

⁶⁷To cite some examples, Agostinho dos Muchangos who in 1933 became school-teacher in Manica, in the late 1940s abandoned his profession and joined the local administration as interpreter; Benjamim Manhoca also school-teacher from 1954 in Manica, left his work in 1955 because of low wages and migrated to Southern Rhodesia to join his father. See interviews in Manica city, 10 April 1993.

white pressure on African peasants. In fact most settlers benefited from the direct collaboration of the local administration. Paradoxically nearly all the mission stations themselves employed a considerable amount of child labour on their farms, and at the local level missionaries combined with the administrators and farmers to recruit children even from the mission stations. Simão Ruvai describes this situation at Jécua Mission station as follows:

I studied at Jécua for two years. Here we had to cultivate potatoes on the mission farm twice a week during the afternoon. Potatoes were for sale. It was forbidden to pupils to eat potatoes. Farm activity was complementary to mission schooling. Apart from cultivating potatoes, there were other crops such as cabbages, tomatoes, and fruit trees namely oranges, mangos, litchis, grapes. etc. The farm was very big [1,407ha] and employed forced and voluntary contracted labourers. I was in second year when in 1949 the police arrived and recruited many school boys attending catechism. The missionaries did not care about the recruitment of school boys by *sipaio* and administrators.⁷¹

The behaviour of the missionaries in rural areas reflected their inferior position in the context of a colonial hierarchy which regarded them not only as the spiritual arm of the State but also as the collaborator of the administration in facilitating labour recruitment. António dos Muchangos remembers that the local missionaries did not go to the administration to protest against child labour. "They use to say: our mission is to teach people to live well in heaven. On earth they must obey the government."⁷²

Administrative and missionary reports in the 1950s both repeatedly revealed their impotence in curbing child migration to Southern Rhodesia. For example in 1953, the administrator of Mossurize claimed that "without commercial farms or any great economic enterprise along the border there will not be any solution to reverse the tide of child migration".⁷³ On the contrary, overall parents tolerated and stimulated the migration of their children either to enroll at mission schools or to engage in

⁷¹Interview with Simão Ruvai, Manica, Mundonguara village, 22 July 1996.

⁷²Interview with António Cufa dos Muchangos, Manica, Jécua village, 12 July 1996.

⁷³AHM-FGDB, Cx 216: Diários de serviço da administração de circunscrição de Mossurize, 1953.

wage labour on farms and tea estates in Southern Rhodesia.⁷⁴In the 1950s, many households, particularly those whose heads or relatives were working in Southern Rhodesia, invited their sons to enroll in Rhodesian schools where they could learn English and Shona as well as acquire occupational skills to further their job prospects. In fact teenagers and their parents began to regard education as an important asset that could empower them to change their lives.

4. Children crossing the border to Southern Rhodesia.

Child labour migration is a dimension of the more general story of Mozambican labour migration to colonial Zimbabwe. From the 1930s to early 1960s Mozambican children were massively employed on farms, especially those producing maize, tea, cotton and tobacco in the eastern districts of Zimbabwe. Some plantations, particularly the Imbeza Forestry at Penhalonga and the Tea Estates in Chipinga Melsetter and Chimanimane, provided their child labourers or the children of their workers with primary schooling. However this was provided on a shift basis in order to keep child labourers under control and always available as labour.

In the annual report of the Diocese of Beira of 1948, the bishop Dom Sebastião Soares de Resende estimated that about 500 Mozambican children were either studying or working in Rhodesian schools and plantations along the border with Manica province. He also mentioned seventeen girls enrolled at Umtali mission station.⁷⁵ The bishop described this migration as a result of the more attractive conditions offered on the Rhodesian side:

Children are attracted because wages are much better over there, work is light and in the afternoon they have some hours for study in the estates. The Mount Selinda mission station appoint teachers for those plantations and pay

⁷⁴See AHM-FGG, No. 355: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1950; AHM-FGG, No. 557: relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1955. For more details on the recognition of this situation by Portuguese officials see: Romeu Ivens Ferraz de Freitas, "Conquista de adesão das populações", Serviços de centralização e coordenação de informações, (Lourenço Marques, 1965).

⁷⁵AHM-FGG No. 271: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1948.

their teachers' wages. Although there is legislation in that respect in Mozambique, such practice does not happen here.⁷⁶

In fact the bishop criticized Portuguese authorities for not imposing the legislation which required local economic enterprises to subsidize local mission schools.⁷⁷ Apart from forced child labour on local white farms, missionary reports also recognized that children migrated because local mission schools were less attractive.⁷⁸

The influence of the Protestant missions based in Southern Rhodesia and central Mozambique goes back to the late nineteenth century with the establishment of the American Board in Chipinga (Mount Selinda) and its branch at Gungunhana's kraal in Mossurize.⁷⁹ Since then many Mozambicans, particularly from Manica and Sofala districts, came under the strong influence of the American Protestant mission.⁸⁰ The establishment of the school networks in Rhodesia, especially along the borders of central Mozambique also fostered education facilities for Mozambican children. The majority of Mozambican children enrolled at the schools of the American Board of Commission for Foreign Missions established at Melsetter in 1893, the American (United) Methodist Episcopal Church founded by J.Hartzell in 1898 in Old Umtali (Mutare), and at the Anglican missions, such as the St.Augustine's and the St.Faith's, in Penhalonga and Rusape respectively.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷ See Portaria No. 10, 707, of 15 August 1944 ; AHM-FGG No. 271: Relatório anual da Diocese da Beira, 1948.

⁷⁸See, Relatório anual da Missão de Jécua, 1952 and 1954, by Armando Vaz da Mota.

⁷⁹See J. Rennie, "Christianity, colonialism and the origin of nationalism among the Ndaus of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935", Ph.D. (Northwestern University, 1973), chapt. six. See also Carlos de Azeredo, "Da nossa Missão de Mossurize" in Missões Franciscanas, No.10, (Braga, July 1941), 3; Eduardo Moreira, Portuguese East Africa: A study of its religious needs, (London, 1936)

⁸⁰See NAZ - UN 3/20/1/12/5: American Board Mission, annual report on Beira Station, 31 May 1917.

Here I am taking up and detailing some matters already mentioned earlier. Although, from the early 1940s, the Catholic Church managed to establish new mission stations and rural schools in the main circumscriptions (Manica and Mossurize) close to the frontier, local people still regarded them as useless. Although their reaction was ideological, there were additional reasons for their antipathy. People wanted instruction which could provide them with useful skills for better wage employment or self-employment as traders, storekeepers, carpenters or farmers. My informants in Mavita village remember that they migrated to Southern Rhodesia because the standard of education in Rhodesian schools was far better than in Mozambique, and because they could learn useful skills. In addition, in Manica Africans complained about child labour on the Catholic mission farms, or on white settler farms which conscripted school children with the connivance of both the missionary staff and the local administration.

As the region was strongly influenced by labour migration to Southern Rhodesia and because of its proximity to the frontier, many children could choose where to study and to find a job. In fact, people living in the villages along the border were much attracted to Southern Rhodesia where, apart from taking farm or mining wage employment, there were many schools, stores and health centres. As informants from Penhalonga village recall of the 1940s:

There were no schools and hospitals at Mucudo/Penhalonga. Schools were very far from the locality. Only very few children could attend school. People with relatives in Zimbabwe could send their children to study there. There were many schools and hospitals alongside the border in Zimbabwe.⁸¹

On the other hand, especially in Manica and Mossurize, children, and not only from poor families, crossed the border to Mutare and Cashel where they could sell their season's crops or fruit at very competitive prices, or go on to the tea or tobacco farms as labour. In general, children working on the estates or with some money from trading could eventually enrol at the Rhodesian mission schools, particularly in Mutare, Melsetter, Mutambara and Chipinga. Other children working as houseboys in

⁸¹Interview with chief Mucudo, Manica, Penhalonga village, 14 September 1996.

these towns were able to attend night school. The following testimonies illustrate different experiences of combination of child employment and education well:

In 1944 when I was 12, I enrolled at Penhalonga Primary School of Methodist Church in Umtali [Zimbabwe]. I studied up to standard three. I paid school fees myself. It was six shillings per year. I was selling bananas, strawberries, *madumbe* [yams], and cane in Umtali city to pay school fees.⁸²

Sometime in the 1940s, I went to stay at my uncle's place in Zimbabwe. I enrolled at Mount Selinda mission school studying at night. After three years I completed the carpentry course. After that my uncle bought me some implements. With them I went to Harare where I established my own carpentry workshop. There were many Mozambicans, especially from Manica and Sofala provinces studying carpentry and bricklaying courses.⁸³

I studied in Zimbabwe up to grade three. I learnt agriculture and carpentry. I had to pay fees with the assistance of my brother who was already working there for Timber Forest Company in a eucalyptus plantation at Penhalonga. When I got a job in 1953, I started paying fees myself. I was fifteen years old when I joined the same plantation and I earned one pound and fifty shillings per month.⁸⁴ We were living on the farm. There were many children from Mozambique working on the same farm.⁸⁵

I studied in Zimbabwe at Lucite mission school (south of Mutambara) from 1954 to 1959 up to grade five. I went there because here we were beaten too much. There were two of us. During the first two years I was in the boarding school. When I reached second grade I got a job on the farm as a houseboy. Then I proceeded with my studies in the night school up to grade five. I was getting four shillings per month with food and accommodation on the farm. My employer also paid my school fees. The standard of education was far better than in Mozambique. Apart from other subjects they taught us English, Shona, carpentry and agricultural skills such as rotation and how to graft. However, many people could only study up to grade one, two or three because they lacked money to pay school fees.⁸⁶

⁸²Interview with F. Bishard Irway, Manica, Penhalonga village, 20 July 1996.

⁸³Interview with João Mesa Chairuca, Manica, Chinhambudzi village, 9 August 1996.

⁸⁴This should surely be one pound ten shillings, i.e. one and half pounds. There were twenty shillings in a pound.

⁸⁵Interview with Pfumai Chali, Manica, Rotanda 9 September 1996. For comparisons, in Mozambique an adult working in white farms earned 66\$00 per month. This was almost half of the wage paid to Chali as child labour in Rhodesia. One pound was equivalent to 80\$00.

⁸⁶Interview with Rojas Manuel Corneta, Mavita, 12 August 1996.

In 1951 when I was 14, I enrolled at St. Augustin Mission station in Mutare where I studied up to standard two. In 1952 my father was imprisoned and deported to S. Tomé because he was a pastor of the Johane Marange Apostolic Church. With the deportation of my father I could no longer afford to pay school fees. In 1954, when I was 17, I engaged in farm labour at Bvumba Mountains. I worked there for two years. There were many Mozambicans, including child labourers.⁸⁷

The above five narratives illustrate how schooling in Southern Rhodesia was not easy to achieve. Apart from paying school fees, children had to be registered as local residents so that they could be allowed to enrol at local schools. As Sossai Chaira recall: "to make things easier, when you wanted to go to school you changed your name because if you told them that you were from Mozambique they did not allow you to enrol. Otherwise you should be known by the people who were in charge of the school."⁸⁸ According to Simão Ruvai, to obtain a juvenile certificate, locally known as *Shitikhane*, you had to be introduced by adults who were living there for a long period. "I was introduced by my cousin who was living there for years", he recalled.⁸⁹ In fact, these narratives stress the importance of family or kin networks to gain access local schools in Southern Rhodesia.

Some enterprises, particularly the Imbeza Forestry plantation at Penhalonga and the Tea Estates and Wattle Company in Chipinga/Melsetter, provided their child labourers and the children of their workers with primary schooling. In 1949 the overall picture of rural areas of Chipinga was of the large amount of development going on, involving the operation of four large tea Estates, nine Wattle Estates and a big sisal and fibre project in conjunction with a general closer settlement of farmers. The total labour force employed on the tea Estates was about 1,436 of which some 75 or 80 per cent was juvenile or female labour. Juveniles worked for half a day (in the morning) and attended school in the afternoon. Estates close to the border attracted most of their juvenile labour from Mozambique.⁹⁰ In 1950, the labour officer of Eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia described juvenile labour in the following terms:

⁸⁷Interview with Pita Chazuca, Chazuca village, 14 September 1996.

⁸⁸Interview with Sossai Chaira, Manica, Penhalonga village, 20 July 1996.

⁸⁹Interview with Simão Ruvai, Manica, Mundonguara village, 22 July 1996.

⁹⁰See NAZ-S1012/270: Report of the labour officer, Eastern District, March 1949.

Juvenile labour is attracted to these estates by reason of the school facilities provided [children work in the morning and attend school in the afternoons]... The Wattle Company has followed the lead of the Tea Company in setting up schools to attract juvenile labour on a part time basis but have not met with the same success as the Tea Company. Probably owing to the fact that juveniles prefer the comparatively light work of plucking to the work of hoeing on the wattle estate.⁹¹

The teachers in these schools were recruited from the mission schools on a part-time basis. Farm schools were allowed to establish a school calendar suitable to their seasonal labour requirements. However this system was no 'paradise'. In fact, the labour officer was aware that if the labour turn over was any criterion then the amount of knowledge absorbed in the schools would have been infinitesimal.⁹² Education offered under such conditions carried serious deficiencies, particularly because classes were held after farm labour. Child workers were left with little time for schoolwork and were very often too tired to follow a normal class without falling asleep.⁹³

With the Native Development Act of 1929 and the Non-Government Regulations of 1959, government officials encouraged the establishment of farm schools in colonial Zimbabwe. While some schools were aided by the government, those which were not tended to offer poor quality education. Some even functioned unregistered so as avoid investment in education facilities while still securing child labour. On school farms the quality of teaching was generally adversely affected owing to lack of qualified teachers. As Peter Mayavo reveals, most farmers were not prepared to pay high wages for qualified teachers and they often hired unskilled staff.⁹⁴

⁹¹See NAZ-S1012/40: Report of the labour officer, Eastern District, March 1950.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³For more details on this aspect see: Peter Mayavo, "The 'invisible' victims", 59-60.

⁹⁴Peter Mayavo, "The 'Invisible' victims", 59.

As Grier has shown, at least before the 1930s, child labour was one of the main characteristics of wage employment, particularly for white farmers and the mining sector in Southern Rhodesia.

Girls and boys, as young as seven and eight, worked alongside adult family on white-owned commercial farms. (...) Popular with white employers, African children were a cheap source of labour that could be assigned many adult tasks. The cheap labour of African children was critical to the profit margins of many white mine owners and of nearly all white farmers.⁹⁵

In 1904 the Native Tax Ordinance and the Native Passes Ordinance which reduced the age of compulsory registration from eighteen to fourteen years, opened the way for the wage employment of child and youth under fourteen.⁹⁶ After World War I, with increasing competition between mines and white farmers for African labour, children and youths were increasingly recruited to alleviate Rhodesian farmers from a critical shortage of cheap labour.⁹⁷

In the 1920s potential adult labour in Rhodesia migrated to the Transvaal and the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia. With the boom of tobacco plantation in Nyasaland, Rhodesian farmers were deprived of adult labour from those sources of supply. The alternative was to intensify the use of child labour. The recruitment of juvenile labour was legalised through the Native Juvenile Act of 1926. Under this legislation there was a provision that no native juvenile under the apparent age of fourteen should be permitted to seek employment unless registered by the Native Commissioner who should be assured that the permission of the father has been obtained.⁹⁸ However colonial authorities in Rhodesia justified its enactment on a paternalist basis by stating that:

One of the objects of the Native Juvenile Act, 1926 is to strengthen the parental control of native parents over their children. I may add that an

⁹⁵B.Grier, "Invisible hands", 27,28.

⁹⁶An overview on the economic and colonial legal foundations of child labour in Rhodesia is provided by Peter Mayavo, "The 'invisible' victims", 1-36.

⁹⁷See Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, 24.

⁹⁸NAZ - S482/518/39: Native labour employment of native juveniles.

important feature of the registration certificate issued to native juveniles, is the provision for record that the father or guardian has consented to the juvenile entering employment.⁹⁹

The employment of juvenile labour included young workers from neighbouring countries such as Mozambique. In the 1920s, administrative officials claimed that about 18 per cent of foreign male workers in Rhodesia were boys under fourteen years old.¹⁰⁰ This pattern of labour supply continued through the 1930s to the 1950s. In July 1947 the Amendment of Juvenile Act restricted the employment of children under sixteen years old.

With regard to Mozambican child migrant labour to Southern Rhodesia in the 1930s, the Portuguese scholar, Álvaro da Fontoura, claimed that the colonial government in Rhodesia was allowing British companies to employ Mozambican children, particularly in the tobacco industry and in the mining sector.¹⁰¹ The well-established system of free transport services the so-called *ulere*, contributed to the transport of Mozambican children from as far as Tete to the Rhodesian labour market. For example a lorry driver operating between Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia through Mozambique's Tete province recognised that movement by claiming that: "there are large number of juveniles from Chikoa working in this district but none of them have been persuaded to leave Chikoa. They are arriving from home every week."¹⁰²

Although intensive forced labour for white farmers in Manica, Chimoio and Buzi plantations, and forced cotton-growing in Dombe and Mossurize were the main internal causes of migration, there were also some children who migrated to become farm labourers because they wanted cash earnings to help meet family income needs.

⁹⁹See statement by the Prime Minister of Rhodesia to the Enlindale Farmers' Association, 19 February 1937. NAZ - S482/518/39: Native labour employment of native juveniles.

¹⁰⁰See Chief Native Commissioner annual report, 1927, quoted by P. Mayavo, "The 'invisible' victims", 12.

¹⁰¹A. Fontoura, "Missões religiosas e ensino indígena" In Boletim da Agência Geral das Colónias, (Lisbon, 1930), 9.

Further, apart from schooling, some children, from an early age, made a deliberate choice in favour of wage employment on Southern Rhodesian farms as cattleherds, instead of working within the household, in order to have control over their own earnings. For example, Benedito Chirara describes his experience as child migrant labour at six years old as follows:

I started working at Bvumba [Zimbabwe] farm when I was six did so until I was nine years old. I worked as a cattleherd and earned 20 shillings per month. I went there voluntarily. I heard from older people that the farmers in Bvumba were looking for child workers. I went there because I was looking for money to buy clothes. At that time [1930s] it was difficult to get money from here even though my father was *régulo*.¹⁰³

According to official statistics, in 1937 there were 5,989 juvenile workers from Mozambique in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁰⁴ However it was only after the 1940s that many children were massively employed on farms, especially those producing maize, tea, cotton and tobacco. In fact, as Clarke pointed out, this was a period of great change in rural Rhodesia, much of it connected with the labour requirements of plantation production.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the economic sector of Southern Rhodesia was stimulated by the European demand for requirements of food, tobacco, textiles and other industrial products during World War II. With investment in Rhodesian industry and the greater expansion of regional economy in southern Africa, a large amount of local African labour was attracted into cities, leaving the rural areas short of labour.

The increasing labour shortage and the need to reduce labour costs, especially on farms and plantations in the 1940s and 1950s, led to the employment of women and children as cheap labour to meet peak period demands. There was a similar pattern in respect of foreign labour supplies, particularly from central Mozambique. Tea, wattle and tobacco employers were more dependent than others on the extra cheap labour

¹⁰²NAZ - S246/705: Alleged abduction of native children from Portuguese East Africa, 8 June 1931.

¹⁰³Interview with Benedito Chirara, 3 August 1996.

¹⁰⁴Southern Rhodesia - Report of the Chief Native Commissioner and Secretary for Native Affairs for the year 1937, 8.

provided by women and juveniles withdrawn periodically from the local African reserves and from the neighbouring villages of central Mozambique.¹⁰⁶ In 1950, the labour officer of the eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia claimed that about 70 per cent of labour employed in Tea Estates was constituted by women and children, most of them coming from Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique).¹⁰⁷ In 1952 the annual report of Department of Native Affairs confirmed this movement by claiming that several children between twelve and fourteen years of age were returning from Rhodesia with certificates of Native Juveniles.¹⁰⁸

Unlike employers in the mining sector and large-scale plantations, small-scale farmers in Southern Rhodesia could not afford to hire workers from the official labour agency (Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission) because they were unable to pay the capitation fees.¹⁰⁹ The alternative was to rely on the 'free flow' migrants or those recruited by individual runners who often combined with Portuguese recruiters to draw clandestine migrant labour from central Mozambique. This included children and juvenile workers who were supplied particularly from across the Honde and Penhalonga frontier. Portuguese recruiters received two pounds for each child supplied to Rhodesian employers.¹¹⁰ In 1956, for example a Portuguese storekeeper in Nhamucuarara (Penhalonga-Manica) was accused of being involved in smuggling

¹⁰⁵D.G.Clarke, Agricultural and plantation workers in Rhodesia, (Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1977),17.

¹⁰⁶See Clarke, Agricultural and plantation workers, 1977:18; Southern Rhodesia - Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development, for the year 1950, 45,46.

¹⁰⁷NAZ-S1012/40: Report of the labour officer, Eastern District, March 1950.

¹⁰⁸AHM-FGG, No. 432: Relatório anual da curadoria geral dos indígenas da repartição central dos negócios indígenas da província de Moçambique, 1952.

¹⁰⁹See van Onselen, Chibaro: African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933, (London, Pluto Press, 1976), 117; Clarke, Agricultural and plantation workers, 1977, 256.

¹¹⁰AHM, FNI, Cx 108: Relatórios da Curadoria dos Indígenas portugueses em Salisbúria, 1941-1948, 73.

clandestine labour, including children, from Manica to the Stapleford Timber plantation in Penhalonga (Rhodesia).¹¹¹

During the 1950s, children from central Mozambique also migrated in huge numbers to find seasonal wage employment on the tobacco and tea estates.¹¹² Juveniles from poorer families were often persuaded by their parents to look for money in order to pay their bridewealth (*shuma*), which tended to be highly inflated in the 1950s.¹¹³ Once again, Manica and Mossurize were among the major suppliers of seasonal child labour to Rhodesian farmers and tea plantations. Although some Rhodesian farmers requested labour from local administrators or asked for permission to recruit inside Manica, the main source of labour was through clandestine migration.¹¹⁴

In 1958 34,747 Mozambican children were recorded as working in the white farms in Eastern Rhodesia and tea estates in Chipinga, Melsetter and Mount Selinda. Of that number about 22,000 were from Manica and Mossurize.¹¹⁵ In October that year the *African Daily News*, (Rhodesia) reported that every day about 47 Mozambican children were crossing the border with their parents looking for employment in Southern Rhodesia. Although it is difficult to explain the reasons behind such massive mobility, however, it is possible to speculate that drought and epizootic which affected the region in the mid-1950s, made local households more dependent upon wage employment to meet their social needs. Indeed, in the mid-1950s Manica had been hit by severe drought and pests which destroyed many hectares of maize

¹¹¹CEM-AM: Process against Cândido Casimiro de Carvalho, resident in Nhamucuarara, Manica village, convicted by Portaria No.402 of 17 June, 1905, art. 90 das Providências, 9 February 1956.

¹¹²AHM-FGDB, Cx 2: Relatórios e diários de serviço da administração da circunscrição de Mossurize, 1943-1959.

¹¹³AHM, FGG Cx 572: Relatório anual da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas, 1953. In this period the brideprice was about 3,000\$00 (about £37.00).

¹¹⁴Apart from the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission which operated in Tete, there is no evidence of any kind of official recruitment network in Manica province. Even those individual farmers who tried to request labour from the local administrator in Mossurize they failed to get any local assistance. See also below (chapter eight).

¹¹⁵See the *Rhodesia Herald*, October 1958.

crops.¹¹⁶ Moreover the imposition of cotton cultivation among peasants in Dombe and Mossurize, particularly in the second half of the 1950s, seems to have contributed to the increasing wave of out migration to Rhodesia.¹¹⁷ In the 1960s juveniles were still a very important source of labour on Rhodesian farms and plantations. According to Clarke, in 1961 there were estimated to be about 24, 660 workers under sixteen years of age of whom about 10,000 were foreigners in Southern Rhodesia.¹¹⁸

Apart from this huge migration, there were also movements of child migrants who were employed on small-scale farms, including maize farms, as permanent labour tenants. On these farms, children from ten years and upwards had to do anything from nursing, picking cotton, cattle herding, weeding, harvesting and carrying crops from the gardens to the storage places. Although the majority of child migrants worked on white farms, there were some juveniles who went to Mutare City and were employed by the Municipality or in domestic service as houseboys. For example, in 1949 Simão Ruvai, who at the time was eleven, worked in the veterinary service in Mutare with another eleven Mozambican youths. He also remembers that Rhodesian employers preferred Mozambican workers because unlike Zimbabweans they would accept any kind of work. "Zimbabweans hated 'dirty' jobs. They even did not want to work in the railways. They preferred to work in the factories, workshops, hotels and shops", he added.¹¹⁹

Rhodesian employers engaged Mozambican children and juveniles to ensure very low wages. Like adult migrants, Mozambican juveniles were regarded as casual workers and therefore vulnerable to employers' manipulations. In fact, with the great influx of migrant labourers, employers would easily break their workers' bargaining power. Poor wages and bad working conditions or maltreatment also prompted some youth to desert their employers. There were also cases where child labourers were enticed by

¹¹⁶CEM-AM: Nota No. 558/D/25 da administração do concelho de Manica ao director da administração civil de Manica e Sofala, 12 March 1954.

¹¹⁷AHM-FGDB, Cx 729: Informação da administração da circunscrição de Mossurize, 1956. See also above (chapter six).

¹¹⁸Clarke, *Agricultural and plantation workers in Rhodesia*, 28. Obviously this data understate the employment of many clandestine juvenile workers.

runners working for tobacco plantations to abandon farms along the border. However those moves were not always worthwhile because, as Mayavo points out, desertion from one farm to another often exposed juvenile workers employers' manoeuvres.¹²⁰ Some youths managed to find employment in the cities. However, here again, because of inadequate wages, they sometimes had to steal to meet their needs.¹²¹

Although labour migration to Southern Rhodesia may have led many youths, particularly boys, away from an identification with rural resources, temporary migration was still the common pattern and was regarded as a supplement to the rural household economy. However, with increasing pressure on African labour in central Mozambique, young migrants tended to establish themselves as permanent workers and residents in southern Rhodesia, either in the reserves or in urban areas. This tendency which was reinforced by their independent access to money, threatened the stability of homesteads and the power of parents and headmen. In fact, in so far as young migrants opted for permanent residence in Southern Rhodesia and got married there, this situation would have affected the control over bridewealth transactions by headmen.¹²²

However, parents and headmen seem to have counteracted this tendency by forcing young boys to return home and get married or pay *shuma* for a girl as young as six years of age. A series of stereotypes were conveyed to young migrants in order to discourage their marriage with Southern Rhodesian women. Peter Baradzai who in the 1950s worked in Umtali as house-boy, remembers that after about two years of his working there his mother urged him to return home to get married. His mother had chosen a girl of six years old for him. "I paid 3,000\$00 in bridewealth. My

¹¹⁹Interview with Simão Ruvai, Manica, Mundonguara village, 22 July 1996.

¹²⁰P. Mayavo, "The 'invisible' victims", 55.

¹²¹There are many reports of cases of Mozambican children deported or sentenced in Rhodesia because of being involved in theft. See for example, AHM-FACC, Cx 333: Administração da circunscrição de Chimoio: autos de averiguações contra o arguido indígena Tique Chiano, registo No. 53, Livro M/49, 15 September 1953.

¹²²See for example my interview with F. Bishard, (Manica, Penhalonga, 20 April 1993) who like many other youths migrated to Rhodesia where he studied and worked in Umtali and late on married a local women.

father paid it for me. One could only afford to pay *shuma* after three years working. The girl stayed at her parents' home until she became adolescent. However, it was my responsibility to take care of her".¹²³ There were other young migrants who, despite paying *shuma* in their villages to avoid conflicts with their parents, married a second wife in Southern Rhodesia leaving their home village wives with their parents.¹²⁴

This chapter has shown that child labour migration to Southern Rhodesia was a result of a variety of factors. However, the underlying reason was the impact of the Portuguese political economy and missionary education on African communities in Manica. In general, because the local Catholic missionaries adopted a paternalist role towards the African community while collaborating with the local administration and white settlers in recruiting child labour their educational efforts were unsuccessful.¹²⁵ Without accurate figures for forced child labour it is difficult to know just how many children were involved - the evidence is too fragmentary to quantify exactly the volume of child and youth labour. However, interviews and other sources including Rhodesian statistics leave no doubt of its importance and that there was a great demand for child labour on white settler farms in Manica, Chimoio and Buzi sugar plantations.

Furthermore, from my interviews there appears to have been strong opposition to the missionary education provided in Manica. Interviews suggest that people reacted against Catholic education not only on ideological grounds, but also because they wanted an education which could provide them with useful skills for their own economic activity or for better employment than working for white farmers under

¹²³Interview with Pedro Baradzai, Manica city, 22 January 1998.

¹²⁴From my interviews, this seems to have been the most common practice amongst migrants from Manica. See for example my interview with Benjamim Manhoca (Manica, 10 April 1993) whom mother had the statute of principal wife although was younger than his stepmother in Rhodesia. His father only joined his mother when he retired and returned home.

¹²⁵However, these initiatives which, if not opposed by the Catholic Mission Board (Beira), were not supported by the Bishop of Beira, D. Soares de Resende.

backward conditions. The alternative to these social and economic conditions in Manica was to flee to Southern Rhodesia where they believed that the conditions were far better than in Mozambique.

Underlining the Portuguese colonial policy and Catholic education as the main factors for child labour and migration to Southern Rhodesia, I am not suggesting that the causes were one-sided. Children from richer families chose to enter wage labour in order to control cash earnings needed to satisfy their own needs. This may have resulted from conflicts within the households over the distribution of income. Parents also encouraged youths to look for wage employment to supplement their household incomes and most importantly to prepare themselves for marriage. The degree of household economic stability may have determined the position of juvenile labourer as either supplementary or central to household income or investment in agricultural implements.¹²⁶

Finally, it seems that the economic structure in the eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia, especially in the farming sector and tea estates, was dependent on the free flow of labour from the neighbouring countries particularly Mozambique. Plantations and small-scale farms were dependent on such labour movement, including that of children and juveniles. The articulation between some estates and the established mission stations as well as the existence of night schools seems to have attracted Mozambican children seeking education in Southern Rhodesia. The employment of child labour guaranteed the profit of Tea Estates and other enterprises because of their sub-economic wages. Seasonal and temporary forms of work were the most common practice to ensure such profit. Local authorities in southern Rhodesia recognised that under these conditions tea could be produced cheaper in Southern Rhodesia than Assam. However, they questioned how far the employment of child labour for profit at sub-economic wages (plus free education and board) could be defended on ethical grounds and on occasion raised it as a matter for consideration.¹²⁷ Although the

¹²⁶For more discussion on this perspective see, D. Elson, "The differentiation of children's labour", 481-490.

¹²⁷NAZ - S1012/27: Report of the labour officer, Eastern Districts, 1949.

colonial administration attempted to counter child labour through protective legislation, supervision and control, employers used many strategies to facilitate its employment.

The child-migration patterns established from the 1930s to the 1960s were deeply rooted in the historical connections between the two territories from the early twentieth century. Labour migration to Southern Rhodesia and the lack of schools in central Mozambique both contributed to strengthen Mozambican dependency on the Rhodesian labour market and mission schools. For many Mozambican children and juveniles in Manica, the sooner they emigrated the better. Thus, from an early age they developed wide knowledge of the Rhodesian labour market and mastered their labour skills. Furthermore they secured their position as adult workers. However, farm labour was no 'paradise'. Low wages and brutal treatment very often prompted youths to desert as soon as they were familiar with the local environment. Juveniles also used farm labour as a transit to urban employment. In the following chapter I analyse adult labour migration and its socio-economic implications in Manica.

CHAPTER 8:

LABOUR MIGRATION TO COMMERCIAL FARMS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1930-1960s.

Introduction

As in many parts of southern Africa labour migration in central Mozambique has been in force for generations. The migrant flow was always socially differentiated. Not only the poorest peasants emigrated. Children of chiefs, farmers and people with some literacy including school teachers also migrated. This chapter aims to analyse the factors behind the migrancy of Manicans to Southern Rhodesia and its position in the labour market, with especial reference to commercial farms in the eastern districts bordering to Manica province. It also discusses the economic and social implications of migrancy, particularly in the African households in Manica district.

Studies of colonial Zimbabwe's cheap labour system have been pursued and are well documented by Charles Van Onselen, Ian Phimister and Duncan Clarke. Apart from Clarke, who mostly deals with industrial, mining and agricultural workers and migrancy to South Africa after World War II, studies by Van Onselen and Ian Phimister are more concerned with the classic model of *chibaro*. This system of forced wage labour was termed *chibaro*.¹ Following Van Onselen's publication of *Chibaro*, scholars have produced a number of essays on migrant labour from the neighbouring territories to Southern Rhodesia, emphasizing the regional competition over labour reserves. However, the role of Mozambique's legal or clandestine migration has been neglected or only marginally tackled.

1. The Mozambique Company and labour Migration to Southern Rhodesia before the 1930s.

In Southern Rhodesia the pattern of rural wage labour had been established since 1890/97 with the advent of white settlement and the control or suppression of African

¹ van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 104.

societies.² From the beginning of the colonial rule the labour supply was regulated by the Master and Servants Ordinance of 1898.³ To meet the labour demand of white settlers, the administrative authorities established the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) in 1903.⁴ In 1904 the Native Tax Ordinance and the Native Passes Ordinance reinforced the Master and Servants Ordinance through the conscription of African peasants into forced wage labour.

However until 1916 the occupation of African land by white settlers was slow and the demand for farm labour very restricted. In fact, in this period white settlers were little more than part-time farmers, and their agriculture was rarely distinguished from that of the African peasantry.⁵ Thus African peasants enjoyed some degree of independence from wage labour. Nevertheless, in the period between 1908 and 1914 new steps towards the reinforcement of *chibaro* were undertaken by colonial administration. In parallel, foreign contract labour was encouraged. The influx of migrants from beyond Southern Rhodesia's borders eventually worked to keep wages in that territory down.

There, labour migration from neighbouring countries, especially Nyasaland and Mozambique, was extremely important to fill the void left by local peasants who resisted employment under low wages. Southern Rhodesia had for many years endeavoured to secure recruiting facilities in Mozambique. However recruitment from central Mozambique and in the region was not easy for Rhodesia as they were also under pressure from WNLA interests.⁶ As the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau put it:

Although no actual proof was obtained, the Management of the old Bureau [Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia] felt convinced that many natives from

²See D.N. Beach, "The Shona economy: Branches of production", in R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds) The roots of rural poverty in central and southern Africa, (London, 1977).

³See Robin Palmer, "The agricultural history of Rhodesia" in R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds) The roots of poverty, 221-254.

⁴The RNLB (1903-1933) was established due principally of the Witwatersrand gold industry competition for Rhodesian labour. Although for many years the Bureau had supplied labour to the mines this pattern of labour distribution changed from 1913 when it gave priority to farms. See van Onselen, Chibaro, 116.

⁵Clarke, Agricultural and plantation workers in Rhodesia..., 15-17.

⁶The Chamber of Mines created the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) in 1900 in order to coordinate labour recruitment for Transvaal.

Nyasaland and Portuguese Territory desiring to enter Rhodesia were intercepted by agents of the WNLA and persuaded to proceed to Transvaal mines. The attractions offered by the WNLA were certainly greater than those offered by Rhodesian employers; but apart from this, the mere fact that WNLA officials were persona grata in Portuguese Territory, that they were able to offer facilities for food, advances, transportation etc, and that there were no Rhodesian representatives to afford similar inducements, doubtless induced a great number of recruits to proceed to Johannesburg rather than Rhodesia.⁷

The conflict over labour resources in central Mozambique forced Southern Rhodesia to negotiate an agreement with South Africa, the Mozambique Company and the Portuguese colonial authorities. Despite the arrangement under the Transvaal-Portuguese Convention (*Modus-Vivendi*) of 1901 whereby Rhodesia was to receive 12.5 per cent of the labour recruited in Portuguese territory adjoining Rhodesia's eastern borders, no facilities were obtained until the Rhodesia-Tete Agreement was brought into force in 1913.⁸ In that year, after some thirteen years of negotiations, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) celebrated the first agreement (Tete Agreement) with Portuguese colonial authorities, which legalized the recruitment of labour in Mozambique and granted Southern Rhodesia the right of control and supervision of the Nyasaland migratory route through Tete province. Under the 1913 agreement, Southern Rhodesian authorities could recruit a maximum of 15,000 labourers with whom contracts lasting one year would be signed.⁹ However, it was not until 1914 when WNLA apparently ceased recruiting north of parallel 22°S, that Manicans sought employment in Southern Rhodesia on any scale.¹⁰

Although legal recruitment in Manica was not allowed by the Mozambique Company, given its geographical position many men, women and children entered Rhodesia in the

⁷NAZ-A3/18/30/34-35: The Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau - Memorandum for His Honour the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, 5 January 1918.

⁸See NAZ-A3/18/30/34-35: The Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau - Memorandum for His Honour the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, 5 January 1918. However, Peter Scott suggests that in 1911 about 13,000 Mozambican were being employed in Southern Rhodesia. Peter Scott, "Migrant labor in Southern Rhodesia", *Geographical Review*, 44, 1, (1954), 29-48.

⁹For more details on negotiations which preceded the Agreement see, P. R. Warhurst, "The Tete Agreement", *Rhodesian History*, 1, 1970, 31-41.

¹⁰The authorities of Transvaal justified this procedure on humanitarian grounds as men from north of parallel 22°S were vulnerable to pneumonia.

vicinity of Melsetter and Umtali clandestinely in search of permanent or seasonal work.¹¹ In fact, labour migration among Manicans was a long established practice and young boys often migrated in order to buy clothes and agricultural implements or to start their own household which depended upon their ability to pay. In 1915, the Rhodesian authorities recognised that farmers in Melsetter, Victoria and Umtali districts relied to a great extent on migrant labour from Manica province.¹² In general, white settlers, particularly in Mashonaland and Manicaland, produced maize, tobacco, cotton and tea as their principal staple market crops. Under such conditions, central Mozambique became an area of great competition over African labour between WNLA, the Mozambique Company, the Zambezia Company and the RNLB.¹³

With the outbreak of the Barue or Makombe rebellion in 1917, several thousand men, women and children in central Mozambique fled to Southern Rhodesia as refugees and were available as cheap labour for local economic enterprises, in particular farms.¹⁴ In 1918 the following figures for Mozambican labourers were recorded: 4,108 men, of whom 783 had permanent employment, 3,137 women and 4,517 children.¹⁵

According to Hodder-Williams, in the 1920s several World War I officers bought farms in the Marandellas district and produced tobacco among other crops. World War I refugees from Europe - Jews, Greeks, Italians and Poles also settled in Marandellas. The presence of these settlers not only intensified African dispossession, but also forced black tenants into farm labour.¹⁶ Small and medium-scale farms as well as large

¹¹NAZ-A3/18/30/34-35: The Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau-Board of Management Circular, Salisbury 20 March 1915. For more details on labour competition in the region see, Jeeves, "Over-reach", 395-410.

¹²NAZ-A3/18/30/34-35: The British South Africa Company, London, 29 April 1915.

¹³AHM-FCM, SG, Processos 51: Nota No.128-A/611 da circunscrição de Manica para o governador do território da Companhia de Moçambique, sobre a emigração para a Rhodesia do Sul, Beira, 31 March 1915.

¹⁴For more details on the rebellion see: Allen Isaacman and B. Isaacman, The tradition of resistance in Mozambique, (London, 1976); T. O. Ranger, "Revolt in Portuguese East Africa", St. Antony's papers, 15 (1963), 54-80.

¹⁵NAZ-A3/18/30/34-35: Chief Native Commissioner's Office, Salisbury, 26 February 1918.

¹⁶Richard Hodder-Williams, White farmers in Rhodesia, 1890-1965: A history of the Marandellas district, (London, 1983), 156-160.

plantations and timber forests all competed over African labour amongst themselves and with local mines, especially the Rezende Mines in Manicaland.

However, with the availability of a local market for food crops some peasants could resist wage employment, while others resisted low farm wages by migrating to the Transvaal.¹⁷ Despite having to abandon recruitment north of parallel 22°S, WNLA showed signs of recruiting labour in those areas again after World War I. In fact, WNLA never wanted to stop recruiting. They were forced to abandon recruiting north of latitude 22°S by the Union government much against their will. The following telegram of 3 December 1917 from Johannesburg, which appeared in the London newspapers, is indicative:

General Botha speaking Johannesburg December 3 stated that in view of the shortage of native labour the Government was allowing the importation of thousand or more natives from north of latitude 22°S who would be inoculated against pneumonia. If the experiment was successful the mines would get a large amount of labour from it.¹⁸

In fact official recruiting was only allowed – with very minor exceptions – until the 1930s. The experience with the pneumonia vaccine was not very successful.

In the 1920s, the Southern Rhodesian authorities were still looking at Mozambique as an important source of African labour for their economic enterprises. As a former official of the British forces operating in northern Mozambique confided to the Southern Rhodesian Chief Native Commissioner.

It chances that I have had opportunity personally to examine the interior (and coast) of the provinces of Mozambique, Quilimane and Portuguese Nyasaland. There are tens of thousands of excellent native labourers in the neighbouring colony, for whom there is no employment, who are very suitable for work in Southern Rhodesia and who are willing to come at a very reasonable wage. The natives are agriculturists. They are strong, industrious and peculiarly docile [!]. There appears, however, one serious difficulty in the introduction of this labour

¹⁷See Arrighi, "Labour supplies in historical perspective: A study in the proletarianization of an African peasantry in Rhodesia", 179-234; Ranger, The African voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930, (London, 1970), 138-141.

¹⁸NAZ-A3/18/30/34-35: The British South Africa Company, London, 5 January 1918.

to Rhodesia. The attitude of the colonial Portuguese. These people make practically no use of these vast labour supplies. They know very little of the interior of their own territories, and less about the natives who inhabit these.¹⁹

Given the increasing labour demand, in 1920 the BSAC renegotiated a new labour agreement with Portuguese colonial authorities.²⁰ However, Rhodesian farmers raised concerns about the role of the RNLB. Although it recognised the importance of foreign African labour, a committee of entrepreneurs questioned the efficiency of the RNLB as their main labour supplier. Their report reiterated the importance of foreign labourers to the prosperity of Rhodesia, and agreed that their level number should be maintained or even augmented. To achieve this, it was suggested that every alien labourer going to Rhodesia should on his return home be satisfied both with treatment and his earnings.²¹ Yet while this was desirable in order to attract the potential labour migrant to Southern Rhodesia, the current procedures followed by the RNLB did not help much. In fact, African labourers were contracted by RNLB to work for a year at a place that was strange to them and for an employer they did not know. In addition, some employers took advantage of the fact that those labourers were under contract for a year to put them in the least popular jobs. The committee report argued that these disabilities inevitably reacted adversely on the future labour supply, and stressed that it was in the interest of every employer in the country to support any scheme which would remedy them.²²

The committee then suggested a number of measures to be undertaken in order to change the current recruitment system:

¹⁹NAZ-A3/3/19/1-2: Confidential letter by F. M. Stokes to the Chief Native Commissioner, Salisbury, 1 January 1919.

²⁰After five years the agreement was renewed again in 1925. See Boletim Oficial No. 18, Serie I, 1 May 1926. However the insistence on the agreement by Rhodesian authorities was due to its interest in controlling Nyasaland labour migration. See, E. P. Makambe, "The Nyasaland African labour 'ulendos' to Southern Rhodesia and the problem of African 'highwaymen', 1903-1923: A study in the limitations of early independent labour migration", *African Affairs*, 79 (317), 1980, 548-566.

²¹NAZ-A3/3/19/1-2: Report to the Board of Management of the Committee consisting of Messrs Hawksley, Gresson, Clive & Taylor, appointed at the Board Meeting held on the 10th April 1920.

Chains of food stations should be established on all routes travelled by natives coming to Southern Rhodesia. Such food stations should not be confined to the portions of the routes that lie in Southern Rhodesia, but, provided permission can be obtained, should also be established in the countries from which the natives originate. If permission cannot be obtained to establish such food stations in the territory of any Government, then they should be established at the nearest point to the border of that territory. At the ports of entry where Alien natives habitually obtain their Registration Certificates (Umtali or Penhalonga, Mrewa, Darwin and Sinoia), depots should be established where the natives should be fed and sheltered whilst obtaining their Certificates of entry, natives should be very fully informed as to the various classes of work for which labourers were required, the rates of pay offered, and the Districts where the work would be obtained. The native should be absolutely free to please himself in his choice of work and the locality for its performance.²³

With the establishment of labour depots alongside the border, eventually many migrants from Manica and Tete entered Rhodesia through Umtali, Honde, Penhalonga, Chioco and Mtoko clandestinely.²⁴ Some came from as far as Niassa, Mozambique, Zambezia districts and Sena, Gorongosa and Barue villages. Portuguese and Rhodesian recruiters as well as African runners from Southern Rhodesia also contributed to this movement. For example, Compton Thomson had established himself as a recruiter in the early twentieth century and operated in Mozambique, Nyasaland and Rhodesias recruiting African labourers for Southern Rhodesia, WNLA and even for the Sena Sugar Estates and the Buzi Sugar Company in Mozambique. In the 1920s he was based in Umtali and employed African runners to recruit labour along the border or within Mozambique to supply mine companies and farmers, especially of tobacco, in Marandellas.²⁵

Presumably the flow of clandestine labour made the RNLB less crucial, especially as many farmers could not afford the capitation fee, while others thought the £12,000 could be better spent.²⁶ As a result, white farmers in Rhodesia demanded its

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴ AHM-FNI, Cx 1066: Oficio do Curador ao governo do distrito de Tete, 27 December 1921.

²⁵ NAZ-A3/3/19/2: Compton Thomson - Manufacturers' commission and labour agent. Umtali, 29 March 1921.

²⁶In fact as time passed, the Bureau recruited less every year. For instance, in 1915 the Bureau recruited 11,316, being 2,804 from Mozambique. In 1919 and 1920 the RNLB recruited only 913 and 659 respectively in Mozambique. See J.Mutambirwa, The rise of

withdrawal.²⁷ For example, in 1921 a farmer from Shamva who employed from 100 to 200 labourers, mainly from Nyasaland and Mozambique, suggested that "the present £12,000 given by the government to the RNLB should be stopped and an annual sum of about the same spent on helping the independent labourer to find work in Southern Rhodesia."²⁸ Moreover, although clandestine migrants only worked for short periods, they were preferred by many farmers because they could reduce their costs of production by paying lower wages.

The 1921-23 slump and the 1929-33 depression apparently favoured the maintenance of this pattern of low wages, given the greater dependence of Africans on wage labour for subsistence. Drought, famine and the depression of market prices increased the vulnerability of peasants in central Mozambique and throughout southern Africa, and intensified their dependence on wage employment. Under these conditions, Manicans opted for employment in the neighbouring countries in the hope of receiving higher pay. In 1921 and 1926, there were respectively about 17,000 and 13,000 Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia.²⁹

During the 1930s the colonial administration in Southern Rhodesia worked together with farm and plantation interests by establishing segregationist land and marketing policies such as the 1930 Land Apportionment Act and the 1931 Maize Control Act.³⁰ Under such conditions African households had few alternatives to avoid wage employment although great part migrated to South Africa.³¹ However, as illustrated below (see tables in Appendix three and four), before 1933/34 local Africans constituted

settler power in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1898-1923, (Toronto, 1980), 120; AHM-FNI, Cx 22: Correspondência da Curadoria dos Indígenas Portugueses na Rodésia, 20 April 1921.

²⁷Due to similar situation in 1911 European farmers had unsuccessfully demanded the abolition of RNLB. See van Onselen, Chibaro, 117.

²⁸NAZ-A3/3/19/1-2: Answers to questions for Native Labour Enquiry Committee by farmer 'Ceres' Shamva, 19 April 1921.

²⁹Scott, "Migrant labor in Southern Rhodesia", 31.

³⁰R. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, (London, 1977), 179-213.

³¹For more details on clandestine labour migration from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa see, David Johnson, "Clandestine migration in South Central Africa", in Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, vol. 16 (October, 1988), Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1-12.

the majority force labour on farms, while migrants preferred mining work.³² The unfavourable economic and social conditions prevalent in central Mozambique still provided increasing numbers of Manicans to the Rhodesian farms and plantations along the border. In general, however, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia migrants preponderated.³³ As white settlers received a steady supply of cheap local labour, the RNLB seemed to be superfluous, and in 1933 it was dissolved.³⁴

2. Labour migration to commercial farms in eastern Rhodesia, 1934-1960s.

As Southern Rhodesia began to recover from the crisis of the 1929/33 world recession it faced renewed competition from South Africa, which was attracting labour from Southern Rhodesia itself as well as from Mozambique north of 22°S parallel and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.³⁵ In addition there was an internal demand for labour in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This situation contributed to the increasing labour shortage in Southern Rhodesia and led its government to negotiate a new agreement with Mozambique in 1934.³⁶ However, the Portuguese administration once again refused to allow recruitment in Manica and Sofala provinces although it agreed to receive recruitment tax from all Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia regardless of their provenance.³⁷

³²NAZ-S482/224/39/1: Natives employed in various industries in Southern Rhodesia, 1939.

³³Despite its modest contribution, Mozambican migrants showed an increasing tendency if compared to other two major suppliers. See Appendix three and four. See also NAZ-S482/224/39/1: Natives in employment, 1939.

³⁴As we will see below, the state-run contract labour system was again re-introduced in the mid-1940s as a measure to meet increasing labour demands resulting from the post World War II economic boom.

³⁵David Johnson, "Clandestine migration in South Central Africa", 1-6.

³⁶Boletim Oficial de Moçambique No. 39, I Serie, 26 September 1934.

³⁷In fact, apart from collecting the full poll tax from migrants from Tete province, the Portuguese authorities benefited from Rhodesian collaboration in being able to collect half of the poll tax from other migrants including those from Manica province. See, Joel das Neves, "O Trabalho migratório de moçambicanos para a Rodésia do Sul, 1913-1958/60", MA, Maputo, 1990; Newitt, *A history of Mozambique*, (London, 1995), 503-516.

In this period the economic structure of Southern Rhodesia's eastern districts still comprised mines, estates and medium-scale and small-scale farms. Commercial farms in this area produced a wide range of crops including tea, coffee, cotton, maize and a variety of vegetables as well as livestock.³⁸ For several decades the region lagged behind the main centres of labour attraction and it mostly functioned as a labour depot and transit corridor for migrant labourers seeking more attractive and remunerative employment in South Africa.³⁹

After 1936, the Rhodesian government sponsored a Free Migrant Labour Transport Service (*Ulere*) and encouraged migration by establishing lorry stations in Mtoko, Honde, Umtali, Penhalonga and Chikwizo alongside the border with central Mozambique.⁴⁰ The establishment of *Ulere* (lorries) services were mainly designed to drain labour from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, but they also encouraged more clandestine emigration from Manica, Tete and elsewhere in central Mozambique. In 1938, out of almost 50,000 Mozambicans working in Southern Rhodesia about 20,000 were employed on farms in Mashonaland area.⁴¹ Although *Ulere* may have encouraged more workers to migrate into Southern Rhodesia, it also contributed to an increase in clandestine migration to South Africa as workers made their way south with funds earned in Southern Rhodesia.⁴²

The agreement between WNLA and the Rhodesian authorities in 1939 seems to have accelerated this trend. Under that agreement WNLA was free to establish road stations and rest camps at (Umtali, Salisbury, Bulawayo, Wankie and Inyazura) in exchange for

³⁸See G. Kay, *Rhodesia: A human geography*, (Salisbury, 1970).

³⁹Johnson, "Clandestine migration in South Central Africa", 1-6; Clarke, Contract labour from Rhodesia to the South African gold mines: A study of the international division of a labour reserve, (South African labour and development Research Unit), Working Paper, No. 6, Cape Town, 1976.

⁴⁰For more details on the regional impact of *Uleres* see, Peter Scott, "Migrant labour in Southern Rhodesia", *Geographical Review*, (N.Y.) 44, 1 (1954), 29-48.

⁴¹See *Southern Rhodesia Statistical Year book* (Salisbury, 1938); AHM-FNI, Cx 107: Relatórios da Curadoria dos indígenas Portugueses em Salisbury, 1934 a 1946.

⁴²NAZ-S482/224/39 Dec 1938 - March 1939: Secretary for Native Affairs to Minister of Native Affairs, 3 July 1939.

agreeing not to contract labour in Southern Rhodesia. However, this clause did not prevent a Rhodesian 'labour drain' to South Africa.⁴³

Although Southern Rhodesian authorities had enacted the Native Land Act of 1930 to force local peasants into reserves and farm employment, because of the continuous adult male labour migration for better wage employment in the south, white farms and estates resorted to casual juvenile and female labour from reserves, including that from Mozambique.⁴⁴ This tendency was particularly acute after World War II.⁴⁵

With the outbreak of World War II, the Rhodesian economy grew in response to the international demand for commodities, especially foodstuffs, clothing and tobacco. World War II and the subsequent Federation of Rhodesias and Nyasaland in the 1950s also reinforced the development of the manufacturing sector which in turn increased the disputes over labour. Foreign investment in manufacturing and mining industry, enabled those sectors to improve work conditions and provide relatively high wages. Under such conditions manufacturing industry and urban employment in general could attract more labour especially from reserves to the detriment of the agricultural sector.⁴⁶ Although foreign investment was also directed to commercial farms, especially the tea, tobacco and cotton agribusiness, in general the rural sector was unable to attract local labour.

With new capital investment, the gap between international and domestic capital in Southern Rhodesia widened. For instance, while before World War II the farming sector was dominated by medium and small-scale maize settlers and mixed farms, after the war agribusiness companies seemed to have dominated the agricultural sector and to have

⁴³See Johnson, "Clandestine migration in South Central Africa", 1-12; Clarke, "Contract labour from Rhodesia", 4.

⁴⁴NAZ-S1012/27: report of the labour officer, Eastern districts, 28 February 1949. For more details on child labour, see chapter seven.

⁴⁵J. C. Mitchell, "Wage labour and African population movements in Central Africa", in K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero (eds), Essays on African population, (London, 1961), 193-248.

⁴⁶For more details on urban employment see below, chapter nine.

exerted more pressure over the existing labour mobilisation strategy.⁴⁷ According to Arrighi, on the one hand manufacturing, wanted a stable skilled workforce whose increasing productivity would result in higher wages and create a domestic market. On the other, agriculture, including both local and foreign interests, demanded the continuation of cheap unskilled labour.⁴⁸ In 1946 owing to the increasing internal pressure from employers, the Rhodesian authorities re-established the formal contract labour system - Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC) in the hope of easing the flow of labour from neighbouring territories.⁴⁹

Although the South African authorities expressed themselves as willing to combat clandestine migration from or through Southern Rhodesia, because of political pressure from agrarian capital in the Transvaal, these initiatives faded out. In addition, in 1946 South Africa signed a labour agreement with Nyasaland, exposing the RNLSC to strong competition from WNLA.⁵⁰ In the hope of controlling labour resources from or through Mozambique, the Rhodesian authorities quickly turned to the Portuguese and in 1947 signed a supplementary labour agreement. This seems to have stimulated even more clandestine migration from central Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia. However, the Portuguese authorities regarded the agreement as the only way of controlling clandestine migration, through the registration of migrants in Rhodesia and the collection of their poll tax.⁵¹

Although some peasants migrated voluntarily and others were forced into wage employment because of bad harvests caused by drought and epizootic, in general Manicans emigrated because of forced contract labour with low wages and deferred pay,

⁴⁷See, Arrighi, "The political economy of Rhodesia" in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul (eds) Essays on the political economy of Africa, (London, 1973), 336-337:358; Clarke, Agricultural and plantations workers in Rhodesia, passim.

⁴⁸ Arrighi, The political economy of Rhodesia, (Mouton, 1973), 228.

⁴⁹See, Clarke, "Contract labour from Rhodesia", 4-6.

⁵⁰For more details on this labour competition see, Johnson, "Clandestine migration in South Central Africa", 1-12.

⁵¹For more details on the context and nature of that agreement, see Joel das Neves, "O trabalho Migratório de Moçambicanos para a Rodésia do Sul, 1913-1958/60", MA, Maputo, 1990; Malyn Newitt, A history of Mozambique, (London, 1995), 503-516.

bad working conditions and forced cotton-growing in Dombe and Mossurize.⁵² The following testimonies by former migrants describe the pattern of labour migration in the 1940s in Manica:

I went to Rhodesia in 1940. I was running away from the *contrato*. Although I was son of the chief [exempted from forced contract labour] I had to run away in order to avoid conflicts with people. I deserted with three friends. I worked for the Municipality in Mutare and Chimanmani in road construction. There were many Mozambicans performing the same work because Zimbabweans did not want such employment. They did not like to work with the hoe and pickaxe.⁵³

I was in Zimbabwe from 1944 to 1964. I went to Zimbabwe looking for money. I started to work as an office boy at Penhalonga in the Rezende Mines. There were more than 2,000 Mozambican workers. Many of them were escaping from *muthandazi* [forced contract labour]. Many Mozambicans not only from here [Manica] but also from Mavonde, Sena and Pungue, used to cross the border and work on farms, mines and railways. There were Portuguese and 'Boer' [white farmers' recruiters] waiting at the Zimbabwean frontier with lorries to catch clandestine migrants. There were *Ulere* throughout the region from Pungue River to Zimbabwe and they carried people for free. They stopped at Penhalonga where they provided new recruited labourers with food, clothes and *situpa* [identification cards].⁵⁴

In 1947, the number of emigrants to Southern Rhodesia was estimated at about 7,000 from Mossurize, 2,700 from Manica and 1000 from Chimoio.⁵⁵ In 1948, because of clandestine migration, the African labour deficit in Manica and Sofala provinces was estimated at about 45,000. According to Portuguese administrative sources, the proportion of migrants out of the local able-bodied male population was about 61 per cent from Mossurize, 31 per cent from Manica and only 19 per cent from Chimoio.⁵⁶ Although these calculations may be unsatisfactorily imprecise they do suggest varied intensity in the regional pattern of labour migration in Manica province.

⁵²In the 1940s there were reported many cases of labour desertion (after two or three days of contract) from local employers in Manica to Southern Rhodesia. For more details see above in chapters three and six.

⁵³Interview with Chimeze Alfai Tomás, Mavita, August 1996.

⁵⁴Interview with Muchararadza Nhacuanicua, Manica, Chazuca village, September 1996.

⁵⁵AHM-FGG, No. 226: Relatório dos administradores da provincia de Manica e Sofala, 1947.

⁵⁶AHM-FNI, Cx 153: Conselho de governadores da colónia de Moçambique: Actas das sessões, 1948.

With the establishment of the RNLSC and *Ulere* services the wave of clandestine migrants from central Mozambique was enormous. As a result, in the 1940s and 1950s Mozambican workers constituted the major source of migrant labour on the farms and plantations in the eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia.⁵⁷ In 1946, for example, about 62,780 Mozambicans were employed on farms in Mashonaland against 17,750 from Northern Rhodesia, 57,582 from Nyasaland and about 95,000 from Southern Rhodesia.⁵⁸

In a long report about clandestine migration, the administrator of Manica district recognised the inability of his administration to stop the movement to Rhodesia. Although he emphasized the lack of human and financial resources to control this migration, he also acknowledged the absence of infrastructure and commercial networks, as well as the unattractive wages and ill treatment by local settlers, as the main factors for African labour desertion from Manica.⁵⁹

Although the administrative authorities expected chiefs to collaborate with the regime to curb the movement of clandestine migration, some chiefs played a double role by facilitating migration in exchange for gifts.⁶⁰ Local chiefs also collaborated with African runners working for Portuguese recruiters or for tobacco and cotton farmers in Mashonaland, especially in Marandellas, in recruiting Mozambicans to engage with their employers, in exchange for fees in Rhodesian currency.

Wages and accommodation facilities seem to have led to strong competition between Mashonaland and Manicaland farms. In general the tobacco farms managed to divert

⁵⁷ See tables in Appendix three and four.

⁵⁸ See Hodder-Williams, *White farmers in Rhodesia*, 166; *Rhodesia: Report of the Commissioner of Native Labour for the year 1950*.

⁵⁹ AHM-FGDB, Cx 626: Nota Confidencial da Administração do Concelho de Manica ao director provincial de administração civil da Beira, Afonso Calçada de Bastos, 16 July 1948; see also, AHM-FGDB, Cx 658: Nota No. 2651/B/9 da Direcção provincial da administração Civil de Manica e Sofala para todas as autoridades administrativas da província, Maio 1944; AHM-FGG, No. 177: Relatório da inspecção às circunscrições de Chimoio, Manica, Mossurize, 1943-1944.

⁶⁰ See my interview with Chief Benedito Chirara, Manica, 3 August 1996.

many labourers from other farms and mines along the border with Mozambique.⁶¹ In the late 1940s, for example, Penhalonga, Umtali and Honde were not only served by *Ulere* stations but also became the most common areas for recruiters and their runners from the Rusapi/Inyazura areas smuggling clandestine migrants for the tobacco industry. According to labour officer in 1949: "The usual scramble by tobacco planters for labour from Portuguese East Africa entering via Penhalonga continues...Although alien labour enters Umtali in considerable number each month very little remains in the area."⁶²

Moreover, apart from low wages some (if not all) farms in Umtali, Penhalonga and Inyanga failed to provide attractive accommodation for their workers. The following quotation is an example of many cases reported by the district labour officer:

The single native compound on Stapleford Foresty is poor. In general farm compounds visited consisted of pole and daga or grass huts and it would appear that satisfactory accommodation for native labour on farms is often the last consideration. If farms are ever to attract labour, this matter will become more important.⁶³

During the 1940s and 1950s the labour pattern in the eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia was characterised by intense competition over migrant labour especially from central Mozambique. With the development of industry in the urban areas, rural enterprises and food producers, particularly medium and small-scale farms suffered an increasing labour drain.⁶⁴ This was a cause of major concern for the local labour officer who reported sadly in 1949 that:

There is a fairly acute shortage of labour among the new settlers on the crown land in the Inyanga area, where it seems possible that the proper development of farms may be held up on that account. Only one settler has any appreciable labour force...There is one feature noticeable in the eastern districts, and that is

⁶¹Hodder-Williams, *White farmers in Rhodesia*, 163-165, discusses the favourable position of tobacco farmers in Marandellas in employing foreign labour particularly from Mozambique which increased sharply during World War II period.

⁶²NAZ-S1012/27: Report of Labour Officer, eastern districts, October 1949.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴See for example discussions among white farmers in Marandellas in 1947. Hodder-Williams, *White farmers in Rhodesia*, 191-192.

the large preponderance of migratory Portuguese labour, which only seems to stay in any one employment for comparatively short periods.⁶⁵

The alternative to that handicap was to employ women and juveniles, not only on agricultural work but also on processing tasks, such as canning. The establishment of farm schools also stimulated the employment of children and juveniles. In 1949 there were about 200 women at Spa Foods Farm in the preparation of fruit canning; they were paid one shilling and given a hot meal a day. In the Honde valley across the border with Mozambique, on a farm of about 500 acres the majority of employees were women who performed tasks such as hoeing, picking of fruit and grading, on task work or at one shilling and six pence per day.⁶⁶

This trend continued in the 1950s. For example, in September that year it was reported that in the Penhalonga/Odzani area where a great deal of market gardening was carried on, labour shortages were being off-set by the employment of women and children.⁶⁷ Although there is no statistical evidence to suggest the employment of migrant women, it is likely that Mozambican women crossed the border to work in Manicaland. Juvenile migrant labour has been discussed in the previous chapter. Women and juvenile workers not only provided an alternative source of labour but also helped employers to keep wages low and therefore maintain or reduce their costs of production.

In the 1950s, wages were the main attracting factor for wage employment with significant advantages for manufacturing, followed by mining domestic services, transport and communications.⁶⁸ Farms were the least attractive form of employment for local adult men and migrant workers. However, given favourable international market conditions tobacco and cotton farms (mostly located in Mashonaland), were the most profitable agricultural enterprises. Although their position was not unproblematic, they became more competitive in recruiting farm labour, to the constant dissatisfaction of other agricultural sectors. Early in 1950, the labour officer described this situation thus:

⁶⁵NAZ-S1012/27: Report of the labour officer, Eastern districts, October, 1949.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., May 1950.

⁶⁸Arrighi, The political economy of Rhodesia, 217

In the Makoni area the general scramble for labour continues. Among the old established growers with reasonably good compounds and amenities there is little or no shortage but the newcomers and particularly the Afrikaner element are almost all short of labour. A considerable number of runners and touts is constantly in the area and in the localities where the shortage is particularly acute almost every employer is using some device or other to attract the labourer, advances of pay, credit in stores, additional ration and gifts, bonus payments and so on. So long as this scramble for labour by tobacco men continues it would seem likely that food producers will go short. Already there is a considerable shortage of cattle herds and labourers for tasks which cannot be performed under a 'gwaza' [task work] system.⁶⁹

The relatively high pay on tobacco farms and urban employment in Southern Rhodesia seem to have attracted more labour migration from Manica district in the 1950s. In May 1950, about 600 Mozambicans were employed in seventeen tobacco farmers in Makoni and comprised about 80 to 100 per cent of employees. However, in Melsetter along the border with Mossurize district, in the Rhodesian Wattle Company, which employed about 1,500 workers, Mozambican labourers represented approximately 80 per cent.⁷⁰

As already discussed above, due to foreign competition and African forced contract labour, in Manica the less capitalised white farmers found it difficult to retain local African labour. Although Mozambican migrants represented a great proportion of the farm labourers in Manicaland and Mashonaland, an increasing number of Manicans preferred employment in railways and in the urban area of Umtali, and merely used farm employment as a transit to Salisbury.⁷¹ According to Rhodesian labour officer:

There has been a marked increase in the number of Portuguese natives seeking work in Umtali and enquiries at the Municipal Pass Office shows that passes to seek work have recently been issued to the number of some 600 per week mostly to natives from PEA [Mozambique]. Notwithstanding this influx the shortage in rural areas particularly in general farming continues... There is no shortage at all in Umtali urban area. Most of the labour offering is from Portuguese territory, but it is noteworthy that whilst the supply in town is plentiful contractors who require labour in the rural areas are unable to obtain it in town. The problem of

⁶⁹NAZ-S1012/40: Report of labour officer, Eastern Districts, January, February and May 1950.

⁷⁰NAZ-S1012/40: Report of labour officer, Eastern Districts, May 1950.

⁷¹NAZ-S1012/40: Report of labour officer, Eastern Districts, February-June 1950; NAZ-S2239: Native Labour reports, 1953-1954..

how to attract labour to the rural areas is one, which will no doubt continue to exercise our minds for some time to come.⁷²

The economic boom of the mid-1950s and the impact of ecological calamities such as drought and starvation which followed bad harvested seasons seem to have saturated local enterprises with increasing number of immigrants coming from as far as Angola and Tanganyika. Also the change over from a rationing system and monthly pay to the payment of cash allowances on a weekly basis may have mobilised Manicans to cross the border for wage employment in eastern districts of Manicaland.

According to Portuguese sources, in 1952 the total number of Mozambicans at work in Rhodesia was over 200,000. In that year there about 5,000 Mozambicans were employed in Umtali against 4,000 from Nyasaland, 1,358 from Northern Rhodesia, about 400 from Tanganyika and around 250 from Angola. In March 1954, the bulk of the Mozambican workers registered in Umtali rose to about 7,500 as against 5,700 from Nyasaland and 2,400 from Northern Rhodesia. About 6,000 from Tete were also registered.⁷³ With such a wave of migrant labour the Umtali labour officer claimed that overall the labour supply was more plentiful than it had been for very many years. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Mozambican immigrants in Southern Rhodesia outnumbered those from both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.⁷⁴

Despite the apparent labour surplus in Rhodesia, Manicans still migrated in great numbers.⁷⁵ Thus, between 1954 and 1957 an average of 11,000 adult men were

⁷²NAZ-S1012/40: Report of labour officer, Eastern Districts, February-June 1950. Although the establishment of Bus services from Honde and Umtali to Penhalonga seems to have countered labour diversion by clandestine recruiters, migrant labourers still deserted their employers after some time.

⁷³ NAZ-S2239: Southern Rhodesia Native Labour reports of November 1953 and March 1954.

⁷⁴See Annual Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Salisbury, 1952; Kay, Rhodesia: A human geography, 64. See also tables in appendix three and four.

⁷⁵However this apparent surplus of African labour was caused by recession in some industries and the increased wages under the new wage regulations which caused many employers to economise in labour.

migrating annually from Chimoio, Manica and Mossurize to Southern Rhodesia.⁷⁶ As cotton and tobacco production in Southern Rhodesia experienced a market-led boom, more acres were planted and therefore more hands, especially cheap hands, were needed particularly in peak periods.⁷⁷ In addition, defying local labour regulations, some Portuguese traders turned into labour pirates and engaged themselves in smuggling labour across the border, especially through Honde and Penhalonga.

In 1956 for example, a storekeeper in Penhalonga was denounced by other local farmers and convicted of smuggling about thirty workers a day. They crossed the border by night through Inhamucarara (Penhalonga) village to supply labour to the Stapleford Timber Forestry in Penhalonga. Men, both young and adult, were recruited as far as Sena and housed in his store about three miles from the border. They were often enticed with food and served with five liters of wine before being sold to Rhodesia for five pounds each.⁷⁸

Labour supply in Southern Rhodesia expanded to a peak in the late 1950s and gradually the role of the RNLSC became less important as the main supplier. In 1958 *Ulere* services were also abolished. In this period Southern Rhodesia was undergoing a period of recession, especially in the manufacturing industry. The agricultural crisis (drought and epizootic) which in general affected southern Africa in the mid-1950s, may have also contributed for increasing flow of clandestine migrants to Southern Rhodesia (especially in urban areas). Owing to increasing unemployment in the urban areas, the administrative authorities now imposed new legislative measures to counteract any further influx of foreign labour, especially from Mozambique. The Foreign Migrant Labour Act of 1958 prevented foreigners from seeking work in the main urban centres

⁷⁶AHM-FGDB, Cx 641: Recrutamento de trabalhadores indígenas, 1954-1957; AHM-FGG, No. 721: Relatório da direcção dos serviços dos negócios indígenas e da curadoria geral de Moçambique, 1958.

⁷⁷For more discussions on African tobacco labour supply and its efficiency see, Hodder-Williams, White farmers in Rhodesia, 191-212; F.A. Stinson, Tobacco farming in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1889-1956, Rhodesia Tobacco Board of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, s.d. (c. 1957), 67-68.

⁷⁸CEM-AM: Administração do Concelho de Manica - Auto e Inquirição de testemunhas contra o arguido Cândido Casimiro de Carvalho, 1956.

other than Umtali, particularly in farms and plantations.⁷⁹ In fact, white farmers reacted angrily against the Bill as they were still dependent upon foreign cheap labour.⁸⁰ As a result, foreign workers were encouraged to work on farms and plantations in Umtali and eastern districts, which to a considerable extent still depended on Mozambican workers particularly from Manica province. In 1958 about 52,000 Mozambican immigrants were registered in Rhodesia, while in 1959 and 1961 an average of 12-13,000 Mozambicans were registered annually in Umtali.⁸¹

In the late 1950s, the authorities in Manica still recognised the continuous flight of local workers to Southern Rhodesia as a result of the unattractive wages and work conditions prevailing locally. Some areas like Dombe and Mossurize still lacked economic enterprises and were regarded as labour reserves and forced cotton production areas. More freedom, a relatively short journey, amenities and social entertainments such as football and cinema which did not exist in Manica, were viewed as additional reasons behind the migration.⁸² In fact, local peasants, including some with literacy and training, regarded Rhodesia as the right place to find jobs and get higher wages to satisfying their social needs, to prepare for marriage or to purchase agricultural implements. Although some migrants opted to remain and reside in Southern Rhodesia, the majority, particularly across the border in Penhalonga, Rotanda, Mavonde and Machipanda, seem to have combined wage employment with their periodic return to rural households.

Mozambican workers in Rhodesia were not passive victims of colonial capitalism. They also joined their Rhodesian and Nyasa workmates in varied forms of collective bargaining and developed a form of worker consciousness. These forms of collective

⁷⁹Kay, Rhodesia: A human geography, 64-65; Clarke, Agricultural and plantations workers in Rhodesia, 18, 31, 263-265; See also Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 1960.

⁸⁰ See Southern Rhodesia Assembly Legislative Debates, 1958.

⁸¹ Informação da Sub-delegação do Instituto do Trabalho e Previdência Social, Umtali, 28 June 1965, by José T. Garrido. (Private papers in possession by João de Deus, Tete)

⁸² See, CEM-AM: Nota No. 873/B/17/1 da administração do concelho de Manica ao Secretário do distrito de Manica e Sofala, 14 Abril 1956; AHM-FGDB, Cx 41: Inspeção aos concelhos de Chimoio e Manica e circunscrição de Mossurize e Gorongosa, 1954-1957; AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária do Concelho de Manica, 1962.

consciousness including experience of political associations were also extrapolated back home and used as important weapons for challenging Portuguese colonial policy. In the following chapters I concentrate on these aspects, and in particular the processes through which African worker associations and political organizations influenced Mozambicans in developing nationalism and other forms of political consciousness.

CHAPTER 9:

MIGRANTS, BURIAL SOCIETIES, TRADE UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS UP TO THE 1950S.

Introduction

Studies of labour migration to Southern Rhodesia covering this period still concentrate on the analysis of its importance in the labour process, particularly the position of labour institutions and state bodies regarding the value of migrants for the local and regional labour market. Issues of culture, migrant associations, identity, collective consciousness and nationalism amongst migrants are barely investigated. Although B. Raftopoulos's study of nationalism and labour in Southern Rhodesia regards migrant labour, especially in Salisbury, as one of the factors intensifying local discontent, he does not explore these complexities. There is a tendency in the labour migration literature to assume, on the one hand, that foreign migrant workers were indifferent to labour struggles or acted as strike 'breakers', and on the other hand, that they refrained from political activity.¹ If this is true, questions still remain: why were migrants indifferent to local political organisations? What was the attitude of local trade union and political leaders towards migrant labour? How did foreign migrant labour respond to the labour movement and political organisations in Southern Rhodesia? While in this chapter I analyse the process through which Mozambican migrants organised themselves into burial societies and developed certain forms of identity and collective consciousness, in chapter ten, I will try to answer these questions, with special reference to Mozambican migrants.

Over the last two decades or so, the many academic studies on the interaction between the African labour movement and the development of nationalist organizations in Southern Rhodesia have provided fruitful debate among Zimbabwean historians, and beyond. By early 1970, Terence Ranger's *African Voice* brought new theoretical perspectives to the field and laid the foundations for subsequent debate.² Adding to the previous studies by Richard Gray and Nathan Shamuyarira, with new archival and oral

¹ For more discussion see L.W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia, white power in an African State, (Cambridge, 1973).

² Ranger, The African voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930, (London, 1970).

research, and particularly with the recording of the life histories of B. Burombo, T. Samkange and others, Ranger and Bhebe have produced new insights into the nature of Zimbabwean nationalism.³ More recently, Jonathan Hyslop, Brian Raftopoulos and Teresa Barnes have produced complementary studies emphasizing the role of the African worker movements after World War II and gender concerns, and their interaction with the development of nationalist consciousness in colonial Zimbabwe.⁴

Hyslop, who concentrates more on the role of trade unionism in Bulawayo city, argues that "the growth of the nationalist and labour movement was intimately connected, and that post-war industrial militancy provided the basis for the emergence of the modern Zimbabwean nationalist movement, and produced a major section of its leadership." He adds that unionism was a major force in inhibiting the growth of ethnic divisions within the urban African community.⁵ Brian Raftopoulos re-opened discussion on the links between nationalism and labour history in Southern Rhodesia, particularly within Salisbury townships. His study emphasizes the links between changes in rural areas and demographic changes in the city as important factors in the rise of nationalist movements, and especially for urban politics amongst Southern Rhodesian Africans.⁶ To complement these analyses, an important contribution on the role of women has been provided by Teresa Barnes. Barnes criticises labour historians for failing to recognize the influence of women on men's consciousness of themselves as dissatisfied workers. Her main argument is that "men workers went on strike and township residents

³R.Gray, The two nations, (Oxford, 1960); Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, (London, 1965); N. Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo: African politics in Zimbabwe, 1947-1958, (Harare, 1989) Ranger, Peasant consciousness and guerilla war in Zimbabwe, (Harare, 1985); Bhebe, "The nationalist struggle, 1957-1962", in Canaan Banana (ed) Turmoil and tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990, (Harare, 1989), 50-115.

⁴Jonathan Hyslop, "Trade unionism in the rise of African nationalism: Bulawayo 1945-1963", African Perspectives, 1, 1-2, (1986), 34-67; Brian Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour in Salisbury, 1953-1965", JSAS, 21,1 (1995), 79-93; and Teresa Barnes, "So that a labourer could live with his family: overlooked factors in social and economic strikes in urban colonial Zimbabwe, 1945-1952", JSAS, 21,1 (March, 1995), 95-113.

⁵Hyslop, "Trade unionism", 35. Early studies from this perspective included C. M. Brand, "Politics and African Trade Unionism in Rhodesia since Federation" Rhodesian History, 2, (1971), 89-109; Oliver B. Pollak, "The impact of the Second World War on African labour organization in Rhodesia", The Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7,3, (1973), 121-137.

⁶ Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour in Salisbury", *passim*.

organized campaigns to a significant extent because they were terribly concerned about the effects of capitalist development on urban women and children."⁷

In these works there is a great deal of concern about the role of African leaders. Some over-ideological studies analyse the role of leaders with the benefit of hindsight, rather than analysing their importance in their chronological framework. However, there is a consensus that Zimbabwean leaders, perhaps with the exception of Benjamin Burombo, used trade-unions and worker associations as 'political stepping stones'. As Hyslop notes, many of the most prominent leaders, especially in Bulawayo, "came from the social milieu of the township elite, into which they had risen either by attaining success in education or by doing well in business. Often their aim in becoming involved in unionism was to carve out a political base for themselves."⁸

1. Burial societies, ethnic associations and Mozambican migrants before World War II.

Before World War II the economy of Southern Rhodesia was based on agriculture and mining. Although there were other economic enterprises, the bulk of African labour was concentrated in agriculture, coalfields and gold mines, and the great majority of workers in these sectors was drawn from Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique).⁹ Although the percentage of Southern Rhodesian Africans in the mine labour force had increased from 26.9 per cent in 1924 to about 29 per cent in the 1930s, many local Africans tended to be employed on small mines in the villages, where the workers lived with their wives and families.¹⁰

In fact, before the Great Depression Southern Rhodesian Africans managed to avoid working in local mines. In 1927 the Shamva mines had only employed 145 (4.2 per cent)

⁷ Barnes, "So that a labour could live with his family", passim.

⁸ Hyslop, "Trade unionism", 42-43.

⁹ See tables in appendix three and four.

¹⁰ Ranger, *The African voice*, 139. For more details on labour force in this period, see chapter eight.

local African labourers, compared to 3,284 migrant workers¹¹ If they did not stay in their villages cultivating their plots, Southern Rhodesian peasants were employed in European agriculture or they emigrated to South Africa. This trend intensified in the late 1920s, owing to the pressure of population on African land and the collapse of African commercial agriculture as a means of raising money. Some, however, particularly those who had had some schooling, sought work in domestic service, as messengers in offices and stores, and as workers on the railways and in the incipient industries.

As noted above, Mozambican labour migration to Southern Rhodesia had its roots in the late 1890s, and involved people from various provinces, particularly Tete, Manica, Sofala and Zambezia, and to a lesser extent from Niassa and southern Mozambique. However, it was only with the 1913 'Tete Agreement' that the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) officially recruited Mozambican migrants from Tete. This agreement prohibited migrants from other parts of the territory from engaging in wage labour in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, many Mozambicans ignored such restrictions and departed to Rhodesia in search of a "better life". Under Portuguese colonial legislation, those who crossed the border illegally were then designated 'clandestine' migrants.

Although the majority seems to have been employed in the forestry and farming sectors, especially in tobacco and tea plantations in the eastern districts, there were also many Mozambicans employed on the railways, in industry and mines, particularly in Umtali (Mutare), Salisbury (Harare), Bulawayo, Gwelo and Hartley.¹² In 1927 there were 296 Mozambican workers in Shamva mine (8.6 per cent of the total).¹³ In 1933 the number of Mozambican mine workers in Southern Rhodesia was estimated at about 4,658. This number rose to about 9,534 in 1937.¹⁴ However, around that time, more than double that number were employed on farms in Mashonaland area.¹⁵

¹¹I. R. Phimister, "The Shamva Mine strike of 1927: An emerging African proletariat", Rhodesian History, 2, (1971), 87.

¹² For more details on labour migration to commercial farms see chapter above.

¹³Phimister, "The Shamva Mine strike of 1927", 87.

¹⁴Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia, Annual Report, 1937.

¹⁵Southern Rhodesia Statistical Year book, 1938. See also chapter eight.

The pattern of the African labour market before the 1940s probably contributed to the development of a certain type of labour movement. For instance, local African associations, such as the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association (RBVA) or the Rhodesian Native Association (RNA) rarely spoke for the interests of working population, especially workers clustered in mining compounds. Although RBVA and RNA members living in municipal locations, especially in Bulawayo and Salisbury, may have interacted with African workers, not only from Southern Rhodesia but also from the neighbouring territories, they were more concerned with issues such as land shortage, dipping fees and de-stocking than they were with wage rates or the conditions of work.¹⁶ These associations also paid little attention to migrant labour grievances. As a result the labour movement on the mines remained cut off from the emergent industrial and political activity of the rest of Southern Rhodesia.¹⁷

However, later on, migrant labourers joined local industrial and political organisations to express their grievances. Labour unrest and mine strikes provide important evidence of this. Moreover, miners developed forms of social, religious and recreational organisations as a means of communication among themselves. These forms of organization were established through a variety of ethnic associations and burial societies.

In some mines, religious movements played an important ideological role. For instance, Watch Tower and other religious groups afforded African workers new radical ideas, especially against the white presence. Mining compounds in Shamva, Globe and Phoenix, Wankie, Que Que, Gwelo and others, were under the influence of the Watch Tower movement in the 1920s. Brought from Nyasaland into Southern Rhodesia, the Watch Tower movement soon developed complex links throughout central and southern Africa. Administrative authorities and compound managers in Southern Rhodesia were deeply suspicious of the movement. Although some compound managers were lenient, the majority always kept their eye on Watch Tower leaders, fearing its connection with the labour movement. Ten years after the Watch Tower established an effective presence

¹⁶Ranger, *The African voice*, 138-141.

¹⁷Ibid, 141.

in Southern Rhodesia, some mines, like the Shamva in 1927, experienced unrest and strikes. The Shamva strike involved some three-and-a half thousand mine workers who had been co-ordinated by mutual-aid associations and the Watch Tower movement.¹⁸

The number and designations of burial societies were diverse. The major regional African societies were among others, the Tete Burial Society; the Nyasaland Burial Society; the 'Port Herald' Burial Society; the Mozambique Native Association; the Gazaland Burial Society; the Matabele Home Society; the Angoni Burial Society; the Ayawo Burial Society; and the Sena Burial Society.¹⁹ Like other African migrant workers, especially from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Mozambican migrants scattered throughout Southern Rhodesian mines and cities, were also organized into various burial societies or associations reflecting their ethnic diversity.

The need for mutual support, especially in funeral ceremonies, led migrants to organize themselves into self-aid societies. According to van Onselen: "... black workers in various parts of Rhodesia had met on an informal and social basis: weekend compound dances, 'big dinners' and 'tea meetings' - each with their own distinctive roots - formed a base from which other activities and organisations could grow."²⁰

In fact, the first burial society in Southern Rhodesia seems to have been established by Mozambican migrants, who founded the Tete Burial Society in 1918. The reasons behind its establishment seem to have been related to sickness and death caused by the influenza epidemic among migrant workers. According to *The African Weekly* of Southern Rhodesia, the first African to set up a mutual-aid society in Salisbury was 'Chief' Zuse Komasho who came from Tete.

Mr. Komasho came to Salisbury in 1905 and has been residing in the Harare Township ever since that time. In 1918 he influenced his fellowmen to form a

¹⁸Ranger, *The African voice*, 143-147.

¹⁹See T. Yoshikuni, "Strike action and self-help associations: Zimbabwean worker protest and culture after the World War I", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 15,3, (April, 1989), 441-468; Phimister, "The Shamva Mine", passim; Van Onselen, *Chibaro*, passim.

²⁰van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 198.

burial society which is now known as Tete Burial Society No.1. As a result of his initiative, many other tribes in the Township followed his example and formed their own burial societies. ... Mr. Komasho was a moving spirit behind his people and all will live to remember his leadership which enabled them to come together and help one another in time of sickness and death.²¹

In the following decades, branches of the Tete Burial Society were established throughout the territory, particularly on the mines and in other industrial centres of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. With the establishment of the Tete Burial Society, other ethnic groups from Mozambique established their own burial societies with branches in many employment areas. These included the Zumbo Burial Society, the Sena Burial Society, the Quelimane Burial Society, the Beira Burial Society and the Ayawo Burial Society.²² Migrants from other territories also followed the example of the Tete Burial Society and organized themselves along similar lines.

These mutual-aid societies were mainly established as a response to the hardships of World War and the flu epidemic which swept almost all territories in southern Africa. In Salisbury it was reported that 300 Africans died from influenza and more than 2,000 were confined in an isolation camp.²³ van Onselen stresses the importance of funeral services stating that: "With cash in short supply and death never a distant prospect, there must have been considerable appeal in the promise that, 'if one of our society dies, the society will buy a coffin for the dead body, and bury him nicely'."²⁴

However to buy a coffin and to bury the dead migrant nicely was not the only main concern of the members of the burial societies. It was also very important to inform the relatives in his home-village about the fate of the dead migrant. As Peter Delius noted in relation to Sekhukhuneland migrants in the Transvaal, "bringing back the bodies of dead men was considered necessary to ensure a proper and harmonious relationship between

²¹ *African Weekly* 19 October 1955; see also Yoshikuni, "Strike action and self-help", 497.

²² See list of Mozambican burial societies in Southern Rhodesia in: Correspondência confidencial da delegação do Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social (ITPAS) em Salisbury, para o Presidente do ITPAS, em Lourenço Marques, Salisbury, 1965. Personal files with Mr. João de Deus, Tete, 1993.

²³ Yoshikuni, "Strike action and self-help", 497.

the living and the dead".²⁵ This can also be applied to Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia. In African communities in Mozambique as in South Africa ancestors and their graves played an important part in the life and affairs of their close kin.

Although burial societies were initially more concerned with organising funerals for the workers who had died in the compounds or locations, they also provided African migrant workers with some sort of security. Migrant workers who became unfit, sick or injured found in their country-mates the necessary support to return home. Indeed, these burial societies functioned as mutual-aid societies and were generally established on an ethnic or regional basis. Burial societies thus acted as welfare organisations among workers, supporting their members in time of stress. From the following account of the activities of such associations, it seems clear also that non-ethnic perspectives were also part of the associative milieu.

The role of burial societies as welfare organisations was particularly important in the economic depressions of the 1920s and 1930s. Although burial societies were organised on an ethnic and regional basis, in some areas or mines, their members were drawn from workers of different provenance. This tendency may have been the result of minor representation of certain groups of migrants who sought protection from their work-mates regardless their origin. Further, ethnic identity was not always exclusive or restrictive to one country. For example, Nyanja, Chewa and Nyasas were both from Mozambique and Nyasaland. This was probably important in the case of cultural events. For instance, in the mid-1920s the 'Port Herald' Burial Society at Shamva mine had its membership drawn largely from Mozambique and its leaders were Mozambican migrants.²⁶ On the other hand, the Mozambique Native Association in Gwelo (Midland), was not confined to Mozambicans. Membership in this association included natives of other territories. Although the number of 'Nyasas' in Penhalonga and Rezende mines in

²⁴van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 199. For comparative purpose see similar accounts in Transvaal by Peter Delius, *A lion amongst the cattle*, (Oxford, 1996), chapter one and two.

²⁵ Delius, *A lion amongst the cattle*, 90-91. This is an interesting issue which deserves more anthropological and sociological research.

²⁶Phimister, "The Shamva Mine", 83.

the Umtali district was insignificant, all mine workers joined the Nyasaland Beni Society.²⁷

Ethnic associations and burial societies not only dealt with mutual-aid or funeral ceremonies, but also served as communication links with their home-villages, and helped migrants to retain their social and cultural identity. Apart from providing newcomers with important networks for seeking employment, these associations also facilitated contacts between village-mates working in different areas. Drinking, dancing and debating issues about home communities complemented their welfare activities.

To stress the importance of African societies as the main organisation among workers I may borrow from van Onselen who remarks that:

The dance, ethnic and mutual aid associations attempted to address themselves in a systematic way to the problems and pressures that were part of life in the black mining communities: through practising rather than preaching, they sought to offer immediate and tangible assistance to miners left vulnerable in an exploited situation.²⁸

As burial societies became the main instrument of the labour associations in the mining compounds and townships, they embodied a much wider social entity, and therefore constituted a prelude to labour organization or trade unionism amongst African workers.²⁹

With the economic recovery after the crisis of the 1930s, Southern Rhodesian economic enterprises demanded large quantities of labour at as cheap a price as possible. Foreign migrant labour was also encouraged. With the increasing number of white immigrants demanding more fertile land, the administrative authorities passed new land legislation

²⁷ For more details on the importance of Beni Society see Terence Ranger, Dance and society in eastern Africa 1890-1970, (London, 1975).

²⁸ van Onselen, Chibaro, 225.

²⁹ van Onselen, "Worker consciousness in black miners: Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1920s", Journal of African History, XIV, 2 (1973), 237-255.

and established stringent legal measures in order to protect farmer's workers, although it may have had the effect of undermining African prosperity. Although African peasants could enjoy the market stimulus provided by the increasing demand of foodstuffs in mines and towns, the overpopulation of the reserves made their situation worse.

As Bhebe points out: "By 1943, many of the reserves were in a deplorable state. First, some parts of the reserves could not support people because of the scarcity of water, while others were already ruined by overpopulation, overstocking and destructive methods of cultivation."³⁰ The disruption of the peasant economy contributed to undermining African subsistence; an increasing number of local men were pushed off the rural areas and integrated into the urban labour market.

As for Mozambique, following the publication of Salazar's Colonial Act of 1930, and the need to supply Portuguese industry with raw materials, particularly cotton, the colonial state in enacted new administrative measures to bring peasants into the market economy, either as crop-producers or as labourers. Adding to these trends, the large sugar, tea, citrus and coconuts plantations, as well as settler farmers, in Manica, Buzi and Zambézia reinforced their pressures on local African peasants. As a result, a stream of Mozambican migrants entered Southern Rhodesia, running away from forced contract labour and cotton growing. Migrants from these places searched for wage employment in Southern Rhodesia's mines, industries, railways, civil construction, farms and domestic services.³¹

Before World War II, African organization in Southern Rhodesia was divided between urban and rural areas, and its leadership was restricted to a minority of educated Africans and independent farmers in the Native Purchase Areas. This pattern of organization was mainly reflected on the Rhodesian Bantu Voters' Association, whose members were more concerned with their individual interests. As Richard Gray records, they were concerned with the need to gain recognition of their status as advanced or civilized individuals.³²

³⁰Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo, 20.

³¹For more details on the factors of migration in central Mozambique, see chapter eight.

³²Gray, The Two Nations, 315.

The first appeal to the ordinary people rose from trade unionist leaders, especially in Bulawayo and Salisbury. These leaders, were inspired by the South African Industrial and Commercial Workers Union under Clements Kadalie's leadership.³³ It is not surprising that African movements in that period were patterned on South Africa, because there were strong links through labour migration in the region, particularly to the South African economic complex. Robert Sambo, a migrant worker from Nyasaland, played a key role in mobilizing workers in Bulawayo and Salisbury.³⁴ The Industrial and Commercial Worker's Union (ICU), then the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Worker's Union (RICU), seems to have been the first African mass movement in Southern Rhodesia during the interwar period.

In the early 1930s, Charles L. Mzingeli in Salisbury and Masoja Ndlovu in Bulawayo, were the most outstanding leaders of the African movement in Southern Rhodesia. The Independent Industrial and Commercial Worker's Union of Rhodesia was more concerned with the labour movement in towns, particularly Salisbury and Bulawayo, than with rural workers. In fact, in the 1930s the ICU established branches in Salisbury, Gatooma, Shabani, Gwelo and Que-Que.³⁵

However, although the towns may have provided an appropriate industrial environment for trade unionism, the ICU faced many difficulties in fulfilling its tasks as a trade-union organization. As Ranger stresses, "The ICU itself was effective in terms of exhortation, stimulation, and education. But it was not effective in terms of organization. It did not really function as a Trade Union at all."³⁶ Moreover, although ICU leaders had shown a great deal of interest in the mining compounds, their ineffective action precluded miners from joining trade unions.³⁷

According to Ranger, one of the main reasons for the trade-union ineffectiveness was the preponderance of relatively unskilled African labour in industries and mines. This group

³³Owest, "Pan-Africanism", 268-69.

³⁴Ranger, *African Voice*, 151.

³⁵Ranger, *African voice*, 164.

³⁶Ranger, *African voice*, 165; Brand, "Politics and African Trade Unionism", 50, called them proto-trade-union.

of workers was particularly swelled by foreign migrant labour brought to Southern Rhodesia from neighbouring territories, especially Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Mozambique. As a result, the Zimbabwean historiography has been suggesting that the presence of foreign cheap labour may have weakened the bargaining power of local African trade union, and that they were also marginalised in the local political movement. This meant that foreign migrant workers, including Mozambicans, might have developed their own sense of collective and worker consciousness. Although this assumption may be true for the period before the World War II, from my own evidence of the late 1940s and the 1950s, it seems that Mozambican migrant worker associations were also precursors to worker organisations and joined collective bargaining and political activities.

Among several worker associations scattered in Salisbury and Bulawayo, the Bulawayo Location Mozambique Club and the Northern Rhodesian (Zambian) Bantu Association were the only migrant associations recognized by the municipality in Bulawayo.³⁸ The Matabele Home Society was the main communicator amongst Ndebele people.³⁹ The Tete Burial Society No.1, was still the major African association amongst Mozambican migrants in Salisbury.

³⁷Ranger, *African voice*, 166, 167.

³⁸ According to my informant, Samuel Dinga, in 1939 the Bulawayo Location Mozambique Club was denominated Mozambique Beira Club until 1961 when the Portuguese officials urged them to label its designation with the word 'Portuguese' "to show that we are Mozambican [sic]. So we changed to Portuguese Beira Club to avoid political problems", added. More on this last aspect is detailed below. See my interview in Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 31 January 1998.

³⁹Ranger, *African voice*, 148.

2. World War II, migrant labour and worker consciousness.

The outbreak of World War II brought about significant changes in the Southern Rhodesian economy and had a great impact on African life. With the shortage of agricultural produce and the increasing demand for manufactured products, rapid industrial development took place in Southern Rhodesia. Secondary industry became the largest sector of the Rhodesian economy. After the War, industrial growth continued to expand the number of manufacturing enterprises were estimated at about 435 in 1946 and about 724 in 1952.⁴⁰ The growing number of enterprises, particularly in Bulawayo and Salisbury, demanded a greater number of African workers.⁴¹ After the war, the number of African workers rose from 45,993 in 1946 to about 75,249 in 1951.⁴² This big jump suggests that the massive immigration from the UK and South Africa and fresh capital investment immediately after the war (especially after 1948) was as important as the war in stimulating economic growth and African urbanisation. In Bulawayo, industrialization also produced an increase in the number of African workers, from 18,211 to 52,553 between 1941 and 1946. The number of African employees in manufacturing industry increased by 96 per cent and the African municipal labour force increased by 113 per cent.⁴³ The influx of labour into the urban areas also included a significant number of women, primarily as domestic labour.⁴⁴

Many Mozambican workers were employed in Umtali, Salisbury and Bulawayo in various sectors such as construction, textiles, brick and tiles works, milling companies, mines, farms, domestic services, etc. In this period, the number of Mozambican migrants

⁴⁰Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour", 81.

⁴¹ Ibid. In Salisbury, for example the number of Africans grew from 22,126 in 1936 to about 28,119 in 1941.

⁴²Ibid. According to Pollak, "The Impact of the second World War", 122, African urban density increased on the order of almost ten per cent per year.

⁴³Hyslop, "Trade unionism", 36.

⁴⁴Pollak, "The Impact of the second World War", 122. For more details on the role of women in the formation of political movements see, Timothy Scameccia, "Poor women and nationalist politics: Alliances and fissures in the formation of a nationalist political movement in Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1950-6", *Journal of African History*, 37 (1996), 283-310.

rose to figures never reached before, and to some extent superseded those from Northern Rhodesia.⁴⁵ Mozambican migrants were not homogeneous. Although the majority were barely literate, some were semi-literate. Others did not even know how to speak Portuguese. As already mentioned in chapter seven, in areas bordering Southern Rhodesia people were not very interested in learning Portuguese as it was seen as a language not useful for job. In fact, those who managed to attend local or farm schools in Southern Rhodesia could speak and write in Shona and English.

During the 1940s, African labourers in Southern Rhodesia developed a worker consciousness, and gradually workers' associations superseded ethnic associations as the main labour organisations. The question is how foreign migrant labourers, particularly Mozambicans, perceived this process and how they interacted with Rhodesian workers. Although I have little evidence of their action in this period, it is probable that Mozambicans were not alien to labour struggles. Although the Portuguese authorities, through the *Curadoria* (Department of Portuguese African Affairs), threatened anyone who joined work stoppages with expatriation, Mozambican migrants played an important role, not only within trade-union movement, but also in the struggles for a better life in the townships, and eventually joined political movements in the 1950s.⁴⁶ However, it is important to recognise that there were many, particularly among the unskilled, who did not want to expose themselves or risk their jobs in joining these movements.

As we have seen, the industrialization during and after the war, produced an enormous working class in the cities and caused the rapid degeneration of social conditions. Wage stagnation, inflation and the inadequacy of housing and sanitation and welfare services caused profound grievances and drove workers into strikes in the 1940s. On the other hand, in rural areas, land hunger combined with the effects of drought and bad harvests resulted in a steady decline in the ability of the rural areas to provide subsistence for workers and their families. In 1942, between 700 and 1,200 African workers at Shabani Asbestos Mine went on strike demanding better pay and food. In the same year about

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶ For more details on political connections see below.

200 railway workers in Bulawayo refused to accept rations, asking for pay in its place. The 1942 strike was a prelude of the more countrywide strikes of 1945 and 1948.⁴⁷

Starting with wages as the dominant issue, African workers gradually expressed their complaints on a much wider political front. Their political awareness was thereafter ignited by the involvement of political leaders. However, conflicts over power amongst political leaders threatened to jeopardize the African labour movement and political organizations.⁴⁸ Although some leaders like, Savanhu, Jason Moyo, Patrick Makoni, Mzingeli and Burombo tried to unite the movement, their personal ambitions made it very difficult to succeed.⁴⁹ The turning point in this process seems to have been marked by the 1948 general strike. With increasing inflation and low level wages, aggravated by drought in 1947, many protests resurfaced and tested the strength of African worker organisations.

In 1948 people felt more hardships and could not wait for the negotiations by the African Voice and Federation of Bulawayo African Workers' Union with the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister. In parallel to negotiations with the government, the Bantu Congress tried to persuade workers not to strike. The *Bulawayo Chronicle* of 12 April 1948 reported the Bantu Congress position in following terms: "Don't strike now!". However, workers defied that slogan when on 14 April, after long hours meeting at Stanley Square in Bulawayo Location, a crowd of about 20,000 participants with slogans "*Tshaya, Tshaya*" (Kick, kick) went on strike and violence.⁵⁰ Soon after, the strike spread throughout the country including places as far as Gatooma, Fort Victoria, Selukwe and Umtali.⁵¹ For example, about 2,000 African workers went on strike at the Rezende Mines demanding a £15 monthly wage. In a meeting held with representatives of the Native Labour Office in Umtali, the mine management, the Provincial Native Commissioner, the Portuguese

⁴⁷Pollak, "The Impact of the Second World War", 122-127.

⁴⁸ See Ranger, *Aspects of Central African History*, 236.

⁴⁹ See Bhebe, *Benjamin Burombo*, chapters six and seven.

⁵⁰ The railway and municipal workers in Bulawayo took the lead and persuaded all the workers in the city to join them. See, AHM-FNI, Cx 108: Informação da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas sobre o relatório do Curador dos Indígenas portugueses na Rodésia do Sul, 1941-1949.

⁵¹ Pollack, "The second World War", 132.

Curator and the labour committee, they demanded new wages arguing that in South Africa miners were getting seven pounds per week.⁵²

During the general strike of 1948, a labour committee composed of twelve members in representation of various work sectors, was set up in Umtali. António Rapozo, a Mozambican worker from Zambézia, joined the committee in representing industrial workers.⁵³ Although Mozambicans participated in this unrest with their worker-fellows, because they were being monitored by the Portuguese Curator, some of them were convicted and expatriated to Mozambique and eventually deported to S.Tomé island for being involved in strikes.⁵⁴ For example, in February 1949, some 37 migrants from Manica and Tete provinces were deported to S.Tomé.⁵⁵ In addition, the Portuguese authorities suspected Mozambicans were being influenced by the Watch Tower Church and Zion churches in general, which they said were spreading 'subversive' ideas. They were particularly alarmed by the spread of slogans such as 'Africa for the Africans!'.⁵⁶

Pollak assessed the significance of the 1948 general strike for the future of African organisation in Southern Rhodesia in the following terms:

The general strike was a turning point in African consciousness and tactics. The results were meagre and there was disillusionment with general strike tactics and purely economic action. Burombo's Voice turned to active recruitment in rural areas. The RICU in Salisbury turned to contesting local elections...Politics was in fact the tactic of the future...⁵⁷

⁵²The presence of the Portuguese curator may confirm that majority of such workers threatening or on strike were Mozambicans. See AHM-FNI, Cx 108: Informação da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas .

⁵³See NAZ-S1012/27: Native Commissioner Office, Umtali, 1949.

⁵⁴AHM-FNI, Cx 108: Informação da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas.

⁵⁵See, AHM-FGDB, Cx 957: Casos de emigração para S. Tomé guia N°462/50 da Intendência do distrito de Tete e da administração da circunscrição de Chimoio, 18 February 1949.

⁵⁶Two other migrants were also deported to S. Tome in February 1949 because of their involvement in Zionism activity. AHM-FGDB; Cx 957: Casos de emigração para S. Tomé guia N°462/50 da Intendência do distrito de Tete, 18 February 1949; AHM-FNI, Cx 108: Informação da Repartição Central dos Negócios Indígenas sobre o relatório do Curador dos Indígenas portugueses na Rodésia do Sul, 1941-1949.

⁵⁷Pollak, "The Impact of the second World War", 134.

An analysis of urban-rural connections is important for understanding the nature and process of proletarianization and the way it shaped labour struggles and the nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia.⁵⁸ With the maturation of the nationalist movement in the 1950s, it became clear that the rural and urban grievances were part of the same problem. Norma Kriger explores this aspect by analysing the relationship between the African educated elite and other Africans and their influence on African mass nationalism in the period before the late 1950s. She also stresses that this period has been characterized in divergent ways: "One view is that African elites were conscious of their links to the masses because racial discrimination ensured their marginality to European society. Others have commented on the political gap between the African elite and other Africans because of the former's identification with Europeans."⁵⁹ Terence Ranger presents a tentative response to this discussion in his book on the Samkange family.⁶⁰ The following section will bring us much closer to those events that combined political movements and labour struggles.⁶¹ The events of the 1950s provide more evidence of the complexities of the relationship between Mozambican migrants and Southern Rhodesian workers and politics.

3. The turning point: Migrants, trade unionism and seeds for nationalism in the early 1950s.

With the establishment of the Central African Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, Southern Rhodesia experienced an unprecedented economic boom, which eventually led to a relative increase in the wages of the unskilled workers. As secondary industry continued to expand, a larger number of African workers was also employed. In 1953 the number of Africans employed in this sector was

⁵⁸See Peter Harris, "Industrial workers in Rhodesia, 1946-1972: Working class élites or lumpenproletariat?", *JSAS*, 1-2, (1975), 139-161.

⁵⁹Norma J. Kriger, *Zimbabwe's guerrilla war*, (Cambridge, New York, 1992), 71.

⁶⁰Ranger, *Are we not also men?*, 90-120.

⁶¹See Hyslop, "Trade unionism", 34 critique to A. Turner, "The growth of railway unionism in Rhodesia, in R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen (eds.), *The development of an African working class*, (London, 1977), 99-128.

estimated at about 70,000.⁶² Despite this economic growth, however, changes in conditions for Africans were very slow. In some cases, particularly in mines and farms, labour conditions even deteriorated.⁶³ Although some of the African élite may have enjoyed improved socio-economic opportunities, in general the situation in rural areas remained stagnant or even worsened. In the cities, African workers faced housing problems, increased poverty and segregation.⁶⁴ As a result, the mid-1950s witnessed a series of strikes in mines, and protests on the railways and in some industries.

In general, in the cities of Bulawayo and Salisbury foreign migrants outnumbered local workers, and the same is true for the mines. For example, in 1952, 80.74 per cent of African labour in Salisbury municipality was from Nyasaland and Mozambique. According to Raftopoulos, by 1956, 40 per cent of Salisbury's working population came from Mozambique, while 20 per cent was from Nyasaland and the remaining 40 per cent from Southern Rhodesia.⁶⁵ In 1954, 73.2 per cent of the workers on the mines were 'foreign' Africans compared to 26.8 per cent who were Southern Rhodesian. Between 1954 and 1957, about 10,000 Mozambicans were employed on the mines.⁶⁶ In February 1954, about 9,000 African workers at Wankie colliery mines went on strike. In the same month, about 6,000 African workers called for strike action in Bulawayo and refused to hear the appeals of Joshua Nkomo and Gray Bango for negotiations. They demanded a

⁶²Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour", 85.

⁶³I. Phimister and van Onselen, "African labour conditions and health in the Southern Rhodesian mining industry 1898-1953", Studies in the history of African mine labour in colonial Zimbabwe, (Gwelo, 1978), 102-151.

⁶⁴The hostels provided by the Council were dominated by foreign dwellers, who comprised 67 per cent of occupants in 1955. See reports of the Director of Native Administration 1954/55 - 1957/58, quoted from Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour", 82; Volker Wild, "Black Competition or white resentment? African retailers in Salisbury, 1935-1953", JSAS, 17,2, (June, 1991), 177-190; Michael O. West, "Pan-Africanism, capitalism and racial uplift; the rhetoric of African business formation in colonial Zimbabwe", African Affairs, 92, (1993), 263-283.

⁶⁵Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour", 82.

⁶⁶In 1957 they were distributed as follows: 3,252 in Bulawayo, 4,109 in Salisbury, 1,397 in Victoria, 1,270 in Hartley and 994 in Gwelo. See The Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia, Annual Report, 1957.

rise of a minimum starting wage of £7.15.0 in all local areas.⁶⁷ Mozambican migrants workers also participated actively in strikes and demonstrations. For example, Muchero Tore a migrant labourer from Maringue – Sofala who entered Southern Rhodesia in 1949, remembers those connections, particularly in Bulawayo in the 1950s.⁶⁸ Vasco Antonio M'Lapa, a migrant worker from Mutarara, remembers vividly the period between 1951 and 1954 when he joined demonstrations while working for the Supersonic company with about two hundred other Mozambicans in Bulawayo.⁶⁹

In this period, Southern Rhodesian administrative reports, and some industrial and mining managers, reported protests conducted or addressed by foreign migrants including Mozambicans. On 10th February 1954, about 600 workers in the Rhodesian Jute Industries in Umtali, went on strike following a stone-throwing episode; they demanded a fuel allowance instead of fuel in kind, and free food and a minimum wage of 25 shillings per week. Many of these strikers were from Mozambique. According to the Commissioner for Native Labour in Umtali: "The labour force consists largely of fairly raw natives from Portuguese East Africa, who, in spite of prior advice, were unable to appreciate the change over from a rationing system and monthly pay to a money economy on a weekly basis."⁷⁰

Although Mozambicans were still clustered in two major associations of the Mozambique Club in Bulawayo and the Tete Burial Society in Salisbury, they also joined local associations and political organisations in meetings or in cultural events.⁷¹ Some migrants who had married local women felt more attached to local organisations,

⁶⁷NAZ-S2239: Report of labour officer, Bulawayo, March 1954. Six migrant workers from Northern Rhodesia were expatriated because of their involvement in leading this unrest.

⁶⁸ See my interview in Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 31 January 1998.

⁶⁹ See my interview in Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 31 January 1998.

⁷⁰NAZ- S2239: Native Labour Reports, Umtali, 1953-54.

⁷¹ Isaac Antonio, a migrant worker from Mutarara came into contact with the Bulawayo Welfare Association in 1952. He used to combine his working activity with music. Between 1952 and 1954 he was invited by Joshua Nkomo to play the saxophone in the social events among local railway workers in Bulawayo. See my interview in Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 31 January 1998.

and therefore formalized their membership in these associations.⁷² Despite Tete Burial Society was dominated by migrants who were originally from Tete and Zambézia provinces, its membership was drawn from various ethnic groups and had branches everywhere, especially on the mines. However, their main language was ci-Chewa and they developed strong links with people from Nyasaland. The Mozambique Club tended to be more of an inter-ethnic organization. Apart from arranging sports and cultural activities, both associations proved to be of great importance for newcomers who generally benefited from their support. Gaveta a migrant from Tete in the mid-1940s recalls those events accurately. After working in Umtali and Marondera, in 1951 or 1952, he moved to Bulawayo where he met many people from Tete and other places. Gaveta also met a cousin who had married a Ndebele woman and owned a house, a big motor-bike, and three sewing machines and employed his own workers. Gaveta worked in the building industry as carpenter. This cousin, who helped him to find a house and paid his rent, belonged to the Tete Society and invited him to join the association. Gaveta describes the Society in following terms:

Our leader was João Ntchunga [da Chunga] from Mutarara. There were many people from Tete, Catandica, Changara and some from Beira. There were also many people speaking Chitewe, Chindau and Chimanica-Barue [Manica] all there were more than one hundred associations. They played football and boxed.⁷³ I had a work-mate who was a very good footballer. We use to watch them playing and to bet on the scores. It was very interesting. Some time in 1956 [?] the Governor-General of Mozambique Gabriel Teixeira visited Bulawayo and we bought a souvenir for him. This was handled by Chunga's daughter. We offered him so many things and we said that we were happy with his visit.⁷⁴

Sports were encouraged by local companies not only as part of recreation amongst their workers but also in the interests of social control. However, amongst migrants it reinforced their sense of community, which tended to go beyond ethnic boundaries. Singers and boxers also contributed to boost their pride and unity. In fact their

⁷²Because of violence between Shona and Ndebele supporters, Mozambicans often registered in both associations to avoid being assaulted. However, they then had to hide one or other of the cards when necessary. See interview with Muchero Tore (Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 31 January 1998).

⁷³See my interviews in Bulawayo, January 1998.

⁷⁴See my interview with Mr. Gaveta, Tete, 22 September 1993.

performance provided their countrymen, especially young boys, with some degree of prestige and advantages amongst local girls.

Prior to the 1950s, most Mozambican labour associations were still organised on an ethnic and regional perspective. According to Samuel Dinga, from Tambara, who had worked in Southern Rhodesia since 1948, "before the 1950s the ethnic [?] nation was the background organisation amongst migrants".⁷⁵ As Domingos Chauma recognised, "our notion of Mozambique was very limited to our region [Tete, Zambézia, Manica and Sofala] of provenance."⁷⁶ Indeed, even those who had completed primary schooling did not have a notion of a Mozambican nation, either geographically or culturally. At school they were taught the history and geography of Portugal and not of Mozambique. Further, they were called Portuguese natives and not Mozambican natives, or simply by their ethnic names. For instance, migrants from Tete and Zambézia felt more connected to Malawians than to their fellow-countrymen from other provinces. However, later on the nature and strategy of those associations were designed in a much wider context and a broader sense of Mozambican nationalism arose. Samuel Dinga also remarks that in the 1950s the Mozambique Club functioned as a political underground organisation.⁷⁷

Although migrants from central Mozambique constituted the majority, there was also a growing number of migrants from the south, particularly from Gaza and Inhambane provinces. The establishment in 1956 of the Limpopo railway line connecting Maputo to Matabeleland exercised enormous influence on new migration patterns to Bulawayo and the surrounding industrial areas of Shabani, Wankie, etc. Even migrants who had been working in South Africa felt attracted by the economic boom of the Federation, as well as by the relatively liberal Rhodesian government policy. According to these migrants, Rhodesia was a paradise (compared to Mozambique or South Africa).

The presence in Bulawayo of migrants from southern, central and eventually northern Mozambique may have contributed to the development of a broad sense of a

⁷⁵Interview with Samuel Dinga in Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, January, 1998.

⁷⁶Interview with Domingos Chauma, Harare, June, 1996. Chauma migrated from Tete and entered Southern Rhodesia in 1944. He had been employed in Salisbury since then.

⁷⁷Interview with Samuel Dinga in Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, January, 1998.

Mozambican "nation". However, in the 1950s there was a growing suspicion among Portuguese officials that Mozambicans were becoming involved in political activities. As a result, the Portuguese government tried to control the Mozambican associations through the *Curadoria*, and infiltrated African spies and detectives to work within these associations. As already referred above, in this period, Mozambican migrants who joined local strikes and political demonstrations were threatened with deportation.⁷⁸ By encouraging the new "Portuguese" associations the *Curadoria* hoped to encourage a sense of Portuguese nationality as a way of heading off the idea of Mozambican nationality.⁷⁹ However, activities of the Portuguese secret police and the African detectives in the early 1960s (see below) helped to increase suspicion of spying amongst Mozambican nationalists. The Mozambican associations were then relabeled "Portuguese", and were encouraged to use the Portuguese flag, while new associations and multi-racial clubs (sports teams) were established. For example in 1955, the *Associação dos Indígenas Portugueses de Sena*, in Salisbury, and the *Clube dos Indígenas do Império Português* in Bulawayo, were established to divert migrants from the original Tete Burial Society and the Mozambique Club. Alfai Vareta Cherene and João da Chunga were made presidents of these new 'clubs'. João da Chunga's story is illuminating.

João da Chunga came to Southern Rhodesia in 1927 as a young boy, and had been there ever since. In the mid-1950s, he became very active trade-unionist, particularly through defending Mozambican workers' interests (see below). In the mid-1950s, he also became an important figure in the Portuguese African Society and collaborated with the Portuguese *Curadoria* in monitoring migrants and even submitted a letter to the General Governor of Mozambique requesting the following items: "One large picture of His Excellency, the President of Portugal; one large picture of His Excellency, the Governor General of Mozambique; one large picture of the Prime Minister of Portugal; two

⁷⁸ However, the legal mechanisms used by the *Curadoria* to prevent Mozambican workers from joining work stoppages are not explicit. Whether was it part of the condition of registration with the *Curadoria* (not mentioned in the Supplementary Agreement 1947), or simply as a result of information brought to the attention of the Rhodesian authorities by the *Curadoria*, is not clear.

⁷⁹ I am grateful to David Hedges for pointing out this aspect.

Portuguese national flags."⁸⁰ As a result, by the early 1960s, he had become a very controversial figure.⁸¹

The colonial objective was to instill in migrants a concept of Portugal as their fatherland and to isolate or, as they said, to "protect", Mozambicans from the influence of local associations and political organizations in Southern Rhodesia. On the other hand, as Mozambican migrants became victims of worker xenophobia and Rhodesian police repression in the late 1950s, Portuguese officials in the *Curadoria* may have convinced some workers of the advantages of the official protection afforded by the Portuguese government-backed association.⁸² Thus, African spies or detectives on both sides had a role in dividing workers on "national" lines now that worker or nationalist protest and unemployment were hot issues.

With increasing repression in Mozambique, migrants tended to establish themselves in the townships, locations and reserves of Southern Rhodesia. Many put down strong family roots and invested their savings in small-businesses and workshops, and even bought houses. Although the majority were illiterate and without professional skills, an increasing number of youths who had attended mission schools or who had even completed teaching courses sought semi-skilled positions in the railways or in industry. Among other occupations messengers, the carrying of messages, marking tickets, tailoring, brickmaking or building, carpentry, blacksmithing and panel beating were commonly preferred by new migrants.

The new generation of Mozambican migrants born in Southern Rhodesia also had higher aspirations. These youths were either children of migrants and local women or of migrants and their wives who had come from Mozambique.⁸³ Others entered Southern

⁸⁰AHM-FNI, Cx 3, Doc. A/4: Associação dos Indígenas Portugueses do Sena em Salisbury e Clube dos Indígenas do Império Português em Bulawayo, Rodésia do Sul, 1955/56.

⁸¹ See collective interview in Harare, Mbare, January 1998.

⁸² Worker xenophobia was peculiar amongst Southern Rhodesian African workers in the late 1950s as they now regarded Mozambicans as a threat for their employment prospects. See below.

⁸³ See chapter eight.

Rhodesia in search of suitable education.⁸⁴ With increasing African urbanization and competition for employment, some Mozambicans, if not the majority, opted for Rhodesian nationality. The following testimony – from a reference letter – of a Mozambican migrant who acquired Rhodesian nationality is just one example of many.

I am addressing you on behalf of my native employee Dikson Matorwa (alias Sixpence) who has been in my service in Salisbury for just upon 28 years... It would appear that he was born on Portuguese territory near the Rhodesian border but that his parents died when he was about 12 years and he then came to Rhodesia where he has resided ever since. He married a Mashona [Zimbabwean] woman and has eight children by her all living, the eldest being nearly 19 years. ...Nevertheless he is not registered as an Rhodesian citizen or subject and he has apparently no claim as a Portuguese subject so that he fears difficulty in the matter of land in Southern Rhodesia being allotted to him and his family. It is in this matter that he seeks your sympathetic help and he also asks that he be registered as a Southern Rhodesian subject and issued with Southern Rhodesian registration.⁸⁵

One of the main reasons why Mozambican migrants did not want to return home, was the lack of security and freedom there and the absence of facilities for the investment of their money in central Mozambique, quite apart from the chronic problem of forced contract labour.⁸⁶ In May 1952, an employer from Umtali complained to the local authorities on behalf of his Mozambican worker who, during his visit to Manica, was arrested by Portuguese authorities and sent to work on the roads.⁸⁷ With the exception of Manica, where the Portuguese authorities recognized the viability of African farming, in other districts of central Mozambique, peasants had very limited opportunities. The majority, especially in Sofala, were coerced into cotton-growing or contract labour. In Tete, for example, there were no economic stimuli at all. Tete lagged behind in the creation of a colonial market and lacked roads. In Zambézia and Sofala, arable land was occupied by large concessionaires, such as the Sena Sugar Estates, the Companhia Colonial do Buzi,

⁸⁴ See chapter seven.

⁸⁵ NAZ-S2985/LAN/2: Reference letter from the Enterprise Road of Salisbury to the Native Commissioner in Umtali, 15 May 1954.

⁸⁶ For more details on this aspect see chapter eight.

⁸⁷ See NAZ-1012/CP-4-10: Letter from the E.P. FAIR BAIRN company to the Native Commissioner, Umtali, 19 May 1952.

the Namagoa Company, and the Boror, Lugela, Gurué and Madal companies. These companies were extremely dependent on forced contract labour.⁸⁸

Migrants who wished to visit their parents or families in Mozambique had to do so by night and by hiding in the bush during the day.⁸⁹ Some migrants even avoided local transport (e.g. Beira Railway) by crossing the border and continuing their trip by foot. Other strategies included bribing local chiefs in order to protect them from administrative raids. For example, Simão Soares remembers that, in the 1950s, when he was working in Bulawayo he used to visit his parents every Christmas; to keep himself safe he offered money, trousers, blankets and a jacket to the local chief in Mutarara.⁹⁰ Migrants bitterly remember their maltreatment, punishment and beatings by colonial authorities when they visited home. Africans in rural Mozambique who wore smart suits and shoes or drove their own cars were always regarded with suspicion by Portuguese authorities.

Although *assimilados* may have enjoyed such luxuries, in practice in those areas men caught wearing such clothes were immediately taken to the administration for inquiries. For example, Muchero Tore who worked in Bulawayo in the 1950s was arrested by the Police when he went home for a holiday in 1956. "When I arrived at Sena station at about 10 p.m., the police pointed five guns at me. They showed me letters with Banda's printed image. After five days of imprisonment, I paid two pounds to the clerk for clearance."⁹¹ António Arouta went home in 1950 to get married. Although was marrying a local chief's daughter he was caught and forced into contract labour. However, he managed to escape and returned to Bulawayo clandestinely leaving his young wife behind.⁹² Nevertheless, the contacts Mozambican migrants maintained with their parents and relatives helped to keep them informed about the political situation in Mozambique, and enabled them to share local grievances. This also contributed to the heightening of their political awareness.⁹³

⁸⁸For more details on land tenure in Zambézia see, José Negrão, "One hundred years of African rural family economy", 1995.

⁸⁹ See interview with Simão Simone Chihurure, Penhalonga, 20 April 1993.

⁹⁰Interview with Simão Soares, Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, January 1998.

⁹¹Interview with Muchero Tore, Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, January 1998.

⁹²Interview with Antonio Arouta, Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, January 1998.

⁹³ See below chapter ten.

African political consciousness in Southern Rhodesia was also influenced by changes occurring in other parts of Africa, particularly by the successes of nationalism in Ghana and the establishment of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). As Africans gradually had access to their own wireless sets, they openly listened to radio news broadcasts. With African access to the radio, news of unrest soon disseminated throughout the territory, and particularly in the townships of Bulawayo, Salisbury and other cities.⁹⁴In Southern Rhodesia the press also contributed to an awakening people's political awareness.⁹⁵

The names of Nkomo, Burombo, Chikerema and Nyandoro are well recorded in Mozambican migrants' memories, particularly those who worked in Bulawayo and Salisbury.⁹⁶The most illustrative examples come from my interviewees with Francisco Raposo Chicote and Muchero Tore. Chicote joined the City Yough League in 1957 and from then developed a wide range of contacts with Zimbabwean politicians before he joined the Mozambican African National Congress (MANC) in 1960.⁹⁷ Tore was an activist of the SRANC branch in Bulawayo. He remembers being a participant in demonstrations and throwing stones episodes. He also developed strong contacts with Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, especially James Chikerema and George Nyandoro. Mozambicans working in the railways and factories participated side by side with other workers in their struggles for better wages and decent accommodation.

In this chapter I have suggested that Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia developed different forms of collective consciousness and identity, and were not indifferent to local worker struggles. During the inter-war period African workers

⁹⁴See, Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration, June 1956, cited from Raftopoulos, "Nationalism and labour", 89.

⁹⁵Among others, the *African Weekly* and the *Bantu Mirror* had a greater impact not only on local African people, but also on foreign migrant labourers including Mozambicans. For more discussions on the importance of press, see Lawrence Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, (London, 1976), chapter 18.

⁹⁶ See interviewees with Antonio Raposo Chicote (Harare, Mbare, 1 February 1998) and Muchero Tore (Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 31 January 1998).

experimented with different forms of collective organization, ranging from mutual aid-societies to ethnic and non-ethnic associations. The Tete Burial Society and the Mozambique Club were the most representative Mozambican associations in Salisbury and Bulawayo. Apart from dealing with self-help, especially funeral services, they combined welfare organisation with cultural activities, and effectively became cultural centres. They taught their languages and customs to the new generation and organised competitions between groups of dancers representing the various regions of Mozambique. They also brought Mozambican workers scattered throughout Rhodesia into regular contact. In addition, cultural and sport contacts seem to have contributed to the development of their collective consciousness beyond ethnic boundaries.

The period after World War II was characterized by a rapid expansion of poverty among urban and rural workers in Southern Rhodesia. In this period Mozambicans and other foreign labourers were integrated with local workers into the trade-union movement and developed their worker consciousness and political awareness. The combination of trade-unions and political associations addressed political issues focusing on both urban and rural grievances. Although migrants shared certain social forms and cultural meanings, they were now mobilised as workers in response to the hardships of urban life. Although Mozambican associations were still in part ethnically-based, boxing and football competitions may have helped them unite and forge a wider sense of Mozambican nationality. In fact, for Mozambicans this was also an important moment for diagnosing the political situation at home and to discuss their grievances collectively. I analyse this process more closely in the following chapter.

⁷ For more details on this political organisation see below.

CHAPTER 10:

TRADE UNIONISM, MOZAMBICAN ASSOCIATIONS AND NATIONALISM, 1950s-1962.

Introduction

This chapter analyses in greater detail the interaction of Mozambican migrants with local political movements and the process through which African worker associations and political organisations in Southern Rhodesia influenced Mozambicans—in developing various forms of political consciousness and nationalist ideas.

Historians of Mozambican labour migration in southern Africa, especially to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, have largely concentrated on inter-state agreements, the economic exploitation, the 'push' and 'pull' factors, and, to lesser extent, the emergence of African farmers as a result of the investment of migrant remittances.¹ Apart from a few remarks on the emergence of the embryonic political movements in neighbouring countries, by Isaacman, Munslow, Henriksen, Chilcote and Friedland, very little has been written so far on the interaction between Mozambican migrants and the rise of collective consciousness and nationalist ideas in these territories, particularly in Southern Rhodesia.² The main exception to these traditional approaches, seems to be Patrick Harries, who explores broader issues of culture and identity amongst Tsonga-speaking migrants from southern Mozambique to South Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.³ Alpers's essay on Mozambican migrants to Tanganyika is a very important in beginning to address the links between Mozambican migrants and political

¹ L.Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture in southern Mozambique, 1920-1992", Ph.D. Thesis (University of London), 1996; R.First, Black gold: The Mozambican miner, proletarian and peasant, (Sussex, 1983).

²E.Friedland, "A Comparative study of the development of revolutionary nationalist movements in southern Africa - Frelimo (Mozambique) and the African National Congress of South Africa", Ph.D. Thesis (City University, New York), 1980; B.Munslow, Mozambique: the revolution and its origins, (London, 1983); A.Isaacman and B.Isaacman, Mozambique: From colonialism to revolution, 1900-1982, (London, 1983); R.Chilcote, (ed.) Emerging nationalism in Portuguese Africa, (Stanford, 1972); T.H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A history, (London, 1978).

³Patrick Harries, Work, culture, and identity: Migrant laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c.1860-1910, (London, 1994).

organization in host countries.⁴ In fact, the Mozambican nationalist movement gained room to develop outside Mozambique. The foundation of FRELIMO in Tanganyika in June 1962 marked the maturation of the early nationalist movements amongst Mozambican workers, and those who had recently been politically exiled in neighbouring countries. An analysis of the process through which Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia developed their sense of collective consciousness and nationalist ideas is thus very important for understanding the foundations of FRELIMO. Indeed, it was in Southern Rhodesia that one of the most significant and perhaps more consistent political movements, UDENAMO, was born in 1960.

1. Trade unionism, the 1958 Migrant Act and Mozambican associations.

By the late 1950s, Mozambican migrants in Salisbury and Bulawayo became more active in politics, and eventually established their own political organizations. However, although they may have enjoyed a 'camaraderie' with Zimbabwean politicians, their position as workers was increasingly questioned by their local work-mates. In fact, the stabilization of labour, especially of skilled and semi-skilled workers, brought about conflict between local workers and foreign migrants, particularly Mozambicans. Wrongly accused by some trade unionists of being 'indifferent' to labour struggles, migrants were also accused of weakening the labour movement and 'stealing' the jobs of Rhodesians. Reacting to local African workers' leaders, who urged the government to pass a Bill preventing the employment of "foreigners" in Rhodesia in 1958, the Chief Native Commissioner stated that:

There have at times [been] indications amongst the indigenous natives of a conviction that these immigrants tend to flood the labour market and depress wage rates. It may well be necessary to expose methods whereby the demand for labour in the rural areas can be satisfied while the present surplus in urban areas continues.⁵

As a result of increasing pressure by local trade-unionists in August 1958 the government issued the Foreign Migrant Act in order to prevent aliens from being

⁴E. Alpers, "'To seek a better life:' The implications of migration from Mozambique to Tanganyika for class formation and political behaviour", Canadian Journal of African Studies, 18,2, (1984), 367-388.

⁵Ibid.

employed in Southern Rhodesia.⁶ Foreigners were also no longer permitted to buy houses in Highfield in Salisbury. On 3 September 1958, the *African Daily News* reported that: "Workers from Nyasaland, N. Rhodesia and P.E.A. who form 82 per cent of the labour force in Salisbury are no longer permitted to purchase houses on long lease in Highfield." In 1958, about 25 per cent of 2,000 houses in Highfield were owned by foreign migrants.⁷

The Foreign Migrant Act was mainly applied to Mozambicans as they comprised the majority of non-Federal workers. Josia Maluluke, a trade-unionist leader from Salisbury, acclaimed the Bill, claiming that he was pleased that the P.E.A. Africans were kept out of the colony of Southern Rhodesia by provisions of the Migratory Bill now before the Assembly: "P.E.A. aliens were the present cause of low wages in this colony."⁸ Earlier, Benjamim Jamela of the Southern Rhodesian African T.U.C., regarded the Bill as a victory for African trade-unions. He, too, was delighted because Mozambican migrants would no longer find it easy to get jobs in Southern Rhodesia. He also alleged that Mozambicans were largely responsible for the low wages being paid to Africans in Southern Rhodesia.⁹ João da Chunga, a Mozambican leader in Bulawayo (see above), repudiated the T.U.C. position and in particular Maluleke's statement. While agreeing with him that the presence of Mozambicans worsened the existing level of unemployment, Chunga did not agree that Mozambicans were responsible for low wages. "I strongly disagree that we P.E.A. aliens [depress] wages and undercut local Africans in the matter of housing", he protested. He also stressed that he had joined local organisations so as to help his fellow Mozambicans get better wages. "I am still in the same battle. But today the conditions are a little different. Does Mr. Maluleke think that I and many more thousands working in the colony do not want money and are in fact undermining the battle for improved salaries?"¹⁰ He then went on to say that as aliens they knew that the Southern Rhodesia Government did not hate them:

⁶ For more details on the 1958 Migratory Act see chapter eight.

⁷ See statement by the Superintendent of Highfield, Mr. A.M. Cook, quoted from *African Daily News*, 3 September 1958.

⁸ See *African Daily News*, 15 August 1958.

⁹ See *African Daily News*, 11 August 1958.

¹⁰ The experience of Samuel Dinga may confirm the value of this statement as he remembers losing his job because of joining 5,000 workers' protest at Dunlop Rhodesia Ltd in 1960 in Bulawayo. See my interview in Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 28 January 1998.

The law is being introduced because of the pressure by the T.U.C. which we support and of which we are in fact members. He [Maluleke] should know that although the ban may be effected there will still be a problem because young Rhodesian Africans do not want to work. They prefer to loaf about and grab hard-earned money by force at night in the streets[!] Alien Africans were prepared to work at all sorts of odd jobs that local Africans would not accept. These jobs carried with them low wages.¹¹

There is no doubt that the Bill further divided African workers and instigated clashes amongst them. However, there were some trade-unionists and politicians who viewed the issue in a different but not contradictory perspective. This was the case of Jason Z. Moyo, who, like many other African trade unionists, expressed some doubt as to whether the problem would be solved if the Southern Rhodesia government enacted a law prohibiting foreign Africans from entering the country. Moyo claimed that he appreciated the Act in principle, but that it should have been extended to European immigration schemes which were another cause of unemployment among skilled and semi-skilled workers, particularly in the building industry.¹² Enos Nkala, president of the S. R. African Artisans' Union, reinforced this position arguing that he wanted the government to take into account the railway industry where large numbers of Europeans displaced indigenous people from jobs which "could be done easily by Africans."¹³ B. Jamela complemented these complaints by stating that he was not against the importation of European technicians, but he did not see any reason why it was necessary to import them into the country when African artisans are still available in large numbers. "There are many African artisans who went about without jobs", he added.¹⁴

X The major Mozambican association established in the late 1950s in Southern Rhodesia was the "Tete East Africa National Globe Society" or the "Tete Portuguese East Africa National Globe Society". It was based in Salisbury under Jeque Mirijo Tundumula's leadership. Tundumula was a son of a local chief in Moatize (Tete) village, and had migrated to Southern Rhodesia in the early 1930s. Although its statutes claimed it engaged in cultural and mutual or self-help activities, soon the association functioned as

¹¹See African Daily News, 15 August 1958.

¹²See African Daily News, 13 August 1958.

¹³See African Daily News, 13 August 1958.

an-umbrella for Mozambican political purposes.¹⁵ And while it did not address petitions to the Portuguese authorities, it gave individuals room to express their grievances and paved the way for them to join local political movements, particularly the City Youth League and the Southern Rhodesian African National (Council) Congress (SRANC).¹⁶ For example, Francisco Raposo Chicote, who migrated to Southern Rhodesia from Mutarara in 1953, soon became a member of the Tete Globe Society and afterwards joined the City Youth League of Southern Rhodesia in 1957.¹⁷ He remembers participating in crowded rally meetings organised by George Nyandoro. By 1958, a migrant from Tete, Njiranjibodzi William, submitted a four page letter to the Governor-General of Mozambique complaining about racial harassment and indignities in Tete province:

perseguição

the administrator harasses our wives and daughters. A woman who refuses to give in may face imprisonment for a fortnight. Well-dressed men are envied and even punished. If you walk in dirty clothes in the city, you are punished. If you are well-dressed, you are also punished. I am black Portuguese. I would not like to be a black of other territories. But because of beatings and punishments, I sometimes feel like giving up being Portuguese. Black people in Southern Rhodesia have freedom to advertise in local newspapers and they enjoy freedom to demonstrate [in the streets]. In Tete we do not have such an opportunity. If you are heard or seen protesting, you are tied and 'burnt'. There are many blacks [Mozambicans] here [in Rhodesia] who have got some capital and wish to return home to establish some business. However, they feel scared. Because of that, we prefer to stay here until we get old. When I think about all these things, I cry and

¹⁴See African Daily News, 11 August 1958.

¹⁵See collective interview with João Chaúma, Simão Timenze Mazimo, Francisco Bastião, Mambo B.Kanyemba, Harare, Mbare, January 1998.

¹⁶ The City Youth League (CYL) was established in 1955 in Salisbury and was led by James Chikerema. The SRANC was launched on 12 September 1957 in the Recreation Hall in Harare Township (Mbare) 1957 as a result of a merger between the CYL, the Bulawayo branch of the 1934 ANC and other organisations. Joshua Nkomo was elected President, James Chikerema Vice-President, George Nyandoro Secretary, Jason Z.Moyo Vice-Secretary, Joseph Msika Treasurer and Paul Mushonga Vice-Treasurer. In 1958 the Party had branches in Harare Township, New Highfields, and Mabvuku. See, Bhebe, "The nationalist struggle, 1957-1962", in Cnaan S.Banana (ed) Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe, 1890-1990, (Harare, 1989), 50-115; Maurice Nyagumbo, With the people: An autobiography from the Zimbabwe struggle (London, 1980), 237.

¹⁷ Interview with Francisco Chicote, Harare, Mbare, January 1998. Mozambican youths in Southern Rhodesia did not have any specific association like that of Amalaita in South Africa described by Peter Delius and Phillip Bonner. See Delius, A lion amongst the cattle, chapters one and two; P. Bonner, "African Urbanisation on the Rand between the 1930s and 1960s: its social character and political consequences", JSAS, 21, 1 (1995), 115-129.

I think that it is better to die than to face those hardships. In Tete there is no African community because we are afraid of being sent to S.Tomé for life sentence. That is why we are very cautious. Blacks, particularly in Tete, are not at peace because of the local administration. I hope God will bless you [Governor-General] and illuminate your mind and spirit for the benefit of poor black Mozambicans.¹⁸

The letter is a mix of protest, anxiety, naivety and a racial complex of black inferiority that characterized the mentality of some if not the majority of Mozambican victims of Portuguese paternalist colonial ideology. In addition, from the last statement of this letter it is clear that anyone addressing such protests to Portuguese authorities one had to be very careful. This example may well illustrate the 'ambiguities of dependence' that characterized people's protests in that period.¹⁹ In fact, Njiranjibodzi may have written in this way to shield himself from possible retaliation from the colonial authorities.

At least before the Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front regime and despite the bannings of 1959-60, Southern Rhodesia still offered relatively more freedom to people and political associations than its Portuguese neighbour. Through their own associations or the state's institutions, Africans could negotiate their grievances with the colonial administration. Although not always satisfied, workers could gain some reforms or increased salaries as a result of their strikes. In Mozambique the response was always beating, imprisonment and deportation to S.Tomé. Mozambicans never enjoyed any kind of negotiations with the Portuguese administration. They could only set up associations for cultural or self-help purposes. The relatively open political and economic environment of the African community, as well as the influence of the press in Southern Rhodesia, may have persuaded Mozambicans to establish political organisations in Southern Rhodesia.

However, as we have already seen, in order to inhibit the emergence of political movements amongst Mozambicans in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Curator encouraged the establishment of a multi-ethnic association, which eventually included some Portuguese immigrants. In fact, in the 1950s there was a significant number of

¹⁸Ministério do Trabalho-Centro de Documentação, Direcção dos Serviços dos Negócios Indígenas: Cópia da carta de Njiranjibodzi William dirigida a sua Excelência o Governador Geral de Moçambique, 27 November 1958. I am grateful to Mr. Vilanculos for this reference.

white Portuguese immigrants from Beira and Manica in Salisbury and Bulawayo. By this time, they were already organised into sports clubs and associations, namely the Salisbury Portuguese Club (1952) and then the Portuguese Association of the Central African Federation (*Associação dos portugueses na Federação das Rodésias e Niassalândia*) in 1958.²⁰ Also in the 1950s, Mozambican migrants under Phillip Madzuzere's leadership set up the Portuguese East Africa Society in Salisbury.²¹ Other influential members included João da Chunga and Jaime Rivaz Sigauke. In addition, other associations like the Tete Globe Society, had representatives in the Portuguese Society.²² The aims and objectives of the Portuguese East Africa Society were defined as essentially those of a welfare organisation and cultural association, namely:

To encourage ways and means of achieving and maintaining good customs and culture of Africans; to organise and encourage dances and plays of Portuguese culture and customs; to organise parties to entertain members of the society at which outside people shall be asked to speak on matters of good understanding between all people.²³

Notwithstanding these aims, the Portuguese *Curadoria* soon monitored the association and recruited African members including João da Chunga to work as spies.²⁴ In the mid-

¹⁹ The study of John L. Dube by Shula Marks, "The ambiguities of dependence: John L. Dube of Natal", *JASAS*, 1-2 (1975), 162-180, provides an important analogy for understanding this issue..

²⁰ See AHM-FNI, Cx 3: Nota da Curadoria dos indigenas portugueses de Salisbury ao chefe dos serviços dos negocios indigenas em Lourenço Marques, 27 January 1956; Correspondência confidencial da delegação do Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social (ITPAS) em Salisburia para o Presidente do ITPAS em Lourenço Marques, Salisbury, 1965. I am extremely grateful to Mr. João de Deus (Tete, April 1993) for making this material available to me, and allowing me to quote from it.

²¹ See Correspondência confidencial da delegação do Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social (ITPAS) em Salisburia para o Presidente do ITPAS, em Lourenço Marques, Salisbury, 16 August 1965.

²² My informants justified their membership in the Portuguese Association on the grounds that it enabled them to avoid suspicion and persecution by Portuguese authorities.

²³ I have a copy of the constitution of the Portuguese East Africa Society signed by Madzuzere in 1961 in my possession. I am grateful to Mr. João de Deus for allowing me to make a photocopy of this document.

²⁴ By that time da Chunga was working for the Portuguese *Curadoria* as messenger. In confidential correspondence between the ITPAS and the Portuguese authorities in Lourenço Marques (16 August 1965), da Chunga is mentioned as a key informant for the Portuguese authorities of political activities amongst Mozambican migrants and refugees. In 1964, da Chunga denounced Muchero Tore to Portuguese authorities for

1960s, Phillip Madzudzere, seems to have also collaborated with the Portuguese authorities.²⁵

In this period, Mozambicans in Southern Rhodesia, either in urban or rural areas, were also exposed to the political activities of the SRANC (Southern Rhodesia African National Congress) and later of the NDP (National Democratic Party) founded in January 1960.²⁶ Speeches delivered by African leaders claiming better education, health and housing facilities, access to land, participation in the franchise and employment, stimulated Mozambicans and heightened their political awareness. Their fearlessness in the face of the white authorities and statements like: "SRANC is prepared to die, either by guns or some other force, in its fight for freedom"; "Africans want freedom and democracy now not tomorrow"; "we are tired of laws which discriminate against us"; "we shall not rest until we find political freedom and economic stability", may also have encouraged Mozambicans to establish their own political groups in order to launch their struggle against the Portuguese colonial administration.²⁷ By 1960, two political organisations had been founded by Mozambican migrants in Salisbury and Bulawayo. The Mozambique African National Congress (MANC) was established in Salisbury and the Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO) was founded in Bulawayo. Before analysing the establishment of Mozambican nationalism in Southern Rhodesia, however, it is necessary to set out the wider history of nationalism in Mozambique and the events that led to the formation of the groups in the neighbouring countries which eventually merged into the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in 25 June 1962. The following section not only provides an overview of the varied forms of proto-nationalism throughout the country, but also stresses its dynamic in central Mozambique which provides a useful background to understand the connections with migrants in Southern Rhodesia.

joining political activities. See my interview with Muchero Tore, Bulawayo, Mpopoma township, 31 January 1998.

²⁵See interview with Amaral Matos, Maputo, July 1997. See also below.

²⁶NDP was initially under Michael Mawema's leadership who was then replaced by Nkomo until its ban in December 1961. See Nyagumbo, *With the people*, 237.

²⁷See Bhebe, "The nationalist struggle", 67, 73; speeches by George Nyandoro of SRANC and Herbert Chitepo of NDP.

2. Popular resistance and the seeds for nationalism in Mozambique.

Studies of the history of nationalism in Mozambique are very sketchy. The few studies available concentrate more on the history of the armed struggle, and especially on the FRELIMO's leadership.²⁸ Others, emphasize the chiefdoms' resistance and peasant protest.²⁹ Thus, while Vail and White assess songs as sources of resistance among peasants, Alpers has written an important study of cultural resistance, especially by writers and artists in general.³⁰ Further, many studies concentrate on the role of intellectuals and the mixed elite, or *assimilados*, before World War II.

The extent to which this elite represented any sort of proto-nationalist movement is a matter for consideration.³¹ Their goal seems have been more to defend their social privileges within the colonial system rather than to combat the colonial regime. Although they stressed their role in defending the rights of blacks, their position, particularly that of João Albasini, the founder of the African Association in Lourenço Marques (Maputo) in the 1920s, was ambivalent.³² However, it is worth recognising that the newspapers written either in Portuguese or in the vernacular, especially in Maputo city, not only provided intellectuals with space for expression and debate, but were also an important source of information about the external world.³³

²⁸ Munslow, Mozambique: The revolution and its origins; Thomas Henriksen, Revolution and counterrevolution: Mozambique's war of independence, 1964-1974 (Westport, 1983); Newitt, A history of Mozambique, chapter nineteen.

²⁹ For more discussion on this perspective see A. Issacman, "Peasant and rural social protest in Africa" African Studies Review, XXXIII (2), 1990, 1-20.

³⁰ Edward Alpers, "The role of culture in the liberation of Mozambique", Ufahamu, 12, 143-188.

³¹ See Aurelio Rocha, "Aculturação e assimilação em Moçambique" in Actas do seminário Moçambique: Navegações, comércio e técnicas, (Maputo 25 - 28 November 1996), 317-350.

³² See Jeanne Penvenne, "João dos Santos Albasini (1876-1922): The contradictions of politics and identity in colonial Mozambique", Journal of African History, 37 (1996), 419-464; David Birmingham, Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique, (London, 1992), 19.

³³ For example, in 1928 Portuguese officials were getting worried about the potential influence of nationalist ideas from neighbouring countries on local *assimilados*. See Joaquim Nunes, "Apontamento para o estudo da questão da mão-de-obra no distrito de Inhambane", Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, série 46, 1928, 139, quoted from Aurelio Rocha, "Aculturação e assimilação em Moçambique", 323; Olga I. Neves

The education system envisaged by Portuguese colonial policy widened the gap between the *assimilados* and the mixed elite and the rest of African people. The Portuguese authorities espoused the ideology that 'civilization' would come from a study of the bible and from manual labour, and conferred this responsibility on the Catholic Church.³⁴ To turn this policy into practice, the colonial regime instituted a system of education, which gave African children inferior education to that provided for European children and eventually also for *assimilados*. Under this policy of elitist assimilation a small number of the black and 'mixed' elite was given Portuguese citizenship. Although this status may have removed a sense of cultural inferiority, it did not remove the racial segregation they faced in the employment market. The best that Africans, also called *indigenas* could achieve was training in basic auxiliary skills. This system was designed to keep them in the rural areas working for white settlers. However, in many districts until the 1950s primary instruction was only up to grade three and did not provide any skills apart from reading and writing in Portuguese.³⁵ Under such circumstances it became difficult to find potential educated African leaders. These expectations could only be achieved within the Protestant missions. However, Protestant missions were always undermined by both the Portuguese administration and the Catholic Church. They were accused of spreading anti-Portuguese feelings amongst African population.

Discriminação
na
educação

e

emprego

The most significant Protestant influence came from the Presbyterian Church of Switzerland and the American Board Mission.³⁶ The role of the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the Anglican Church was no less important. While the Presbyterian Church networks extended from southern Mozambique to South Africa, especially amongst migrant labour, the American Board Mission exercised its influence

"Em defesa da causa africana, intervenção do Grémio Africano na sociedade de Lourenço Marques, 1908-1938", Tese de mestrado, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1989.

³⁴In the 1950s, Portuguese officials still emphasized this educational policy. See AHM-FNI, Cx 52: Manuel Ferreira Rosas (Overseas Inspector for Education), "Rural primary schooling", in *Inter-African Conference on Rural Welfare*, (Lourenço Marques, September 1953).

³⁵ See also Eduardo Mondlane, *The struggle for Mozambique* (London, 1969).

³⁶ See Teresa Cruz-Silva, "Protestant Churches and the formation of the political consciousness in Southern Mozambique, 1930-1974", Ph.D., Bradford, 1996.

Religious
propaganda
in the
area

in central Mozambique through Southern Rhodesia.³⁷ The African Methodist Church also developed connections with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.³⁸ Both missions provided education, and helped create new ethnic and cultural identities amongst African people. Their missionary activity also contributed to reinforcing notions of collective belonging with which people might identify.³⁹ This was particularly important amongst the Tsonga and Shona-Ndau people in southern and central Mozambique. However, Protestant missionary activity was not confined to the creation of cultural identities; it also questioned the concept of civilization enjoined by the Portuguese government, and suggested an alternative curriculum which could provide African students with more skills in order to widen their level of knowledge. Eventually, a few students were provided with scholarships to travel abroad and seek higher education in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and United States of America.⁴⁰

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It was under these conditions that Kamba Simango, Eduardo Mondlane and Uria Timoteo Simango, became the first black Mozambicans to get university degrees. These activities gave southern and central Mozambique particular advantages in producing potential political communicators. Kamba Simango was born at Mashanga, at the mouth of the Sabi River, in the 1890s. He studied at the American Mount Silinda station in Southern Rhodesia for about six years. Before leaving for Mount Silinda, Simango had been employed in domestic service in Beira and joined Bunker's night school in 1905. In 1914, he was given a scholarship to pursue with his studies at Hampton Institute in the US where after about four years he graduated with a Bachelor's degree. In 1919/1920 he

³⁷ See J. K. Rennie, "Christianity, Colonialism and origins of nationalism among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1945", passim.

³⁸ For more details on the role of Methodist Church see Alf Helgesson, "Church, State and people in Mozambique: An historical study with special emphasis on Methodist Developments in Inhambane Region", Ph.D, Uppsala, 1994.

³⁹ See for example, Teresa Cruz-Silva, "Youth groups and consciousness: The 'Swiss Mission' in southern Mozambique, 1930-1961", Paper presented at JSAS Conference: Paradigms lost, paradigms regained? Southern African Studies in the 1990s, University of York, (September, 1994).

⁴⁰ Professor William Humbane of Africa University in Zimbabwe, was one of the few black Mozambicans who benefited from Methodist Church support to study, first in Mutare mission station, and latter in U.S. He also remembers the important role played by Bishop Ralph Dodge (to whom he worked as Secretary in the Mission headquarters in Salisbury) in mobilizing resources to help young Mozambicans to pursue their studies either in Southern Rhodesia or abroad. Some of those students became active

was admitted to Teachers' Training College at Columbia University in New York and was awarded a Bachelor of Science degree and a Diploma in Education. Before returning to Mozambique in the mid-1920s, he spent some time teaching in Angola.⁴¹

Protestant churches and local associations, particularly in southern and central Mozambique, seem to have encouraged the development of African nationalism. In her study on religious movements and identities in Mozambique, Anne-Sophie Arnold, stresses the importance of such interaction, and particularly the role of Methodist Church. She gives as an example Elias Saúte Mucambe, who worked as a minister of this church, and describes his political consciousness as follows:

Mucambe went to Southern Rhodesia in 1938, where he studied theology and English at the Old Umtali mission school. His remarkable activities included the edition of an illegally printed book with poetry. The poems indeed were provoking because of their radical content. African pride and African self-confidence were put forward (as in the poem 'I'm a Negro!') and in rejecting colonial exploitation.⁴²

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Under the fascist government some educated Africans and *assimilados* established new Associations such as the *Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique* and the *Núcleo dos Estudantes Secundários de Moçambique* (NESAM) in Lourenço Marques. NESAM was founded by the new generation of African secondary students in 1949, again under the guise of promoting social and cultural activities. NESAM members included Eduardo Mondlane and Joaquim Chissano (the president of FRELIMO and of Mozambique). Mondlane stressed that NESAM was the only organisation founded in Mozambique, which from its inception had definite political concerns.⁴³ He also criticised the former

nationalists and later on joined FRELIMO in Tanganyika. See my interview in Harare, 2 July 1997.

⁴¹See L. P. Spencer, "Towards an African Church: Kamba Simango, Fred Bunker, and the Lowlands of Mozambique, 1893-1945", paper presented at the 18th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association in San Francisco (28 October 1975); M. P. Andrade, "Proto-nacionalismo em Moçambique - um estudo de caso: Kamba Simango" *Arquivo*, Maputo, 6, (1989), 127-147. While much of the Mondlane's life's story is well known, we still lack information about Uria Simango who became FRELIMO's Vice-President in 1962.

⁴² See Anne-Sophie Arnold, "Missions, African religious movements and identity in Mozambique, 1930-1974" in *II Colóquio internacional de ciências sociais sobre a Africa de lingua oficial portuguesa*, Bissau, 1991, 15.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 398.

associations, particularly the African Association of Lourenço Marques and the *Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique* as

at best bourgeois social clubs, often called upon by the government to shout their part in the martial chorus of allegiance to Salazar and his fascist regime...since these two organisations [sic] are no longer what one might call popular movements, they no longer serve any visible social or political purpose for the masses of the oppressed African population.⁴⁴

In Beira, Sixpence Simango, a former student and teacher at the American Board Mission in Mount Selinda and Gogoi (Manica province), and Kamba Simango (former student in U.S.) founded a major African association in central Mozambique in the early 1940s. The *Núcleo Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala*, like NESAM, soon became an important nationalist organisation in Beira.⁴⁵ In addition, the *Núcleo Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala* encouraged the emergence of African Protestant and prophetic Protestant churches, which developed various forms of cultural and political resistance amongst rural people in Manica and Sofala provinces.⁴⁶ The Bishop of Beira, Sebastião Soares de Resende, was most concerned about what he considered to be the dangerous consequences of the expansion of Zion Church, and complained of their threat to Catholic missionary education: "They are dreadfully fanatic and are making converts on a very large scale. They are almost enemies of our schools. They teach themselves how to read and write in the vernacular. They regard teaching in Portuguese as (things) for the Whites." He also accused them of spreading communist ideas from revolutionary Russia via South Africa and believed they used the dangerous slogan "Africa for Africans".⁴⁷

⁴⁴ E. Mondlane, "The development of nationalism in Mozambique", in Ronald Chilcote (ed.), *Emerging nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, (Stanford, 1972), 391-400:397.

⁴⁵ See M. P. Andrade, "Proto-nacionalismo em Moçambique - um estudo de caso: Kamba Simango", 143.

⁴⁶ The most active African Protestant churches were among others the Zion Apostolic Church of South Africa, the Ethiopian Christian Mission of Mozambique, the Apostolic Church of Johanne Maranke, and the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Mambone, Machanga, Buzi, Gondola, Manica, Spungabera, Lourenço Marques, Umtali and Johannesburg. See AHM-Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil, (FDSAC), Cx 21: Processos de averiguações relativas as actividades do Núcleo Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala, 28 November, 1955; AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Concelho de Manica, 1968. For comparative studies in this perspective see Jeff Haynes, *Religions and politics in Africa*, (London, 1996).

⁴⁷ AHM-FGG, No. 224: Annual report of the Diocese of Beira, 1947.

In the 1950s various sects of the Zion church defied the colonial regime and diverted people from the Catholic Church, instigating them to resist forced cotton cultivation particularly in Mossurize district. In Manica district, the Apostolic Church of Johanne Maranke was the most defiant.⁴⁸ This prophetic Protestant Church entered the Manica district as a result of migrant labour. It was established in Southern Rhodesia in 1930 by Johanne Maranke.⁴⁹ Its leader in Manica district, Richon (Lixon) Chazuca was also local *Sabuku* (*Chefe de povoação*) and his brother Marufu Chazuca was *regulo* (*Mambo*).⁵⁰ Chief Richon Chazuca combined his functions of local chief and pastor in the community. From then, Richon Chazuca embodied three conflicting identities: local traditional chief, religious preacher and collaborator of the Portuguese administration. This ambiguity soon played against him. Some time in 1953, he was accused by the Portuguese of sedition and was convicted and condemned to three years' forced labour on the cocoa and coffee plantations on S. Tomé Island. Chazuca was imprisoned for three months in Macequece before he was sent to S. Tomé with nine other involved in independent church activities (then considered subversive). They were sent to Beira and then Lourenço Marques, before being deported to S. Tomé. Initially Richon Chazuca was convicted because he failed to provide the required amount of eight sacks of wheat as *agricultor* and was sent for forced labour on the Tavares' Farm (the biggest farm in Macequece). Then he was denounced by the Catholic missionary as the leader of the Apostolic Church of Johanne Maranke.⁵¹

⁴⁸ See AHM-ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária ao Concelho de Manica, 1968.

⁴⁹ For more details see M. L. Daneel, Old and new in Southern shona independent churches vol I: Background and rise of the major movements, (The Hague: Mouton, 1971).

⁵⁰ Richon Chazuca was born in Chazuca chieftaincy about 1910. He was the second son of his mother, who was the second wife (amongst five) of his father, Chapanduka Chazuca (*Mambo* Chazuca). In 1930 he migrated to Southern Rhodesia where he was employed on a farm in Umtali for three years. While working there Chazuca joined the Johanne Maranke Church. When he returned from Southern Rhodesia in 1933, he established a branch of that Church in Manica. In the same year, Johanne Maranke also came to Manica, where, apart from appointing Chazuca as pastor (*Muvanguere*) of the local branch of that Church, he made many converts amongst the local people of the Chazuca chieftaincy. See my interview with Richon Chazuca, Manica, Chazuca village, 19 September 1996.

⁵¹ Interview with Richon Chazuca, Manica, Chazuca village, 19 September 1996. In the 1940s, he was punished by the Portuguese administrator because he failed to collect tax from local dwellers and deliver the amount required by local administration. He was beaten with *palmatória* fifteen times on each hand. To avoid further punishment

Chazuca showed great commitment with his people. Far from being a mere puppet of the Portuguese regime, he protected his people from colonial demands. For instance he introduced secret signals to alert local dwellers to campaigns of compulsory labour recruitment. As soon as he knew that the tax collectors or labour recruiters were coming to his village he warned people through these coded signals. This gave the people enough time to run away and hide in the bush. The main signals consisted of wearing a white cassock during the day, or making fire at night.

29 years old

Outdoors
Poetry

After World War II a generation of urban Africans and mixed *assimilados* published works expressing the growing anger of Mozambicans and reasserting their African culture. While their writings highlighted African pride, they also satirised the Portuguese colonial regime. Noémia de Sousa and José Craveirinha poems as well as Luis Bernardo Honwana's novel (*Nós matamos o cão tinoso*) provide good examples of their expression of cultural resistance and political consciousness.⁵² Other expressions of cultural resistance were in the form of songs, music, dance, stories, proverbs and wood sculpture.⁵³ As Alpers stressed, although these forms of artistic expression did not give rise to an immediate national consciousness, they created a tradition of popular resistance, which eventually became part of such a consciousness when the liberation struggle began in the early 1960s.⁵⁴

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Forced labour recruitment and compulsory crop growing became the most powerful grievance in the anti-colonial tradition in Mozambique, particularly in rural areas. As David Birmingham points out, this anti-colonialism was a powerful factor in the nationalist struggle.⁵⁵ Although forms of resistance or protest varied from one region to another, peasants shared many of the same concerns. In the mid-1950s there were work stoppages, unrest and rural revolts throughout Mozambique. For example, peasant

Chazuca falsified the number of residents in his chiefdom, stating that they died in order to eliminate them from the census.

⁵² See, Jeanne Penvenne, "Mozambique: a tapestry of conflict" in David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin, History of central Africa: The contemporary years since 1960, (London, 1998), 231-266:237/38; Fátima Mendonça, Literatura Moçambicana: A história e as escritas, (Maputo, UEM 1988).

⁵³ See E. Alpers, "The role of culture in the liberation of Mozambique", passim.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 144.⁴

⁵⁵ Birmingham, Frontline Nationalism, 27.

Revolts
1953-54

revolts occurred in Machanga, Mambone and Buzi in central Mozambique, and Manjacaze, Guija and Xinavane, in Gaza and Maputo provinces.⁵⁶ The revolt of Machanga in 1953 was remarkable and involved the collaboration of the *Nucleo Negrofilo de Manica e Sofala*.⁵⁷ However, due to the lack of leadership and Portuguese repression and harassment those forms of protest were unsuccessful.

By the late 1950s, Portugal envisaged some movement towards non-racialism and political integration in the colonies. Much of the social reform legislation was enacted in September 1961. Apart from the abolition of discriminatory laws and forced cotton cultivation, these reforms also aimed at providing more educational opportunities to Africans. Although educational reforms may have the prospect for a better future for African children, the economy, service and job opportunities continued dominated by white settlers who were in indirect competition with Mozambicans.⁵⁸ In rural areas, exploitation, low salaries and maltreatment by white farmers increased peasant resentment and resistance. While in urban areas some Mozambicans took the few opportunities offered by the Portuguese reforms to ease their lives, peasants and workers in general continued with their hidden struggles, hoping for real change. For example, on 16 June 1960 peasants in Mueda district demonstrated before the local administration seeking better trading terms of their agricultural products. The Portuguese administration responded to these protests with violence, shooting at the peasants and causing several casualties and deaths. A petition forwarded to the 16th General Assembly of United Nations in 1961 by UDENAMO described the Mueda massacre in following terms:

Mueda
massacre

On the 16th June 1960 – Kibirity Diwani, Faustino Banomba and Madesta Yossuf (a 21 years old African woman) handed to the administrator of the Niassa region a letter protesting against the savage thuggery of the Salazar storm troopers. The three had been eyewitnesses to the unprovoked massacre of the villagers of Mueda-Makondes. The people had held a peaceful demonstration

⁵⁶ See D. Hedges and A. Chilundo, "A contestação da situação colonial 1945-1961" in Hedges (ed.), *Historia de Moçambique*, vol.3 (Maputo, 1993), chapter five: 196, 210-221.

⁵⁷ See Michael Cahen, "Les mutineries de la Machanga et de Mambone (1953): Conflicts sociaux, activism associatif et tensions religieuses dans la partie orientale de la 'zone vandau'", Communication a la deuxieme reunion internationale de specialistes en sciences sociales sur l'Afrique de langue portugaise (version preliminaire) Bissau, April, 1991.

⁵⁸ See Penvenne, *African workers and colonial racism*, passim.

but the trigger-happy bloodthirsty Salazar thugs shot 36 dead, and injured 150. The colonialists' mock courts of Salazar sentenced 250 to terms of imprisonment running from two to seven years. Diwane, Banomba and Yussuf were jailed for life and sent to an undisclosed destination.⁵⁹

In fact, in this period Portuguese officials increased the repression in the colonies and combined with the neighbouring colonial regimes to suppress African political organisations. Urban journalists, civil servants, intellectuals and clergymen suspected of being involved in promoting nationalist ideas were also imprisoned.⁶⁰ Some escaped by fleeing and seeking refuge abroad. Mozambicans in Europe and America in contact with other Africans and Africanist academics were exposed to liberal and nationalist ideas. For example, intellectuals and students in Lisbon and France joined other Africans, particularly from Angola and Guiné Bissau, as well as Portuguese opponents of Salazar's authoritarianism and Portugal's colonial policies, in the *Movimento Anti-colonialista* (MAC) established in 1957 in Paris.⁶¹ Unlike the neighbouring colonial powers, particularly in the Central African Federation, in Mozambique, and in the Portuguese overseas territories in general, the colonial administration did not allow Africans to establish political organisations which could question the Salazar regime. This policy had already been applied to the Portuguese mainland, where political freedom was also very restricted. People wishing to participate in political activities were supposed to join the official party, i.e. the National Union (*União Nacional*).⁶²

Nevertheless, the political atmosphere in southern Africa and the winds of nationalism from north and west Africa encouraged Mozambican migrants to organise themselves into political groups to challenge the Portuguese colonial regime. Thus, by the early 1960s, migrants in the neighbouring countries had established the following political organisations: the MANC, the UDENAMO in Southern Rhodesia, the Mozambican-

⁵⁹ Copy of a petition by UDENAMO - Dar es Salaam - Adelino Gwambe - National President to the President 16th United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations, New York, 2 October 1961. See personal files with João de Deus (Tete, 1993)

⁶⁰ See Raul Bernardo Honwana, The life history of Raul Honwana: An insider view of Mozambique from colonialism to independence, 1905-1975, (Boulder, 1988).

⁶¹ These intellectuals included Marcelino dos Santos (Mozambique), Amílcar Cabral (Guinea) and Agostinho Neto (Angola). See Jeanne Penvenne, "Mozambique: a tapestry of conflict", 239; Christine Messiant, "Angola: the challenge of statehood", in Birmingham and Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa, 131-166.

Makonde National Union (MANU) in Kenya and Tanganyika and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) in Nyasaland. In the following section I analyse the factors which led to the foundation of MANC and UDENAMO in Southern Rhodesia.

factors de fundação 3. Migrants and the origins of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia.

By late 1959, a group of Mozambican migrants had founded the Mozambique African National Congress (MANC) in Salisbury.⁶³ The founders were living in Harari Township and had strong connections with the local SRANC, and modeled their political organisation on this movement. Dominated by migrants from Tete, MANC also included members from Sofala and Zambézia. Peter Balamanja (born in Zambia and son of a Mozambican migrant from Tete) was the President. Jeque Tundumula (former leader of the Tete Globe Society) was Vice-President and Damos Mosha was Secretary General. Mambo Bingo Kanyemba (from Zumbo/Tete) was given a position as Publicity Chairman. In the early 1960s it had about 15,000 Mozambican members, and had established cells in Mutare, Bulawayo and branches in Harare (Mafokoso, Mbare, Mabvuku and Highfields). The branches in Harare were under leadership of João Makossa, Bingo Kanyemba, Damos Mosha and Peter Simbe respectively.⁶⁴

In October 1960, a group of Mozambicans working in Bulawayo founded the UDENAMO at António Mandlate's house in Mpopoma Township. Adelino Gwambe was elected President, Fanuel Mahluza Vice-President, Aurélio Bucuane General Secretary, Calvino Mahlaeie, Vice-General Secretary, David Chambal Propaganda and Publicity Secretary.⁶⁵ The Committee members were Jaime Rivaz Sigauque (a former

⁶³See David Birmingham, Frontline Nationalism in Angola & Mozambique, (London, 1992); Eduardo Mondlane, "The Development of Nationalism in Mozambique", 391-400.

⁶⁴ See also João da Costa Freitas, "Movimentos subversivos contra Moçambique", in Moçambique: curso de extensão universitária, ano lectivo de 1964-1965. Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina (Lisbon, 1965), 317-337: 320-21. This essay can be misleading as it is full of many inaccuracies.

⁶⁴Interview with Mambo Bingo Kanyemba, Harare, Mbare, January 1998. The MANC had followers in N.Rhodesia, particularly in Copperbelt.

⁶⁵ Thomas Henriksen, Mozambique, 169, account on the UDENAMO is misleading. In fact, contrary to his assumption Uria Simango did not participate in the foundation of UDENAMO in Southern Rhodesia.



Portuguese East Africa Society member), José Nkovane, Anibal Chilengue, Daniel Mahlalele, Mulendze Kandawere, Simão Mapangue, Jaime Mapangue, Bombata Tembe, Manuel Mangate and Muatine Machava. The latter was then arrested by security police in the hotel in Salisbury.⁶⁶ Gwambe had been working in the Railways since 1952. He was from Inhambane and had been working in Lourenço Marques before leaving for Beira from where he fled to Mutare, Salisbury and Bulawayo. He spoke Shona, Ndebele, Portuguese and English. Bucuane was the most literate in the group. He was responsible for elaboration of the statutes, which were inspired by the NDP. He completed a teaching course at Alvor (Maputo) in 1953. Before leaving for Rhodesia in October 1957, he had been teaching at Maleice (Gaza). In Bulawayo he was received by Gwambe with whom he shared a room for many years. He also worked for the Railways.⁶⁷

Later, new members, namely José Guterrez Bila and Lopes Tembe, joined the Party. Some of newcomers were from South Africa where they have been working in mines or other enterprises. For example, Lopes Tembe, who later became very active as a FRELIMO combatant, arrived in Salisbury in 1958 and worked as a travelling salesman for Dallas & Company. As a salesman he came into contact with the social and economic reality of the African community in Southern Rhodesia and sympathized with their struggles. He met his country-fellows in rally meetings organized by NDP. Soon after he joined UDENAMO. Lopes Tembe Ndelane is now Mozambican High Commissioner in Swaziland. Before that he had been Mozambican Ambassador in Zimbabwe and in China. He was born in Matutuine (Maputo), and grew up in South Africa with his parents. He was schooled in English and Zulu in South Africa. His father had emigrated to South Africa in the early 1930s and became an ANC (South Africa) member. In 1956, Ndelane returned to Mozambique where he faced racial segregation and eventually was imprisoned because his Portuguese colleague envied his being paid 1000\$00PTE per week, against the 365\$00 monthly salary that black Mozambicans usually earned. He and his employer (Dallas & Company) forwarded a letter to the United Nations denouncing Portuguese repression and racism.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Apart from Jaime Sigauke (from central Mozambique) and Mulendze Kandawere (from Nampula), the majority seems to have come from southern Mozambique.

⁶⁷ See interview with Aurélio Bucuane, Maputo, October 1996. Bucuane is now a Chairman of the Primer Minister Cabinet in Maputo.

Some time in 1960, UDENAMO members met Joshua Nkomo for the first time after he had addressed a rally at Barbour Fields in Bulawayo. The group was composed of Adelino Gwambe, Aurélio Bucuane, Aníbal Chilengue, David Chambal, Daniel Mahlaeie, Fanuel Mahluza, José Nkovane, Jaime Sigáúke and José Bila. In January 1961 a delegation of UDENAMO consisting of Gwambe, Bucuane and Chambal was invited for a meeting at NDP headquarters in Highfields, Salisbury. At this meeting Joshua Nkomo assured his party's moral and material support to UDENAMO. Nkomo also suggested that the Mozambican Party move to Tanganyika because in Southern Rhodesia they were not safe enough to carry out their political activities. After promising to talk to Julius Nyerere about the move, he asked them to keep quiet until arrangements were made.

In the course of that meeting with Joshua Nkomo, Zimbabwean nationalists talked to the Mozambicans about Uria Simango, and during the break they were escorted to Simango's house. Simango welcomed them and talked about the Portuguese East Africa Society and other Mozambican nationalists in Salisbury. He also told them that he knew Eduardo Mondlane from U.S.⁶⁹ Although he did not join any political group, Simango soon became a key figure amongst the Mozambican migrants, and used his theological and political background to bring them together. He had entered Southern Rhodesia as a political refugee before 1959 and had joined the Portuguese East Africa Society. Simango was born in Sofala, and belonged to a very influential political and religious lineage in central Mozambique. He had a mission education and was ordained as a Minister in the Presbyterian Swiss Church. After some time he left Southern Rhodesia for Malawi and then for Tanganyika, where he joined UDENAMO. In 1962 he was elected as FRELIMO's Vice-President.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ See interview with Lopes Tembe Ndelane, Mbabane, February, 1998.

⁶⁹ Simango attained his Divinity degree in U.S. See interview with Aurélio Bucuane, Maputo, October 1996.

⁷⁰ The election of Uria Simango as Vice-President of FRELIMO was joyfully celebrated by Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia, particularly those gathered into Mozambican African National Congress in Salisbury. They regarded Simango as their genuine leader. Even today Simango is still their hero. See collective interview in Mbare, January 1998; For more details on Simango's affiliation to UDENAMO in Tanganyika, see my interview with Lopes Tembe, Mbabane, February, 1998.

While in Southern Rhodesia, Simango devoted his time to teaching Portuguese and spreading the evangelical and political gospel amongst Mozambican migrants in Salisbury. He stressed the importance of learning Portuguese as a language of unity. He was based in Mbare (Harari Township) at Miguel's house, with his wife and child. Miguel was a bachelor from Zambézia. Simango taught at night in a small room rented from the Salvation Army and followed the Portuguese curricula from first to fourth levels. He had 24 students, including youths and adults from Tete, Sofala, and Maputo. During the class he talked to his students about the bible and the importance of unity and liberty. According to João Rampi who attended his classes, Simango sometimes stopped the teaching and talked to them about the war and the massacres in Angola. He then selected two of his students and sent them to Tanganyika. One was Martinho Bucuane from Angónia (Tete), and was a member of MANC.⁷¹

However, Mozambican nationalists were divided and suspected each other of being Portuguese spies. As a result, MANC and UDENAMO never came together. There were other isolated movements established either in Salisbury or in Bulawayo. However, it was UDENAMO whose members were largely from southern Mozambique which took its political role more seriously, and soon moved to Tanganyika. Thus, in mid-1961 Gwambe, Bucuane and Chambal moved to Tanganyika.⁷² However, UDENAMO did not disappear from Southern Rhodesia, as the remaining members continued mobilizing new adherents and channeling them to Zambia or Tanganyika.⁷³ They also established contacts with their leadership in Tanganyika. Gwambe also tried to widen UDENAMO's influence over Mozambican migrants throughout southern Africa. According to a document by Portuguese Intelligence, dated November 1961,

[Adelino] C. [Chitof] Gwambe,⁷⁴ UDENAMO's National President, has contacted P. J. Mdzudzere of the Portuguese East African Society in Salisbury. Gwambe stressed it was most important to form a strong organization in all the territories of the Federation, South Africa and Dar es Salaam, and suggested it

⁷¹See also interview with João Rampi, Harare, Mbare, January 1998 and collective interview in Mbare, January 1998.

⁷²Interview with Aurélio Bucuane, Maputo, October, 1996.

⁷³For example the second group left Southern Rhodesia via Zambia to Tanganyika in October 1961. Recommended by ZAPU they were welcomed by Kenneth Kaunda and Kapwepwe at African House in Lusaka. Kaunda asked Mozambican nationalists not betray them.

⁷⁴His full name seems to be Adelino Chitof, Hlomulo Gwambe.

would be useful if clandestine links were established at the Shabani Mine and on the railway lines which run from Southern Rhodesia to Beira and Lourenço Marques. Madzudzere was asked to submit a list of Portuguese East African natives studying at St. Augustine's Mission, Umtali, as 'they are very useful to us for further studies abroad'. Gwambe also stressed the necessity for great care in whom they contacted as Portuguese 'spies' were on the increase.⁷⁵

It is also reliably reported that C. Z. Mahlayeye, General Secretary of UDENAMO in Dar es Salaam, has been in contact with J. Simango of Salisbury. Wherein the latter is informed that two refugees from Lourenço Marques named Daniel Mahlayeye and Lourenço Matola, are on their way to Salisbury. Seven more refugees will follow. When the two men arrive in Salisbury, they are to be taken to the NDP Secretary General, T.G.M. Silundika. From Southern Rhodesia, the refugees will travel through Northern Rhodesia contacting the UNIP in Lusaka and thence to Limbe where further instructions will be awaiting them at Malawi Congress Party Headquarters. It would appear that they are on their way to Tanganyika.⁷⁶

At least before the foundation of FRELIMO, Gwambe seems to have been an active nationalist. He had many followers and established strong contacts in Ghana, Morocco, Egypt, United Nations, etc. He also confronted Portuguese government with several letters.⁷⁷

On the other hand, MANC also continued mobilizing followers and addressing meetings, especially in Harari and Mabvuku Townships. Although SRANC and NDP were respectively banned in 1959 and 1960, MANC managed to survive by remaining underground. Peter Balamanja and Jeque Tundumula had established many links with

⁷⁵ "National Democratic Union of Mozambique, 2nd November, 1961", Intendente Afonso R.I.Ferraz e Freitas, for director, F.I.S.B., in: Correspondência confidencial da delegação do Instituto do Trabalho, Previdência e Acção Social (ITPAS) em Salisburia para o Presidente do ITPAS, em Lourenço Marques, Salisbury, 1965. See personal files with Mr. João de Deus, Tete, 1993.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ See for example Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, Arquivo Salazar - AOS/CO/UL-9C PT2: Carta (Memorandum ao governo Português pela União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique - UDENAMO) rejeitando a "ideia de multi-racialismo", s.d. [13 September 1961]. This document was also signed by Faniel Mahluza, Calvino Mahlayeye, Jaime Sigauke, T. Marapendê, C. Estanislaus and Marcelino dos Santos. It is surprising how in Eduardo Mondlane, *The struggle for Mozambique* (London, 1969), there is no single reference to the political activities of UDENAMO and other proto-nationalist movements before the foundation of FRELIMO.

Zambia and Malawi and sent their members to Tanganyika.⁷⁸ With the increasing repression of the combined Portuguese and Rhodesian police the political environment in Southern Rhodesia became fragile.⁷⁹ In 1962 ZAPU was banned. In the following year, Portuguese police arrested Jeque Tundumūla and Peter Balamanja after they had addressed a mass rally of about 5,000 Mozambican participants in Mafakosi, Harare. After this incident a delegation consisting of Bingo Kanyemba, Peter Simbe and Damos Moshā went to Malawi to ask President Banda to persuade the Portuguese colonial authorities to release them.⁸⁰ Although MANC directed its members to join FRELIMO in Tanganyika, its future depended heavily on Banda support in Nyasaland and eventually it merged with the local based Mozambican political organisation - UNAMI (Independent Mozambique African National Union) under José Baltazar da Costa Chagonga's leadership.⁸¹ Zambia and Nyasaland became their major stronghold.⁸² It is important to note that although the proto-nationalist movements joined FRELIMO in Tanganyika as a united umbrella organization, many migrants still joined the former parties first and then joined FRELIMO through them. However, further ideological conflicts within FRELIMO seem to have led to confusion amongst migrants.

This chapter sheds some light on our understanding of the different manifestations of consciousness and variety of struggles amongst Mozambicans, especially Mozambican migrants that characterised the late 1950s. In this period, Southern Rhodesia underwent a period of economic recession with high levels of unemployment, particularly in urban areas. As a result, local Africans experienced economic deprivation and political repression. Unemployment contributed to a deterioration in the African labour movement

⁷⁸ In fact there were strong connections between political organisations in the region. For example, Ranger refers to connections between NDP and the Malawi Congress Party. See Ranger, *Are we not also men?*, 195.

⁷⁹ See for example one episode occurred in Tete (Mozambique) in 1960 accounted by Sketchley Samkange of arrest of his friend Peter Mackay by Portuguese authorities in their way to Malawi. He also described Portuguese authorities as "the most atrocious brutes I have ever known in my life". See Ranger, *Are we not also men?*, 195.

⁸⁰ Interview with Francisco Chicote, Bingo Kanyemba and Domingos Chauma, Mbare, Harare, January, 1998.

⁸¹ See Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, Arquivo Salazar: AOS/CO/UL-9C PT2. See also, Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A history* (Cape Town, 1978), chapter seven.

⁸² See various documents in Arquivo da Torre do Tombo, Arquivo Salazar: AOS/CO/UL-9C PT2.

which was plagued by the rise of xenophobic attitudes against foreign labourers, especially Mozambicans. At the same time, however, local political repression brought about some sort of solidarity amongst political organisations, especially between the Rhodesian organisations, SRANC and NDP and later ZAPU, and the Mozambican MANC and UDENAMO.

Although Mozambican associations may have retained their ethnic identity they were now expressing them in parallel with a broader national political consciousness. Political consciousness in the 1940s and 1950s was markedly affected by labour conflict and political struggle, while ethnic origin remained fundamentally important for individuals, groupings and associations. Labour conflict and political consciousness were the main elements of change for Mozambicans in the 1950s in Southern Rhodesia. Mozambican nationalists argued for territorial nationalism rather than regional factionalism or an ethno-nationalist approach. This position may explain why they joined FRELIMO in 1962.⁸³ However, the official history of Mozambique has ignored the role of the African proto-nationalists in the neighbouring countries.⁸⁴ The futility of their attempts to advance solutions for national liberation does not mean however that they can be left out of the history of Mozambican nationalism. In fact, they were fully aware of exploitation and the need for liberation.

⁸³The crisis that occurred in the following years can only be explained as a result of conflicts for leadership rather than as a regional factionalism. I am aware this is a complex issue which requires more research before any consistent conclusion can be reached. In fact, events in the second half of the 1960s seem to have changed this approach amongst FRELIMO's dissidents.

⁸⁴Their absence from the history of Mozambican liberation seems motivated by their hesitant attitude towards FRELIMO's ideology.

CHAPTER 11:

CONCLUSION

LABOUR MIGRATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MANICA, 1930-1960s.

Before concentrating on the colonial economy and its impact on African societies, the main subject of my thesis, I have analysed trade and political relations established between African communities and the external powers, the Asian and European, from sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. This summary introduction describes the process through which central Mozambique, particularly the present Manica province, became involved in the world market before the nineteenth century.

Manyika and Quiteve were the most important kingdoms in central Mozambique and through Macequece and Bandire fairs they traded gold in exchange for cloths and beads with Asian and European traders. This activity seems to have reinforced the power of local ruling classes and integrated peasants in the world market economy. In the eighteenth century Macequece had been transformed into a centre for regional commerce in a variety of products such as iron hoes, cattle, copper, rubber, and ivory. Trade seems to have encouraged local peasants to produce surplus food for sale, especially on the trade routes and goldfields. European presence seems to have influenced changes in local languages, education, food, clothes and religion.

In the mid-nineteenth century the region came under Gaza-Nguni influence. The Gaza-Nguni disrupted trading networks in Manica and imposed their power on former ruling lineage groups, especially through tax collection and the recruitment of local men into Nguni armies and other duties. The Gaza state also disrupted the old Portuguese trade-routes between the coast and the hinterland and, established its own control, especially over the ivory, hides and rubber trade. In general, the Gaza political elite had in cattle their principal means of accumulating wealth. Cattle were not only a way of paying tribute, but also replaced hoes and cloths as the main currency. Although territorial control remained under local chieftaincies, the political centralization of the Gaza-Nguni state meant that it had control over people.

The development of mining in Kimberley and the Transvaal in the 1870s and 1880s, drew men from villages in central Mozambique, particularly Mossurize and neighbouring areas, who travelled to these new economic centres in search of wage employment. With the increasing influx of sterling brought home by migrant labourers, Gaza-Nguni chiefs demanded that tribute be paid in pounds. Although cattle did not lose there economic and social value, pounds became the principal currency in commercial and marriage transactions. This change may have influenced the growing number of young men migrating to the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia. Migrant remittances were also used for purchasing food during cyclical failures in agriculture because of drought and epizootics. After the colonial conquest migrancy was both combated and incorporated into the colonial strategy of exploitation of African peasants through the collection of hut tax and poll tax in foreign currency.

Because of their environment and their communication networks, from the beginning of colonial settlement, Chimoio and Manica districts were occupied by foreign settlers from almost every corner of the world. However, from 1891 to 1942 the process of colonisation was controlled by the Mozambique Company. Initially, to achieve its economic goals, the Mozambique Company concentrated on the exploitation of railway services and mineral extraction, land speculation, and especially the commercialization of African rubber, cotton and maize production as the main source of accumulation. In the 1920s Chimoio became the main white farming area of the region while Manica developed substantial gold, silver and copper mining. In Mossurize people gathered bees-wax and collected rubber for the market. However, because it lacked a transport network it was less attractive to white settlers. With the crisis in the rubber market in the after World War I, Mossurize was transformed into a labour reserve for Chimoio and Manica enterprises.

Owing to the competition from African peasants in Manica, only very few settlers were successful farmers. Clandestine recruitment and African migration to neighbouring territories caused great concern to local employers in Manica province. The labour shortage crippled settler farmers whose economic situation deteriorated with the world

market crisis in the late 1920s and early 1930s. White farmers who failed in agriculture had to turn to marketing African maize in exchange for imported goods. A small number engaged in lorry-driving carrying migrant labourers to Southern Rhodesia, Manica, Tete and Sofala provinces.

In chapter three I have shown that the development of settler farming in Manica province in the 1930s and 1950s was engineered by the Mozambique Company and the state, and was a result of the more general colonial settlement policy to settle colonies with white people, especially Portuguese colonists, so as to avoid the "denationalization" of the colonies. The state and the Mozambique Company not only created a political climate favourable to the suppression of African communities, but also played a major role in providing labour, land and credit facilities on the basis of which settler farmers could gradually seize control of farm production, particularly of maize. State protection has been common in Southern Africa and in other colonial African experience.¹

The incorporation of African labour into the new agrarian capitalist economy was one of the most daunting challenges that faced white settlers in Manica province. The small and medium-scale farmers in Manica were totally dependent on African labour at the cheapest cost possible to run their economic enterprise, and relied heavily on state protection and labour coercion. However, the stiff competition over African labour offered by neighbouring territories stimulated labour desertion and migration to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, and increased the local labour shortage. Officials and administrative staff generally claimed that this labour shortage was "artificial", and that the solution lay in improved wages and working conditions, including decent accommodation, clothing and good food. Undercapitalised settler farmers were in no

¹ See, Tim Keegan, "Debate: The Origins of Agrarian Capitalism in South Africa: A Reply", *JSAS*, 15, 4, (1989), 683-4.

position to implement such measures, however the African labour migration continued to undermine the settler economy throughout the 1950s and 1960s.²

This study of Manica province has also shown, however, that although they were victims of coercion, some sections of African peasantry, if not the majority, remained relatively autonomous and took advantage of the available market for foodstuff supply and labour migration remittances particularly in the 1940s and 1950s.³ Owing to the need for cheap labour for white economic enterprises, in general colonialism inhibited the possibility of accumulation for the rural households. However, compared to southern Mozambique, in Manica, peasants seem to have responded differently. In the Manica province, the amount of alienated land was small in relation to the total land surface, and occurred along the railway line. As a result, land alienation was insufficient to provide free African labour. In fact, the displaced population could find reasonable land elsewhere relatively easily. Moreover, given their proximity to Southern Rhodesia, Manica African peasants were also integrated into the Rhodesian colonial market, either as labourers or through selling their crops at very competitive prices. This economic relationship in the 1940s and 1950s, provided local peasants with an extra market in Southern Rhodesia which endures to this day.

As Portuguese administrative authorities were unable to conscript men into wage labour for white settler agriculture in Manica province, they applied new strategies to extract a surplus from Africans, such as promoting African cash-cropping. Although this policy was implemented throughout the province, the areas bordering Manica and Mossurize districts were of most concern to the colonial administration. In the 1940s and 1950s Rotanda, Mavita, Dombe and the Mossurize highlands were regarded as the main target for the establishment of government-oriented African settlement projects.

The African response to these transformations was uneven. Although the policies aimed to retain men in the rural areas and to curtail labour migration to the neighbouring

² I analyse this process in chapters five and six.

³ This aspect is analysed in detail in chapters four to six.

countries, this was unsuccessful and the prevalence of male migration meant that much of the agricultural burden remained on women's shoulders. Unlike in the case of cotton, in the case of maize and wheat cultivation, the situation was far better, as men were keen to take advantage of the growing market in food, and here the colonial administration provided African farmers with more technical support, especially through the *Junta de Exportação de Cereais* which set up an agricultural experimental station in Rotanda in 1943. These changes were complemented in 1949 by the establishment of an agricultural fund (*Fundo de auxílio à agricultura indígena*) to support African farming.

Overall, the economic changes which occurred in the 1940s and early 1950s in central Mozambique seem to have contributed both to the reinforcement of household or community subsistence agriculture and to the emergence of African progressive farmers. The adoption of new crops and farming systems in response to the market implied the mobilisation of surplus labour and or investment in oxen and ploughs. The degree of the African response to the maize market economy depended mostly on their control over household labour. Labour resources were mobilised mainly for food production. Ecological factors also contributed to rural and social differentiation amongst households in Manica. Indeed, people living in tsetse fly areas were inhibited from breeding livestock, especially cattle. Sometimes, peasants also faced seasonal hardship as a result of drought and plagues, particularly locusts, and this increased the vulnerability of small households.

Chapters five and six analyse the transformations that occurred during the 1950s and early 1960s, and the impact of the state-sponsored settlement scheme on African community. While the 1950s confirmed the failure of white settlers to conscript local African labour into their economic enterprises, in the 1960s the colonial authorities tried to bring Africans and Portuguese colonists into a multi-racial economic program, the so-called *colonatos*. Although in 1960, the majority of African peasants were moved away from Sussundenga *colonato*, it was in the interests of the Portuguese administration to keep a small number of progressive African farmers within, or side by side with, the Portuguese villages. In the early 1960s about seventeen African farmers joined the settlement scheme in Sussundenga.

Moving from subsistence to commercial agriculture and applying modern technology such as mechanized cultivation, rotation system, fertilizers and hybrid seeds, African progressive farmers changed their economic and social status. To reinforce their position, they moved from huts to brick houses and had access to pumped water. Although their modest brick houses were far below the quality of those provided to white farmers, they still shared social facilities with white settlers in Vila Nova de Vidigueira, including a Catholic church, a health centre and an official primary school which served all farmers, white or black. In addition, a social or recreational club, including a bar and dance hall, was also established. Further, the colonial administration intended to allow the children of these progressive farmers or 'assimilados' to play together, or share some degree of intimacy, with white children. However limited, a small number of African progressive farmers enjoyed some degree of social ease and tasted a multi-racial community life. The majority of peasants, however, still lived in a condition of 'semi-slavery' as labour tenants on small and medium-scale white farms.

While in Manica-Macequece, Mavonde, Rotanda and Mavita, African peasants were entitled to cultivate maize and wheat as the main cash-crop, in Dombe and Mossurize, peasants were forced into cotton-growing in order to supply raw cotton to the Portuguese and the local textile industry. As in other areas bordering Southern Rhodesia, in Dombe and Mossurize, the cotton scheme was also imposed to prevent men from migrating to neighbouring countries of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. However, due to low prices and the absence of market facilities, peasants were hostile to cotton cultivation. To overcome this, in the early 1950s, the CNA and the colonial administrative authorities introduced incentives, such as new prices and the semi-mechanisation of agricultural methods through the provision of ploughs and tractors as well as transport facilities. They also planned to establish some social infra-structure, including boreholes, stores, health centres and schools.

Most of these projects remained theoretical however, until the late 1950s when they finally came into being when new rural development programs were designed in form of *ruralato* scheme or communities complexes. Two types of *ruralato* can be

distinguished: one which developed mechanised agriculture, and another where peasants depended on rudimentary technology. Nevertheless, financial problems seem to have hampered these projects, leaving the greater part of Dombe and Mossurize without any significant change until the outbreak of the liberation struggle in the region in 1972.

The integration of African farmers into cotton schemes accelerated African social differentiation. In general, land for cotton cultivation was distributed to men. The colonial administration regarded women as men's assistants on the cotton fields. The women's agricultural role was mainly supposed to be food-crop production. Although very few African farmers hired wage labour, access to labour was basically through household networks and the co-operation of neighbours. In general, African farmers relied on the labour of their wives and children to farm.

With mechanisation and price incentives, a few African farmers now invested their income in cotton farming, but were not enough to stimulate much growth. Land fertility, labour input and technology also played an important role in household decisions whether or not to produce cotton. Cotton cultivation had many risks and the income generated from its production could not guarantee the subsistence of household members, let alone the satisfaction of other social needs and accumulation. Indeed, many peasants resisted cotton cultivation in favour of food-cropping. Most men preferred to join the labour market in neighbouring countries because that way they could earn more money to fulfil their social needs. Although some migrant labourers invested in agricultural implements, the lack of transport to access the market and irregular household labour due to the migration of teenagers, meant that the majority of peasants were unlikely to become rich.

The establishment of Textáfrica in 1954 in Chimoio had three main implications for central Mozambique. First, with the demand for raw cotton it exerted more pressure on cotton cultivators in Mossurize, Dombe and elsewhere in Sofala and Zambezia provinces; second, as part of a more general policy of *portuguesification* in the overseas territories, it played a pivotal role in white settlement, industrialisation and the

development of the infra-structure in central Mozambique in general and in Manica province in particular. Although other industries made their appearance in this period, Textafrika, Textil de Pungue and Moçambique Industrial, were the most important and helped to enhance farming enterprises in Manica and Sofala provinces

This study also shows the importance and the great demand for child labour on white settler farms in Manica, Chimoio and Buzi sugar plantations during the period under consideration and how it influenced child migration to Southern Rhodesia. With the establishment of the textile industry in Manica, pressure increased on peasants to grow cotton and on children and juveniles to work. Boys and girls were conscripted into cotton cultivation in the household or for CAN, to the detriment of their education.

The migration of children to Southern Rhodesia arose from a variety of factors. However, the underlying reason was the impact of the Portuguese political economy and of missionary education on African communities in Manica. In general, because the local Catholic missionaries adopted a paternalist role towards the African community while collaborating with the local administration and white settlers in recruiting child labour, their educational efforts were unsuccessful. Not surprisingly, there appears to have been strong opposition to the missionary education provided in Manica. People reacted against Catholic education not only on ideological grounds, but also because they wanted an education which could provide them with useful skills for their own economic activity or for better employment than working for white farmers under backward conditions. The alternative to social and economic conditions in Manica was to flee to Southern Rhodesia where they believed that the conditions were far better.

By stressing Portuguese colonial policy and Catholic education as the main factors behind child labour and migration to Southern Rhodesia, I am not suggesting that these were the only causes. Children from richer families chose to engage in wage labour in order to earn cash to satisfy their own needs. This may have resulted from conflicts within the households over the distribution of income. Parents also

encouraged their children to look for wage employment to supplement household incomes and, most importantly, to prepare themselves for marriage. The degree of household economic stability determined whether juvenile earnings were supplementary or central to household income, or were invested in agricultural implements.

Finally, it seems that the economic structure of the eastern districts of Southern Rhodesia, especially in the farming sector and tea estates, was dependent on the free flow of labour from its neighbours, particularly Mozambique. Plantations and small-scale farms were dependent on such labour movement, including that of children and juveniles. The articulation between some of the estates and the established mission stations, as well as the existence of night schools, seems to have led Mozambican children to seek education in Southern Rhodesia.

The child-migration patterns established from the 1930s to the 1960s were deeply rooted in the historical connections between the two territories from the early twentieth century. Labour migration to Southern Rhodesia and the lack of schools in central Mozambique both contributed to strengthen Mozambican dependency on the Rhodesian labour market and its mission schools. For many young Manicans, the sooner they emigrated the better. Thus, from an early age they developed a wide knowledge of the Rhodesian labour market, and mastered labour skills. This way they also secured their position as adult workers. However, farm labour was no paradise. Low wages and brutal treatment very often prompted youths to desert as soon as they were familiar with the local environment. Juveniles also used farm labour as a transit to urban employment. In chapter eight I analysed adult labour migration and its socio-economic implications in Manica.

As in many parts of southern Africa, migrancy from Manica province to Southern Rhodesia resulted in the division of households and families, especially the separation

of migrant men from their wives and children.⁴ However, most migrants also developed a network that enabled them to remain in contact with their families. Contrary to the position in southern Mozambique and Tete province where migrancy was governed by official agreements, in Manica province the main pattern of migrancy was that of so-called clandestines. Because clandestine migrants had the freedom to choose their employer, length of contract (if any) and place of work, they could combine wage employment with household labour as they pleased. Usually, those migrants worked for periods varying from one to six months before returning home with their income, either in cash or in the form of agricultural implements and other commodities.

Manicans living in Penhalonga, Machipanda, Rotanda, Mavonde and Espungabera and working in Southern Rhodesia returned home either every day or at the week-end. However, some migrants established themselves in Rhodesia, either in the reserves or in urban areas, and their families were divided between that territory and Mozambique. As we have seen, some young migrants even married Rhodesian women and thereafter discharged themselves from any social responsibility in their home villages. Nevertheless their position as permanent residents in Rhodesia proved to be very important to people back home as they provided a security network for newcomers, including children looking for education.

Income from migrant labour was also an important resource for young migrants having to pay *shuma* and hoping to set up their own household. Young men were normally expected to spend some years as migrants in order to contribute substantially to their bridewealth. The marriage of young migrants in their home villages was very important. Not only did it secure the reproduction of labour for the household; it also brought great prestige for both the bride and groom's families. Further, reproduction was very important for the expansion of the household. In the rural context, a household or homestead with only a few members was vulnerable and more likely to be poor than a larger one. An unmarried young girl not only deprived her parents of the lucrative and

⁴See also the study on southern Mozambique by L. Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture in southern Mozambique to special reference to the lower Limpopo valley, 1920-1992" (Ph D, London), 1996; Colin Murray, Families divided: The impact of migrant labour in Lesotho (Cambridge, 1981).

socially prestigious *shuma*, but could also be regarded as a prostitute (*mahore*) in the community.

Although there were many alternatives for negotiating marriage, young girls were expected to marry men who could pay *shuma*. Generally they were adults with some wealth or young boys who had managed to save some money as migrant workers or who had received help in cattle from their parents. In rural Manica, marriages were rarely the result of individual choice or mutual agreement between bride and groom. Usually those marriages were arranged by parents or elders and often involved girls or children before they reached puberty. As a result, girls could be married to men who were far older than they were.⁵

After payment of *shuma*, a girl could either stay at her parents' household until she reached puberty or move into her mother-in-law's home. After that, she could be formally married and left with her parents' in law until the birth of her first children, when the couple usually established their own household. When her husband returned to migrant labour, his wife could either go with him, stay alone with her younger brothers or sisters-in-law, or live with her mother-in-law. Simão Ruvai who became a migrant when he was youth, remembers that his parents obliged him to marry a local girl, but did not allow to take his wife with him to Southern Rhodesia lest she stay there forever. However, he managed to buy her a head of cattle, built a brick house with a sheet-iron roof and purchased a sewing machine.⁶ Husbands who were absent for a long time also tended to marry Rhodesian women, leaving their wives in Mozambique dependent upon parents or relatives. Although young wives could sometimes travel with their migrant husbands for short periods, in most cases they were left in a powerless position and subordinated to their mothers-in-law. In these circumstances wives rarely had control of remittances sent by their husbands.⁷ The high prevalence of male migration resulted in

⁵See for example my interview with P. Baradzai in chapter seven. However it is possible that girls made their own choice to marry old men because they wanted more social security.

⁶See interview with Simão Ruvai, Manica, Muñonguara village, 22 July 1996.

⁷For comparative purposes with other places in southern Africa see, Peter Delius, *A lion amongst the cattle*, (Oxford, 1996), chapters three and five; Henrietta L. Moore & Megan Vaughan, *Cutting down trees*, (London, 1994), chapter six.

an increased workload on women. Under these circumstances, women played an important role in the household economy. Thus, paradoxically women were either in a vulnerable or in a powerful position in the African household as a result of migrant labour.

On the one hand, wives who commanded their own household in the absence of their husbands seem to have been more powerful even if they were burdened by colonial demands, especially in cotton-growing areas.⁸ Moreover some migrants whose families were split between the two territories managed to provide their dependents with reasonable security as one of my informants in Manica remembers:

My late father worked in Zimbabwe from the late 1920s till early 1960 when he retired. He had married a Rhodesian wife before he was married to my mother in Penhalonga village. My father had studied in a local mission school in Penhalonga [Zimbabwe] up to standard three before he joined the Rezende Mines as 'bossboy'. He was well known and helped many Mozambicans to get employment there. Later on he became a policeman and worked in Sakubva Township in Umtali. In fact, my father had two wives. One here (my mother) was the youngest and had been engaged when she was still adolescent. She was considered the first wife (with rights to inheritance). My father had children with his second wife in Zimbabwe. I was born in 1931. By that time my mother was adult and had regular contacts with my father. My father visited her every weekend and sometimes took her with him for short visit. He guaranteed our subsistence. We could visit him too or go to stay and study there. My sisters studied here and there. Some of them got married there. I also studied here and there. However my father sent me to Boroma mission station in Tete where I completed a teacher training course in 1953. In 1955 I abandoned teaching and joined my father in Zimbabwe to pursue my studies. In 1960 I returned to Manica and worked for the local administration as a secretary in Mavonde. After his retirement in the early 1960s my father invested his retirement bonus in a restaurant business in Umtali before returning to Manica in 1965. He left the restaurant with his nephew in Zimbabwe and established a new business here [Manica].⁹

The relationship between migrants and their wives was affected also by other advantages of migrancy. For example, migrants presented their wives at home with clothes, shoes, scarves, rings and cosmetics, such as toilet soap and body lotions. Those products reinforced the prestige of migrants' wives in the community.

⁸For more details on this aspect see chapter six.

⁹Interview with Benjamim Manhoca, Manica city, 10 April 1993.

By and large African households in Manica and Mossurize districts depended on migrant earnings to enhance their agriculture and their accumulation more generally. However, the articulation between wage employment over the border and the household economy also depended on the productive capacity of those left behind. An industrious wife (or wives) and other members of the household were very important for guaranteeing levels of production that not only secured their subsistence but also provided cash to purchase locally available goods. This meant that the migrants' earnings could be directed to other priorities, especially agricultural implements, hybrid seeds, building materials, and cattle. Cattle were not only an essential means of production but also important socially for marriage transactions and household security, particularly during bad harvests.

The degree and success of articulation between migrant labour and household economy may also explain peasant social differentiation. Pedro Baradzai remembers how his father invested in agriculture in Manica while working in Southern Rhodesia.

I was born in Mavonde near the Pungue River that bordered on Zimbabwe. My late father was called Fourpence Baradzai. His Portuguese employer killed him when he was working in building in Vila de Manica. My mother is from Zimbabwe. She was married to my father when he was working in the building industry in Mutare in the early 1950s. By that time he had another wife in Mozambique. When I was young I sometimes lived in Sakubva [Mutare] with my sister who had married a Zimbabwean man. My parents had about 10ha of field-crops in Mavonde, especially maize, sorghum and sesame for market. We helped our mother[stepmother] in crop cultivation. My father brought two ox-drawn ploughs with one disc each from Zimbabwe. He also brought seeds and clothes for us and his wife, and other domestic utensils. As my father was absent my mother controlled the productive work and presented the revenues to her husband monthly when he came home. My father used to give me some money from that revenue. He also bought some cattle and goats with that money. We had 25 goats, seven cows and four bulls.¹⁰

African commercial farms in Manica district were dependent to a very considerable extent on the agricultural implements bought in Rhodesia. In general, migrant workers

¹⁰See interview with Pedro Baradzai, Manica city, 22 January 1998. See also interview in chapter seven.

regarded ploughs, grinding-mills, donkeys (in Mossurize) and hybrid seeds as an important investment for their agricultural enterprise. The use of donkeys for ploughing, and to transport crops to the market and fetch water or firewood seems to have considerably reduced these burdens on women.¹¹ Ploughs and donkeys also provided the wife or wives of migrants with the power to expand their agriculture. African agriculture not only benefited from those means of production, but also from the empirical and practical experience that farm labourers developed during their work on farms. Many ex-farm labourers in Rhodesia believed that agricultural activity was the best investment for their retirement and were inspired by the example of Rhodesian farmers. One ex-migrant labourer exemplified this by stating that: "In Rhodesia Boers always wore shorts and sometimes went to the city dirty. But they had a lot of money, not like the ones who lived in the city."¹²

Further inputs were transferred into household agriculture through the agricultural knowledge that young migrants acquired on the mission or in farm schools.¹³ These experiences varied from learning agricultural methods, how to select seeds, combat insects, to use fertilizers, as well as learning skills such as how to graft, drive tractors and repair machines (e.g. grinding mills). In the late 1940s for example a progressive farmer in Mavita sent his son to Mutambara to work for a panel beating workshop in Cashel to get training in mechanics in order to enable him to maintain the mechanical grinding-mill he was planning to import from Rhodesia.¹⁴

Although the majority of migrants addressed their attention to agricultural activities, there were others who also acquired some literacy or industrial skills. In fact migrants cannot be treated as an undifferentiated mass. Their position in the labour market also stimulated different interests. Migrants with some professional skill, such as carpentry,

¹¹On the importance of donkeys in Mossurize, see my interview with João de Deus in chapter six.

¹²Interview with Felix Bishard, Penhalonga village, 20 April 1993.

¹³For example Pita Chazuca, who studied in mission school in Umtali and then worked in the Bvumba mountains farm, when he returned home helped his father (chief and progressive farmer) with his farming production. See interview in Chazuca village, 14 September 1996 and chapters four and seven.

¹⁴See chapter four.

tailoring, brick-making or metalworking, often returned home with tools and sewing machines and established their own workshops.¹⁵ João Chairuca, for example, studied at Mount Selinda mission station where he completed a carpentry course. After running his carpentry business in Salisbury, in the late 1950s, he returned to Manica and set up a carpentry workshop, which he combined with his building skills. Later on he became a very successful builder and farmer in Manica district.¹⁶

Migrants who managed to move from farm labour to urban or industrial employment were able to accumulate more and invest their savings in more profitable businesses as storekeepers, restaurant owners and tailors in Rhodesia. Those investments were viewed as providing a more secure retirement than being pensioners only. Some of these migrants acquired Rhodesian nationality to improve their standard of living. For example in Mutare city there is a large community of central Mozambicans who acquired Zimbabwean nationality and have many children born there. The majority of these migrants worked for the Rhodesia Railways, especially after World War II. One of the reasons inhibiting their return home was the repressive colonial policy in Mozambique and the absence of legal facilities to set up businesses there, as well as the lack of roads and other infrastructure. Contrary to southern Mozambique, in Manica migrant remittances had less impact on the development of commercial networks.¹⁷

Aniva Alferes for example who was orphaned in 1952 ran away from Catandica when he was eighteen years old and entered Umtali via Penhalonga. Initially he worked for Border Timber and after three months he joined the railways. Afterwards he was transferred to Salisbury and in the 1960s returned to Umtali again. He remembers that there were many Mozambicans in Umtali. "They were and still are the majority of residents here. There are many rich Mozambicans [here] with bars, restaurants, shops, taxi services (my sons have two) and buses," he added.¹⁸ Leocadia Rutsuara who was born in Rhodesia recalls her father's experience as follows:

¹⁵ See my interview with João de Deus in chapter six.

¹⁶ Interview with João Mesa Chairuca, Manica-Chinhambudzi village, 20 July 1996.

¹⁷ For comparative purpose see L. Covane, "Migrant labour and agriculture in southern Mozambique", chapter five.

¹⁸ Interview with Aniva Alferes, Mutare, Sakubva, 27 October 1996.

My father is a Mozambican from Chazuca [Manica] and my mother is Zimbabwean. I have got two sisters and three brothers. All of us studied in Zimbabwe. I am the youngest [born in 1970]. All my brothers and sisters are [doing] very well. They have got good jobs with good salaries. My father went to Rhodesia in the 1940s. He started to work in Imbeza at Border Timber. In 1957 my father changed his nationality and became Zimbabwean. In that year he joined the police [BSAP] until his retirement in 1993. In the mid-1960s he was appointed inspector of Police in Masvingo. Apart from working for the Police, my father had a farm of 1.5ha, livestock, a grinding-mill, a shop and a car.¹⁹

Apart from agricultural implements, new cultigens and building materials, migrants also brought home a wide range of products, which helped increase their social prestige within the community. These included clothes, shoes, suits, domestic utensils sewing machines, radios, furniture and bicycles. Almost all my interviewees brought home bicycles which were regarded as the second most valued acquisition, the first being a wife. Money was also very important, especially for paying to enroll their children in boarding schools, which were in general far from home, in Jécua or in Amatongas mission stations. However, the majority of migrant workers sent their children to study in mission stations in Mutare or Mount Selinda. As mentioned in chapter seven, education was viewed by local peasants, especially migrants, as an important investment for the future of their children.²⁰ However, education facilities in rural areas were hardly available to girls as parents preferred to keep them at home and away from the influences of modernisation.²¹

¹⁹Interview with Leocadia Rutsuara, Manica, August 1996.

²⁰It is no surprise that amongst the more educated young generation in Manica the majority are either children of *assimilados* or of ex-migrants. The latter even have strong connections with Zimbabwe through their kin network. Some children of migrants hold important senior positions in the public sector either in Mozambique or in Zimbabwe. See my interviews with Ana Paula Chidza (Manica, 14 September 1996) and Leocadia Rutsuara (Manica, August 1996) and João Mesa Chairuca (Manica, Chinhambudzi village, 20 July 1996).

²¹I discuss this aspect in chapter seven.

Mozambican workers in Rhodesia were not passive victims of colonial capitalism. They also joined their Rhodesian and Nyasa workmates in varied forms of collective bargaining and developed a form of worker consciousness. Further, Mozambican migrants joined different sects of African Protestant churches, many of which adopted a social gospel, which questioned the *status quo*. These forms of collective consciousness including experience of political associations were also extrapolated back home and used as important weapons for challenging Portuguese colonial policy.

My thesis has shown that the present situation of economic underdevelopment and dependence of Manica on Zimbabwe was to a great extent a result of colonial exploitation and the lack of economic and social infra-structure. Over a hundred years labour migration from Manica province to colonial Zimbabwe played a vital role in African rural life, especially in creating opportunities to enhance African farming. However, the great economic difficulties which still remain in Manica as a result of lack of capital, infra-structure, and job opportunities combined with the increasing unemployment in Zimbabwe raise new complex problems for further research.

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APPENDIX 1.

MAIZE PRODUCTION IN MANICA AND SOFALA (1908/9 – 1950/51)

Year	Bags (90 Kg)	Year	Bags (90 Kg)
1908/9	7,3955	1930/31	270,104
1909/10	103,830	1931/32	311,286
1910/11	89,679	1932/33	205,684
1911/12	85,282	1933/34	216,545
1912/13	130,339	1934/35	233,210
1913/14	188,684	1935/36	277,953
1914/15	238,978	1936/37	149,553
1915/16	270,234	1937/38	162,548
1916/17	316,948	1938/39	175,795
1917/18	206,460	1939/40	214,859
1918/19	145,000	1940/41	252,378
1919/20	394,184	1941/42	166,232
1920/21	552,886	1942/43	216,518
1921/22	265,000	1943/44	188,161
1922/23	305,000	1944/45	286,747
1924/25	190,033	1945/46	211,619
1925/26	201,033	1946/47	171,623
1926/27	386,296	1947/48	184,155
1927/28	369,621	1948/49	166,728
1928/29	201,678	1949/50	253,237
1929/30	280,100	1950/51	137,527

Source: AHM – FGG Nº, 381: Relatório da Comissão Administrativa e Centro de observações do solo e ordenamento agrícola, 1952.

APPENDIX 2.

LIST OF WHITE FARMS IN MANICA DISTRICT, 1910 - 1961.

Name	Place	Administrative area	Hectares	Since	Distance from Macequece
Robert Garvin	Chimeze	Mavonde	2,000	1910	26 Km
Agro Pecuária do Dororo	Dororo	Mavonde	1,900	1920	31 Km
Maria Elizabeth Delport	Machipanda	Manica	20	1935	19 Km
Artur Magno Pinheiro	Muza	Mavonde	400	1937	18 Km
Chimonica	Revué	Manica	2,430	1937	18 Km
Chimonica	Elvas	Mavonde	1,015	1937	20 Km
Manuel Fernando	Vila Manica	Manica	4	1939	1 Km
Armindo Duarte	Zué	Mavonde	200	1940	28 Km
Helena de Jesus	Vengo	Mavonde	100	1940	7 Km
António Tavares	Munene	Manica	1,200	1942	7 Km
Sociedade Agrícola de Mavita	Mavita	Mavita	525	1942	38 Km
Missão de Jécua	Jécua	Manica	1,407	1942	6 Km
José da Cruz	Vengo	Mavonde	120	1942	7 Km
Agro Pecuária do Muza	Muza	Mavonde	3,400	1943	20 Km
Costa Apotsos	Revué	Manica	477	1945	22 Km
Manuel Rosa	Machipanda	Manica	750	1945	13 Km
Lourenço M. Duarte Canhão	Machipanda	Manica	1,500	1946	15 Km
Manuel Eduardo dos Santos	Muza	Mavonde	120	1948	23 Km
António G. Mão Cheia	Zombe	Manica	1,000	1949	20 Km
Mussa Chand & Filhos	Andrade	Manica	50	1949	11 Km
Joaquim V. M. de Carvalho	Tsetserra	Mavita	5,000	1949	50 Km
Silvino Simões	Vengo	Mavonde	200	1949	7 Km
Alfeu Cardoso	Vengo	Mavonde	130	1949	9 Km
António Toscano	Elvas	Mavonde	900	1949	7 Km
Sociedade Predial do Vumba	Vumba	Manica	787	1951	10 Km
Bernardino José Carvalho	Águas Frescas	Manica	770	1952	12 Km
Manuel da Costa Campos	Jécua	Manica	800	1952	8 Km
Manuel Agonia N. Gomes	Vila Manica	Manica	15	1952	1 Km
Laurinda Casais Lopes	Vila Manica	Manica	11	1953	2 Km
António Henriques de Matos	Vila Manica	Manica	6.5	1954	1 Km
António Tavares	Vengo	Mavonde	4,500	1954	11 Km
Missão do Dombe	Dombe	Dombe	400	1955	235 Km
Domingos T. Magalhães	Dombe	Dombe	200	1957	245 Km
Joaquim V. M. de Carvalho	Tandara	Mavita	3,000	1957	32 Km
Arlindo Viriato	Inharimba	Mavita	346	1958	54 Km
António de Paiva Roda	Inharimba	Mavita	375	1958	56 Km
Joaquim Dimas Fachadas	Inharimba	Mavita	498	1958	58 Km
João M. Bernardino	Nhamezara	Mavita	210	1959	75 Km
João Mendes	Nhamezara	Mavita	210	1959	76 Km
José Duarte Lourenço	Revué	Manica	300	1959	10 Km
Álvara Ribeiro	Nhamezara	Mavita	210	1959	77 Km
António Fernandes Aguiar	Chirara	Manica	2,050	1959	25 Km
Manuel da Costa Santos	Munene	Manica	180	1960	11 Km
Dr. Fernandes Lisboa e Abílio de Jesus Antunes	Inhamucarara	Manica	497	1961	22 Km

Source: AHM - ISANI, Cx 52: Relatório da inspecção ordinária ao concelho de Manica, 1962.





Chart 3. African workers in Southern Rhodesia, 1926-1938




Chart 4. Migrant labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1929-1938





Chart 5. African workers in Southern Rhodesia, 1940-1952



Appendix 4. Source: NAZ-S482/224/39/1 (Tables 1-3)
 AHM-FNI, CX 108 (Table 4)

Table 1: African workers on farms, 1927-1938

BY 31ST DECEMBER	LOCAL	FOREIGNERS	TOTAL
1927	49,097	34,888	83,985
1928	38,315	32,622	70,937
1929	37,159	32,544	69,703
1930	36,197	31,740	67,837
1931	35,914	30,887	66,801
1932	38,849	33,381	72,230
1933	40,224	37,243	77,467
1934	38,691	44,819	83,520
1935	37,306	44,198	81,404
1936	35,143	45,661	80,804
1937	38,998	48,879	87,877
1938	41,074	50,977	92,051

Table 2: African workers on mines, 1930-1938

BY 31ST DECEMBER	LOCAL	FOREIGNERS	TOTAL
1930	11,664	33,698	45,342
1931	8,305	26,897	35,202
1932	9,443	26,607	36,050
1933	14,390	33,879	48,269
1934	19,266	43,073	62,339
1935	21,942	54,284	76,226
1936	23,597	60,495	84,092
1937	23,770	66,830	90,600
1938	22,824	65,023	87,847



Appendix 4: Source: NAZ-S482/224/39/1 (Tables 1-3)
AHM-FNI, CX 108 (Table 4)

Table 3: African workers in Southern Rhodesia, 1926-1938

YEAR	LOCAL	FOREIGNERS	TOTAL
1926	80,538	94,642	175,180
1927	82,750	97,184	179,934
1928	83,241	94,613	177,854
1929	72,306	90,683	162,989
1930	68,238	88,484	156,716
1931	68,379	95,883	164,262
1932	72,547	84,666	157,213
1933	75,182	101,345	176,527
1934	79,116	104,963	184,079
1935	83,638	120,984	204,622
1936	87,659	133,758	221,417
1937	94,646	149,040	243,686
1938	96,786	138,974	255,760

Table 4: African workers entering Southern Rhodesia, 1940-1952

YEAR	NYASALAND	NORTHERN RHODESIA	MOZAMBIQUE
1940	18,777	14,000	29,000
1941	27,054	14,861	31,940
1942	17,734	12,435	31,257
1943	21,659	12,923	33,308
1944	27,884	12,360	40,996
1945	24,999	10,731	36,133
1946	22,160	11,990	34,281
1947	21,828	10,921	33,558
1948	17,392	11,008	33,267
1949	19,477	10,798	52,398
1950	19,381	9,573	38,192
1951	30,063	12,337	56,221
1952	39,340	13,966	52,892